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Matthew W. McKeon [7]Matthew William McKeon [5]
  1.  33
    On the Rationale for Distinguishing Arguments from Explanations.Matthew W. McKeon - 2013 - Argumentation 27 (3):283-303.
    Even with the lack of consensus on the nature of an argument, the thesis that explanations and arguments are distinct is near orthodoxy in well-known critical thinking texts and in the more advanced argumentation literature. In this paper, I reconstruct two rationales for distinguishing arguments from explanations. According to one, arguments and explanations are essentially different things because they have different structures. According to the other, while some explanations and arguments may have the same structure, they are different things because (...)
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  2.  3
    Inference Claims as Assertions.Matthew William Mckeon - 2021 - Informal Logic 42 (4):359-390.
    When a speaker states an argument in arguing—in its core sense—for the conclusion, the speaker asserts, as opposed to merely implies or implicates, the associated inference claim to the effect that the conclusion follows from the premises. In defense of this, I argue that how an inference claim is conveyed when stating an argument is constrained by constitutive and normative conditions for core cases of the speech of arguing for a conclusion. The speech act of assertion better reflects such conditions (...)
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  3.  9
    The Concept of Logical Consequence: An Introduction to Philosophical Logic.Matthew W. McKeon - 2010 - Peter Lang.
    Introduction -- The concept of logical consequence -- Tarski's characterization of the common concept of logical consequence -- The logical consequence relation has a modal element -- The logical consequence relation is formal -- The logical consequence relation is A priori -- Logical and non-logical terminology -- The meanings of logical terms explained in terms of their semantic properties -- The meanings of logical terms explained in terms of their inferential properties -- Model-theoretic and deductive-theoretic conceptions of logic -- Linguistic (...)
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  4.  10
    Arguments and Reason-Giving.Matthew W. McKeon - 2022 - Argumentation 36 (2):229-247.
    Arguments figure prominently in our practices of reason-giving. For example, we use them to advance reasons for their conclusions in order to justify believing something, to explain why we believe something, and to persuade others to believe something. Intuitively, using arguments in these ways requires a certain degree of self-reflection. In this paper, I ask: what cognitive requirements are there for using an argument to advance reasons for its conclusion? Towards a partial response, the paper’s central thesis is that in (...)
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  5.  2
    Argument, Inference, and Persuasion.Matthew William McKeon - 2020 - Argumentation 35 (2):339-356.
    This paper distinguishes between two types of persuasive force arguments can have in terms of two different connections between arguments and inferences. First, borrowing from Pinto, an arguer's invitation to inference directly persuades an addressee if the addressee performs an inference that the arguer invites. This raises the question of how invited inferences are determined by an invitation to inference. Second, borrowing from Sorenson, an arguer's invitation to inference indirectly persuades an addressee if the addressee performs an inference guided by (...)
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  6.  2
    Inference Claims as Assertions.Matthew William Mckeon - 2021 - Informal Logic 43 (1):359-390.
    When a speaker states an argument in arguing—in its core sense—for the conclusion, the speaker asserts, as opposed to merely implies or implicates, the associated inference claim to the effect that the conclusion follows from the premises. In defense of this, I argue that how an inference claim is conveyed when stating an argument is constrained by constitutive and normative conditions for core cases of the speech of arguing for a conclusion. The speech act of assertion better reflects such conditions (...)
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  7.  5
    In Defense of a Normative Concept of Argument.Matthew W. McKeon - forthcoming - Argumentation:1-18.
    Blair articulates a concept of argument that suggests, as he puts it, that argument is a normative concept (Blair, Informal Logic 24:137–151, 2004, p. 190). Put roughly, the idea is that a collection of propositions doesn’t constitute an argument unless some taken together constitute a reason for the remaining proposition and thereby support it enough to provide at least prima facie justification for it (Blair, in: Blair, Johnson, Hansen, Tindale (eds) Informal Logic at 25, Proceedings of the 25th anniversary conference, (...)
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  8.  6
    Statements of inference and begging the question.Matthew W. McKeon - 2017 - Synthese 194 (6):1919-1943.
    I advance a pragmatic account of begging the question according to which a use of an argument begs the question just in case it is used as a statement of inference and it fails to state an inference the arguer or an addressee can perform given what they explicitly believe. Accordingly, what begs questions are uses of arguments as statements of inference, and the root cause of begging the question is an argument’s failure to state an inference performable by the (...)
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  9.  11
    Arguments and reason-giving.Matthew W. McKeon - 2024 - New york, NY: Oxford University Press.
    Arguments, understood initially as premise-conclusion complexes of propositions, figure in our practices of giving reasons. Among other uses, we use arguments to advance reasons to explain why we believe or did something, to justify our beliefs or actions, to persuade others to do or to believe something, and (following Pinto 2001b) to advance reasons to worry or to fear that something is true. This book is about our uses of arguments to advance their premises as reasons for believing their conclusions, (...)
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  10.  7
    A plea for logical objects.Matthew William McKeon - 2009 - Synthese 167 (1):163-182.
    An account of validity that makes what is invalid conditional on how many individuals there are is what I call a conditional account of validity. Here I defend conditional accounts against a criticism derived from Etchemendy’s well-known criticism of the model-theoretic analysis of validity. The criticism is essentially that knowledge of the size of the universe is non-logical and so by making knowledge of the extension of validity depend on knowledge of how many individuals there are, conditional accounts fail to (...)
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  11. Logic, Semantics, and Possible Worlds.Matthew William Mckeon - 1994 - Dissertation, The University of Connecticut
    The general issue addressed in this dissertation is: what do the models of formal model-theoretic semantics represent? In chapter 2, I argue that those of first-order classical logic represent meaning assignments in possible worlds. This motivates an inquiry into what the interpretations of first-order quantified model logic represent, and in Chapter 3 I argue that they represent meaning assignments in possible universes of possible worlds. A possible universe is unpacked as one way model reality might be. The problem arises here (...)
     
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  12.  8
    What does formal logic have to do with arguments?Matthew W. McKeon - 2022 - Metaphilosophy 53 (5):696-708.
    This paper sharpens the distinction between inferential and logcon arguments. Inferential arguments represent possible inferences, logcon ones need not. This distinction clarifies the roles that arguments play in accounting for the normativity of validity for inferential reasoning and in establishing the theoretical connection between validity and logical consequence. There are two related takeaways. First, the normativity of validity for inferential reasoning is grounded on the notion of an inferential argument. This will account for the use of validity to judge inference (...)
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