This book explores the role of causal constraints in science, shifting our attention from causal relations between individual events--the focus of most philosophical treatments of causation--to a broad family of concepts and principles generating constraints on possible change. Yemima Ben-Menahem looks at determinism, locality, stability, symmetry principles, conservation laws, and the principle of least action-causal constraints that serve to distinguish events and processes that our best scientific theories mandate or allow from those they rule out. Ben-Menahem's approach reveals (...) that causation is just as relevant to explaining why certain events fail to occur as it is to explaining events that do occur. She investigates the conceptual differences between, and interrelations of, members of the causal family, thereby clarifying problems at the heart of the philosophy of science. Ben-Menahem argues that the distinction between determinism and stability is pertinent to the philosophy of history and the foundations of statistical mechanics, and that the interplay of determinism and locality is crucial for understanding quantum mechanics. Providing historical perspective, she traces the causal constraints of contemporary science to traditional intuitions about causation, and demonstrates how the teleological appearance of some constraints is explained away in current scientific theories such as quantum mechanics. (shrink)

Politychna sot︠s︡ializat︠s︡ii︠a︡: radi︠a︡nsʹka sim'i︠a︡ i radi︠a︡nsʹka shkola -- I︠A︡k navchalysi︠a︡ miz︠h︡narodnyky v stolyt︠s︡i URSR -- U "Sektori problem ideolohichnoï borotʹby": "Perebudova" v kraïni ta Instytut istoriï -- Vidnovlenni︠a︡ Mohyli︠a︡nky, hazeta "Denʹ" i staz︠h︡uvanni︠a︡ zakordonom -- 'Bahatoviktorna polityka": Pomarancheva revoli︠u︡t︠s︡ii︠a︡ i povernenni︠a︡ I︠A︡nukovycha -- I︠E︡vromaĭdan - Revoli︠u︡t︠s︡ii︠a︡ hidnosti -- Front i "hibrydna viĭna" v tylu -- Vyklyky transformat︠s︡iï ta "Zelena khvyli︠a︡": Shcho dali? -- Zamistʹ pisli︠a︡movy: optymizm vid Bohdana Horyni︠a︡.

Passer en revue les conceptions de la maladie qui s’expriment dans la tradition juive est une entreprise risquée et qui – l’auteur de ces lignes en a fait maintes fois l’expérience – expose le théologien de service qui a accepté d’en traiter ex cathedra aux tirs de barrage de ceux-là même, spécialistes d’autres disciplines, qui l’ont prié de le faire. Je prends donc ce risque, non sans demander au lecteur de faire preuve de cette disposition favorable du cœur et de (...) cette humilité de l’esprit, sans lesquelles l’écoute de l’autre n’est que politesse formelle, ou concession momentanée de parole de la part d’un interlocuteur qui n’a un instant endigué le fleuve de ses certitudes que pour les déverser ensuite sur l’imprudent que vous êtes, dès qu’il estimera que vous avez épuisé vos chances de le convaincre. À l’instar de son collègue chrétien, et peut-être avec plus de rigueur, le théologien juif est confronté à un dilemme. D’une part, conscient de l’auguste dignité de l’être humain, créé à l’image de Dieu, mais aussi de sa faiblesse et des difficultés de sa condition incarnée, il voudrait passionnément parler de Lui à ses semblables, leur dire ce qu’il attend d’eux, en termes que chacun et chacune puissent comprendre et accepter. Par ailleurs, s’il n’est pas lui-même dévoyé ou démagogue, il sait que ce Dieu, dont il s’efforce d’exposer les voies et les exigences, agit et s’exprime souvent de manière tellement déconcertante, à vue humaine, que le simple énoncé de ses actions et de ses paroles, telles qu’elles sont relatées dans les Écritures, risque de scandaliser les esprits les mieux disposés. Dieu ne dit-il pas lui-même (Ex 20, 5) : "Je suis un Dieu jaloux qui punis la faute des pères sur les enfants, les petits-enfants et les arrière-petits-enfants pour ceux qui me haïssent." Ou encore : (Dt 32, 35) : "À moi la vengeance et la rétribution, pour le temps où leur pied trébuchera…" Contrairement à une opinion très répandue, il ne s’agit pas là de conceptions vétérotestamentaires «totalement étrangères à l’Évangile d’amour de Jésus-Christ». En témoignent des passages néotestamentaires tels que ceux-ci : [C’est Jésus qui est censé parler (1), en faisant allusion au jugement eschatologique]: "Quant à mes ennemis, ceux qui n'ont pas voulu que je règne sur eux, amenez-les ici, et égorgez-les en ma présence." (Lc 19, 27). "Quand le Fils de l'homme viendra dans sa gloire, escorté de tous les anges, alors il prendra place sur son trône de gloire… Alors il dira encore à ceux de gauche: Allez loin de moi, maudits, dans le feu éternel qui a été préparé pour le diable et ses anges…" (Mt 25, 31-33; 41) À la lumière de cet aperçu, forcément sommaire, il est facile d’entrevoir que les réponses de l’Écriture et de la tradition juive au dramatique problème de la souffrance humaine, en général, et à celui de la maladie, en particulier, risquent d’être tout aussi dérangeantes, voire scandaleuses pour le croyant moyen. Je procéderai, ci-après, à un inventaire sommaire des conceptions relatives à la maladie, telles qu’elles s’expriment dans les écrits bibliques canoniques (I), dans le Nouveau Testament (II), et dans la littérature rabbinique des premiers siècles (III), en les illustrant par des textes de référence, choisis parmi ceux qui font autorité tant pour le judaïsme que pour le christianisme. Enfin, dans la dernière Partie de cette étude (IV), je brosserai, à grands traits, un panorama des opinions et des croyances des penseurs juifs orthodoxes, du Moyen Âge à l’époque moderne, et des comportements qu’ils préconisent face à la maladie et aux souffrances qui en découlent. Tenant compte du fait que, sauf exception, je m’adresse à un public non versé dans les sciences juives, j’ai choisi de donner à mon exposé un caractère plus descriptif que spéculatif. (shrink)

Recent models of psychopathology and psychotherapy highlight the importance of interpersonal factors. The current review offers a biological perspective on these interpersonal processes by examining inter-brain synchrony—the coupling of brain activity between people interacting with one another. High inter-brain synchrony is associated with better relationships in therapy and in daily life, while deficits in the ability to achieve inter-brain synchrony are associated with a variety of psychological and developmental disorders. The review suggests that therapy improves patients’ ability to achieve such (...) synchrony through inter-brain plasticity—a process by which recurring exposure to high inter-brain synchrony leads to lasting change in a person’s overall ability to synchronize. Therapeutic sessions provide repeated situations with high inter-brain synchrony. This can lead to a long-term increase in the ability to synchronize, first with the therapist, then generalized to other interpersonal relationships, ultimately leading to symptom reduction. The proposed inter-brain plasticity model offers a novel biological framework for understanding relational change in psychotherapy and its links to various forms of psychopathology and provides testable hypotheses for future research. Understanding this mechanism may help improve existing psychotherapy methods and develop new ones. (shrink)

In this book, I deal with some fundamental problems of the Hegelian dialectic. For this purpose, I take a middle course between total scepticism, which considers dialectic as a devastator sophistry with no respect even for the non-contradiction principle, and authoritarian dogmatism, which claims to solve any question with the magic wand of the Hegelian Aufhebung. That is, I decide to be critical, defining concepts anew, bringing out sources, determining conditions of possibility and fields of validity, accepting or rejecting when (...) necessary. Following G. R. G. Mure's thinking, from an inner point of view I examine whether, in carrying out his work, Hegel remains faithful to the different principles he proclaims, and I find substantial deviations. And, following W. Becker's thinking, from an external point of view, that is, from a formal, empirical or existential contemporary angle, I try to determine the extent to which we may legitimately talk about the fruitfulness of Hegelian dialectic. In this way, I reconstruct Hegel's thought so that it may become acceptable to us-readers of the twentieth-century-as intelligible and coherent as possible. I conclude that dialectic, as a logic of human reality, has to be grasped and expressed from the viewpoint of the particular historical individual, in constant interaction with the cultural environment of his or her time. Using this approach, I investigate the questions at issue from Hegel's Logic point of view. (shrink)

This article provides an analysis of the relationships between IVF and therapeutic cloning, as they played out in the UK Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority consultation of 2006: Donating Eggs for Research: Safeguarding Donors. We develop an account of current developments in IVF and cloning which foregrounds the role of mediation in structuring the discursive context in which they are constituted. We foreground the imperative of choice and the promise of cures as key features of this context. We also argue (...) that the intercorporeal exchanges of IVF are materially restructured in relation to cloning research, despite their represented similitude in the consultation document. The discourse of choice in relation to reproductive technologies has become entrenched over the last twenty years. In relation to therapeutic cloning, it has been coupled with, and strengthened by, the discourse of cures. In examining relations between IVF and cloning with specific attention to both mediating imaginaries, and intercorporeal exchanges, we develop an analysis that displaces the rhetoric of choice and cures. This makes visible the limited subject positions available, and the limited possibilities for responding critically to the consultation. Identifying women as the gendered subjects of this consultation and placing intercorporeality at the centre of our analysis illuminates the interdependency of women undergoing IVF, cloning science and the governance of embryo research in the UK. (shrink)

In Phaedo 115c-e Socrates scornfully rebukes Crito for enquiring how Socrates should be buried for Crito had not been persuaded by the previous arguments that burying Socrates’ body is not equal to burying Socrates. A parallel account is found in Aelian and Diogenes Laertius where Apollodorus is rebuked for attempting to persuade Socrates that he should be bothered how his remains would be clothed when laid out. Several scholars have suggested this should not be considered a copy of Plato but (...) an early proto-type written by one of his contemporaries with particular regard to Euclides of Megara. While this thesis has been criticized, further evidence will be examined in this article where the character of Apollodorus cites an unnamed Megarian examining this same argument but with conclusions different from those in Plato. Here the Megarian concludes that though the body may be separate from the soul we still show care and grief for the remains. The argument is both cogent and non-metaphysical in approach but characterized from a Socratic perspective. In the conclusions, I will attempt to reopen the case for a Euclidean origin of the Crito vignette in Phaedo 115c-e. (shrink)

The daring idea that convention - human decision - lies at the root both of necessary truths and much of empirical science reverberates through twentieth-century philosophy, constituting a revolution comparable to Kant's Copernican revolution. This book provides a comprehensive study of Conventionalism. Drawing a distinction between two conventionalist theses, the under-determination of science by empirical fact, and the linguistic account of necessity, Yemima Ben-Menahem traces the evolution of both ideas to their origins in Poincaré's geometric conventionalism. She argues that (...) the radical extrapolations of Poincaré's ideas by later thinkers, including Wittgenstein, Quine, and Carnap, eventually led to the decline of conventionalism. This book provides a fresh perspective on twentieth-century philosophy. Many of the major themes of contemporary philosophy emerge in this book as arising from engagement with the challenge of conventionalism. (shrink)

The daring idea that convention - human decision - lies at the root both of necessary truths and much of empirical science reverberates through twentieth-century philosophy, constituting a revolution comparable to Kant's Copernican revolution. This book provides a comprehensive study of Conventionalism. Drawing a distinction between two conventionalist theses, the under-determination of science by empirical fact, and the linguistic account of necessity, Yemima Ben-Menahem traces the evolution of both ideas to their origins in Poincaré's geometric conventionalism. She argues that (...) the radical extrapolations of Poincaré's ideas by later thinkers, including Wittgenstein, Quine, and Carnap, eventually led to the decline of conventionalism. This book provides a fresh perspective on twentieth-century philosophy. Many of the major themes of contemporary philosophy emerge in this book as arising from engagement with the challenge of conventionalism. (shrink)

The daring idea that convention - human decision - lies at the root of so-called necessary truths, on the one hand, and much of empirical science, on the other, reverberates through twentieth-century philosophy, constituting a revolution comparable to Kant's Copernican revolution. Conventionalism is the first comprehensive study of this radical turn. One of the conclusions it reaches is that the term 'truth by convention', widely held to epitomize conventionalism, reflects a misunderstanding that has led to the association of conventionalism with (...) relativism and postmodernism. Conventionalism, this book argues, did not contend that truths can be stipulated, but rather, that stipulations are often confused with truths. Their efforts were thus directed toward disentangling truth and convention, not reducing truth to convention."--Jacket. (shrink)

In a situation in which several explanations compete, is the one that is better qua explanation also the one we should regard as the more likely to be true? Realists usually answer in the affirmative. They then go on to argue that since realism provides the best explanation for the success of science, realism can be inferred to. Nonrealists, on the other hand, answer the above question in the negative, thereby renouncing the inference to realism. In this paper I separate (...) the two issues. In the first section it is argued that a rationale can be provided for the inference to the best explanation; in the second, that this rationale cannot justify an inference to realism. The defence of the inference rests on the claim that our standards of explanatory power are subject to critical examination, which, in turn, should be informed by empirical considerations. By means of a comparison of the realist's explanation for the success of science with that of conventionalism and instrumentalism it is then shown that realism does not offer a superior explanation and should not, therefore, be inferred to. (shrink)

The paper provides a new characterization of the concepts of necessity and contingency as they should be used in the historical context. The idea is that contingency (necessity) increases in direct (reverse) proportion to sensitivity to initial conditions. The merits of this suggestion are that it avoids the conflation of causality and necessity (or contingency and chance), that it enables the bracketing of the problem of free will while maintaining the concept of human action making a difference, that it sanctions (...) tendencies without recourse to teleology, and that it recasts the controversy between historicists and anti‐historicists in less dogmatic language. (shrink)

Socrates’ burial is dismissed as philosophically irrelevant in Phaedo 115c-e although it had previously been discussed by Plato’s older contemporaries. In Antisthenes’ Kyrsas dialogue describes a visit to Socrates’ tomb by a lover of Socrates who receives protreptic advice in a dream sequence while sleeping over Socrates’ grave. The dialogue is a metaphysical explanation of how Socrates’ spiritual message was continued after death. Plato underplays this metaphorical imagery by lampooning Antisthenes philosophy and his work (Phd. 81b-82e) and subsequently precludes him (...) from an active role in the Phaedo. A similar case is the exclusion of Euclides of Megara. Fragments of a lost Socratic dialogue depict Apollodorus citing an unnamed Megarian in order to justify care for the remains of the dead. Similar mistaken notions explain Kyrsas’ belief when he lusts after Socrates even though he was dead. In spite of these disputes, the philosophers (Euclides, Antisthenes and Plato) each attempted to present Socrates’ moral influence as a force that continued after his death and burial. (shrink)

Emch, G.G., Liu, C.: The Logic of Thermostatistical Physics. Springer, Berlin/ Heidelberg (2002) 11. Frigg, R., Werndl, C.: Entropy – a guide for the perplexed. Forthcoming in: Beisbart, C., Hartmann, S. (eds.) Probabilities in Physics. Oxford  ...

This paper offers an interpretation of Poincaré's conventionalism, distinguishing it from the Duhem–Quine thesis, on the one hand, and, on the other, from the logical positivist understanding of conventionalism as a general account of necessary truth. It also confronts Poincaré's conventionalism with some counter-arguments that have been influential: Einstein's (general) relativistic argument, and the linguistic rejoinders of Quine and Davidson. In the first section, the distinct roles played by the inter-translatability of different geometries, the inaccessibility of space to direct observation, (...) and general holistic considerations are identified. Together, they form a constructive argument for conventionalism that underscores the impact of fact on convention. The second section traces Poincaré's influence on the general theory of relativity and Einstein's ensuing ambivalence toward Poincaré. Lastly, it is argued that neither Quine nor Davidson has met the conventionalist challenge. (shrink)

This book subjects the traditional concept of law of nature to critical examination. There are two kinds of reasons that invite this reexamination, one deriving from philosophical concerns over the traditional concept, the other motivated by theoretical and practical changes in science. One of the philosophical worries is that the idiom of law of nature, especially when combined with the notion of laws 'governing' individual events and processes, is no longer as intelligible as it used to be in the theistic (...) context in which the formulation of laws became central to science. The traditional concept is also challenged in various ways by contemporary scientific theories such as quantum mechanics, chaos theory and the general theory of relativity. It is no longer clear that there are any universal laws, laws do not always guarantee predictability, and the border between physical and mathematical considerations is constantly shifting. The most difficult challenge, perhaps, is to come up with a scientific explanation of the origin of laws. Wrestling with these intriguing problems, the papers in this volume broaden both our understanding of the natural order and our desiderata of scientific explanation. (shrink)

This book provides a survey of the major issues in the philosophy of mathematics, such as ontological questions regarding the nature of mathematical objects, epistemic questions about the acquisition of mathematical knowledge, and the intriguing riddle of the applicability of mathematics to the physical world. Some of these issues go back to the nascent years of mathematics itself, others are just beginning to draw the attention of scholars. In addressing these questions, some of the papers in this volume wrestle with (...) them directly, while others use the writings of philosophers such as Hume and Wittgenstein to approach their problems by way of interpretation and critique. The contributors include prominent philosophers of science and mathematics as well as promising younger scholars. The volume seeks to share the concerns of philosophers of mathematics with a wider audience and will be of interest to historians, mathematicians and philosophers alike. (shrink)

Apollodorus' prelude to Pl. Symp. is a complex rejection of earlier accounts of Socrates' participation in a symposium. This can be examined contextually as a literary mannerism, or sub-textually as a rejection of previous literary versions of this topos. Neither approach contradicts the other, but scholars have found difficulties in finding any earlier author who could have been rejected. Recently, it has been argued that Xen. Symp. preceded Pl. Symp. acting as a catalyst for Plato's work. However, if neither was (...) the first on a sympotic theme in a Socratic dialogue, we need not presume that Apollodorus referred to Xenophon, but rather that both responded to an earlier author. Scholars suggest various candidates although none has been proven. However, one source has not attracted attention: two anecdotes recorded in PFlor 113 where Antisthenes depicts both Socrates and himself as critical of symposia in general. The conclusions of my paper are that the contents of these anecdotes can be seen as the raw kernel out of which both Xenophon and Plato could have responded. (shrink)