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Matt Hewson
Oxford University
  1.  30
    Indicative Conditionals and Epistemic Luminosity.Matt Hewson & James Ravi Kirkpatrick - 2022 - Mind 131 (521):231–258.
    Kevin Dorst has recently pointed out an apparently puzzling consequence of denying epistemic luminosity: given some natural-sounding bridging principles between knowledge, credence, and indicative conditionals, the denial of epistemic luminosity licenses the knowledge and assertability of abominable-sounding conditionals of the form ⌜If I don’t know that ϕ, then ϕ⌝. We provide a general and systematic examination of this datum by testing Dorst’s claim against various semantics for the indicative conditional in the setting of epistemic logic. Our conclusion is that, regardless (...)
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  2.  21
    Accurate Believers Are Deductively Cogent.Matt Hewson - 2021 - Noûs.
    This paper argues that the agent concerned to have accurate (outright) beliefs will have a consistent and multi-premise closed belief set, and not a (merely) single-premise closed and (merely) pairwise consistent belief set, as has often been thought. This argument rests on the fact that we need a notion of accuracy coherence for belief that is belief-sensitive; sensitive to one's perspective, in a way that the standard belief-insensitive notion of accuracy coherence is not. The choice of the belief-sensitive over belief-insensitive (...)
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  3.  79
    Accuracy Monism and Doxastic Dominance: Reply to Steinberger.Matt Hewson - 2020 - Analysis 80 (3):450-456.
    Given the standard dominance conditions used in accuracy theories for outright belief, epistemologists must invoke epistemic conservatism if they are to avoid licensing belief in both a proposition and its negation. Florian Steinberger (2019) charges the committed accuracy monist — the theorist who thinks that the only epistemic value is accuracy — with being unable to motivate this conservatism. I show that the accuracy monist can avoid Steinberger’s charge by moving to a subtly different set of dominance conditions. Having done (...)
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