The identity of working-memory and long-term memory representations follows from many lines of evidence. However, the data provided by Ruchkin et al. are hardly compelling, as they make unproved assumptions about hypothetical generators. We cite studies from our lab in which congruent slow-wave topographies were found for short-term and long-term memory tasks, strongly suggesting that both activate identical cell assemblies.

Evidence for the contribution of the neocortex to memory is overwhelming. However, the theory proposed by Ruchkin et al. does not only ignore subcortical contributions, but also introduces an unnecessary and empirically unsupported division between the posterior cortex, assumed to represent information, and the prefrontal cortex, assumed to control activation. We argue instead that the representational power of the neocortex is not restricted to its posterior part.

Problem: Visions of technology, future scenarios, guiding visions represent imaginations of future states of affairs that play a functional role in processes of technological research, development and innovation—e.g. as a means to create attention, communication, coordination, or for the strategic exertion of influence. Since a couple of years there is a growing attention for such imaginations of futures in politics, the economy, research and the civil society. This trend concerns technology assessment as an observer of these processes and a consultant (...) on the implications of technology and innovation. TA faces increasing demands to assess imaginations of futures that circulate in the present and to participate in shaping these through scenarios or foresights. More than ever, this raises the question, which propositions can be made based on these imaginations by TA and how this can be used in advisory practices. Imaginations of futures are relevant for TA not as predictions but in their significance and effectiveness in the present, which need to be understood and assessed.Contents: This discussion paper outlines how present significance and effects of imagined futures in technological research and innovation processes can be conceived and analyzed. In this paper, all forms of imaginations of technology futures will be called “socio-technical futures” because within them technological developments and social changes are interwoven and inseparably interrelated. In this paper, we discuss why TA should analyze socio-technical futures, how such analyses can grasp the societal conditions that are expressed in the imagined futures and how these become effective in processes of technology development, communication, decision making etc. We raise the question which self-reflexive positioning or possible realignment of TA is needed as a response to its increased concern with assessing and even co-producing socio-technical futures. The latter is often demanded regarding the growing attention by politics and publics to imaginations of futures with wide temporal and spatial reach.Addressee of this paper is the TA community in a broader sense. The aim is to sensitize colleagues for the topic and its challenges, to consolidate discussions and to provide theoretical and methodical suggestions for research in TA and related advisory practices with respect to socio-technical futures. This paper has been originally initiated during the workshop “The present of technological futures-theoretical and methodical challenges for Technology Assessment”, in which all of the paper’s authors participated. The contents of this discussion paper are preliminary results that shall initiate and guide further discussions. (shrink)

Appeals to dispositionality in explanations of phenomena in metaphysics and the philosophy of mind, require that we first agree on what we are talking about. I sketch an account of what dispositionality might be. That account will place me at odds with most current conceptions of dispositionality. My aim is not to establish a weighty ontological thesis, however, but to move the discussion ahead in two respects. First, I want to call attention to the extent to which assumptions philosophers have (...) made about dispositionality are far from innocent. The assumptions incorporate substantive theses that, by constraining the space of acceptable answers to particular philosophical questions, have inhibited the search for answers to those questions. Second, and more positively, I hope to open up the space of possibilities by offering an alternative way of conceiving dispositionality developed by C. B. Martin. (shrink)

The book develops a philosophical foundation to the field of management education using the work of Martin Heidegger as a guiding philosophy. It asks the questions ‘what is a corporation?’ and ‘what is corporate management?’ These two questions are foundational for management thought in general and management ethics in particular. Most other academic fields are in some way defined and guided by a philosophical discourse. This philosophical discourse is largely missing in the field of management thought and education. Without (...) this foundation it can never be clear what actually belongs into a certain academic discipline and what does not. It also therefore lacks a sound and well articulated ontological foundation critical for developing approaches to ethical management. This book seeks to fill this gap and consequently represents an interdisciplinary effort between the academic field of management/business administration and philosophy, which is vital for business ethics. Intended as required reading for an elective on philosophy of management that is offered annually at the Wits Business School / University of the Witwatersrand / Johannesburg. The structure of the course will be largely based on the structure of the book. (shrink)

John Heil’s new book is remarkable in many ways. In a concise, lucid and accessible manner, it develops a complete system of ontology with many strikingly original features and then applies that ontology to fundamental issues in the philosophy of mind, with illuminating results. Although Heil acknowledges his intellectual debts to C. B. Martin, he is unduly modest about his own contribution to the development and application of this novel metaphysical system. A full examination of the position (...) that Heil defends would require a book in itself, so I shall limit myself to discussing some of its central themes and to explaining a few doubts that I have concerning some aspects of it. (shrink)

Impure Eliminativism about Categories is the idea that ontological categories are not wholly eliminable insofar as they have epistemic value to understand the nature of ordinary and scientific objects. From the perspective of Impure Eliminativism, different criticisms have been addressed to substantialist approaches in metaphysics and, in particular, to John Heil’s substance-mode two-category ontology. The aim of this paper is to contribute to this critical project by extending its scope to C. B. Martin’s substantialism. The thesis I defend (...) is that Martin’s substratum-trope two-category ontology satisfies the elimination criterion of Impure Eliminativism for ontological categories because either it is inconsistent or else it supplies a non-exhaustive and non-exclusive categorization of ordinary and scientific objects and their properties. First, I introduce Impure Eliminativism and its novel elimination criterion for ontological categories, and I survey recent criticisms of substantialism from that perspective. Second, I show that nothing satisfies Martin’s definition of substratum in a way that is consistent with Martin’s view on tropes. Third, I note that the attempts to avoid the inconsistency make the categorization supplied by Martin’s ontology either non-exhaustive or non-exclusive. I then conclude that Martin’s substratum-trope categorial system should be eliminated in accordance with the criterion of categorial elimination of Impure Eliminativism. (shrink)

The first thing to note about the present work is that it is divided into twenty short chapters, all of which contain numbered sections averaging two to three pages in length. This organization adds to the concision and clarity of the book and works well with Heil’s attempt to present ideas in an unpretentious manner. The dust jacket tells us that the book is written in an accessible, nontechnical style that is intended for nonspecialists as well as seasoned metaphysicians. (...) But despite the organization and flow of bite-sized nuggets, I doubt anyone with less than graduate training in analytical philosophy will understand the problems and issues. A brief survey of the contemporary philosophers who get the most discussion should confirm the point. This includes: C. B. Martin, D. M. Armstrong, Frank Jackson, David Chalmers, Sidney Shoemaker, E. J. Lowe, Donald Davidson, Saul Kripke, and Hilary Putnam. (shrink)

Heidegger was rector of Freiburg University from April 21, 1933, until sometime in March 1934. Soon after becoming rector, he joined the Nazi Party and devoted much energy and personal initiative to the implementation of Nazi programs in his university. A documentary record of this year is collected in Guido Schneeberger's Nachlese zu Heidegger. Of Schneeberger's 217 documents, 41 contain actual texts by Heidegger or reports of things he said. Thus there is room for useful editing. In the present "translation," (...) Runes unsuccessfully undertakes this task. He retains just 17 of the Schneeberger documents; eight of these contain words by Heidegger. Or perhaps one should say words by Runes, for the mutilated translation does even less credit to Heidegger than the brown clichés that pervade the original. No page is free from such mistranslations as "outdated" for "vollendet," "the State" for "die Stätte," "adherence to tradition" for "Wille zum Wesen," "kiss good-bye" for "einbüßen," "old people's home" for "Elternhaus." In eight different places the word "Hitler" has been inserted. On page 22, e.g., Runes has added his own "Heil Hitler" to Heidegger's signature. Thus, though many of the general facts can be gleaned from this book, it is not reliable as far as detail is concerned. And of course it shares with the original Schneeberger documentation the limitation of giving no hint as to Heidegger's Nazi activities, if any, after early 1934.—J. B. B. (shrink)

The rule-following paradox of Kripke's Wittgenstein posits that there is no fact of the matter about an individual that can determine whether he means one thing or another by a term, such as "+". The paradox thus renders the existence of meaning illusory. The objective of this thesis is to examine the paradox and try to offer a version of a dispositional account that can counteract Kripke's skeptics. ;Gaining insights from previous dispositionalist accounts of meaning and rule-following, including those of (...) Dretske, Fodor, Millikan, Martin & Heil, Shogenji, and Yallowitz, my project is to put all those insights together to formulate a functional view of human dispositions to rule-following which will resolve the error, finitude, and first-person epistemic problems that Kripke raises against the dispositionalist approach. Specifically, I argue that rule-following or meaning consists in one's possessing a disposition, realistically construed. A rule-following disposition is real in the sense that it is responsible for, and hence not to be equated with, its manifestations under various conditions. A person acquires a real disposition to rule-following through a learning history which is constrained by biologically innate human endowments of learning and cognition. The error problem then becomes the problem of how to identify the disposition without vacuity or circularity. My claim is that identifying a rule-following disposition is a task of scientific hypothesizing, which is epistemically and methodologically sound. The finitude problem is in my view a form of Humean inductive skepticism. My response to it is to adopt a reliabilist theory of justification and its treatment of the induction problem. A distinctive contribution of mine is to offer a functionalist account of dispositions and introspection in the resolution of the first-person epistemic problem. My aim is to do full justice to the phenomenology and epistemology of meaning and rule-following from the first-person point of view. ;My conclusion is that a satisfactory dispositional account such as the one I offer not only vindicates the reality of rule-following and meaning but also increases our understanding of the nature of meaning and human rule-following phenomenon. (shrink)

Inter-godsdienstige verhoudinge was nog altyd problematies. Teologie van godsdiens en teologie van godsdienste is die wyse waarop die Christendom oor die teenwoordigheid en aard van ander godsdienste besin. Die kerkhervormers het ook 'n bepaalde verstaan van die bestaan van en verhouding tussen die Christendom en nie-Christelike godsdienste gehad. Hierdie bydrae probeer aantoon hoe die kerkhervormers verskil het in hulle benadering tot ander godsdienste. Martin Luther en Philipp Melanchthon het die moontlikheid van verhoudinge met ander godsdienste, in besonder Jode en (...) Moslems voorgestaan, al was dit dan ook net n momentele mening van Luther. Daarmee verteenwoordig hulle n kategorie van 'moontlikheid'. Johannes Calvyn was meer afwysend teenoor die gedagte van moontlikheid van heil binne ander godsdienste en behoort daarom tot die kategorie van 'geslotenheid'. Die kerkhervormer Theodore Bibliander was oop vir gesprek en positief oor verhoudinge met Moslems alhoewel hy nie gedink het dat heil en verlossing buite die Christendom moontlik is nie. Vir Bibliander het verhouding met ander begin, met kennis van die ander. Hy verteenwoordig die kategorie van 'openheid'. Die kerkhervormers se verstaan van die verhouding met ander godsdienste lewer n bydrae tot n huidige besinning oor inter-godsdienstige verhoudinge. (shrink)

Epiphenomenalism is the view that phenomenal properties – which characterize what it is like, or how it feels, for a subject to be in conscious states – have no physical effects. One of the earliest arguments against epiphenomenalism is the evolutionary argument (James 1890/1981; Eccles and Popper 1977; Popper 1978), which starts from the following problem: why is pain correlated with stimuli detrimental to survival and reproduction – such as suffocation, hunger and burning? And why is pleasure correlated with stimuli (...) beneficial to survival and reproduction – such as eating and breathing? According to the argument, the fact that we have these particular correlations and not other ones must have an evolutionary explanation. But given epiphenomenalism, differences in phenomenal properties could not cause differences in fitness, so natural selection would not be expected to favor these correlations over any other ones. Epiphenomenalism thus renders these correlations an inexplicable coincidence, and should therefore be rejected. The evolutionary argument has been widely criticized and few have deemed it cogent (Broad 1925; Jackson 1982; Robinson 2007; Corabi 2014). In this paper, I will consider previous and potential criticisms and conclude some of them are indeed fatal to the argument if it is understood, as it traditionally has been, as an argument for any standard version of non-epiphenomenalism such as physicalism and interactionism. I will then offer a new and improved version of the argument, as an argument for a particular non-epiphenomenalist view, which I will call the phenomenal powers view. This is the view that phenomenal properties produce and thereby (metaphysically) necessitate their effects in virtue of how they feel, or in virtue of their intrinsic, phenomenal character alone – along the lines of C. B. Martin and John Heil’s powerful qualities view (Martin and Heil 1999; Heil 2003). I will argue that the phenomenal powers view explains the correlations given natural selection far better than any other view. It follows that if (and only if) understood as an argument for the phenomenal powers view, the evolutionary argument is far stronger than it is usually thought to be. (shrink)

The ontology of ‘powerful qualities’ is gaining an increasing amount of attention in the literature on properties. This is the view that the so-called categorical or qualitative properties are identical with ‘dispositional’ properties. The position is associated with C.B. Martin, John Heil, Galen Strawson and Jonathan Jacobs. Robert Schroer ( 2012 ) has recently mounted a number of criticisms against the powerful qualities view as conceived by these main adherents, and has also advanced his own (radically different) version (...) of the view. In this paper I have three main aims: firstly, I shall defend the ontology from his critique, arguing that his criticisms do not damage the position. Secondly, I shall argue that Schroer’s own version of the view is untenable. Thirdly, the paper shall serve to clear up some conceptual confusions that often bedevil the powerful qualities view. (shrink)

One powerful argument for dualism is provided by Chalmers: the ‘zombie’ or conceivability argument. This paper aims to establish that if one adopts the ‘Powerful Qualities’ account of properties developed by Martin and Heil, this argument can be resisted at the first premise: the claim that zombies are conceivable is, by the lights of Chalmers’ own account of conceivability, false. The Powerful Qualities account is outlined. Chalmers’ argument, and several distinctions which underlie it, are explained. It is argued (...) that to make sense of the claim that zombies are conceivable, some account of properties must be given. The paper’s central claim is presented and defended from potential responses: given the Powerful Qualities view, zombies are in fact inconceivable. Finally, an error theory is presented, which offers an explanation of why so many have taken the conceivability of zombies to be unproblematic, and the view is briefly contrasted with Russellian monism. (shrink)

This paper proposes a causal-dispositional account of rule-following as it occurs in reasoning and intentional agency. It defends this view against Kripke’s (1982) objection to dispositional accounts of rule-following, and it proposes a solution to the problem of deviant causal chains. In the first part, I will outline the causal-dispositional approach. In the second part, I will follow Martin and Heil’s (1998) realist response to Kripke’s challenge. I will propose an account that distinguishes between two kinds of rule-conformity (...) and two kinds of rule-following, and I will defend the realist approach against two challenges that have recently been raised by Handfield and Bird (2008). In the third part, I will turn to the problem of deviant causal chains, and I will propose a new solution that is partly based on the realist account of rule-following. (shrink)

Lighting upon Weber as a history student in the late 1950s led to all round engagement with his work to the present day, beginning with rationality and bureaucracy, passing through appreciation of his synoptic vision of modernity, and arguing for the continuing relevance of his rationalization thesis. This emphasis on Weber’s contribution to understanding the course of modernity led in the 1990s to pointing out that his approach to epochal shift provides the basis for understanding the global age. The ever-developing (...) nature of his thought can be further illustrated in his studies of China. (shrink)

Handfield and Bird claim that dispositionalists such as Martin and Heil appeal to antidotes and finks to explain why and how a conditional analysis of dispositions falls to Kripke's criticisms, but fail. The main reason is that some antidotes and finks are unavoidably intrinsic and relatively permanent in an agent, in which case the ascription of a rule-following disposition to the agent is false. In this paper, I contend that the presence of intrinsic and relatively permanent finks or (...) antidotes does not imply the absence of a rule-following disposition; some additional condition is needed for this implication to go through, but remains wanting. I end the paper with a discussion of where the real challenge lies for realist dispositionalism. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:American Journal of Philology 124.1 (2003) 137-141 [Access article in PDF] Qvomodo Stemma Gladiatoris Pellicvlae More Philologico Sit Constitvendvm Martin M. Winklersive Martinvs Satiricvs Philocinematographicvs [Figures]Poetae rervmqve scriptores et antiqui et recentiores lectoribus fabulas suas sententiis vel versibus bene textis soliti sunt adferre. Sed hodie novum exstat narrandi genus, quod fabulas hominibus adfert praecipue picturis eo modo compositis et inter se coniunctis ut oculi humani imagines singulares celerrime (...) et sine ulla motus intermissione ipsas moveri percipiant, personarum dialogis et arte musica sonisque diversis comitantibus et iuvantibus. Adeo enim progressa est ars magna lucis et umbrae, quam primum photographiam deinde cinematographiam nominare consuevimus, ut fabulae cuiusvis modi—breves longae, novae antiquae, laetificae tragicae—imitatione veri paene perfecta spectatoribus persuadeant tempora iam praeterita in vitam novam esse recreata.In ipsa arte narrandi non multum interest inter eos qui verbis utuntur, ut poetae ac scriptores, et eos qui imaginibus, ut cinematographi. Praeclare Horatium in arte poetica exponenda dixisse recordemur ut picturam poesin esse. Qua in re Simonidem illum Ceum aliosque poetas Graecos secutus est Flaccus noster. Utroque enim modo, et verbis et picturis, auctores antiqui atque hodierni homines docent delectant movent. 1 Facillime ergo intellegimus fabulam cinematographicam genus quoddam esse textus, sed textus non tantum legendi aut audiendi sed imprimis videndi vel spectandi. Peritissimus quisque talium fabularum [End Page 137] auctor omne tulit punctum, nam miscuit utile dulci. Is quoque non aliter ac poeta antiquus aut prodesse vult aut delectare.Sed editiones nonnullarum fabularum cinematographicarum inter se differunt et lacunas corruptelas vitia alia exhibent. Non enim raro pelliculas adfectas esse constat eius generis damno quod textuum antiquorum docti in editionibus suis obelis indicare solent. Itemque quomodo fabulae cinematographicae originem suam trahant ab antiquioribus quaerere et explicare haud absurdum est. 2Ergo editorum usum secutus his paginis originem pelliculae Gladiatoris anno MM editae exempli gratia stemmate quasi philologico explicabo. Deinde stemmatis sigla brevibus adnotationibus percurram. 3 Hoc modo me demonstraturum spero principia artis philologicae, quae litterarum Graecarum Romanarumque docti adhuc solum soliti sunt textibus adhibere, fabulis quoque cinematographicis magno cum fructu admoveri posse. In stemmate infra dato titulos fabularum cinematographicarum et auctorum eorum nomina Latine reddidi.Ridlius Scotus, pelliculae Gladiatoris auctor, magna cum acclamatione publica, minore criticorum, narrare studet quae imp. Caes. M. Aurelii Commodi Antonini Aug. aetate in imperio Romano gesta sunt. Sed stemmate monstrabo Gladiatorem imprimis ortum esse a nonnullis fabulis cinematographicis prioribus, quibus sons aut insons copiosissime usus sit ille Scotus. Qua de causa pellicula eius nobis indicat quemadmodum res Romanae temporibus nostris undique floreant. Cum ipsa et ceterae huius modi fabulae falsa inventione abundare soleant, tamen rerum et linguarum Romanarum Graecarumque magistri hodie hoc artis popularis genere in scholis saepius niti consueverunt, ut discipulos a falsa ad veram adducant rerum gestarum scientiam et rebus antiquis accuratius instruant. Quibus igitur magistris hoc offero stemma, nam amicus Scotus, sed magis amica veritas. 4 [End Page 138] [Begin Page 140] Conspectvs Siglorvm WPellicularum res antiquas tractantium archetypus, qui est summa rerum Romanarum a scriptoribus antiquis et recentioribus expositarum.AConsensus fabularum quae vel litteris vel ludis scaenicis vel picturis cinematographicis praecipue Italicis Americanisque res Romanas narrant depinguntque.TTriumphus Animi Helena Riefenstahle auctore anno MDCCCCXXXV editus. 5SSpartacus Antonio Viro—nomine suppresso—et Stanlio Cubrico auctoribus anno MDCCCCLX editus.CCasus Imperii Romani Antonio Viro auctore anno MDCCCCLXIIII editus. 6B1-3Triga Georgii Lucae Bella Galactica inscripta et annis MDCCCCLXXVII MDCCCCLXXX MDCCCCLXXXIII primum edita, quae his picturis cinematographicis constat: Pars Quarta: "Spes Nova" (B1), Pars Quinta: "Imperium Referit" (B2), Pars Sexta: "Iedi Reversi" (B3). 7 Editio trigae altera anno MDCCCCLXXXXVII edita itemque Bellorum Galacticorum trigae novae Pars Prima: "Simulacri Minae" anni MDCCCCLXXXXVIIII nihil ad rem.M1-3Triga Georgii Molitoris Maximus Furens inscripta, annis MDCCCCLXXVIIII MDCCCCLXXXI MDCCCCLXXXV edita et his picturis cinematographicis constans: Maximus Furens (M1), Maximi Furentis Pars Altera vel Bellator Peregrinans (M2), Maximus Furens Vltra Tonitrus Tholum (M3). 8GGladiator Ridlio Scoto auctore anno MM editus. 9 [End Page 140]His alias poteram et plures subnectere causas vel philologicas vel cinematographicas. Qui de Scoti Gladiatore plurima cognoscere velint... (shrink)

En este trabajo partimos de la hipótesis de que Heidegger tiene en miras las nociones aristotélicas de _δύναμις_ (_dýnamis_) y _δυνατóν_ (_dynatón_) al momento de tematizar su concepto de posibilidad (_Möglichkeit_) en _Sein und Zeit_ (1927), pero no con el sólo propósito de asimilar las reseñadas conceptualizaciones –apropiación que, como veremos subsiguientemente, no es plena-, sino también, para radicalizarlas, asumiendo un punto de vista francamente superador. Sustentamos esta tesis, en principio, en el hecho que Aristóteles haya pensado que la _ἐνέργεια_ (...) (_enérgeia_) o _ἐντελέχεια_ (_entelécheia_) es, en términos generales, anterior (_πρότερον_/_próteron_) respecto de la _dýnamis_, siendo esta posición teórica revisada y renovada por Heidegger en el texto reseñado. Por otra parte, Heidegger cuestiona la tesis aristotélica de la fundamentalidad de la realidad efectiva (_Wirklichkeit_) o de la realidad a secas (_Realität_) y como consecuencia de ello, el concepto aristotélico de ser (_εἶναι/eînai_), _ἐστίν_ (_estín_) o lo que es (_ὄν/ón_), señalando no sólo que la posibilidad es más originaria que la realidad efectiva, sino también, que la realización de una posibilidad no implica nunca la transición a una realidad efectiva. Además, el vínculo de Heidegger con Aristóteles se inicia muy tempranamente -más específicamente, en el año 1907-, merced a la lectura de la tesis doctoral de Franz Brentano y se prolonga constantemente desde 1921, cuando Heidegger dicte un seminario sobre _De Anima_ en la Universidad de Friburgo. (shrink)

Analyses of preference for the timing of uncertainty resolution usually assumes all uncertainty to resolve in one point in time. More realistically, uncertainty should be modelled to resolve gradually over time. Kreps and Porteus (1978) have introduced an axiomatically based model of time preference which can explain preferences for gradual uncertainty resolution. This paper presents an experimental test of the Kreps-Porteus model. We derive implications of the model relating preferences for gradual and one-time resolving lotteries. Our data do not support (...) the Kreps-Porteus model but show that some of the behaviour observed may be explained by similarity heuristics. (shrink)

Der Skeptizismus ist der advocatus diaboli der Philosophie. Welche Immunisierungsstrategien fand man gegen ihn? Zu den spannenden und lehrreichen Facetten des Deutschen Idealismus gehört zweifelsohne die mit der Auseinandersetzung mit Kants kritizistischer Position anhebende Debatte um einen neuen Skeptizismus. Von ausserordentlichem Interesse bleibt hierbei der Gehalt der Repliken Reinholds, Fichtes und Hegels auf die Attacken von Gottlob Ernst Schulze. Aus heutiger Perspektive geht es um die philosophische Relevanz und Stringenz der verschiedenen Immunisierungsstrategien gegen den Skeptizismus. Der Band widmet sich den (...) philosophischen Voraussetzungen, systematischen Aspekten und Kontexten der Angriffe Schulzes auf Reinhold, sowie den Auswirkungen dieser zum Teil neu zugespitzten Angriffe bei Fichte, Hegel u.a. (shrink)

The public debate on voluntary termination of life by elderly people, which has been an intensely controversial subject in the Netherlands for some time, has centered around the issue of “completed life” in recent years. In 2016, an ad hoc governmental advisory committee concluded that the already existing Euthanasia Act provided sufficient scope to resolve most of the problems related to the issue. Most of the older adults who feel they no longer have anything to look forward to in their (...) lives and who have developed a wish to die as a result would be able to invoke this Act. Partly for this reason, the committee considered broadening the legal options relating to assisted suicide undesirable. Analysis of the assessment practice of the regional euthanasia review committees reveals that the room for interpretation offered by the Euthanasia Act is indeed considerable. (shrink)

El objetivo de este trabajo es mostrar las diferencias y relaciones entre las concepciones kantianas de dos disciplinas. La primera es la psicología empírica contenida en la Metafísica de Baumgarten, que Kant empleaba para dar sus lecciones de antropología. Consideraremos principalmente la interpretación kantiana de esta psicología. La segunda es la antropología pragmática. Con respecto a esta última disciplina, tendremos en cuenta las lecciones de antropología de Kant y la publicada Antropología en sentido pragmático. Mostraremos que, aunque las concepciones kantianas (...) de la psicología empírica y la antropología pragmática son esencialmente diferentes, hay relaciones entre las mismas. Nuestra conclusión es que la psicología empírica permanece como un cierto enfoque metodológico dentro de la antropología pragmática. Tal enfoque consiste en la consideración de los fenómenos internos, y es uno, entre otros, de los recursos metodológicos empleados por la antropología pragmática. (shrink)

According to the Kripke-Putnam orthodoxy, a term like 'water' refers to samples of the same substance as the items on the basis of which the term was introduced. However, observations due to Needham and Leslie cast doubt on the idea that there is a uniquely privileged notion of substance relevant to the determination of reference, in which case it would seem at best indeterminate what the word `water' refers to. In response to this problem, Gómez-Torrente has argued that there is (...) a privileged notion of substance that plays a role in the determination of reference, namely, the ordinary notion of substance. This paper argues that Gómez-Torrente's proposal is not successful. Contrary to what Gómez-Torrente supposes, there is no uniquely privileged ordinary notion of substance; rather, there are many notions of substance compatible with the meaning of 'substance' none of which seems privileged over the rest. (shrink)

This Thesis engages with contemporary philosophical controversies about the nature of dispositional properties or powers and the relationship they have to their non-dispositional counterparts. The focus concerns fundamentality. In particular, I seek to answer the question, ‘What fundamental properties suffice to account for the manifest world?’ The answer I defend is that fundamental categorical properties need not be invoked in order to derive a viable explanation for the manifest world. My stance is a field-theoretic view which describes the world as (...) a single system comprised of pure power, and involves the further contention that ‘pure power’ should not be interpreted as ‘purely dispositional’, if dispositionality means potentiality, possibility or otherwise unmanifested power or ability bestowed upon some bearer. The theoretical positions examined include David Armstrong’s Categoricalism, Sydney Shoemaker’s Causal Theory of Properties, Brian Ellis’s New Essentialism, Ullin Place’s Conceptualism, Charles Martin’s and John Heil’s Identity Theory of Properties and Rom Harré’s Theory of Causal Powers. The central concern of this Thesis is to examine reasons for holding a pure-power theory, and to defend such a stance. This involves two tasks. The first requires explaining what plays the substance role in a pure-power world. This Thesis argues that fundamental power, although not categorical, can be considered ontologically-robust and thus able to fulfil the substance role. A second task—answering the challenge put forward by Richard Swinburne and thereafter replicated in various neo-Swinburne arguments—concerns how the manifestly qualitative world can be explained starting from a pure-power base. The Light-like Network Account is put forward in an attempt to show how the manifest world can be derived from fundamental pure power. (shrink)

Excerpt from Forschungen Uber die Lateinischen Aristoteles-Ubersetzungen des XIII Jahrhunderts Den XVIl. Band dieser, Beitrage kann ich nicht l1inausgehen lassen, ohne dem Verfasser der Abhandlung uber, Zeit und Ewigkeit nach Thomas von Aquino, welche den Band beginnt, meinem lieben Schuler Dr. Friedrich Josef Beemelmans, ein Wort des Gedenkens nachzurufen Zu Beginn des Weltkan1pfs voll Begeisterung mit dem Bayerischen InfanterieLeibregiment zur Verteidigung des Vaterlandes hinausgezogen, tapfer bewahrt im Kampf, an dem er, von einer Verwundung notdurftig geheilt, alsbald wieder teilnahn 1, starb (...) er am 29. September 1914 bei Flaucourt unweit Peronne den Hel(lentod fur das Vaterland. Viele Hoffnungen sanken Init ihm dahin: fur die Wissenschaft, in der es ihn aulzer zur Philosophie, die er am Institut catholique zu Paris und in Munchen gepflegt hatte, besonders Zur Mathen1atik l1inzog, welcher er als Geisteserbe seines verstorbenen Vaters der als Ministerialrat im Ministerium von ElsasLotliriiigeii insbesondere die technischen Angelegenheiten ver waltete eine besondere Vorliebe entgegenbrachte und die er in Verbindung mit der Philosophie zu seiner Lebens a11fgabe Inachen wollte, sowie fur seine tiefgepruftc, treu sorgende Mutter, eine Schwester des fruheren grolzbritannischen Botschafters in St. Petersburg, Sir Arthtir Nicolson, die an allen seinen Bestrebungen den tatigsten Anteil nahm und der er jederzeit der liebevollste Sohn war. Aber auch die "Beitrage" selbst haben in Inanclien Beziehungen die durch den Krieg geschaffenen Schwierigkeiten zu verspuren gehabt, wie man auch aus dem Vorwort Martin Grabn1anns zu seinen, Forschungen uber die lateinischen Aristoteles ubersetzungen des Xlll. Jahrhunderts" (Heft 5 - 6) ersehen kann. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works.". (shrink)

Metaphysical orthodoxy holds that a privileged minority of properties carve reality at its joints. These are the so-called fundamental properties. This thesis concerns the contemporary philosophical debate about the nature of fundamental properties. In particular, it aims to answer two questions: What is the most adequate conception of fundamental properties? What is the “big picture” world-view that emerges by adopting such a conception? I argue that a satisfactory answer to both questions requires us to embrace a novel conception of powerful (...) qualities, according to which properties are at once dispositional and qualitative. By adopting the proposed conception of powerful qualities, an original theory of fundamental properties comes to light. I call it Dual-Aspect Account. In this thesis, I defend the Dual-Aspect Account and its superiority with respect to rival views of fundamental properties. I illustrate this claim by examining Dispositionalism, the view defended among others by Alexander Bird and Stephen Mumford, Categoricalism, which has been advocated notably by David Lewis and David Armstrong, and the Identity Theory of powerful qualities, primarily championed by C. B. Martin and John Heil. The latter is the standard conception of powerful qualities. However, in the literature, the Identity Theory faces the charge of contradiction. A preliminary task is therefore to show that a conception of powerful qualities is coherent. To accomplish this aim, I introduce the notion of an aspect of a property. On this interpretation, powerful qualities can be thought of as having dispositional and qualitative aspects. I show that such a conception allows us to disambiguate the claim that a property’s dispositionality is identical with its qualitativity, and evade the charge of contradiction. Aspects bring us other theoretical benefits. I illustrate this claim by showing how the Dual-Aspect Account offers us a promising theory of resemblance. I then compare its merits with David Armstrong’s theory of partial identity. The conclusion of this thesis is that the Dual-Aspect Account is better suited to capturing the world as we find it in everyday life and scientific investigation as compared to the theoretical positions examined. (shrink)