Ist Leben mehr als eine Leistung „natürlicher Systeme“? Wie unterscheiden sich Lebewesen von Artefakten? Lassen sich Lebewesen genauso herstellen wie Maschinen? Diese Fragen werden mit dem Siegeszug der „converging technologies“ besonders dringlich, denn je mehr Biologie, Ingenieurswissenschaften, Informatik und Physik zusammenfinden, desto weniger scheinen gewohnte Unterscheidungen zu treffen. Doch zeigt eine systematische Rekonstruktion der Lebenswissenschaften in ihrer aktuellen Form als Systembiologie und synthetische Biologie, daß es sich dabei um ein Selbstmissverständnis der Logik wissenschaftlicher Darstellung handelt. Eine alternative Auffassung der begrifflichen (...) Struktur unserer Rede über Lebendiges ist Anliegen dieses Buches. Leben ist danach eine Formbestimmung von Tätigkeitsverhältnissen, die sowohl theoretische wie praktische Begründungen ermöglicht. Die Entfaltung der spezifisch technischen Form dieses Wissens über das Lebendige gestattet es nicht nur, szientistische Verkürzungen zu vermeiden, sondern zudem den methodischen Ort wissenschaftlicher Strukturierungen von Lebendigem auszuzeichnen. Auf dieser Grundlage wird schließlich auch „der Menschen“ durch Lebenswissenschaften darstellbar – und zwar so, wie es der historischen Form des Gegenstandes angemessen ist. (shrink)

This book focuses on some of the most pressing methodological, ethical, and technique-philosophical questions that are connected with the concept of artificial autonomous systems. (Series: Hermeneutics and Anthropology / Hermeneutik und ...

Service-Robotic—mainly defined as “non-industrial robotics”—is identified as the next economical success story to be expected after robots have been ubiquitously implemented into industrial production lines. Under the heading of service-robotic, we found a widespread area of applications reaching from robotics in agriculture and in the public transportation system to service robots applied in private homes. We propose for our interdisciplinary perspective of technology assessment to take the human user/worker as common focus. In some cases, the user/worker is the effective subject (...) acting by means of and in cooperation with a service robot; in other cases, the user/worker might become a pure object of the respective robotic system, for example, as a patient in a hospital. In this paper, we present a comprehensive interdisciplinary framework, which allows us to scrutinize some of the most relevant applications of service robotics; we propose to combine technical, economical, legal, philosophical/ethical, and psychological perspectives in order to design a thorough and comprehensive expert-based technology assessment. This allows us to understand the potentials as well as the limits and even the threats connected with the ongoing and the planned implementation of service robots into human lifeworld—particularly of those technical systems displaying increasing grades of autonomy. (shrink)

Der Beitrag beleuchtet die Struktur und Funktion forschender Laborpraxis vor dem Hintergrund verschiedener erkenntnis- und wissenschaftstheoretischer Positionen. Das Labor kann in seiner Relevanz unterschätzt werden – mit Blick auf die darin verrichteten praktischen Tätigkeiten, auf dabei erforderliche Urteilsbildungen und nicht zuletzt auf unverzichtbare Impulse für die Wissenschaft. Die abstrakte Gegenüberstellung von Theorie und Praxis ist aufzugeben. Zugleich sollte Wissenschaft weder allein über das Labor noch über die Theoriebildung bestimmt werden. Abschließend plädiert der Beitrag dafür, die skizzierten Fragestellungen in die Labordidaktik (...) sowie in die Planung und Durchführung von Lernlaboren einzubeziehen. (shrink)

The determination of specific limitations of biological descriptions, explanations and structuralisations presupposes a proper understanding of the methodical status of “function”. This is particularly relevant if biological knowledge is supposed to play a crucial argumentative role even beyond the limits of the empirical science. In such cases it is not easily determinable at which point purely empirical knowledge enters into the argument and where additional methodical and methodological aspects must be considered. This paper provides a methodological reconstruction of the functional (...) form of biological knowledge itself, which is unfolded in three consecutive steps. The reconstruction starts with the determination of model-theoretical prerequisites of functional structuralisation of biotic entities as organisms. The second step explicates the logical grammar of functional and dysfunctional characters. Based upon this reconstruction, the systematic relation between the form of functional and evolutionary arguments is reconsidered. Finally some of the argumentative burdens are developed, which result from the use of biological language- and theory-particles being applied beyond the scope of validity that is and can be claimed for their proper use within their original life-scientific language game. (shrink)

Abstraction and Ideation - The Semantics of chemical and biological fundamental concepts. The methods of abstraction and ideation are indispensable tools to introduce new concepts in a scientific terminology. The latter is paradigmatically introduced within the 'protophysical program' whereas abstraction is commonly applied in logics and mathematics. The application within the reconstruction of chemistry and biology causes several problems. Ideation appears to be inadequate whereas the application of abstraction necessitates a critical and minute examination of the corresponding equivalence relations. These (...) problems are solved by the introduction of the method of materially-synthetic (material-synthetische) abstraction which is exemplified by the introduction of the chemical concept of 'substance' (Stoff) and the biological concept of 'hereditary factor' (Erbanlage). (shrink)

Philosophical anthropology and philosophical biology were both very powerful and influential movements in the German academic discussion of the early 20th century. Starting with a similar conceptual background (particularly with reference to Hans Driesch’s bio-Aristotelism) they aimed at a synthetic philosophy of nature, which was supposed to include human nature into the realm of a monist description of nature itself. Within this field of biophilosophical reasoning, Jakob von Uexküll’s theory of organism and his theoretical biology hold a central place. In (...) this paper, Uexküll’s theoretical biology is reconsidered as a resumption and reformulation of a theory of knowledge from a “Kantian” provenience. Its specific structure as a generalized theory of knowledge is reconstructed and the pitfalls of a biological interpretation of the condition of the possibility of knowledge are outlined. The theory of organism is reconstructed as a centrepiece of Uexküll’sapproach. The last section of this paper presents a proposal of engineering morphology which allows the full application of Uexküll’s insights into the relativity of organismic constitution. The usefulness of functional modeling for evolutionary reconstructions on the basis of a theory of organism of uexküllian type and its relevance for biological research is evaluated. (shrink)

ion and Ideation - The Semantics of chemical and biological fundamental concepts. The methods of abstraction and ideation are indispensable tools to introduce new concepts in a scientific terminology. The latter is paradigmatically introduced within the 'protophysical program' whereas abstraction is commonly applied in logics and mathematics. The application within the reconstruction of chemistry and biology causes several problems. Ideation appears to be inadequate whereas the application of abstraction necessitates a critical and minute examination of the corresponding equivalence relations. These (...) problems are solved by the introduction of the method of materially-synthetic abstraction which is exemplified by the introduction of the chemical concept of 'substance' and the biological concept of 'hereditary factor'. (shrink)

Wird Biodiversität als Naturgegenstand angesprochen, bleiben häufig die verschiedenen und durchaus nicht reduzierbaren Konnotationen von ‚Natur‘ unberücksichtigt. Dies führt zur Annahme, Biodiversität sei gleichsam von Hause aus in den Lebenswissenschaften angesiedelt. Das Ziel des Aufsatzes ist es nun umgekehrt, den Sitz solcher Bestimmungen ‚im Leben‘ ausweisend, die Besonderheit der Gegenstandsbestimmung in den Lebenswissenschaften in den Blick zu nehmen und die systematischen Folgen einer solchen Verortung für die lebenswissenschaftliche Theoriebildung selber zu untersuchen. Der zugrunde liegende Funktionalismus weist auf einige fundamentale (Selbst-)Missverständnisse (...) der Lebenswissenschaften hin und zeigt zugleich systematische Alternativen auf. (shrink)

Evolution seems tobe a perfect example of a historical process: It began with the earliest “living” units, progressed to massive diversity and disparity, and resulted in our recent lifeworld, the subject-matter of the evolutionary biologist. Yet some irritation remains considering the logical grammar of “history”, as it seems to introduce non-functional aspects into evolutionary theory – which is often addressed as contingency in evolutionary biology. But even reducing the “historical” aspect of evolutionary biology to a functional understanding of lifeworld, we (...) have to consider the specific historicity of the epistemic situation of the evolutionary biologist. This paper argues for the relevance of the explication of this peculiar epistemic situation, taking into account the recent systemic transformations of evolutionary theory.The argument is developed in three steps: first, a revision of the use of temporal expressions in (bio-)sciences, revealing the prevalence of a non-modal understanding of time, which leads to “thin” temporal characterizations of biological processes. Second, based upon biology’s shift toward system paradigms, the formal structure of recent evolutionary approaches is shown to result in a “loss of historicity”. Finally, the consequences for the self-understanding of humans as evolutionary lifeforms are explicated.This reconstruction of the difference between historical and evolutionary judgment emphasizes the relevance of the modal aspects of temporality, which is demonstrated by considering a significant shift of the underlying temporal frames. Accordingly to human beings as historical entities, the differences between natural history, prehistory and history proper are relocated within the concept of history itself. (shrink)

Dieses Handbuch behandelt umfassend und systematisch das Phänomen Technik: Einerseits wird der Gegenstand vollständig philosophisch entwickelt, also sowohl ideen- und begriffsgeschichtlich behandelt als auch in die Systematik der philosophischen Probleme eingeordnet. Auf dieser Grundlage kann dann andererseits ein gründliches Gespräch mit anderen Fachgebieten geführt und können die wichtigen Fragen der Technologieentwicklung beantwortet werden.

Metaphors, allegories and other kinds of indirect speech-acts and catachretical phrases are usually considered to be the very opposite of scientific theories. An alternative can be identified in the constructivists’ approach, dealing with catachretical expressions as a starting point for the explication of scientific language games. The aim of this paper is to demonstrate such an alternative point of view, dealing with metaphorical applications of the term information within biological narratives.

Biodiversity is a term easily applied in different and differing contexts. At first glance it seems to be a biological concept, defined and used in the realm of biological theory, serving for the description of particular aspects of the human and non-human environment. In this sense biodiversity even found its way into the texts of international conventions: “Biological diversity means the variability among living organisms from all sources including, inter alia, terrestrial, marine and other aquatic systems and the ecological complexes (...) of which they are part; this includes diversity within species, between species and of ecosystem.” [Harper and Hawksworth (1995)] But despite this clear and distinct definition, the intension of the term BD seems to be ambiguous. This is true for the single aspects of the definition itself, for example, the discussion over “what is a species?” took place in biology during the last 200 years and it is far from being finished [Claridge et al. (1997) Species]. This discussion asks not only for the “correct” biological definition of the term, but at the same time the methodological status of this term is in question. The result of this situation can be seen in the existence of at least 10–20 different definitions, considering biological as well as methodological aspects [Bachmann (1998) Theor Biosci 117:213–230]. Setting aside the fundamental scientific problems even the application of the term, its parametrisation and finally its relevance for biological theory-building is subject matter of controversies. The same is true for further particles of the definition, e.g. the term “ecosystem”, “complexity”, “gen”, “organisms”, etc. The intensity of the debate contrasts in a peculiar way to the reaction of (non-evolutionary) biologists, insofar as the biological research seems to be untouched by the irritating results of the debate itself. Referring to this strange situation, the aim of our article is a reconsideration of the term “biodiversity”. From an epistemological point of view it can be shown that a definition of biodiversity is possible which does not refer to biological knowledge and know-how—at least in its very first steps. Biodiversity then turns out to be a metaphor for specific aspects of societal organisation, the structuration and reproduction of nature-society relations within societies, and not for biological facts at all. (shrink)

Die von Tomasello vertretene naturwissenschaftliche Theorie der durch Kultur vermittelten Entwicklung des Menschen zum sprechenden Wesen scheint positives Wissen da bereitzustellen, wo bisher die begriffliche Arbeit philosophischer Reflexion ihren Ort hatte – etwa bei der Klärung des Verstehens. Die Autoren rekonstruieren die argumentative Grundstruktur dieses Forschungsprogramms und seine Leitmetaphern methodologisch, um seine Erklärungsmächtigkeit und Grenzen zu ermitteln.

The concept of form belongs—apparently—to an older stage of biological concept formation. Paradoxically, it is even the insistence on the reference to form that shows its very disappearance.1 The more the functionalization2, systematization, and finally algorithmization of modern biology3 advances, in the sense of systems biology, synthetic biology and bioinformatics, the less audible the call for a rehabilitation of the concept of form becomes.This technomorphic tendency, to deal with living entities in terms of artifacts, increasingly brought the concept of transformation (...) into the forefront—articulated, e.g., in the formal sense by differential equations and their combination on all “levels” of the biological... (shrink)

Der tote Körper wird hinsichtlich seiner möglichen Relevanz als Reflexionsgegenstand der Philosophie untersucht. Im Resultat wird dessen epistemischer Sonderstatus dargestellt und die Abhängigkeit der Rede vom „Körper” von der vom „Leib” rekonstruiert. Die Grammatik des Ausdruckes „Leben” wird sowohl als Reflexionsbegriff wie als verbaler Ausdruck vorgeführt, um daran die Rede vom „Sterben” ebenfalls als verbaler Ausdruck zu entwickeln. Es ergibt sich, daß der Ausdruck „toter Körper” sowohl lebenswissenschaftlich wie ohne konstitutiven Bezug auf lebenswissenschaftliche Beschreibungen als Anzeige eines spezifischen „Sich-verhaltens-Zu” menschlichem (...) Tun wir menschlicher Tätigkeit rekonstruiert werden kann. (shrink)

Philosophical anthropology and philosophical biology were both very powerful and influential movements in the German academic discussion of the early 20th century. Starting with a similar conceptual background (particularly with reference to Hans Driesch’s bio-Aristotelism) they aimed at a synthetic philosophy of nature, which was supposed to include human nature into the realm of a monist description of nature itself. Within this field of biophilosophical reasoning, Jakob von Uexküll’s theory of organism and his theoretical biology hold a central place. In (...) this paper, Uexküll’s theoretical biology is reconsidered as a resumption and reformulation of a theory of knowledge from a “Kantian” provenience. Its specific structure as a generalized theory of knowledge is reconstructed and the pitfalls of a biological interpretation of the condition of the possibility of knowledge are outlined. The theory of organism is reconstructed as a centrepiece of Uexküll’sapproach. The last section of this paper presents a proposal of engineering morphology which allows the full application of Uexküll’s insights into the relativity of organismic constitution. The usefulness of functional modeling for evolutionary reconstructions on the basis of a theory of organism of uexküllian type and its relevance for biological research is evaluated. (shrink)

Philosophical anthropology and philosophical biology were both very powerful and influential movements in the German academic discussion of the early 20th century. Starting with a similar conceptual background (particularly with reference to Hans Driesch’s bio-Aristotelism) they aimed at a synthetic philosophy of nature, which was supposed to include human nature into the realm of a monist description of nature itself. Within this field of biophilosophical reasoning, Jakob von Uexküll’s theory of organism and his theoretical biology hold a central place. In (...) this paper, Uexküll’s theoretical biology is reconsidered as a resumption and reformulation of a theory of knowledge from a “Kantian” provenience. Its specific structure as a generalized theory of knowledge is reconstructed and the pitfalls of a biological interpretation of the condition of the possibility of knowledge are outlined. The theory of organism is reconstructed as a centrepiece of Uexküll’sapproach. The last section of this paper presents a proposal of engineering morphology which allows the full application of Uexküll’s insights into the relativity of organismic constitution. The usefulness of functional modeling for evolutionary reconstructions on the basis of a theory of organism of uexküllian type and its relevance for biological research is evaluated. (shrink)

The concept of sciences holds a central place in the early philosophy of Ernst Cassirer and it provides a conceptual framework even for the philosophy of symbolic forms. This paper identifies Cassirer's concept of sciences as a double barrelled reconstructive approach, which allows to understand not only the constitution of actual scientific semantics but at the same time the transformation of the scientific mode of thought. It is shown, that these principles of transformation are indeed the very form of form, (...) referring to which the transformation of a mode of thought is to be considered as a process of self-determination and self-development, a process that can only be understood re-constructively. It is this reconstructive approach of Marburgian Neokantianism which provides a specific culturalist point of view on the status of sciences and their formal, theoretical and experimental modes of world-making. (shrink)

Mirror neurons are a particular class of visumotorical neurons, originally discovered in area F5 of the monkey premotorical cortex. They discharge both (1) when the animal performs a specific action and (2) when it observes a similar action. Actually, it is often assumed that this unique functioning could explain different abilities ranging from imitation behaviour to faculty of speech. In this article, we discuss the question what is meant by the expression: The neuron x mirrors the action y by perception (...) z . The problem resulted from the fact, that neurons cannot mirror anything—except in the light of a metaphorical description. How can this metaphorical description be dissolved for a distinct and explicit scientific terminology? The basic steps of our argumentation are as follows. (1) The expression to mirror can be defined in mutual relation between different types of actions in respect of at least two participants: the proponent A, who conducts a special action x (e.g. grapping a peanut (A(x)) and the opponent B who observes these actions y (B(y)) and vice versa. (2) In order to detect different tokens as a type of action and to guarantee the changes of the participants there must be constituted a speech act in a dialogue, in which types of actions are defined by the invariance of special equivalence. (3) The change of the participants represents and defines the metaphorical expression to mirror in the light of a non-metaphorical and reproducible schema. (4) Then, the invariance of the type of action can be identified in different speech acts. Three of them (called narratives) were defined paradigmatically: (4.1) the ethological-narrative; (4.2) the neurophysiological-narrative; (4.3) the language-narrative. (5) These narratives are the modelling and explicit formulations of the primarily metaphorical expression: The neuron x mirrors the action y by perception z. (shrink)

In the history of genetics, the information-theoretical description of the gene, beginning in the early 1960s, had a significant effect on the concept of the gene. Information is a highly complex metaphor which is applicable in view of the description of substances, processes, and spatio-temporal organisation. Thus, information can be understood as a functional particle of many different language games (some of them belonging to subdisciplines of genetics, as the biochemical language game, some of them belonging to linguistics and informatics). (...) It is this wide covering of different language games that justifies the common description of genes x, y, z as containing information for the phenotypic traits X, Y, Z (or the genome as storage for the information of a whole organism). However, if information is taken as the explanans and phenotypic traits or organisms as the explananda, then a description of the explanandum is of prior importance before the explanans can be characterised. This way of thinking could be useful for future discussions on the strikingly dominant information -metaphor, and the different gene concepts as well. The article illustrates this in two steps. First, a condensed overview on the history of genetics is given, which can be divided into three parts: (1) genetics without genes, (2) genetics with genes, but without information, (3) genetics with genes and information. It is assumed that this provides not only some historical knowledge about the origin of genetics and the introduction of technical terms, but offers at least preliminary insight into the methodological structure of genetic descriptions. In a second step, we redraw Spemann’s disturbation experiments to discuss our thesis that genetic information is not a natural entity, but part of a causality-language game which is secondarily added to the descriptions of interventionalistic practices, viz. experimental approaches. (shrink)

Information: a universal metaphor in natural and cultural sciences? Content Type Journal Article DOI 10.1007/s10202-008-0046-2 Authors Michael Bölker, Philipps-Universität Marburg Fachbereich 17: Biologie Karl-von-Frisch-Straße 8 35032 Marburg Germany Mathias Gutmann, Philipps-Universität Marburg Institut für Philosophie Wilhelm Röpke Str. 6B 35032 Marburg Germany Wolfgang Hesse, Philipps-Universität Marburg Fachbereich 12: Mathematik und Informatik Hans-Meerwein-Straße 35032 Marburg Germany Journal Poiesis & Praxis: International Journal of Technology Assessment and Ethics of Science Online ISSN 1615-6617 Print ISSN 1615-6609 Journal Volume Volume 5 Journal Issue Volume (...) 5, Numbers 3-4. (shrink)