This first volume in the four-volume series The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law focuses on the "harm principle," the commonsense view that prevention of harm to persons other than the perpetrator is a legitimate purpose of criminal legislation. Feinberg presents a detailed analysis of the concept and definition of harm and applies it to a host of practical and theoretical issues, showing how the harm principle must be interpreted if it is to be a plausible guide to the lawmaker.

Because of immigration in the West, increased cultural diversity poses a variety of problems for the criminal justice system. This paper examines whether a so‐called “cultural defense” ought to be allowed as a freestanding defense to a criminal charge. Such a defense would “negate or mitigate criminal responsibility where acts are committed under a reasonable good‐faith belief in their propriety, based on the actor's cultural heritage or tradition.” The cultural defense, as a formal defense, and the use of cultural evidence (...) in order to buttress one of the traditional defenses, are distinguished. Three cases are discussed to illustrate the issues. The possible similarity of the cultural defense to an ignorance or mistake of law defense is then considered. The latter is accepted by such theorists as Gunther Arzt and George P. Fletcher and also apparently in German law, but it is rejected by Jerome Hall on the ground that it undermines the objectivity of the criminal law. The similarity, however, is shown not to hold. It is concluded that a freestanding cultural defense should not be allowed. (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: Questions About Responsibility The Holmesian Approach: Objective Liability Aristotle on Voluntary Action and Responsibility The Model Penal Code and Voluntariness Responsibility as a Defeasible Concept: H.L.A. Hart Individual Responsibility: Antony Duff Individual Responsibility: Norrie's Critique of Duff The Abandonment of Responsibility: Wootton The General Rationale of Excuses: H.L.A. Hart Conclusion References Further Reading.

After a brief discussion of altruism, supererogation, and the duty to rescue in American and Jewish Law, this paper turns to an examination of the challenge to altruism presented by the developing field of evolutionary psychology. Evolutionary psychology is the investigation of animal behavior from the perspective of natural selection. The fundamental issue, as E.O. Wilson says, is the question, "How can altruism, which by definition reduces personal fitness, possibly evolve by natural selection?" According to a seminal article in the (...) field, "Models that attempt to explain altruistic behavior in terms of natural selection are models designed to take the altruism out of altruism." The challenge of evolutionary psychology is that it provides a "genealogy of morals" that many have found to be disturbing. From the evolutionary perspective what crucially matters is the reproductive success of the individual animal, the transmission of its genes to later generations, and this provides the measure of its individual fitness. The evolutionary psychologist's argument proceeds by the introduction of three basic concepts: kin selection , reciprocal altruism, and indirect reciprocity. Each of these concepts is critically analyzed. It is concluded that the current status of altruism and cooperation is not affected by evolutionary history. They do have a genetic basis, but then so does everything about human beings, nastiness as well as cooperation; it does not follow that motives for cooperation are always self-serving. Nach einer kurzen Erörterung von Altruismus, Supererogation und der Hilfeleistungspflicht im amerikanischen und jüdischen Recht wendet sich der Artikel einer Untersuchung der Anforderungen zu, die die Evolutionspsychologie an den Altruismus stellt. Evolutionspsychologie ist die Erforschung tierischen Verhaltens aus der Perspektive der natürlichen Auslese. Das grundlegende Problem ist, wie E.O. Wilson sagt, die Frage: "Wie kann sich Altruismus, der per definitionem die eigenen Fähigkeiten vermindert, durch natürliche Auslese entwickeln?" Nach einem bahnbrechenden Artikel sind "Modelle, die versuchen, altruistisches Verhalten in Begriffen der natürlichen Auslese zu erklären, darauf angelegt, dem Altruismus das Altruistische zu nehmen". Die Herausforderung der Evolutionspsychologie ist die von ihr bereitgestellte "Genealogie der Sitten", die von vielen als eine Beeinträchtigung empfunden wird. Vom Standpunkt der Evolution kommt es entscheidend auf den Reproduktionserfolg des einzelnen Wesens an, auf die Übertragung seiner Gene auf spätere Generationen, und das liefert den Maßstab für seine eigenen Fähigkeiten. Die Argumentation der Evolutionspsychologen fährt mit der Einführung von drei grundlegenden Begriffen fort: "kin selection" , reziproker Altruismus und indirekte Reziprozität. Jeder dieser Begriffe wird kritisch analysiert. Daraus folgt, daß der gegenwärtige Stand von Altruismus und Kooperation von der Evolutionsgeschichte nicht beeinflußt ist. Altruismus und Kooperation haben eine genetische Basis. Aber das haben alle menschlichen Eigenschaften, Bosheit genauso wie Kooperation. Daraus folgt nicht, daß die Motive für Kooperation stets dem Handelnden dienen. (shrink)

If the University had a constitution, would it contain a free speech provision such as exists in the U.S. Constitution? The author develops in some detail the idea of the University as a special social institution that has as its goal the dissemination and advancement of knowledge.Free Speech on Campus examines the arguments, pro and con, concerning appropriate standards of discourse and expression that are particularly germane to the campus context, public or private, whether or not they are constitutionally enforceable. (...) Students and teachers in every discipline will find this book engaging and illuminating; it is especially relevant for ethicists and philosophers of education. (shrink)

Dealing with issues pivotal to Jewish law theory, this volume offers English-language readers a concise presentation of an important legal tradition. This volume touches on theological concerns of Judaism and the law, but it focuses on broader trends in legal theory. essays address the philosophy of law and jurisprudential analysis which have contributed to modern legal systems.

From the perspectives of Jewish tradition, particularly that of the Halakhah (Jewish law), this paper considers the policy problem of the balance in health care allocations between preventive and curative or crisis medicine. Since the value of human lives has a high degree of supremacy, and the duties to rescue imperiled life and to treat the sick are recognized, it might be argued that a basically curative policy should be favored. On the other hand, the duty of personal health maintenance (...) and safety would appear to argue in favor of a preventive policy. In balancing these considerations, it is suggested that the halakhic tradition can accommodate a preventive policy of health care because the duty to rescue is lessened or negatived by risk to the as-it-were rescuers. It is further suggested that Halakhah permits a non-divertable allocation of tax-generated funds to preventive health care. Keywords: Preventive medicine, curative medicine, value of human lives, duty to rescue, risk taking, Jewish law ( Halakhah ), charity tax CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

The underlying theme of this article is how a successor state should deal with its past. It considers whether a state that is committed to the rule of law may depart from it in order to deal with problems left to it by its predecessor regime. Specifically, may it use retroactive legislation to punish informers who collaborated with a predecessor police state? Lon Fuller's formulation of the canons of the rule of law as an internal morality of law is expounded (...) as well as his notion of legal pathology as symptomatic of departure from the canons' requirements. Various problems inherent to the implementation of the rule of law are examined, such as the effect of the passage of time on reasonable expectations. While legal pathology is always a matter of degree, police states are shown to suffer seriously from it. Among the examples discussed are Nazi Germany and Communist East Germany, though it is granted that there are moral differences between them. In the course of the discussion, a response is made to some contemporary critiques of the rule of law. Although it would be difficult to formulate a retroactive law for punishing informers, it is argued that such a law may be the best way for a successor state to express a moral judgment on its past. Diesem Artikel liegt die Frage zugrunde, in welcher Weise ein Nachfolge-Staat mit seiner Vergangenheit umgehen sollte. Es wird untersucht, ob ein Staat, der sich der Idee des Rechtsstaats verpflichtet fühlt, von dieser Idee abrücken darf, um mit den Problemen umzugehen, die ihm von seinem Vorgänger-Staat hinterlassen worden sind. Insbesondere wird gefragt, ob ein solcher Staat zu dem Mittel rückwirkender Gesetzgebung greifen darf, um Denunzianten zu bestrafen, die mit einem vorangehenden Polizeistaat kollaboriert haben. Lon Fullers Formulierung der Prinzipien eines Rechtsstaats im Sinne einer internen Moralität des Rechts wird ebenso erläutert wie sein Begriff von rechtlicher Pathologie als Symptom für ein Abgehen von den Anforderungen der genannten Prinzipien. Verschiedene Schwierigkeiten, die mit der Verwirklichung des Rechtsstaats entstehen, werden näher untersucht, so etwa die Auswirkungen des Zeitablaufs hinsichtlich vernünftiger Erwartungen . Wenngleich rechtliche Pathologie immer eine Frage des Grades ist, kann doch gezeigt werden, daß Polizeistaaten ernstlich an ihr leiden. Unter den diskutierten Beispielen sind Nazi-Deutschland und das kommunistische Ostdeutschland, obwohl zugegeben werden muß, daß es zwischen diesen moralische Unterschiede gibt. Im Verlauf der Untersuchung wird zudem auf einige gegenwärtige kritische Stellungnahmen zum Rechtsstaat erwidert. Obwohl es schwierig wäre, ein rückwirkendes Gesetz zur Bestrafung von Denunzianten zu formulieren, wird doch die These vertreten, daß ein derartiges Gesetz der beste Weg für einen Nachfolge-Staat sein könnte, ein moralisches Urteil über seine Vergangenheit zum Ausdruck zu bringen. (shrink)

The principle of bivalence is the assertion that every statement is either true or else false. Its legal analog, however, must be formulated relative to particular legal systems and in terms of validity rather than truth. It asserts that every statement of law that can be formulated in the vocabulary of a given legal system is valid or else invalid in that system. A line of New York cases is traced, beginning with Thomas v. Winchester . This case, which involved (...) a poison mislabeled as a medicine, established an exception to the rule that a manufacturer or supplier is never liable for negligence to a remote purchaser. The court made an exception because a poison is an “imminently dangerous” thing. How far may this exception be applied to other fact‐situations? Some subsequent cases are examined, and it is considered whether there is no correct answer in these instances and, more dramatically, whether more than one correct answer is tenable. In either event the legal analog of bivalence would seem to fail. (shrink)

This paper deals with three topics: types of rights, the development of the terminology of rights, and the question of the primacy of welfare rights. Because these topics are interrelated, my exposition does not observe rigid boundaries among them. There is no pretence at all that any of these subjects is fully covered here; nor is it proposed, except for one writer, to touch upon the contemporary literature on rights, as noteworthy as some of that literature is. In order to (...) gain entrance into the field, on which the writing has grown to massive proportions, I shall begin with an interesting historical phenomenon, some of whose philosophical import I want to explore. I should say at the outset, however, that the general motivation of this paper is the problem of the significance of the language of “rights.” Does it really make a difference, for instance, to speak of the “rights of man” rather than the “common duties of humanity”? Does the term “rights” add anything of special significance or is its only significance rhetorical and ideological? Can we dispense with the language of rights and still say everything we need to say about our moral relations? I confess to a moderate skepticism about the necessity of the language of rights in the last analysis. At any rate, this paper is intended as a contribution, however small, to this problem. The historical phenomenon with which I am going to begin will enable us to bring into focus the issue of the meaning of “rights.”. (shrink)

This paper seeks to establish a connection between the existence of a legal system and the ideal of the rule of law. Its point of departure is the phenomenon of a transitional regime that is attempting to restore or institute the rule of law. Lon Fuller's formulation of the canons of the rule of law as an internal morality of law is expounded as well as his notion of legal pathology as symptomatic of departure from the canons' requirements. The existence (...) of a legal system, it is argued, is a matter of degree, covariant with the degree to which the rule of law is realized. Problems inherent to the implementation of the rule of law are examined, such as the effect of the passage of time on reasonable expectations. While legal pathology is always a matter of degree, police states are shown to suffer seriously from it. Among the examples discussed are Nazi Germany and Communist East Germany, though it is granted that there are moral differences between them. Finally, a response is made to some contemporary critiques of the rule of law. (shrink)

This article focuses on questions of pure fact-of-the-matter and asks whether two omniscient judges may disagree over the legal answer to a straightforward question of a matter of fact. There are approaches to legal theory among some western and Jewish philosophers of law whereby at least superficially it is possible that two or more contradictory legal statements regarding a given reality can be equally correct. The article provides a critical analysis of three different models derived from the Jewish legal literature, (...) and reviews the contributions of Jewish sources to the understanding of the phenomenon of disagreements concerning matters of fact. (shrink)