We give sound and complete tableau and sequent calculi for the prepositional normal modal logics S4.04, K4B and G 0(these logics are the smallest normal modal logics containing K and the schemata A A, A A and A ( A); A A and AA; A A and ((A A) A) A resp.) with the following properties: the calculi for S4.04 and G 0are cut-free and have the interpolation property, the calculus for K4B contains a restricted version of the cut-rule, the (...) so-called analytical cut-rule.In addition we show that G 0is not compact (and therefore not canonical), and we proof with the tableau-method that G 0is characterised by the class of all finite, (transitive) trees of degenerate or simple clusters of worlds; therefore G 0is decidable and also characterised by the class of all frames for G 0. (shrink)
The studies of the Czech phenomenologist Jan Patočka has been flourishing recently. Martin Ritter’s book Into the World: The Movement of Patočka’s Phenomenology offers an important contribution to the debate and a long-awaited critical presentation of Patočka’s asubjective phenomenology as well as creative re-reading of Patočka's central doctrine of the movements of existence.
Abstract The work of Martin Buber oscillates between talk in which transcendence is experienced and talk in which transcendence is merely postulated. In order to show and mend this incoherence in Buber's thought, this essay attends to the rhetoric of verification ( Bewährung ), primarily but not solely in I and Thou (1923), both in order to show how it is a symptom of this incoherence, and also to show a broad pragmatic strain in Buber's thought. Given this pragmatic (...) strain, the essay argues that a weak notion of Buberian verification, in which taking a dialogic stance with reference to others evinces the right to talk of the real possibility of transcendence (a You-world, or God as the “eternal You“), is all that is necessary to combat despair. Strong notions of encounter are unnecessary, and also sink Buber in a morass of theodicy, in which he interprets historical misfortune and destruction as evidence of history's meaning. (shrink)
There is no adequate understanding of contemporary Jewish and Christian theology without reference to Martin Buber. Buber wrote numerous books during his lifetime (1878-1965) and is best known for I and Thouand Good and Evil. Buber has influenced important Protestant theologians like Karl Barth, Emil Brunner, Paul Tillich, and Reinhold Niebuhr. His appeal is vast--not only is he renowned for his translations of the Hebrew Bible but also for his interpretation of Hasidism, his role in Zionism, and his writings (...) in psychotherapy and political philosophy. In addition to a general introduction, each chapter is individually introduced, illuminating the historical and philosophical context of the readings. Footnotes explain difficult concepts, providing the reader with necessary references, plus a selective bibliography and subject index. (shrink)
What exactly is hope and how does it influence our decisions? In How We Hope, Adrienne Martin presents a novel account of hope, the motivational resources it presupposes, and its function in our practical lives. She contends that hoping for an outcome means treating certain feelings, plans, and imaginings as justified, and that hope thereby involves sophisticated reflective and conceptual capacities. Martin develops this original perspective on hope--what she calls the "incorporation analysis"--in contrast to the two dominant philosophical (...) conceptions of hope: the orthodox definition, where hoping for an outcome is simply desiring it while thinking it possible, and agent-centered views, where hoping for an outcome is setting oneself to pursue it. In exploring how hope influences our decisions, she establishes that it is not always a positive motivational force and can render us complacent. She also examines the relationship between hope and faith, both religious and secular, and identifies a previously unnoted form of hope: normative or interpersonal hope. When we place normative hope in people, we relate to them as responsible agents and aspire for them to overcome challenges arising from situation or character. Demonstrating that hope merits rigorous philosophical investigation, both in its own right and in virtue of what it reveals about the nature of human emotion and motivation, How We Hope offers an original, sustained look at a largely neglected topic in philosophy. (shrink)
Martin Buber appartient à plusieurs mondes : celui de la Vienne fin de siècle dans laquelle il naît en 1878, du sionisme culturel, de la République de Weimar et de la renaissance juive, celui de la lutte contre le nazisme, de l'exil dans la Palestine du Mandat où il débarque en 1938, enfin celui de la naissance du jeune État d'Israël. Philosophe, historien des religions, interprète de la mystique juive, il a correspondu avec tous les grands esprits de son (...) temps. À sa mort à Jérusalem en 1965, c'est une conscience de l'humanisme hébreu qui disparaît. Pour la première fois en français, un choix de lettres traduites de plusieurs langues permet de restituer un itinéraire intellectuel à nul autre pareil, quelques époques à jamais disparues, et la réalisation d'une utopie, le retour des juifs en Terre sainte. Professeur à Francfort et à l'Université hébraïque, traducteur de la Bible, penseur du dialogue, militant de l'entente avec les Arabes et exégète inspiré des Hassidim, ses lettres sont une pièce capitale de la pensée allemande et européenne. Y apparaissent les figures de Kafka, de Benjamin, d'Einstein, de Scholem, de Rosenzweig, mais aussi de Gandhi, de Jung, de Barth ou de Georg, de Rang, de Dibelius, de Lou Andreas-Salomé et de tant d'autres, juives ou non, qui trouvèrent en Buber un interlocuteur privilégié. (shrink)
This book explores a question central to philosophy--namely, what does it take for a belief to be justified or rational? According to a widespread view, whether one has justification for believing a proposition is determined by how probable that proposition is, given one's evidence. In this book this view is rejected and replaced with another: in order for one to have justification for believing a proposition, one's evidence must normically support it--roughly, one's evidence must make the falsity of that proposition (...) abnormal in the sense of calling for special, independent explanation. This conception of justification bears upon a range of topics in epistemology and beyond. Ultimately, this way of looking at justification guides us to a new, unfamiliar picture of how we should respond to our evidence and manage our own fallibility. This picture is developed here. (shrink)