The main purpose of this book is to investigate, from the philosophical point of view, the concept of mind in some quickly developing fields of contemporary science, from physics and cosmology to biology and cognitive science. New scientific investigations have brought many empirical results that help to explain natural phenomena from quantum states to human thinking, yet the question of the nature of the mind itself is still open. In this book, the authors discuss several philosophical problems raised or reformulated (...) by recent scientific discoveries. The authors use an interdisciplinary and holistic approach that bridges the gap between scientific and humanistic pictures of the mind. (shrink)

Le problème principal présenté dans cet article est le point de vue philosophique ou théologique d’Einstein dans sa phrase célèbre: Dieu ne joue pas aux dés. Quel en était le concept « fondamental » de nécessité? Et avant tout: quel est ce Dieu qui ne joue pas aux dés? Est-ce un Dieu théiste, déiste ou panthéiste? Certains autres passages des écrits informels d’Einstein et de ses discours montrent qu’il était très proche du panthéisme, admirateur de Spinoza qu’il considérait comme le (...) plus grand des philosophes. Pourtant le panthéisme de Spinoza implique le déterminisme qui, probablement, n’a pas été la raison principale de son désaccord avec Dieu qui joue aux dés dans la physique quantique. Donc il est sans importance que le Dieu d’Einstein soit plus proche du Pantocrator de Newton, ou plutôt de Deus sive natura de Spinoza. Peut-être que oui, mais seulement si le Souverain universel ne punit ni ne récompense ses créatures, donc nous-mêmes, ces êtres minuscules dans ce monde immense et bien harmonisé. L’énigme est toujours posée. (shrink)

Der Artikel setzt sich vornehmlich mit der Frage auseinander, was es mit Einsteins berühmtem Dictum Gott würfelt nicht im philosophischen und/oder theologischen Sinne auf sich hat. Welches ist das grundlegende Konzept der Notwendigkeit, auf der dieser Satz beruht, und vor allem: Welcher Gott, der nicht spielt, ist hier gemeint – der theistische, der deistische oder der pantheistische? Einige Abschnitte aus Einsteins Schriften und öffentlichen Reden legen die Vermutung nahe, dass er dem Pantheismus zugeneigt war, in Anlehnung an Spinoza, den er (...) stets bewunderte und von allen Philosophen am meisten schätzte. Allerdings setzt Spinozas Pantheismus Determinismus voraus, was vermutlich nicht der Hauptgrund für Einsteins Protest gegen einen „würfelnden Gott” in der Quantenphysik gewesen sein mag… Sollte demnach Einsteins Gott dem Newton’schen Pantokrator oder Spinozas Deus sive natura näher stehen? Das ist möglich, aber nur wenn der Universalherrscher seine Kreaturen, uns winzige Geschöpfe, in einem immensen und vor allem „wohltemperierten” Universum weder bestraft noch belohnt. Das Änigma des berühmten Satzes bleibt ungelöst. (shrink)

This paper deals with one of the basic philosophical questions in modern cosmology: can the so-called Anthropic Principle , considered as an alternative to the classical teleology of creation, be an adequate explanation of the evidence that our universe is fine-tuned for the emergence of life and consciousness. The main problem with this principle is not its presumed teleology, as it is sometimes wrongly supposed, but quite the contrary: its intention to avoid teleological explanations by including the existence of many (...) universes ( multiverse ) into extended cosmological models. After having compared logical and cosmological many-worlds concepts, this paper reaches the conclusion that the ontological reality of the multiverse is an even more problematic presupposition than some properly revised version of teleological causality. This in itself does not imply the classical theistic explanation of creation, since it also yields a pantheistic explanation of the emergence of life and consciousness in our universe. (shrink)

The main issue of this paper is the question what Einstein actually meant from the philosophical and/or theological point of view in his famous phrase God does not play dice. What is the ‘underlying’ concept of necessity in this phrase, and first of all: which God here does not play dice – theistic, deistic, pantheistic? Some other passages from Einstein’s informal writings and public speeches suggest that he was very close to pantheism, following Spinoza, whom he admired and appreciated mostly (...) among philosophers. However, Spinoza’s pantheism implies determinism which was presumably not the main point of Einstein’s protest against ‘dicing God’ in quantum physics… So, is Einstein’s God nevertheless closer to Newton’s Pantocrator as to Spinoza’s Deus sive natura? Maybe yes, but only in case if the ‘Universal Ruler’ does not punish, neither reward his creatures, ourselves, tiny human beings in the mighty and incredibly ‘well-tuned’ cosmos. The enigma of the famous phrase remains. (shrink)

In this essay, the author outlines his re-construction of Spinoza’s ontological monism by re-presenting the system of Ethica, ordine geometrico demonstrata , in an “intuitive” model of the Perfect Diamond, called NATURADEUS. So, for example, ordo et connexio idearum et rerum , is presented to the inner eye in the forms of two parallel structures, of rays and of facets within the NATURADEUS, respectively. The conceptual background of the proposed model is mostly analytic, the author essays to develop some ideas (...) of Jonathan Bennett’s Spinoza’s metaphysics (especially “transattributive mode identity”), with strong emphasis on ethical issues of ontological monism or pantheism. This essay is written as a dialogue between master Bruno and his student John (physically absent at the moment). More philosophical dialogues of this kind can be found on the author’s web page and in his book Four Seasons (in Slovenian, 2002). (shrink)

The Oration on the Dignity of Man makes a claim, characteristic for the Renaissance, that the dignity of man, the real “excellency of human nature,” is not present in any specific human quality or ability. Neither is it present in the role of the human soul as the “tie of the world”, as Marsilio Ficino has taught. Even higher than this eminent human role in the world is the freedom of man to choose his role and task himself. At the (...) same time, Pico believes that Man was created as the image of God, in the sense that no man is determined in advance: human free will reflects God’s free will in creation. From the point of view of the mainstream modern dualism, this is a paradox, even a contradiction. This paper argues the opposite: that the human free will is even nowadays, not less than in the Renaissance period, compatible with the belief in God. However, this is only the case if God does not command anything, if God does not demand anything – except love. Violence and killing are eo ipso prohibited, especially in the name of faith. Therefore, freedom and faith are perfectly compatible. Even more, modern humans are fatally unfree either in the secular “radicalization” of faith or in the atheistic secularization of the world. Unfree due to their existence, enslaved by the Angst of “mere nothing.”. (shrink)

This paper deals with one of the basic philosophical questions in modern cosmology: can the so-called “Anthropic Principle”, considered as an alternative to the classical teleology of creation, be an adequate explanation of the evidence that our universe is “fine-tuned” for the emergence of life and consciousness. The main problem with this principle is not its presumed teleology, as it is sometimes wrongly supposed, but quite the contrary: its intention to avoid teleological explanations by including the existence of many universes (...) (“multiverse”) into extended cosmological models. After having compared logical and cosmological many-worlds concepts, this paper reaches the conclusion that the ontological reality of the “multiverse” is an even more problematic presupposition than some properly revised version of teleological causality. This in itself does not imply the classical theistic explanation of creation, since it also yields a pantheistic explanation of the emergence of life and consciousness in our universe. (shrink)