W artykule analizuję znaczenia, jakie można przypisać pojęciu i doświadczeniu obcości.Najpierw przypominam dwa opisy fenomenologiczne tego doświadczenia, z których wynika, iż już na tym abstrakcyjnym poziomiedoświadczenie obcości ma sens ambiwalentny: obcy może być doświadczany jako zagrożeniedla mojej podmiotowości, ale również jako wezwanie do jej pogłębienia. Następnie przyglądamsię bardziej empirycznym sposobom doświadczania obcości w świecie społeczno-politycznym,stawiając tezę, iż kryje się za nimi polityczna konstrukcjaobcości. Wreszcie pytam o moralny sens doświadczenia obcości, konkludując, że również natym poziomie jest to sens ambiwalentny: chociaż słuchanie (...) obcego można uznać za obowiązekmoralny, to moralnie dopuszczalne, a czasem konieczne jest również traktowanie go jakowroga w imię uniwersalnych wartości. (shrink)

By defining consciousness as nothingness or simply as “nothing,” Sartre plays with several meanings of these terms: negativity and negation, distance, indetermination, irreducibility. The nothingness of consciousness takes on an ontological meaning: it is a “tearing away” from being-in-itself, a transcendence understood as the capacity to transcend what is, while retaining an epistemological meaning: it is what cannot be positively determined as “something” or as a property of being. Still, on the epistemological level as well as on the ontological level, (...) it is indeed from “something,” from physical and social being, that the nothingness of consciousness draws its existence and its capacities. In my article, I examine different meanings that can be given to the “nothing” of consciousness in the light of the thought of Sartre himself, emphasizing the difference between two major meanings of negation: as opposition and as indetermination. Then I confront Sartre’s concept of consciousness with more recent considerations of different inspiration, notably from researchers like Chalmers, Damasio, Gallagher, and Zahavi. My thesis is that the Sartrean concept, semi-transcendental and semi-naturalist, does admit the search for a naturalist explanation of consciousness, but assigns its limit precisely through the concept of nothingness. En définissant la conscience comme néant, néantisation, ou simplement comme un « rien », Sartre joue avec plusieurs acceptions de ces termes : négativité et négation, distance, indētefmination, irréductibilité... Le néant de la conscience prend un sens ontologique : c’est un « arrachement » à l’être-en-soi, une transcendance entendue comme capacité de transcender ce qui est, tout en gardant un sens épistémologique : c’est ce qui ne peut pas être déterminé de manière positive comme « quelque chose » ou comme une propriété d’être. D’autre part, sur le plan épistémologique comme sur le plan ontologique, c’est bien de « quelque chore », de l’être physique et social, que le néant de la conscience tire son existence et ses capacités. Dans mon article, j’examine différents sens qu’on peut donner au « rien » de la conscience à la lumière de la pensée de Sartre lui-même, en mettant l’accent sur la différence entre deux sens majeurs de la négation : comme opposition et comme indétermination. Ensuite je confronte le concept sartrien de la conscience avec les considérations plus récentes et d’inspiration différente, notamment chez les chercheurs comme Chalmers, Damasio, Gallagher et Zahavi. Ma thèse est que le concept sartrien, semi-transcendantal et semi-naturaliste, admet bien la recherche d’une explication naturaliste de la conscience, mais lui assigne la limite précisément par le concept du néant. (shrink)

<I>Dialectics beyond Dialectics is a study of contemporary French philosophy from Bataille to Derrida. It analyses, on the first level of generalization, the decomposition of Hegelianism understood as <I>philosophy of totality. Many French philosophers of the 20<SUP>th century deconstruct Hegelian dialectics and harshly criticize the very idea of totality as either dangerous or impossible. The thesis of the book is that, on doing so, they do not really break with dialectics, but transform it. On the second level of generalization, the (...) issue of the book is modernity and the thesis is that transformations of dialectics reveal transformations of modern consciousness which - despite hasty declarations on the <I>end of modernity - still remains ours. (shrink)

The main idea of the article is that in our „postmodern” world ideologies are not at all dead but adopt new forms which I call both cynical (in Slotedijk’s sense of the term) and naïve. I start with reflecting on the very meaning of the term “ideology” and propose to adopt its broad and “dialectical” sense, embracing ideology as false knowledge and as false consciousness, but emphasizing its connection with power. After recalling some theories of the “end of ideology”, from (...) Aron to Lyotard, through Polish thinkers such as Leszek Kołakowski, all based on a rather narrow sense of ideology. I argue that ideologies understood as a complex interconnection of desire and power have regained a crucial role, after the fall of the communist utopia, in the context of consumerist and technological capitalism and its conservative opponents. (shrink)

Les auteurs contribuant à ce recueil réfléchissent sur notre condition postmoderne, non pas tant sur les sens différents qu'a pris le terme du postmoderne que sur l'heure qu'il est. La réflexion se déroule dans l'horizon de la pensée des classiques du postmodernisme et dans l'horizon des questions qui y sont, explicitement ou implicitement, posées.

The author juxtaposes two extreme approaches to the relationship between consciousness and the physical world: phenomenological-idealistic (represented by Edmund Husserl) and radically naturalistic (represented by Paul Churchland). These two positions are interpreted in terms of opposite if symmetrical types of reduction (on the one hand, the reduction of the world to a sense for consciousness, and on the other hand, the reduction of consciousness to an element of the physical world). They emerge as two ways of abstracting from the ambivalence (...) of ordinary experience, in which consciousness and the physical world are both mutually entangled and non-identical with each other. In conclusion, the author argues that contemporary philosophy, which follows both the idealistic and the naturalistic path, fails to solve the problem of this relationship. (shrink)