Universalism in philosophy, argue Penny Enslin and Mary Tjiattas, tends to be regarded as an affront to particular affiliations, an act of injustice by misrecognition. While agreeing with criticisms of some expressions of universalism, they take the view that anti-universalism has become an orthodoxy that deflects attention from pressing issues of global injustice in education. In different ways, recent reformulations of universalism accommodate particularity and claims for recognition. Defending a qualified universalism, they argue, through a discussion of the Education for (...) All campaign, that the present focus on recognition should be widened to address redistribution and representation as elements of global justice in education.In her response to Enslin and Tjiattas, Sharon Todd expresses sympathy for their aspiration towards a ‘qualified universalism’, but she seeks to go beyond the dichotomy of universalism versus anti-universalism by way of a discussion of aspects of the work of Judith Butler. Butler's emphasis on cultural translation offers a way, it is claimed, to think about the universal that transcends the oppositional relation between culture and commitment to universals. In the light of this she advocates an approach that involves neither universalism nor anti-universalism but ‘critique of universality’. Thus, the task of translation, on Butler's account, prevents universality from being a standard or home-base from which we can judge the world and turns it instead into an ongoing struggle for intelligibility.In their rejoinder, Enslin and Tjiattas reject any charge that their own account has fallen into a simple dichotomisation of universalism and anti-universalism, and reaffirm their commitment to a form of universalism in which partial or contextual considerations count in ethical deliberations, and values and principles are subject to reflexive renegotiation in democratic deliberations, which provides the means of their justification and the source of their legitimacy. This yields, they claim, a non-standard form of contractualism that is both culturally sensitive and open-ended. They suggest in conclusion that the debate between themselves and Todd raises questions about whether the analytical and continental traditions can concede one another's place in the philosophy of education. (shrink)

It is argued that Bachelard's work in the philosophy of science is not concerned only with many of the questions which characterize contemporary Anglo-American debates. Through a radical reappraisal of the functions of experimentation, it also proposes a convincing way of analyzing the relations between theories and objects, explanations and events, which avoids both relativism and a return to naive correspondence theories.

Advocates of particularism in moral philosophy (e.g. Prichard, Dancy, McDowell) hold that moral theory contributes little if anything to moral deliberation, claiming that we do best in moral judgement by relying on our intuitive moral sensitivities to situations rather than on general principles. In this paper I argue that particularism lacks the resources to provide a preferable account of moral deliberation and justification.

The view that some forms of irrationality may serve a useful purpose is being increasingly entertained despite the disquiet it elicits. The reason for the disquiet is not difficult to discern, for if the view were made good it might threaten the unqualified normative primacy that rationality enjoys in the evaluation of thoughts, beliefs, intentions, decisions, and actions. In terms of the predominant ‘rational explanation’ model, reasons both generate and justify actions, and carrying out the dictates of reason is held (...) up as an ideal. If it can be shown that under some circumstances or for certain types of actions irrational elements or procedures would produce ‘all things considered’ better results, this would put these deliberative ‘ideals’ in question. (shrink)

Although measurement is widely misused in education, it is indispensable in addressing the problems of injustice in global educational opportunity. Considering how the case can be made for legitimate use of measurement in normative analysis and argument, we explore ways in which metrics have featured in the formulation of theories of justice, with particular attention to resourcist and capabilities approaches. We then consider three means of addressing global inequality and defend a reconstruction of the public sphere in which objective measures (...) of justice, deliberatively constructed, could supersede prevalent assumptions about measurement. (shrink)

The mere possibility of irrationality has been challenged by a long-standing tradition which strongly supports the normative primacy of ideals of rationality. In this paper, I consider the possibility that a coherent account of irrationality can nonetheless be provided and furthermore that some forms of irrationality may be seen as justifiable on the basis of their functional roles.

Advocates of particularism in moral philosophy hold that moral theory contributes little if anything to moral deliberation, claiming that we do best in moral judgement by relying on our intuitive moral sensitivities to situations rather than on general principles. In this paper I argue that particularism lacks the resources to provide a preferable account of moral deliberation and justification.

Darrel Moellendorf argues that duties of justice have global scope. We share Moellendorf's rejection of statism and his emphasis on duties of justice arising out of association in Cosmopolitan Justice. Building on Moellendorf's view that there are cosmopolitan duties of justice, we argue that in education they are both negative and positive, requiring redistribution of educational resources and transnational educational intervention. We suggest what kinds of intervention are justifiable and required, the kinds of international structures that could regulate them, and (...) a conception of cosmopolitan citizenship to underpin education for global citizenship. (shrink)

This chapter explores normative conceptions of citizenship and their implications for moral and civic education. Starting with an account of the historical emergence of Republican and Liberal conceptions of citizenship, it notes important conceptual links between notions of citizenship and agency, democracy, general will formation, political authority and legitimacy, rights and duties, and moral and political standing. Against this historical background, it then turns to a discussion of the cognitive and affective capacities that these notions of citizenship involve, and the (...) role of education in the development of citizens. Contemporary analyses and controversies, such as the role of national identity and the role of educational institutions as sites for developing civic knowledge and dispositions, are outlined. The chapter concludes by exploring the idea of global citizenship and its implications for citizenship education. (shrink)