I introduce a middle route between giving a sharp definition and examples to explain what a thought experiment is. It comprises an account of the concept thought experiment that we can rightly apply to different extents. Three explanatory virtues of this account include (i) that we can use it to explain why one thing may seem to be less of a thought experiment than another, (ii) that it provides for a fine-grained explanation of the relation between literary fiction and thought (...) experiment and (iii) that we can use it to explain conflicting intuitions about whether certain literary fictions are thought experiments. (shrink)

In my dissertation, I develop a novel approach to thought experiments and literary learning. It’s novel primarily because, unlike many prominent approaches, it has us refrain from advancing theories, from giving logical analyses, and from explicating. We are, instead, to proceed in a way inspired by Wittgenstein’s writings. We are, that is, to clarify words that give rise to problems and to clear those problems away. To clarify words, we may compare language games in which figure terms like “thought experiment.” (...) Thereby, we might see that the concept these terms express has a family resemblance character. To clear away problems, we may describe how such a concept, if not illuminated, yields philosophical problems about thought experiments and literary learning. -/- After I develop this approach, I bring it to bear on two problems, and I achieve two main results. One problem concerns the nature of thought experiments. It is: Why do we have trouble explaining what we know them to be? I find that, despite appearances, we have no such trouble. Central to this result are two claims about thought experiments. One is that imaginings aren’t common to them. The other is that our unreflective concept of them has a family resemblance character. -/- The other problem concerns stories in works of literary fiction. It is: How could we possibly learn about the world from them? To solve it, you might claim that we learn by performing thought experiments, and then appeal to a theory of them. I find that you’d risk explaining the wrong thing. That is, you may well explain only how we learn—not how we do so from literature itself. Central to this result are three claims, which concern how these stories differ from thought experiments. They differ, I claim, (i) in how we count imaginings as experiences of them, (ii) in how free we are to interpret them, and (iii) in how complex they may be. This done, I’ve twice taken my novel approach and achieved results. (shrink)

This essay presents a trinitarian alternative to anthropologically-centered forms of Spiritual formation. As such it argues that what is commonly practiced is a “subjective moral formation,” and what is proposed as a solution or antidote to this is an “objective trinitarian participation.” Christologically anemic versions of anthropologically-centered Spiritual formation are examined and contrasted against an approach grounded in a christological ontology. It contends that the critical question for any Spiritual formation framework, practice, or system must be, “What work does the (...) ascended incarnate Christ do in this description of the Christian life?” It argues that Spiritual formation is most properly understood through the dynamic trinitarian lens of participation in the Son’s relation with the Father through the Spirit. Central to this approach is the restoration of the role of the living, ascended Christ as primary agent in the life of the Christian. The work of Thomas F. Torrance serves as a guide for this latter position and is shown to be a valuable resource in both grounding and furthering the conversation on contemporary ecclesial practices of Spiritual formation. (shrink)

With a focus on Works of Love, this book argues that for Kierkegaard the living of the life of faith and love is a kind of art, involving skillful attention to the specificity of the episodes in an individual's life, and the creative imagining of new ways of enacting these virtues.

Discusses Soren Kierkegaard's use of irrationality in his pseudonymous writings to bolster important truths about rationality.

Readings of the Vessantara Jātaka. Edited with an introduction by Steven Collins. Columbia Readings of Buddhist Literature. New York: Columbia University Press, 2016. Pp. x + 216. $90 ; $30 ; $29.99.

There have been recent concerns about an “epidemic of loneliness” during the pandemic, given the pervasiveness of loneliness in the population and its harmful effects on health and well-being. Therefore, it is important to establish the correlates of loneliness. The purpose of the current study was to explore how loneliness relates to a construct termed mattering, which is the feeling of being important to other people. Mattering was assessed with multiple measures in the current study (e.g., mattering in general, fears (...) of not mattering, and mattering to peers). A sample of 172 female psychology undergraduate students aged 18–25 years completed self-report measures of general mattering, mattering to peers, anti-mattering, fear of not mattering, and state and trait loneliness. As predicted, lower levels of both general mattering and mattering to peers were associated with higher state loneliness. Higher feelings of anti-mattering (feelings of being invisible and insignificant to others) and fears of not mattering were associated with greater trait loneliness, as well as a reduced sense of mattering to friends. The findings illustrate that feeling as though one does not matter to others (i.e., feeling insignificant and unimportant) is associated with increased state and trait loneliness among young women. Implications are discussed for loneliness theory and how these results can enhance both clinical understanding and practice. (shrink)

The COVID-19 pandemic is negatively impacting people’s mental health worldwide. The current study examined the effects of COVID-19 lockdown on adult women’s eating, body image, and social media habits. Furthermore, we compared individuals with and without signs of orthorexia nervosa, a proposed eating disorder. Participants were 143 women, aged 17–73 years, recruited during a COVID-19 lockdown in Canada from May-June 2020. Participants completed self-report questionnaires on their eating, body image, and social media habits during the pandemic. The Eating Habits Questionnaire (...) assessed symptoms of orthorexia nervosa. Compared to the period prior to lockdown, women with higher total orthorexia nervosa scores reported eating a lot more than usual, feeling greater pressure to diet and lose weight, thinking about food more often than usual, experiencing greater weight gain, and perceiving more pressure from social media specifically to lose weight and to exercise, compared to their healthy counterparts. We examined associations between individual EHQ subscales and perceived changes to eating and weight. Women who scored high on EHQ-Problems reported seeing more weight loss content on their social media than those who reported fewer orthorexia nervosa symptoms. Conversely, those who scored low on EHQ-Feelings reported feeling a lot less pressure to lose weight, somewhat less or a lot less pressure to lose weight or to exercise from social media specifically, and trended toward less laxative use during lockdown, compared to those who scored higher on orthorexia nervosa. And those who scored low on EHQ-Knowledge reported feeling somewhat less or a lot less pressure to lose weight than those who reported more orthorexia nervosa symptoms. Together, the findings suggest that women with symptoms of orthorexia nervosa are experiencing an exacerbation of disordered eating thoughts and behaviors during COVID-19, and that social media may be a contributing factor. (shrink)

Similar to parasites, malignant cells exploit the host for energy, resources and protection, thereby impairing host health and fitness. Although cancer is widespread in the animal kingdom, its impact on life history traits and strategies have rarely been documented. Devil facial tumour disease, a transmissible cancer, afflicting Tasmanian devils, provides an ideal model system to monitor the impact of cancer on host life-history, and to elucidate the evolutionary arms-race between malignant cells and their hosts. Here we provide an overview of (...) parasite-induced host life history adaptations, then both phenotypic plasticity of LH responses and changes in allele frequencies that affect LH traits of Tasmanian devils in response to DFTD are discussed. We conclude that akin to parasites, cancer can directly and indirectly affect devil LH traits and trigger host evolutionary responses. Consequently, it is important to consider oncogenic processes as a selective force in wildlife. Exposure to transmissible cancer cells, i.e., Tasmanian devil facial tumour cells, can cause changes to life history traits either as the result of phenotypic plasticity in response to exposure during the lifetime of the individual or as the result of evolutionary change in LH traits due to selection over generations.Photo credits: Frédéric Thomas, Sarah Peck, Geordie Jennings. (shrink)

My advocacy is teachers’ continuing professional growth, the practice and beliefs of which must be constantly fine-tuned with the school’s philosophy. One must purposely get out of the comfort zone to get a more philosophical view. I teach in a learner-centered school, which puts the learner at the center of the educative process. Some pedagogical techniques are recognized as more learner-centered than others, but other methods could be transformed as well. It helps to consult literatures on how to grow more (...) learner-centered. In this article, I share how I used McCombs and Miller’s attributes of learnercentered leaders and best teachers, and Blumberg’s model for transitioning to learner-centered instruction. I realize that I have yet to improve on sharing the responsibility in learning with my students. I anticipate pleasure and pain in shifting my beliefs on the boundary between teacher and students. The exercise demonstrates that the learner-centered mindset compels planning and adapting; preparing the classroom, lessons and instruction; and seeking new information and technology, all for making a teaching moment more helpful to each learner. For this reason, the learner-centered pedagogy contributes not only to the learner’s growth but also to the teacher’s growth in his or her own pedagogy. (shrink)

La filosofía de la comunicación del siglo XX aceptó, en términos generales, la teoría de la agenda-setting propuesta por McCombs y Shaw (1972). Esta teoría subrayaba la capacidad de los medios de comunicación de masas para configurar la comprensión que el gran público tiene de la realidad social (Wolf, 1987). Sin embargo, Internet y las redes sociales han cambiado radicalmente el panorama, puesto que los grandes medios de comunicación tradicionales van ahora a remolque de lo que es trending-topic en las (...) redes. Este artículo señala la necesidad de desarrollar una nueva filosofía de la comunicación, adaptada a la existencia de un nuevo marco (frame) tecnológico y social, que redefina los patrones y los factores que configuran actualmente la agenda pública (agenda-setting 2.0). (shrink)

Søren Kierkegaard (1813-1855) has often been cast as an irrationalist -- an enemy of reason, logic, and perhaps even truth. It is easy to see why. Some of his works encourage us to "crucify" our understanding or to take a leap of faith beyond the evidence.[1] We also encounter texts suggesting that passionate beliefs are more important than true ones.[2] Perhaps his most frequently read book, Fear and Trembling, lauds Abraham for following God's commands "by virtue of the absurd."[3] Finally, (...) a number of passages encourage us to accept "the absolute paradox" or "the contradiction" of the God-man, Jesus Christ.[4] Richard McCombs joins a growing chorus of scholars who reject this view. Indeed, there is something approaching a consensus among specialists that Kierkegaard is not as irrational as he appears. What sets McCombs apart is that he also defends a more ambitious thesis. In addition to downplaying the irrationality of Kierkegaard, he maintains that Kierkegaard is actually a "robustly rational thinker" (7). (shrink)