Addressing a wide range of topics, from Newton to Post-Kuhnian philosophy of science, these essays critically examine themes that have been central to the influential work of philosopher Michael Friedman.

I aim to clarify the argument for space that Newton presents in De Gravitatione (composed prior to 1687) by putting Newton's remarks into conversation with the account of geometrical knowledge found in Proclus's Commentary on the First Book of Euclid's Elements (ca. 450). What I highlight is that both Newton and Proclus adopt an epistemic progression (or “order of knowing”) according to which geometrical knowledge necessarily precedes our knowledge of metaphysical truths concerning the ontological state of affairs. As I argue, (...) Newton's commitment to this order of knowing clarifies the interplay of the imagination and understanding in geometrical inquiry and illuminates how geometrical knowledge of space can lead to knowledge that space depends on and is related to God. In general, appreciating the Proclean elements of Newton's argument brings added light to the significance of geometrical inquiry for his general natural philosophical program and grants us insight into the philosophical grounding for the notion of absolute space that is presented in the Principia mathematica (1687). (shrink)

In the preface to the Principia (1687) Newton famously states that “geometry is founded on mechanical practice.” Several commentators have taken this and similar remarks as an indication that Newton was firmly situated in the constructivist tradition of geometry that was prevalent in the seventeenth century. By drawing on a selection of Newton's unpublished texts, I hope to show the faults of such an interpretation. In these texts, Newton not only rejects the constructivism that took its birth in Descartes's Géométrie (...) (1637); he also presents the science of geometry as being more powerful than his Principia remarks may lead us to believe. (shrink)

This chapter, which examines the unity shared between what appear to be conflicting modes of natural investigation, an often neglected aspect of the history of British natural philosophy, also discusses the views of Francis Bacon on observation and experiment and describes his system of the sciences. It looks at aspects of Bacon's program for natural philosophy that made critics set the divide Baconian natural philosophy and the mathematical sciences of the seventeenth century. The chapter furthermore highlights the role of the (...) Baconian system of the sciences in the acceptance of Isaac Newton's Principia mathematica. (shrink)

Commentators attempting to understand the empirical method that Isaac Newton applies in his Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy (1687) are forced to grapple with the thorny issue of how to reconcile Newton's rejection of hypotheses with his appeal to absolute space. On the one hand, Newton claims that his experimental philosophy does not rely on claims that are assumed without empirical evidence, and on the other hand, Newton appeals to an absolute space that, by his own characterization, does not make (...) any impressions on our senses. Howard Stein (1967, 2002) has offered an insightful strategy for reconciling this apparent contradiction and suggested a way to enhance our understanding of Newton's 'empiricism' such that absolute space can be preserved as a legitimate part of Newton's experimental project. Recently, Andrew Janiak (2008) has posed a worthy challenge to Stein's empirical reading of Newton and directed our attention to the metaphysical commitments that underlie the experimental philosophy of Newton's Principia . Although Stein and Janiak disagree on the degree to which Newton's empiricism influences his natural philosophy, both agree and clearly show that an adequate treatment of Newton's empiricism cannot be divorced from consideration of Newton's views on God and God's relationship to nature. (shrink)

I argue for an interpretation of the connection between Descartes’ early mathematics and metaphysics that centers on the standard of geometrical intelligibility that characterizes Descartes’ mathematical work during the period 1619 to 1637. This approach remains sensitive to the innovations of Descartes’ system of geometry and, I claim, sheds important light on the relationship between his landmark Geometry and his first metaphysics of nature, which is presented in Le monde. In particular, I argue that the same standard of clear and (...) distinct motions for construction that allows Descartes to distinguish ‘geometric’ from ‘imaginary’ curves in the domain of mathematics is adopted in Le monde as Descartes details God’s construction of nature. I also show how, on this interpretation, the metaphysics of Le monde can fruitfully be brought to bear on Descartes’ attempted solution to the Pappus problem, which he presents in Book I of the Geometry. My general goal is to show that attention to the standard of intelligibility Descartes invokes in these different areas of inquiry grants us a richer view of the connection between his early mathematics and philosophy than an approach that assumes a common method is what binds his work in these domains together.Keywords: René Descartes; Geometry; Mathematics; Intelligibility; Metaphysics. (shrink)

We examine the contrast between the “Newtonian style” and the Cartesian, hypothetico-deductive method in order to expand on George Smith's account of working hypotheses and theory-mediation. We stress the pivotal role of theory-mediation in turning experience into well-defined phenomena and introduce the complementary notions of conditional and independent evidence. Conditional evidence is evidence in favor of an hypothesis that is based on phenomena that would not be constituted as phenomena without the hypothesis in question. Direct evidence is evidence based on (...) phenomena that are independently available. We use the distinction to interrogate the role of mathematical representation as the most basic constitutive posit of the Newtonian style, as the working hypothesis that enables all further theory-mediation. Our primary examples are Newton's struggles with motion in fluids and his defense of the Laws of Motion. (shrink)

My goal in this paper is to develop our understanding of the role the imagination plays in Kant’s Critical account of geometry, and I do so by attending to how the imagination factors into the method of reasoning Kant assigns the geometer in the First Critique. Such an approach is not unto itself novel. Recent commentators, such as Friedman (1992) and Young (1992), have taken a careful look at the constructions of the productive imagination in pure intuition and highlighted the (...) importance of the imagination’s activity for securing the universality of geometry knowledge. Specifically, as their respective examinations bring to light, it is only with due attention to the imagination that we can make sense of how a .. (shrink)

Historians of modern philosophy have been paying increasing attention to contemporaneous scientific developments. Isaac Newton's Principia is of course crucial to any discussion of the influence of scientific advances on the philosophical currents of the modern period, and two philosophers who have been linked especially closely to Newton are John Locke and Immanuel Kant. My dissertation aims to shed new light on the ties each shared with Newtonian science by treating Newton, Locke, and Kant simultaneously. I adopt Newton's philosophy of (...) geometry as the starting point of investigation, for here I believe we have a constructive means by which to assess Locke and Kant's relationship to Newton, In particular, I defend the thesis that the justification Newton, Locke and Kant offer for applying geometrical principles to nature is central to understanding their respective ties to a Newtonian science characterized by the intermingling of mathematics and experiment, Although little is said by Locke in regard to a mathematical approach to nature, I hope to show that his interpretation of the origins of our geometrical ideas has a close affinity to Newton's own characterization of geometry, leading us to reexamine the extent of Locke's 'Newtonianism.' Kant famously attempts to bridge the gap between geometry and the empirical world by establishing space as a "pure form of intuition." My discussion of Kant's Newtonian approach to nature centers on the imagination, and I argue that the mediating work completed by this faculty in geometrical construction and experience in general is equally important to understanding Kant's application of geometry to the empirical realm, In the end, I hope my treatment of the strategies employed by Newton, Locke, and Kant to account for a mathematical-experimental method of natural philosophy sheds further light on the importance of Newton to the progress of modern philosophy. (shrink)

In this paper, I examine the manner in which Descartes defends his Vortex Hypothesis in Part III of the Principles of Philosophy, and expand on Ernan McMullin’s characterization of the methodology that Descartes uses to support his planetary system. McMullin illuminates the connection between the deductive method of Part III and the method Descartes uses in earlier portions of the Principles, and he brings needed light to the role that imaginative constructions play in Descartes’s explanations of the phenomena. I develop (...) McMullin’s reading by bringing further attention to the constraints that Descartes places on the imagination in Part III. I focus in particular on the way in which Descartes uses metaphysical truths concerning God’s nature to support his general description of the planetary system, and on the way he relies on a mathematical standard of intelligibility to defend his proposals about the configuration of matter. Attending to the role of metaphysics and mathematics in Part III shows that Descartes’s arguments for the explanatory power of the Vortex Hypothesis are more effective than McMullin suggests. The reading I forward also offers important perspective on how Descartes’s hypotheses in Part III can be seen as both metaphysically and mathematically well-grounded. (shrink)

Those familiar with the Critique of Pure Reason will not at all be surprised that Thomas C. Vinci has found it fitting to dedicate an entire book to the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories, a chapter of the CPR that is as important to Kant’s argument for Transcendental Idealism as it is difficult to decipher. The purpose of that section is to establish the objective validity of the categories—to show, that is, that the pure concepts of the understanding apply to (...) all objects of human experience. While the general goal of the TD may be easy enough to state, the argument strategy that Kant uses to establish the objective validity of the categories is hardly easy to understand.Vinci focuses on the.. (shrink)

Building on the work of Henk Bos and John Schuster, I will examine how the story of Descartes-the-philosopher and Descartes-the-mathematician proceeds in the years immediately following 1628. Specifically, I will focus on the 1633 Le Monde and the 1637 Geometry and hope to show that Descartes is still trying in this period to integrate his distinctively Cartesian version of math with his distinctively Cartesian version of philosophy. Being even more specific, I will look at the creation story presented in Le (...) Monde in conjunction with Descartes’ solution to the Pappus problem, which was published in the Geometry. On the reading I’ll offer, we find both a mathematical influence on the early metaphysics in Le Monde as well as (and this is the heart of my account) a metaphysical grounding for one very important part of the mathematical program that Descartes presents in the Geometry. (shrink)