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  1.  45
    Phenomenological Reduction and the Nature of Perceptual Experience.Matt E. M. Bower - 2023 - Husserl Studies 39 (2):161-178.
    Interpretations abound about Husserl’s understanding of the relationship between veridical perceptual experience and hallucination. Some read him as taking the two to share the same distinctive essential nature, like contemporary conjunctivists. Others find in Husserl grounds for taking the two to fall into basically distinct categories of experience, like disjunctivists. There is ground for skepticism, however, about whether Husserl’s view could possibly fall under either of these headings. Husserl, on the one hand, operates under the auspices of the phenomenological reduction, (...)
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  2. Daubert’s Naïve Realist Challenge to Husserl.Matt E. M. Bower - 2019 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 96 (2):211-243.
    Despite extensive discussion of naïve realism in the wider philosophical literature, those influenced by the phenomenological movement who work in the philosophy of perception have hardly weighed in on the matter. It is thus interesting to discover that Edmund Husserl’s close philosophical interlocutor and friend, the early twentieth-century phenomenologist Johannes Daubert, held the naive realist view. This article presents Daubert’s views on the fundamental nature of perceptual experience and shows how they differ radically from those of Husserl’s. The author argues, (...)
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  3. Husserl’s theory of instincts as a theory of affection.Matt E. M. Bower - 2014 - Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 45 (2):133-147.
    Husserl’s theory of passive experience first came to systematic and detailed expression in the lectures on passive synthesis from the early 1920s, where he discusses pure passivity under the rubric of affection and association. In this paper I suggest that this familiar theory of passive experience is a first approximation leaving important questions unanswered. Focusing primarily on affection, I will show that Husserl did not simply leave his theory untouched. In later manuscripts he significantly reworks the theory of affection in (...)
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  4.  42
    Levinas's Philosophy of Perception.Matt E. M. Bower - 2017 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 55 (4):383-414.
    Levinas is usually discussed as a philosopher wrestling with the nature of our experience of others, ethical obligation, and the divine. Unlike other phenomenologists, such as Husserl and Heidegger, he is not often mentioned in discussions about issues in philosophy of mind. His work in that area, especially on perception, is underappreciated. He gives an account of the nature of perceptual experience that is remarkable both in how it departs from that of others in the phenomenological tradition and for how (...)
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  5.  21
    Sociality and the minimal self: On Dan Zahavi’s “group‐identification, collectivism, and perspectival autonomy”.Matt E. M. Bower - 2023 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 61 (S1):78-85.
    I present and critically examine Dan Zahavi's view that minimal selfhood and self-awareness per se do not have a social character. I argue that Zahavi's conception of the minimal self as fundamentally asocial makes it hard to comprehend the unity of the self and that it is partly the result of an overly narrow conception of what it might mean for the self to be social.
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  6. Do We Visually Experience Objects’ Occluded Parts?Matt E. M. Bower - 2021 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 51 (4):239-255.
    A number of philosophers have held that we visually experience objects’ occluded parts, such as the out-of-view exterior of a voluminous, opaque object. That idea is supposed to be what best explains the fact that we see objects as whole or complete despite having only a part of them in view at any given moment. Yet, the claim doesn’t express a phenomenological datum and the reasons for thinking we do experience objects’ occluded parts, I argue, aren’t compelling. Additionally, I anticipate (...)
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  7.  43
    Is perception inadequate? Husserl's case for non‐sensory objectual phenomenology in perception.Matt E. M. Bower - 2022 - European Journal of Philosophy 30 (2):755-777.
    One key difference between perceptual experience and thought is the distinctly sensory way perception presents things to us. Some philosophers nevertheless suggest this sensory phenomenal character does not exhaust the way things are made manifest to us in perceptual experience. Edmund Husserl maintains that there is also a significant non‐sensory side to perception's phenomenal character. We may experience, for instance, an object's facing surface in a sensory mode and, as part of the same perceptual experience, also that object's out‐of‐view surface (...)
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  8.  52
    Is perception inadequate? Husserl's case for non‐sensory objectual phenomenology in perception.Matt E. M. Bower - 2021 - European Journal of Philosophy 30 (2):755-777.
    European Journal of Philosophy, Volume 30, Issue 2, Page 755-777, June 2022.
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  9.  30
    Finding a Way Into Genetic Phenomenology.Matt E. M. Bower - 2019 - In Iulian Apostolescu (ed.), The Subject(s) of Phenomenology. Rereading Husserl. Springer. pp. 185-200.
    The relation of genetic phenomenology and the project of phenomenological reduction is the primary concern of this paper. Despite Husserl’s occasional loose references to “the” reduction, performing the reduction actually refers to numerous interrelated techniques. I want here to delve into these intricacies with the aim of determining the place of genetic phenomenology within the whole of phenomenological technique. It will be necessary to both state in general terms what the aim of the reduction is and what the different “ways” (...)
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