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  1.  12
    Pritchard on Veritism and Trivial Truths.Anumita Shukla & Mayank Bora - 2024 - Journal of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research 41 (2):273-295.
    Proponents of Veritism believe that truth is the sole non-instrumental epistemic good. This view is often taken to entail that all truths should be of equal epistemic value. Hence, it is put under stress by the presence of trivial truths: truths to which we attach relatively little or no epistemic value. Pritchard, in the defense of Veritism, has tried to argue that the best way to understand the implications of Veritism is to think in terms of how an intellectually virtuous (...)
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  2.  17
    On Davidson Against Language as Conventional.Mayank Bora - 2023 - Journal of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research 40 (3):287-304.
    Davidson (in: LePore (ed), pp 433–46, 1986) uses the existence of malapropisms to motivate a model of linguistic communication where communication succeeds between conversational partners without their having to rely on conventional meanings. Davidson uses this model to then claim that there is no such thing as a conventional language shared by a linguistic community which must be known in advance for linguistic communication to succeed. However, for many cases, Davidson relies on there being standard lines of interpretation for communication (...)
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  3.  44
    Mental Files and Naïve Semantic Accounts of Substitution Failure.Mayank Bora - 2019 - Acta Analytica 34 (3):301-325.
    Ever since Kripke’s influential arguments against descriptivism philosophers have attempted to provide solutions to Frege’s puzzle of substitution failure that adhere to Naïve Semantics—the view that names contribute their referents and referents alone to propositions expressed by sentences containing them. Recently, philosophers have also appealed to psychological objects called mental files, which are used to represent and store information on individuals, in solving the puzzle. Combining the two promises to revive a simple commonsensical theory while, at least prima facie, doing (...)
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  4.  13
    On the Singularity of Descriptive Files.Mayank Bora - 2019 - Journal of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research 36 (1):71-95.
    Jeshion (New essays on singular thought, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010b) believes that singular thought is implemented by the tokening of mental files (MFC). She also believes that an individual’s being significant to the agent is necessary and sufficient for the agent’s having singular thought about the individual (Cognitivism). Goodman (Rev Philos Psychol 7(2):437–461, 2016a, Philos Q 66:236–260, 2016b) argues that mental files created under a description lead to descriptive not singular thought. She uses this to criticize Cognitivism’s sufficiency claim (...)
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  5.  17
    On Motive Accounts of Care.Anumita Shukla & Mayank Bora - 2018 - Journal of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research 35 (1):175-192.
    Care Ethics needs to make clear and defensible normative claims. Michael Slote’s work shows how accounts taking care as a sentimental motive can do the needful. Such motive accounts of care can also provide a way to capture the important distinction between care and justice approaches to morality. However, it is important for Care Ethics to establish harmony between caring motives and acting rightly. Slote’s account does so at the cost of an unintuitive account of obligation. We propose another way (...)
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