Music is a natural human expression present in all cultures, but the functions it serves are still debated. Previous research indicates that rhythm, an essential feature of music, can enhance coordination of movement and increase social bonding. However, the prolonged effects of rhythm have not yet been investigated. In this study, pairs of participants were exposed to one of three kinds of auditory stimuli (rhythmic, arrhythmic, or white‐noise) and subsequently engaged in five trials of a joint‐action task demanding interpersonal coordination. (...) We show that when compared with the other two stimuli, exposure to the rhythmic beat reduced the practice effect in task performance. Analysis of the behavioral data suggests that this reduction results from more temporally coupled motor movements over successive trials and that shared exposure to rhythm facilitates interpersonal motor coupling, which in this context serves to impede the attainment of necessary dynamic coordination. We propose that rhythm has the potential to enhance interpersonal motor coupling, which might serve as a mechanism behind its facilitation of positive social attitudes. (shrink)

The present article is an elaborated and upgraded version of the Early Career Award talk that I delivered at the IAPR 2019 conference in Gdańsk, Poland. In line with the conference’s thematic focus on new trends and neglected themes in psychology of religion, I argue that psychology of religion should strive for firmer integration with evolutionary theory and its associated methodological toolkit. Employing evolutionary theory enables to systematize findings from individual psychological studies within a broader framework that could resolve lingering (...) empirical contradictions by providing an ultimate rationale for which results should be expected. The benefits of evolutionary analysis are illustrated through the study of collective rituals and, specifically, their purported function in stabilizing risky collective action. By comparing the socio-ecological pressures faced by chimpanzees, contemporary hunter-gatherers, and early Homo, I outline the selective pressures that may have led to the evolution of collective rituals in the hominin lineage, and, based on these selective pressures, I make predictions regarding the different functions and their underlying mechanisms that collective rituals should possess. While examining these functions, I echo the Early Career Award and focus mostly on my past work and the work of my collaborators, showing that collective rituals may stabilize risky collective action by increasing social bonding, affording to assort cooperative individuals, and providing a platform for reliable communication of commitment to group norms. The article closes with a discussion of the role that belief in superhuman agents plays in stabilizing and enhancing the effects of collective rituals on trust-based cooperation. (shrink)

Humans have evolved various social behaviors such as interpersonal motor synchrony, play and sport or religious ritual that bolster group cohesion and facilitate cooperation. While important for small communities, the face-to-face nature of such technologies makes them infeasible in large-scale societies where risky cooperation between anonymous individuals must be enforced through moral judgment and, ultimately, altruistic punishment. However, the unbiased applicability of group norms is often jeopardized by moral hypocrisy, i.e., the application of moral norms in favor of closer subgroup (...) members such as key socioeconomic partners and kin. We investigated whether social behaviors that facilitate close ties between people also promote moral hypocrisy that may hamper large-scale group functioning. We recruited 129 student subjects that either interacted with a confederate in the high synchrony or low synchrony conditions or performed movements alone. Subsequently, participants judged a moral transgression committed by the confederate toward another anonymous student. The results showed that highly synchronized participants judged the confederate’s transgression less harshly than the participants in the other two conditions and that this effect was mediated by the perception of group unity with the confederate. We argue that for synchrony to amplify group identity in large-scale societies, it needs to be properly integrated with morally compelling group symbols that accentuate the group’s overarching identity. Without such contextualization, synchrony may create bonded subgroups that amplify local preferences rather than impartial and wide application of moral norms. (shrink)

This paper examines the current interest in ‘art activism’, and the relationship between artistic expression and civil disobedience. Boris Groys has argued that the lack of political dissidence within contemporary art is not down to the ineffectiveness of the aesthetic, but the far more effective intrusion of the aesthetic by the political. As such, the political question of civil disobedience is necessarily an aesthetic one. At the same time, this raises problems for how politically effective artistic dissidence can be. As (...) Grindon argues, if art activism often only mimics ‘real’ social activism, it remains within the boundaries of the gallery system with no real consequences. Most art activism fails to be effective civil disobedience, in this sense, as it already operates within the confines of pre-established curatorial spaces. As such, the use of art for the purposes of civil disobedience cannot be, then, mere aestheticism, but rather must act as ‘an insight into the transformed mechanisms of conquest’ : a conflict over the topology of disobedience which exposes the interrelation of aesthetics and politics through medium, space and archive. This paper critically assesses attempts in contemporary art to re-appropriate the symbolic dimension of dissidence as an aesthetic; in particular the use of militancy, asceticism and dissidence as an attempt to move beyond mere counter-political protest and towards a reclaiming of aesthetics from the intrusions of politics. It uses as a specific case example Militant Training Camp, a social experimental performance camp held at Arcadia Missa Gallery in London, March 2012. This weeklong performance piece was designed to explore the activity and mind-set of militant groups and the idea of non-pacifist activity within wider social movements. Engaging with not only the tradition of anarchist activism, but also more recent artistic engagements with civil disobedience, the camp involved a residential ascetic ‘training programme’ followed by a series of violent performances open to the public, often disturbing other sites of protest such as Anarchist theatres and Occupy sites in the process. The paper uses first-hand documentary evidence and critical reflection on the event in order to argue that, as both an act of civil disobedience, and an exploration of the limits of its aesthetic treatment, the event raises two specific issues surrounding the notion of disobedience and its conceptual possibilities. The first issue is the representation of rage within the context of art activism. Here, the performance is discussed with particular reference to Sloterdijk’s arguments that argues that militancy and revolt operate under a ‘thymotic economy’. However, Sloterdijk’s re-appropriation of the thymotic – a conceptualising of ‘rage’ which is not absorbed within the sublimination of psychology or Habermasian symbolism – is not as simple as offering an alternative, ‘non-symbolic’ rage. Given that modern militancy is always subject to containment, the second issue raised is the formative role of ‘curating’ acts of disobedience. Using the work of Groys on aesthetics and power, the paper assesses how ‘events’ of civil disobedience such as Militant Training Camp are located, represented, circulated and even stored, and the ways in which they might resist their reduction to or supplementing of a further economy which conceals the formative ‘rage’ of disobedience. (shrink)

ORTSBESTIMMUNG DER PHILOSOPHISCHEN GRAMMATIK I. Absicht dieser Arbeit ist es, ein wenig Licht in die teils komischen, teils lebensgefahrlichen Aspekte der Aufsplitterung unseres Lebens in h eines vor und in eines nach 17 zu bringen, und zwar anhand des Ent­ wicklungsgangs der Wittgensteinschen Philosophischen Grammatik. Das aufgezeigte Problem kursiert unter vielen Titeln und Etiketten: Theorie und Praxis, Wissen und Glauben, Beruf und Freizeit o. a. Diese Auf­ zahlungen mochten allerdings kein Unvermogen des Verfassers andeuten, sich auf einen Titel festzulegen. Vielmehr (...) ist es ein wichtiges Resultat Wittgensteinschen Philosophierens, dass verschiedene Sinne nicht selbiges vermeinen, insofern sie denselben Gegenstand meinen, sondern sofern sich der Sinn als Sinn durchhalt, d. i. als Gebrauch im umlaufist. Insofern der Verfasser mit Wittgenstein die Partikel »d. h. «, »d. i. «, »m. a. W. « und ahnliche flir das Philosophieren flir konstitutiv und eigentlimlich halt, also, mithin die Bestimmung »Sinn ist Sinn als Sinn«l zu erfiillen ver­ sucht (trotz der penetranten Haufung in einer derartigen Exposition), konnen die Untersuchungen zunachst als »subjektiv«, bzw. »transzen­ dental« bezeichnet werden. Die nahere Lokalisierung des Themas wird in drei Zligen vorgenommen: das populare Gegensatzpaar »Ideologie« und »Wissenschaft« fiihrt uns zu den in einer bestimmten philosophischen Tradition fixierten Begriffen »Lebenswelt« und »technische Welt«, deren Widerstreit wiederum von L. £ley auf das ungeklarte Verhaltnis von Phanomenologie und Logik zurlickgefUhrt worden ist. Nach dieser Orts­ bestimmung wird hoffentlich einigermassen verstandlich, dass die Kenn­ zeichnung Wittgensteins als eines Aufldarers nicht nur nicht logische Untersuchungen verbietet, sondern sie vielmehr notwendig macht. (shrink)

ORTSBESTIMMUNG DER PHILOSOPHISCHEN GRAMMATIK I. Absicht dieser Arbeit ist es, ein wenig Licht in die teils komischen, teils lebensgefährlichen Aspekte der Aufsplitterung unseres Lebens in h eines vor und in eines nach I7 zu bringen, und zwar anhand des Ent­ wicklungsgangs der Wittgensteinschen Philosophischen Grammatik. Das aufgezeigte Problem kursiert unter vielen Titeln und Etiketten: Theorie und Praxis, Wissen und Glauben, Beruf und Freizeit o. ä. Diese Auf­ zählungen möchten allerdings kein Unvermögen des Verfassers andeuten, sich auf einen Titel festzulegen. Vielmehr (...) ist es ein wichtiges Resultat Wittgensteinschen Philosophierens, dass verschiedene Sinne nicht selbiges vermeinen, insofern sie denselben Gegenstand meinen, sondern sofern sich der Sinn als Sinn durchhält, d. i. als Gebrauch im Umlauf ist. Insofern der Verfasser mit Wittgenstein die Partikel »d. h. «, »d. i. «, »m. a. W. « und ähnliche für das Philosophieren für konstitutiv und eigentümlich hält, also, mithin die Bestimmung »Sinn ist Sinn als Sinn«! zu erfüllen ver­ sucht (trotz der penetranten Häufung in einer derartigen Exposition), können die Untersuchungen zunächst als »subjektiv«, bzw. »transzen­ dental« bezeichnet werden. Die nähere Lokalisierung des Themas wird in drei Zügen vorgenommen: das populäre Gegensatzpaar »Ideologie« lmd »Wissenschaft« führt uns zu den in einer bestimmten philosophischen Tradition fixierten Begriffen »Lebenswelt« und »technische Welt«, deren Widerstreit wiederum von L. Eley auf das ungeklärte Verhältnis von Phänomenologie und Logik zurückgeführt worden ist. Nach dieser Orts­ bestimmung wird hoffentlich einigermassen verständlich, dass die Kenn­ zeichnung Wittgensteins als eines Aufklärers nicht nur nicht logische Untersuchungen verbietet, sondern sie vielmehr notwendig macht. (shrink)