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Maxwell Gatyas
University of Wisconsin, Whitewater
  1. Assessing abstract thought and its relation to language with a new nonverbal paradigm: Evidence from aphasia.Peter Langland-Hassan, Frank R. Faries, Maxwell Gatyas, Aimee Dietz & Michael J. Richardson - 2021 - Cognition 211 (C):104622.
    In recent years, language has been shown to play a number of important cognitive roles over and above the communication of thoughts. One hypothesis gaining support is that language facilitates thought about abstract categories, such as democracy or prediction. To test this proposal, a novel set of semantic memory task trials, designed for assessing abstract thought non-linguistically, were normed for levels of abstractness. The trials were rated as more or less abstract to the degree that answering them required the participant (...)
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    Emotion sharing as empathic.Maxwell Gatyas - 2023 - Philosophical Psychology 36 (1):85-108.
    Emotion sharing plays a key role in many accounts of empathy. However, some equate emotion sharing with emotional “contagion” and thereby discount it as a form of empathy. In what follows, I clarify the nature of empathic emotion sharing and differentiate it from contagion. I first reflect on the notions of sharing an object and of sharing a life, arguing that each has four core features. I then argue that emotion sharing also has those features. These characteristics allow me to (...)
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    The moral value of feeling-with.Maxwell Gatyas - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (9):2901-2919.
    Recent work on empathy has focused on the phenomenon of feeling on behalf of, or for, others, and on determining the role it ought to play in our moral lives. Much less attention, however, has been paid to ‘feeling-with.’ In this paper, I distinguish ‘feeling-with’ from ‘feeling-for.’ I identify three distinguishing features of ‘feeling-with,’ all of which serve to make it distinct from empathy. Then, drawing on work in feminist moral psychology and feminist ethics, I argue that ‘feeling-with’ has unique (...)
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