6 found
  1.  12
    Cognitive Biology: Evolutionary and Developmental Perspectives on Mind, Brain, and Behavior.Luca Tommasi, Mary A. Peterson & Lynn Nadel (eds.) - 2009 - MIT Press.
    An overview of current research at the intersection of psychology and biology,integrating evolutionary and developmental data and explanations.
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  2.  19
    The ambiguity of mental images: insights regarding the structure of shape memory and its function in creativity.Mary A. Peterson - 1993 - Cognition 20:109.
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  3.  11
    The initial identification of figure-ground relationships: Contributions from shape recognition processes.Mary A. Peterson & Bradley S. Gibson - 1991 - Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 29 (2):199-202.
  4.  40
    Knowledge and intention can penetrate early vision.Mary A. Peterson - 1999 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (3):389-390.
    Although some types of cognition may not affect early vision, there is ample evidence that other types of cognition do. Evidence indicating that early vision is penetrable by direct manipulation of viewers' perceptual intentions and by knowledge of the structure of familiar objects is reviewed, and related to both the Pylyshyn target article and Fodor (1983).
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  5. Vision: Top‐Down Effects.Mary A. Peterson - 2003 - In L. Nadel (ed.), Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. Nature Publishing Group.
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  6.  3
    Limitations of Hoerl and McCormack's dual systems model of temporal consciousness.Eve A. Isham, Elijah M. Ziskin & Mary A. Peterson - 2019 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 42.
    Hoerl & McCormack's dual systems framework provides a new avenue toward the scientific investigation of temporal cognition. However, some shortcomings of the model should be considered. These issues include their reliance on a somewhat vague consideration of “systems” rather than specific computational processes. Moreover, the model does not consider the subjective nature of temporal experience or the role of consciousness in temporal cognition.
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