Many philosophers have asserted that evolutionary theory is unfalsifiable. In this paper I refute these assertions by detailing some falsifiable predictions of the theory and the evidence used to test them. I then analyze both these predictions and evidence cited to support assertions of unfalsifiability in order to show both what type of predictions are possible and why it has been so difficult to spot them. The conclusion is that the apparent logical peculiarity of evolutionary theory is not a property (...) of evolutionary theory; it is a property of our human-sized perspective on evolutionary theory. (shrink)

This paper shows that species are individuals with respect to evolutionary theory in the sense that the laws of the theory deal with species as irreducible wholes rather than as sets of organisms. 'Species X' is an instantiation of a primitive term of the theory. I present a sketch of a proof that it cannot be defined within the theory as a set of organisms; the proof relies not on details of my axiomatization but rather on a generally accepted property (...) of speciation; hence the same argument should work for any axiomatization which captures this generally accepted property of speciation. (shrink)

Many philosophers have claimed that the structure of evolutionary theory is intrinsically different from the structure of physical theories. These claims were based on the appearance of the immature structure of the theory. Refutations of these claims have been based on newly available glimpses of the mature structure of the theory. These claims and their refutations show that the relationship between the immature and mature structures of evolutionary theory is dramatically different from this relationship for Newtonian physics. Analysis of the (...) cause of this difference provides insight into significant features of the process of maturation of scientific theories. (shrink)

This paper: (1) gives a schema of the logical structure of functional explanation in biology; (2) shows that it falls under the covering law model of explanation by proving that the explanandum follows from the explanans; and (3) supports the claim that it captures the logical structure underlying the biological usage by analyzing in detail two cases from biology.

The use of cautionary tales to inculcate appropriate professional moral standards into professionals in various fields is described, and application to computer science professionals is suggested. The wider moral aspects of the computer's impact on society are then discussed.Because the computer gives us fundamentally new power, we are faced with decisions for which our experiences may give little guidance. The danger of applying old standards to a fundamentally new situation is well illustrated by the law, passed soon after the production (...) of the first automobiles, which required automobiles traveling the roads to be preceded by a man on foot carrying a red flag. This law reduced danger, but robbed the auto of its intrinsic power.Similarly we could stop one type of computer crime by outlawing electronic fund transfer, or prevent a potentially dangerous accumulation of governmental power by outlawing the interconnection of computers storing different sets of information about individuals, or prevent robots from taking workers' jobs by outlawing robotization. It is possible to respond to every danger by cutting off the power that leads to that danger. But it is more productive to respond by analyzing the particular situation in order to determine whether our fundamental values are better served by changing our expectations or rules than by denying ourselves the use of the power. Such an analysis requires some understanding both of the problems which may be caused in our society by the computer and of the nature of our values.This paper begins with some computerization problems that are essentially problems of inculcating the proper professional morals into computer professionals. We point out that other professions inculcate professional moral standards by the use of cautionary tales, and we indicate how the computer profession can develop the cautionary tales it needs. We then turn to the problems to the computer's impact on society, discussing some of the issues that must be addressed if the negative impacts of computerization are to be minimized. (shrink)

Narrative explanations in evolutionary biology have seemed fundamentally different from other scientific explanations, and similar to historical explanations. This investigation of the structure of narrative explanations in evolutionary biology reveals that narrative explanations do have a deductive-nomological base, but that their structure contains two significant additional elements as well. The additional elements are: the multidimensional recursive connection between the different sub-explanations in a narrative explanation; and a set of generic explanations which make possible the integration of multiple co-existing processes.