The Michael Heller’s article entitled “How is philosophy in science possible?” was originally published in Polish in 1986 and then translated into English by Bartosz Brożek and Aeddan Shaw and published in 2011 in the collection of essays entitled Philosophy in Science. Methods and Applications. This seminal paper has founded further growth of the ‘philosophy in science’ and become the reference point in the methodological discussions, especially in Poland. On the 40th anniversary of Philosophical Problems in Science we wanted to (...) make this paper freely available to the international public by reprinting its English version. In this issue it is followed by two additional articles-commentaries. (shrink)

'The infinite! No other question has ever moved so profoundly the spirit of man; no other idea has so fruitfully stimulated his intellect; yet no other concept stands in greater need of clarification than that of the infinite.' David Hilbert (1862-1943). This interdisciplinary study of infinity explores the concept through the prism of mathematics and then offers more expansive investigations in areas beyond mathematical boundaries to reflect the broader, deeper implications of infinity for human intellectual thought. More than a dozen (...) world-renowned researchers in the fields of mathematics, physics, cosmology, philosophy, and theology offer a rich intellectual exchange among various current viewpoints, rather than a static picture of accepted views on infinity. The book starts with a historical examination of the transformation of infinity from a philosophical and theological study to one dominated by mathematics. It then offers technical discussions on the understanding of mathematical infinity. Following this, the book considers the perspectives of physics and cosmology: Can infinity be found in the real universe? Finally, the book returns to questions of philosophical and theological aspects of infinity"--Provided by publisher. (shrink)

We present a short account of the early history of the Center for Interdisciplinary Research in Cracow. These beginnings go back to the inter-war period when the tradition was established of close interactions between philosophers and scientists, especially physicists (Smoluchowski, Natanson). In the post-war period, under the communist regime, this tradition was continued at the Theological Institute (later the Pontifical Academy of Theology) in Cracow, erected by Cardinal Wojtyła, the then archbishop of Cracow, after the Theological Faculty had been removed (...) from the Jagiellonian University by the communists. The collaboration of the Cracow Center with the Catholic University of Lublin and with the Warsaw Academy of Theology is briefly described, and the style of philosophy in Cracow presented. (shrink)

Recenzja książki: Elaine Landry, _Categories for the Working Philosopher_, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2017, ss. xiv+471.

Physical theories give us the best available information about what there exists. Although physics is not ontology, it can be ontologically interpreted. In the present study, I propose to interpret physical theories à la Quine, i.e. not to speculate about what really exists, but rather to identify what a given physical theory presupposes that exists. I briefly suggest how Quine’s program should by adapted to this goal. To put the idea to the test, I apply it to the famous Hartle–Hawking (...) model of the quantum creation of the universe from nothing, and try to discover what kind of nothingness the model presupposes. I also make some remarks concerning ontological commitments of the method of physics itself. (shrink)

The issue of infinity appeared in cosmology in the form of a question on spatial and time finiteness or infinity of the universe. Recently, more and more talking is going on about “other universes” (different ones from “our”), the number of which may be infinite. Speculations on this topic emerged in effect of the discussions on the issue of the anthropic principle, and the so-called inflation scenario. In truth, this kind of speculations are hardly recognized as scientific theories, however, they (...) may be included in a sort of “scientific fringe” fulfilling a beneficial heuristic function.All of the speculations regarding numerous universes boil down to the juggling of probabilities, i.e. to the applying of the theory of probability to the universes’ set. However, without probabilistic measure being introduced onto this “set” (as it is not known whether it is a set in a technical sense of this term)—and there is no knowledge at all as to how to do this—such considerations may not go beyond a vague intuition.The producing of other universes usually results from an assumption that the disturbing of original circumstances, of values of physical constants, or of other parameters characterizing the universe is possible. On the other hand, the idea of the final theory seems to assume that the mathematical structure of this theory should be rigid, i.e. that the disturbing of its parameters leads on to the very same structure. This would have eliminated the possibility of the existence of other universes.The idea of infinite number of universes sometimes has an anti-theological undertone: there is no need for assuming purposeful acting of the Creator, since all possibilities are fulfilled. The reaction of a theologian may be as follows: Just the same, God may create just a single universe, as much as an infinite number of universes. What’s more, one may risk saying that God is not interested in nothing that may be short of infinity. (shrink)

The interaction between syntax and its semantics is one which has been well studied in categorical logic. The results of this particular study are employed to understand how the brain is able to create meanings. To emphasize the toy character of the proposed model, we prefer to speak of the homunculus brain rather than the brain per se. The homunculus brain consists of neurons, each of which is modeled by a category, and axons between neurons, which are modeled by functors (...) between the corresponding neuron-categories. Each neuron has its own program enabling its working, i.e. a theory of this neuron. In analogy to what is known from categorical logic, we postulate the existence of a pair of adjoint functors, called Lang and Syn, from a category, now called BRAIN, of categories, to a category, now called MIND, of theories. Our homunculus is a kind of “mathematical robot”, the neuronal architecture of which is not important. Its only aim is to provide us with the opportunity to study how such a simple brain-like structure could “create meanings” and perform abstraction operations out of its purely syntactic program. The pair of adjoint functors Lang and Syn model the mutual dependencies between the syntactical structure of a given theory of MIND and the internal logic of its semantics given by a category of BRAIN. In this way, a formal language and its meanings are interwoven with each other in a manner corresponding to the adjointness of the functors Lang and Syn. Higher cognitive functions of abstraction and realization of concepts are also modelled by a corresponding pair of adjoint functors. The categories BRAIN and MIND interact with each other with their entire structures and, at the same time, these very structures are shaped by this interaction. (shrink)

This ground-breaking collection of essays tackles the philosophical issues at play in cosmology, physics, mathematics, and neuroscience. The book considers topics such as the presence of ontology in cosmological theory and physics. It also weighs the philosophical issues connected with mathematical method, the neuroscience of emotions, and evolutionary anthropology. The contributions look at structuralism in the Platonic philosophy of science and the issue of knowledge and faith. This book is a must read for anyone interested in the philosophy of science (...) and the increasingly blurred borders between the two. (shrink)

The paper contains a comment on the criticism of the author's book Początek jest wszędzie (Prószynski i S-ka, 2002) by Marek Lagosz ("Przegląd Filozoficzny - Nowa Seria, 14, 2005, 121-133). The comment focuses on the following issues: (1) the conception of philosophy of physics; (2) some methodological questions, especially the role of models in physics; (3) some explanations concerning the model proposed by the present author and his coworkers. A few "ideological remarks" are also made.

Zaproponowano, by Quine’a kryterium istnienia (teoria zakłada istnienie zmiennych związanych) rozszerzyć na matematyczne struktury. W duchu tego kryterium każdą matematyczną strukturę można uważać za oddzielny świat, w którym istnieją tylko te byty, bez zakładania których struktura straciłaby sens. Niektóre matematyczne światy są używane przez fizyków do modelowania rzeczywistego świata. W takiej sytuacji ontologia danej struktury matematycznej przenosi się na fizyczny świat. Mówiąc bardziej prozaicznie, niektóre matematyczne struktury interpretuje się jako struktury fizycznego świata. Cud rozumienia świata sprowadza się do cudu tej (...) interpretacji. (shrink)

The issue of infinity appeared in cosmology in the form of a question on spatial and time finiteness or infinity of the universe. Recently, more and more talking is going on about “other universes” (different ones from “our”), the number of which may be infinite. Speculations on this topic emerged in effect of the discussions on the issue of the anthropic principle, and the so-called inflation scenario. In truth, this kind of speculations are hardly recognized as scientific theories, however, they (...) may be included in a sort of “scientific fringe” fulfilling a beneficial heuristic function.All of the speculations regarding numerous universes boil down to the juggling of probabilities, i.e. to the applying of the theory of probability to the universes’ set. However, without probabilistic measure being introduced onto this “set” (as it is not known whether it is a set in a technical sense of this term)—and there is no knowledge at all as to how to do this—such considerations may not go beyond a vague intuition.The producing of other universes usually results from an assumption that the disturbing of original circumstances, of values of physical constants, or of other parameters characterizing the universe is possible. On the other hand, the idea of the final theory seems to assume that the mathematical structure of this theory should be rigid, i.e. that the disturbing of its parameters leads on to the very same structure. This would have eliminated the possibility of the existence of other universes.The idea of infinite number of universes sometimes has an anti-theological undertone: there is no need for assuming purposeful acting of the Creator, since all possibilities are fulfilled. The reaction of a theologian may be as follows: Just the same, God may create just a single universe, as much as an infinite number of universes. What’s more, one may risk saying that God is not interested in nothing that may be short of infinity. (shrink)

Physics is inseparably connected with western philosophy. From the seventieth century, physics began to play the role similar to that of ontology. Moreover, many notions and problems moved from philosophy to physics. That way it came into being something that is now called „philosophy in physics”. It means that some traditional philosophical questions, like for example the problem of individualization, emerge in physics in a new, exact and mathematical form. Therefore, physics will in the future become gradually philosophy.

Book review: K. Chamcham, J. Silk, J.D. Barrow, S. Saunders, The Philosophy of Cosmology, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2017, pp. XII + 514.

Recenzja książki: Bogdan Dembiński, _Stara Akademia Platona. W początkach epoki hellenistycznej _, Wydawnictwo Marek Derewiecki, Kęty 2018, s. 183.