A fictional text is commonly viewed as constituting an invitation to play a certain game of make-believe, with the individual sentences written by the author providing the propositions we are to imagine and/or accept as true within the fiction. However, we can’t always take the text at face value. What narratologists call ‘unreliable narrators’ may present a confused or misleading picture of the fictional world. Meanwhile there has been a debate in philosophy about so-called ‘imaginative resistance’ in which we are (...) inclined to resist imagining (or even accepting as true in the fiction) what’s explicitly stated in the text. But if we can’t take the text’s word for it, how do we determine what’s true in a fiction? We propose an account of fiction interpretation in a dynamic setting (a version of DRT with a mechanism for opening, updating, and closing temporary ‘workspaces’) and combine this framework with belief revision logic. With these tools in hand we turn to modelling imaginative resistance and unreliable narrators. (shrink)

The main aim of this dissertation is to model the different ways in which we use language when we engage with fiction. This main aim subdivides itself into a number of puzzles. We all know that dragons do not exist. Yet, when I read the Harry Potter novels, I do accept the existence of dragons. How do we keep such fictional truths separate from ‘ordinary’ non-fictional truths? What is the difference between Tolkien writing down all sorts of falsities, and a (...) liar who also says all sorts of untrue things? How can it be true that Frodo was born in the Shire while it is also true that he was invented by Tolkien? Given that a fiction such as Pride and Prejudice is not about the actual world, how can I learn things about 19th century etiquette in England by reading this novel? -/- I develop a coherent semantic analysis of these different puzzles: the ‘workspace account’. This theory is an extension of Stalnaker’s famous pragmatic ‘common ground’ framework. In this framework, assertions are modelled as proposals to update the ‘common ground’ (the set of shared assumptions) between conversational interlocutors. (shrink)

I investigate statements in fiction that ‘break the fourth wall’ (i.e. statements through which a fictional character somehow acknowledges the fictionality of their world) and suggest that they are a mirror image of ‘parafictional statements’—that is, reports on what is true in some fiction. I explore two possible analyses, according to which statements that break the fourth wall are either a type of fictional statement, or are a type of metafictional statement, and propose a synthesis of these two analyses. I (...) discuss how the proposed analysis relates to different interpretative strategies for dealing with inconsistency in fiction and discuss several potential counterexamples to the proposed analysis. (shrink)

Semanticists and philosophers of fiction that formulate analyses of reports on the content of media—or ‘contensive statements’—of the form ‘In/According to _s_, \(\phi \) ’, usually treat the ‘In _s_’-operator (_In_) and the ‘According to _s_’-operator (_Acc_) on a par. I argue that _In_ and _Acc_ require separate semantic analyses based on three clusters of linguistic observations: (1) preferences for _In_ or _Acc_ in contensive statements about fictional or non-fictional media, (2) preferences for _In_ or _Acc_ in contensive statements about (...) implicit or explicit content and (3) tense preferences in contensive statements with _In_ and _Acc_. To account for these three observations I propose to adopt Lewis’s possible world analysis for contensive statements with _In_ and to analyse contensive statements with _Acc_ as indirect speech reports. (shrink)

Pretend play is generally considered to be a developmental landmark in Theory of Mind acquisition. The aim of the present paper is to offer a new account of the role of pretend play in Theory of Mind development. To this end I combine Hutto and Gallagher’s account of social cognition development with Matravers’ recent argument that the cognitive processes involved in engagement with narratives are neutral regarding fictionality. The key contribution of my account is an analysis of pretend play as (...) interaction with fictions. I argue that my account offers a better explanation of existing empirical data on the development of children’s pretend play and Theory of Mind than the competing theories from Leslie, Perner and Harris. (shrink)

On Walton’s account of make-believe, unknown facts concerning the existence and nature of props can influence fictional truth. Inspired by Lewis’s and Walton’s discussions of import of fictional truth, I explore the shape and tenability of an alternative account that avoids such interference of unknown facts, by making fictional truth rely on participants’ _common beliefs_ about props: conditional principles of generation are only valid if they quantify over props whose existence and nature is common belief between participants of the game (...) of make-believe. I discuss two possible objections to the proposed account that are both based on the intuition that fictional truth should be something that is objective and independent of participants’ mental states. (shrink)

This paper introduces Matraversian skepticism from aesthetics (i.e., there is no _cognitively_ interesting difference between our engagement with fiction versus our engagement with non-fiction) to debates in psychology and cognitive science on memory processing. I argue that the concept of ‘fiction’ has no place in our cognitive models of memory, neither in a specific category of memory, nor as a fact/fiction dimension. I propose a two-stage model of memory processing and explore the skeptical challenge that it poses to existing accounts (...) of the role of the concept of ‘fiction’ in models of memory. An important element of this challenge is the realization that remembering agents typically recognize a range of different kinds of non-fictional, non-believed memories, e.g., memories originating in lies, trickery, dreams, hallucinations, illusions, etc. (shrink)

Traditional definitions of common ground in terms of iterative de re attitudes do not apply to conversations where at least one conversational participant is not acquainted with the other(s). I propose and compare two potential refinements of traditional definitions based on Abelard’s distinction between generality in sensu composito and in sensu diviso.