It is meet and right that pride and humility should be the two human characteristics on which University sermons have to be preached. Left to myself, although I might have picked on my modesty as something I should share with you, I should have given the preeminence to other among my sins than pride. My greed, my sloth, my avarice or, in this salacious age my lust, are subjects on which I could tell you much that might interest you. Pride (...) lacks immediate appeal. We are not sure what it is, or whether it is a bad thing, when we think of it in purely individual terms. But when we consider it collectively, we can see that it is, together with humility, something Oxford is peculiarly well qualified to preach on. We all of us are proud of our university. We were proud, and our schoolmasters were proud, when we first got our places here. We are, dons and undergraduates alike, proud of our colleges, each grateful that good fortune has brought him to the best college in Oxford, and anxious that everyone else should secretly acknowledge it to be the best. Our parents were proud when we took our degrees, and although we profess to be unconcerned with classes, we are deeply content to record our firsts when occasion requires us to do so, or have our contemporaries allude to them as opportunity offers. We are studious, as dons, not to pull rank, safe in the knowledge that others will do it for us, and that we shall receive the deference due to a fellow of an Oxford college. In an age that is egalitarian in theory but elitist at heart, Oxford men have benefited greatly, as other forms of social eminence have been eroded, leaving a clear field for our own claims to public esteem, which are, if not entirely unchallenged, still generally allowed. Oxford is, as we like to be told by outsiders, a centre of excellence, and a lot of the resplendence rubs off on us, not altogether undeservedly. It is, as we corporately admit on Commemoration Sunday, largely due to our having entered into other men's labours.. (shrink)

I must start with an apologia. My original paper, ``Minds, Machines and Gödel'', was written in the wake of Turing's 1950 paper in Mind, and was intended to show that minds were not Turing machines. Why, then, didn't I couch the argument in terms of Turing's theorem, which is easyish to prove and applies directly to Turing machines, instead of Gödel's theorem, which is horrendously difficult to prove, and doesn't so naturally or obviously apply to machines? The reason was that (...) Gödel's theorem gave me something more: it raises questions of truth which evidently bear on the nature of mind, whereas Turing's theorem does not; it shows not only that the Gödelian well-formed formula is unprovable-in-the-system, but that it is true. It shows something about reasoning, that it is not completely rule-bound, so that we, who are rational, can transcend the rules of any particular logistic system, and construe the Gödelian well-formed formula not just as a string of symbols but as a proposition which is true. Turing's theorem might well be applied to a computer which someone claimed to represent a human mind, but it is not so obvious that what the computer could not do, the mind could. But it is very obvious that we have a concept of truth. Even if, as was claimed in a previous paper, it is not the summum bonum, it is a bonum, and one it is characteristic of minds to value. A representation of the human mind which could take no account of truth would be inherently implausible. Turing's theorem, though making the same negative point as Gödel's theorem, that some things cannot be done by even idealised computers, does not make the further positive point that we, in as much as we are rational agents, can do that very thing that the computer cannot. I have however, sometimes wondered whether I could not construct a parallel argument based on Turing's theorem, and have toyed with the idea of a von Neumann machine. A von Neumann machine was a black box, inside which was housed John von Neumann.. (shrink)

Fragmenta Herculanensia - Fragmenta Herculanensia: A descriptive catalogue of the Oxford copies of the Herculanean rolls, together with the texts of several papyri, accompanied by facsimiles. Edited, with introduction and notes, by Walter Scott, M.A., Fellow of Merton College, Oxford. Clarendon Press, 1885. 21s. - Volume 1 Issue 7.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Eleventh General Meeting of the International Thomas Merton SocietyNazareth College, Rochester, New York, USA, 11–14 June 2009Christine BochenThe Eleventh General Meeting of the International Thomas Merton Society was held 11–14 June 2009 at Nazareth College, Rochester, New York. The theme, “Bearing Witness to the Light: Merton’s Challenge to a Fragmented World,” invited presenters and participants to explore ways in which Thomas Merton serves (...) as a model of creative interreligious dialogue and witnesses to its importance in building a world in which the dignity of every person is respected and nurtured.General session speakers explored Buddhist, Christian, Muslim, and Hindu dimensions of Merton’s life and writings. They included Judith Simmer-Brown; James Connor, OCSO; Herbert Mason; and Rachel Fell McDermott. In addition to Judith Simmer-Brown’s presentation, “Profile of a Trappist Yogi: A Tibetan Buddhist Perspective,” and Rachel Fell McDermott’s presentation, “Why Zen Buddhism and Not Hinduism? The Asias of Thomas Merton’s Voyage East,” concurrent sessions focused on Merton and Buddhism, Merton and Zen Buddhism, and Merton and Thich Nhat Hanh.An exhibit of Merton’s photographs, “A Hidden Wholeness: The Zen Photography of Thomas Merton,” on loan from the Thomas Merton Center and Archives at Bellarmine University in Louisville, Kentucky, was on display during the meeting and through the summer in the Nazareth College library. [End Page 195]Christine BochenNazareth CollegeCopyright © 2010 University of Hawai‘i Press... (shrink)

Forty-three years ago Max Weber observed that “the belief in the value of scientific truth is not derived from nature but is a product of definite cultures.” We may now add: and this belief is readily transmuted into doubt or disbelief. The persistent development of science occurs only in societies of a certain order, subject to a peculiar complex of tacit presuppositions and institutional constraints. What is for us a normal phenomenon which demands no explanation and secures many ‘self-evident’ cultural (...) values, has been in other times and still is in many places abnormal and infrequent. The continuity of science requires the active participation of interested and capable persons in scientific pursuits. This support of science is assured only by appropriate cultural conditions. It is, then, important to examine those controls which motivate scientific careers, which select and give prestige to certain scientific disciplines and reject or blur others. It will become evident that changes in institutional structure may curtail, modify or possibly prevent the pursuit of science. (shrink)

An axiomatization of the theory is presented based on an explication of the 1957 text. Twenty-five theorems are deduced from the seven postulates. An abstract test space for the theory is formulated and the operations for its practical testing discussed. Traditional experimentation with the theory seems generally concerned with few of its propositions and incapable of testing it.

One style of conducting scientific research involves the application of theoretical propositions to an empirical domain under investigation. The investigator plans his research in terms of the theoretical propositions and states his findings in these terms as well. We wish to examine not the merits of this style of research but a difficulty inherent in it. The difficulty concerns what is to be done when disconfirmative results are produced by some discrete study or experiment in the course of such research.

On this occasion, I shall try to respond to the suggestions that I report what it was like to be a graduate student at Harvard in the early 1930s engaged in writing a dissertation which took the shape in print of the monograph, Science, Technology and Society in Seventeenth-Century England. This, quite some time before the sociology of science had emerged with a cognitive and social identity. I shall not attempt an account – let alone an explanatory account – of (...) the micro-environment at Harvard back then that provided local context for that study. Indeed, I suspect that the Gerald Holton, Everett Mendelsohn and Arnold Thackray reconstructions come closer to the intellectual and social reality of that time and place than anything I might reconstruct. (shrink)

Although the application of social science to practical problems of policy and action is still in its early stages, a large body of experience has been accumulated. Social science has been applied, in diverse spheres and with diverse results. The experience is there, but it has not been systematically reviewed and codified. Consequently, no one knows the present status of applied social science or, more importantly, its potentialities.

The spiritual and psychological insights of these essays were nurtured in a monastic milieu, but their issues are universally human. Merton lays a foundation for personal growth and transformation through fidelity to "our own truth and inner being." His main focus is our desire and need to attain "a fully human and personal identity." This classic is a newly restored and corrected edition and the inaugural volume of _Gethsemani Studies_, a series of books that explores, through the twin perspectives (...) of psychology and religion, the dynamics and depths of being fully human. (shrink)