This critique of papers by hartshorne, tracy and eslick seeks a possible rapport between process theology and thomistic natural theology. both schools seek a god who is love, intimately involved in daily human life. but a dipolar god is not sufficiently transcendent to be so immanent. hence only love which is purely actual being can satisfy process intentions. tracy's new "tensive analogical language" and eslick's teleological explanation of novelty are thus more feasible on thomistic than on process grounds.

SEARCHING and learning... are altogether recollection". A long and strong tradition in Platonic studies has taken this statement as a literal description of what happens when we come to know something that we had not known before. That literal interpretation is commonly linked to a similarly literal interpretation of Plato's statements about the soul's cycle of rebirths, and to a transcendent rather than a transcendental view of the Ideas, one which gives them an ontological status separate from sensible particulars. Sensibles (...) thus recall to our minds the Ideas which we saw in our earlier life in the other world, the world to which our disembodied souls will return as a reward for having pursued the philosophical life. (shrink)

Schmitz, whose insightful crudition matches that of his subject, traces the development of Wojtyla's project from the plays he wrote in the 1940s for the underground "theater of the living word," through his assimilation of the philosophical tradition as professor of ethics at the Catholic University of Lublin, then through the maturation of his own thought as Archbishop of Krakow and active participant in Vatican II, and into its flowering in the remarkable series of papal documents beginning with his Wednesday (...) talks on Genesis and first encyclical, The Redeemer of Man. Schmitz assesses the effort to integrate contemporary phenomenology into the metaphysical tradition as depending on several careful distinctions. The first is between a Husserlian bracketing of being and an algebraic one. Another is between phenomenology as a technique that presupposes a realistic metaphysics, and as an effort to establish realism that must fail because the intended object of consciousness is still consciousness itself, not an extramental world. A third is between value as a felt good and goodness as coincident with being. Only this latter allows for objective moral norms, for moral goodness that coincides with the existential fullness of human nature, and for moral obligation. The answer to the question "Why be moral?" thus has its solid answer in the potentiality of human nature for fuller, self-transcendent being. (shrink)

It is a truism that affectivity has been by and large neglected in Western philosophy in recent centuries, while analyses of knowledge, especially rational thought, abound. Classical American thought, which frequently takes community as a main theme, is something of an exception. But the fact remains that books with titles like this one's and Solomon's earlier The Passions raise hopes that a neglected and important philosophical topic is to receive some of the attention that it deserves. Solomon's Love: Emotion, Myth (...) and Metaphor, following a reverse order of the topics mentioned in its title, examines the metaphors and myths common to views of love in our culture, with a view to a philosophical reconstruction of the concept of romance. The main thesis continues that of his earlier book, viz., that emotions in general are actions. In Solomon's view, romantic love is not something that happens to us, that we undergo or "fall into," but something that we actively do. It is a free and conscious decision to give meaning to our experience by constructing, with a beloved, a "loveworld" in which we strive for a definable shared self. Choice, says Solomon, a feature of all emotions, is the most striking characteristic of love. Love has, like any choice, its reasons and conditions. It is a choice that our culture values highly because it enables us to achieve, in a society marked by public role-playing, individuality, and mobility, the stable identity of selves that would otherwise be impossible. Earlier societies provided these through stable family life and social order. (shrink)

This book is a brilliant and painstaking analysis, at once historical and systematic, of Plato's penology. The initial sinking of a philosopher's heart at the sight of philosophy done by a classicist is soon stopped and even reversed. For Mackenzie immediately displays a mastery of the philosophical issues involved in a critique of penal institutions. The book opens with five chapters that clearly set forth the basic incongruity: experience shows that penal institutions are inevitable in human societies, and yet punishment--because (...) it does harm to the punished-needs to be justified. But the major philosophical theories fail in that justification: retribution, deterrence, and reform are finally incompatible with each other, and yet none can stand alone without doing violence to the intuitions of common sense. Plato's theory, then--basically reformative, with a touch of deterrence--is finally unsatisfactory. As the author says in her introduction, "different theories of punishment cannot be held conjointly because they conflict. But they cannot be held separately, either, or they risk being violent or unintelligible. Violence is what theories of punishment guard against, and if a theory is incomprehensible, it is no theory at all". Plato's theory is then said to fail by being incomprehensible. (shrink)