The traditional dispute over whether there are one or two ‘concepts’ of freedom has recently been reignited. Despite this, Isaiah Berlin’s distinction between positive and negative freedom retains a significant amount of influence over academic and popular disputes about freedom, continuing to withstand recent attempts, in Eric Nelson’s words, to ‘lift the shadow’ of Berlin’s famous dichotomy. Berlin’s distinction has traditionally been assailed by two separate schools of thought. One line of argument, propounded by Quentin Skinner and Philip Pettit, has (...) suggested that Berlin’s account includes (at least) one concept of freedom too few. Another line of attack, however, propounded by the likes of Nelson, Efraim Podoksik and Gerald MacCallum, has suggested that, to the contrary, Berlin’s account contains one concept of liberty too many. In this article, I will attempt to clear up this confusing picture by discussing how both of these lines of attack have a role to play in helping to dismantle Berlin’s ultimately misleading account of freedom. In the second half of the article, I then go on to explore the implications of this for contemporary political theory in the construction of a theory of freedom for modern political communities, discussing how the ‘spectrum’ of liberty I explore in the first half leads, naturally, to a social model of individual liberty. (shrink)

In this article, I attempt to answer the famous analyses of Benjamin Constant and Isaiah Berlin that the Classical Athenian Democracy had no conception of negative, individual, freedom. I do this by excavating an Athenian democratic concept of individual liberty from Classical Athenian texts. I go on to show that, whilst this has notable links to the later neo-Classical idea of freedom (excavated by the work of Quentin Skinner and Philip Pettit), there are also a number of important differences. This (...) means that we should perhaps stop arguing over whether there are one, or two, or three, concepts of freedom, but investigate instead (and, then, apply, in contemporary political philosophy) different historical uses of the word `'liberty' (as here), though these, interestingly, might well contain a similar basic meaning (of non-interference). (shrink)

Discussions of the liberty of the ancients, in contemporary political theory, treat democratic freedom, and the political equality on which democracy was premised, as anathema to the liberty of the moderns. This article discusses ancient democratic liberty by referencing the theory of arithmetic equality preserved by Aristotle and Plato and suggests that we need to re-investigate this relationship in the interests of modern freedom. The article argues that, in fact, Greek, particularly Athenian, democratic ideas, construe freedom in a negative way (...) and that democratic, arithmetic, accounts of equality are, at root, anti-oppressive and require further investigation in the name of justice for the moderns. (shrink)

The author writes:In this project I set out to provide an answer to two fundamental questions of political philosophy. How can human beings live together, in conditions of co-operation over time, enjoying what Immanuel Kant famously called ‘perpetual peace’? And how much individual freedom can we expect to enjoy, and to what degree can we expect that individual freedom to be equal, whilst engaged in the enterprise described by the first question? These may be age-old questions, but I aim, in (...) this project, to offer a new approach to answering them.In part one of this project, I aim to provide a groundwork upon which an answer to these questions can be built. I argue, contrary to much contemporary political philosophy, that the answers to these questions should not be provided by our representatives, a monarch, the elite, or by a process of philosophical abstraction but, instead, by each of us. That is to say, by you, me and everyone else together. Part one argues not only why it should be each of us who are to be engaged in this enterprise, but it also argues on behalf of a number of changes which might support us in this ongoing, and doubtless difficult, human project. I begin by arguing that, if we are to attempt to provide a genuine answer to how much individual freedom we should each be alloted in human society over time, this means that we must begin with the concept of freedom itself which, in turn, means detaching it from the philosophical and epistemological baggage it tends to carry in everyday language. (shrink)

The author writes:In this project I set out to provide an answer to two fundamental questions of political philosophy. How can human beings live together, in conditions of co-operation over time, enjoying what Immanuel Kant famously called ‘perpetual peace’? And how much individual freedom can we expect to enjoy, and to what degree can we expect that individual freedom to be equal, whilst engaged in the enterprise described by the first question? These may be age-old questions, but I aim, in (...) this project, to offer a new approach to answering them.In part two of this project, I aim to actually provide my own answer to the two fundamental questions with which I began and according to the structure I outline in Liberty. Which is to say, this is the answer I provide to you to judge regarding how successfully it answers those age old political questions. In short, I argue that these are the changes in actual, material, human conditions - the necessary set of ‘alterable human practices’ to borrow a phrase of Isaiah Berlin’s - required to create an enduring, desirable and just ‘perpetual peace’ on earth. In other words, this is not, in Kant’s phrase, a ‘philosophical sketch’ on how perpetual peace might be attained, but, by focusing on the everyday, material, relationships and conditions which create and foster conflict and injustice across the globe today, I hope to provide a ‘material sketch’ as to how human beings might live in successfully together in conditions of peaceful cooperation and freedom over time. (shrink)

Most contemporary justice theories focus on the basic structure of society but pay relatively little attention to the implementation of laws and policies at the street-level. As agents of the basic structure, social caseworkers and street-level bureaucrats are, however, potentially in a unique position in the fight to deliver justice at the coalface of social inequality. Introducing a paradigm of ‘Justice as Action’, we explore how street-level bureaucrats can work with both citizen-clients and, indeed, political philosophers, to promote justice. Although (...) the Justice as Action paradigm does not involve entirely abandoning ideal justice theories, we show how it provides a potential method for paying heed to the objections of political realists about the need to direct attention to the concerns of people ‘now and around here’ if we are to produce both meaningful political theory and meaningful political action. Our conclusion is that it is essential for front-line workers and street-level bureaucrats and political theorists to have more conversations with one another than they currently do in order to advance their shared cause. (shrink)