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Matthew Eshleman
University of North Carolina at Wilmington
  1. The Misplaced Chapter on Bad Faith, or Reading Being and Nothingness in Reverse.Matthew C. Eshleman - 2008 - Sartre Studies International 14 (2):1-22.
    This essay argues that an adequate account of bad faith cannot be given without taking the second half of Being and Nothingness into consideration. There are two separate but related reasons for this. First, the objectifying gaze of Others provides a necessary condition for the possibility of bad faith. Sartre, however, does not formally introduce analysis of Others until Parts III and IV. Second, upon the introduction of Others, Sartre revises his view of absolute freedom. Sartre's considered view of freedom (...)
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  2. What is It Like to Be Free?Matthew C. Eshleman - 2010 - In Jonathan Webber (ed.), Reading Sartre: On Phenomenology and Existentialism. Routledge.
     
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  3.  75
    Bad Faith is Necessarily Social.Matthew C. Eshleman - 2008 - Sartre Studies International 14 (2):40-47.
  4.  19
    Jean-Paul Sartre and Phenomenological Ontology.Matthew C. Eshleman - 20013 - In Lester Embree & Thomas Nenon (eds.), Husserl’s Ideen. Springer. pp. 327--349.
  5.  20
    The Misplaced Chapter on Bad Faith, or Reading 'Being and Nothingness' in Reverse.Matthew C. Eshleman - 2008 - Sartre Studies International 14 (2):1-22.
    This essay argues that an adequate account of bad faith cannot be given without taking the second half of Being and Nothingness into consideration. There are two separate but related reasons for this. First, the objectifying gaze of Others provides a necessary condition for the possibility of bad faith. Sartre, however, does not formally introduce analysis of Others until Parts III and IV. Second, upon the introduction of Others, Sartre revises his view of absolute freedom. Sartre's considered view of freedom (...)
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  6.  6
    Bad Faith is Necessarily Social.Matthew C. Eshleman - 2008 - Sartre Studies International 14 (2):40-47.
  7.  14
    In Praise of Sarah Richmond's Translation of L'Être Et le Néant.Matthew C. Eshleman - 2020 - Sartre Studies International 26 (1):1-15.
    This article surveys most of the recent reviews of Sarah Richmond’s excellent new translation of L’Être et le néant. It offers some close textual comparisons between Richmond’s translation, Hazel Barnes’ translation, and the Checklist of Errors of Hazel Barnes’ Translation of L’Être et le néant. This article concludes that Richmond delivers a higher semantic resolution translation that overcomes nearly all the liabilities found in Barnes and does so without sacrificing much by way of readability.
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  8.  21
    4 Beauvoir and Sartre on Freedom, Intersubjectivity, and Normative Justification.Matthew C. Eshleman - 2009 - In Christine Daigle & Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre: The Riddle of Influence. Indiana University Press. pp. 65--89.
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  9. The Cartesian Unconscious.Matthew C. Eshleman - 2007 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 24 (2):169-187.
     
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  10.  53
    An Atypical Response to Living Without God.Matthew C. Eshleman - 2010 - Sartre Studies International 16 (2):94-106.
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  11.  38
    The Cartesian Unconscious.Matthew C. Eshleman - 2007 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 24 (3):297 - 315.
  12.  5
    Liminal Manifestation and the Elusive Nature of Consciousness.Matthew C. Eshleman - 2019 - ProtoSociology 36:264-296.
    This programmatic essay sketches a few reasons for the elusive nature of conscious experience. It proposes that while neither introspection nor phenomenologically refined reflection delivers direct ‘observational’ access to intrinsic features of conscious experience, intrinsic features of consciousness, nonetheless, manifest themselves in our experience in a liminal way. Overall it proceeds in two movements. Negatively, it argues that implicit self-awareness renders any notion of reflective access methodologically superfluous but existentially irresistible. Positively, it argues that ‘reflective’ access to the liminal dimensions (...)
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