In After God: Morality & Bioethics in a Secular Age, Professor H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr. argues that the now dominant intellectual culture of the West actively shuns any transcendent point of orientation, such as an appeal to God or to a God’s eye perspective on reality. Instead, it seeks to frame its understanding of reality and morality, and thus its bioethics, without reference to any foundation outside of particular human concerns. This article explores the implications of living in a secular (...) culture that eschews any appeal to a fully objective perspective on reality. Drawing on Engelhardt’s analysis, it argues that absent access to a binding moral standpoint that is not already conditioned by a particular society, culture, or place in history, all moral and bioethical commitments are merely contingent, subject to particular human interests, aesthetic inclinations, personal intuitions, idiosyncratic choices, and political objectives. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 125 oped the theory of the swerve and applied it to the problem of voluntary action, also made use of it in his defense of moral responsibility" (l ~9-3o). The distinction Englert has in mind is between to hekousion and to eph' heroin, a distinction he had emphasized in his long chapter 5 on Aristotle, and insisted was important to Epicurus as well. But the promise is (...) not realized; we are told only that to eph' heroin is saved just as is to hekousion, by insisting that the swerve marks a causal break (135). The book then ends with some undigested matters: David Sedley's work on Epicurus 's On Nature and Don Fowler's suggestion that the mind's act of focus (epibole)might constitute a swerve. There is more to be said for their views. And more against. The last word on the subject has yet to be written. JEFFREY S. PURINTON Princeton University Gerard O'Daly. Augustine's Phzlosophy of Mind. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1987. Pp. xii + 241. $35.00. Paul Rigby. Original Sin in Augustine's "Confessions." Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1987. Pp. 137. Paper, $17.95. Augustine's philosophy of the human person is one of the most neuralgic points in his thought, and the neuralgic soreness spreads to almost every other compartment of his thinking. Since there is still much to learn in this troubled area, one can only welcome the publication of these two studies. O'Daly's book aspires to deal with the entire list of questions involved in the ancient world's Platonic tractatus De anima, whereas Rigby focuses on a single issue, critically evaluating (and largely refuting) the contention put forth by Athanase Sage in two classic articles: that the Augustine who wrote the Confessions had not yet come to think of humanity as guilty of original sin. The breadth of O'Daly's focus also betrays a distinctly confident attitude toward the wide array of matters he must discuss; he seems to view the Augustinian field as relatively trouble free. The central chapters of his book originated as a Habilitation thesis for the University of Heidelberg: hence the generous display of German scholarship, but also a greater serenity toward the difficulties non-German students might perhaps raise against some of his conclusions. He moves from Augustine's general theory of the soul, through claapters on the soul's "lower" activities (sense-perception, imagination, and memory), to that peculiar Augustinian preoccupation with the soul's measurement of time; he then concludes with the psychology of what Augustine would term "knowledge" in the higher (i.e., intellectual) sense of the term. The atmosphere throughout is encyclopedic, but then so is the impressive scale of O'Daly's learning; at the end, though, the reader is especially grateful for the two valuable indices---one topical the other an Index locorum--which help in retrieving the multitude both of texts and topics O'Daly handles. O'Daly is confident that Augustine's views on most of these matters solidified early on, so he feels entitled tojump about from early to late works and back again. Those who 126 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 28:1 JANUARY 199o find Augustine's thought more fluid will question this methodology, even find it circular ; it supposes a continuity of thought which ought rather to be proven. But this nondevelopmental approach results in another loss--the living sense of context, the controlled excitement that invariably marks Augustine's own thinking, has mostly drained off. This is all the more disappointing since O'Daly writes a pleasing prose style. But that judgment may only reflect the preferential conviction that we still have more exciting things to learn about Augustine's philosophy of human nature than O'Daly is willing to admit. Is this, one wonders, the reason why he ignores the many relevant insights contained in Oliver DuRoy's massive study? He is particularly adamant on the question of the soul's origin, yet one is at liberty to doubt that forty-four years of Augustine's thinking on this gnawing issue can be treated adequately in a... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:EPILOGUE Robert J. Daly, SJ. Boston College April 2002 Iwill arrange my comments under four headings: (1) what we had hoped to accomplish; (2) what we actually did accomplish; (3) what we may have learned from this; (4) what this might now enable us to do in thefuture. This epilogueisbeingwritten in April, 2002,twenty-twomonths after the conference. To draw what good we can from this delay, writing at this (...) distance allows me to summarize and draw conclusions with, perhaps, a bit more balance. On the other hand, my listening again to the audio record in the course ofpreparing this publication has enabled me to relive something of the original experience. (1)As I indicated in the introduction, we had unrealistically hoped that, by the time ofthe conference, the five presenters, and perhaps also the twoprincipals inthe "Girard-Lonergan Conversation," wouldhavealready exchanged with each other not just first drafts, but even second drafts of their papers, and that the conference itself would then be invited to join a conversation that was already well under way. As it turned out, I couldn't muster the organizational skills and resources needed to achieve this. But reflecting after the fact, I can see that so carefully detailed a preparation might have been counterproductive. Carrying out our original plan might have been at the cost ofimposing more ofa Western analytic pattern on our discussion ofother traditions, and of!thus smothering from the outset some of the insight that did occur. We had also hoped that the opening "Girard-Lonergan Conversation" would provide an analytic resource for the rest of the meeting. But that did not happen to any great extent. (2)The proximate preparation for this conference began with a draft version ofmy paper being sent to the other major presenters. I opened with 194Robert J. Daly, SJ. a series of brief sketches of salient points in the often unhappy but also occasionally felicitous history ofChristianity on this theme ofviolence and institution. Then, after emphasizing the importance of distinguishing between the normative and the descriptive, I tried to make some sense, both rational and theological, of all this data, especially by reflecting on the influences and consequences ofthe belief in hell, on the one hand, and the hope of universal salvation, on the other. The next major religious theme was Judaism. Reuven Kimelman provided a detailed—and, for some, overwhelming—glimpse of the way the talmudic traditions deal with the theme of war and its restrictions. This highly text-oriented and interpretation-of-texts driven presentation seemed to many, at first, to be irrelevant to mimetic theory and to the need to be confronting actual violence. But, in the course of Sandor Goodhart's response, and in the course ofthe at times spirited discussion that followed, we began to understand that how one interprets texts and traditions, and how these are played off against each other, is indeed fundamental to the way Jews typically try to deal with the practical challenges of violence. Qamar-ul Huda's presentation on IsIamfocused stronglyonthe way the spiritual teachings of Islam—i.e., islam as a religion rather than Islam as a political or national institution—foster peace. The initial reaction was somewhat similarto the reaction to Kimelman's paper: disappointment that Huda was not talking more directly about contemporary Muslim extremist violence. But here, too, the discussion enabled us to catch a glimpse both of the inner spiritual resources of Islam, and of the limitations ofthe range of concerns that Westerners typically bring to the table. Francis Clooney, in his presentation ofHinduism, strongly emphasized the great variety in Hinduism, stressing that one cannot speak ofHinduism as such. Much of this variety comes from the several millennia of Hindu history, and from the complex relationships to Buddhism and Jainism which, themselves, are important parts of Hindu history, and also from the fact that only recently have Hindus, after centuries of Moslem or Colonial domination, once again returned to positions of political and military power. Finally, Christopher Ives's presentation on Buddhism, in a way similar to my presentation on Christianity, but more extensively or more consequently, pointed out the various ways in which Buddhism has been politically and... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Introduction VIOLENCE AND INSTITUTION IN CHRISTIANITY Robert J. Daly, SJ. Boston College We need both to define our terms and to indicate whether we are using them in a normative or descriptive sense. Thus the question: "Is Christianity"—or, if you will—"Are the institutions of Christianity violent or nonviolent?" can be answered with either a Yes, or a No, or with anything in between, depending on the meaning we (...) attach to theterms "violence," "institution," and "Christianity" (Daly 1997, 321-43). When we speak normatively, or take Christianity and its institutions accordingto its best ideals, Christianity isessentially nonviolent. But when we speak descriptively, i.e., take Christianity according to what the institutions ofChristianity have actually done, and according to how those who call themselves Christian have actually acted, we can make the argument that Christianity is violent, ffanalogous distinctions can be made from within the other four traditions, this might offer a good starting point for discussion. Adapting to my purpose standard dictionary definitions, I understand violence to include in a broad way the justified or unjustified human exertion of internal or external power or force in order to achieve an injurious or abusive end, i.e., an end that is against the will, the good, or the interests of those who suffer it. (This includes all war and avoids, at least at the outset, arguments about whether a war is or can be a "just war.") I understand institution in its ordinary meaning of: any significant or established practice, relationship, structure, system, or organization in a society or culture. I understand Christianity also in its ordinary sense: the Roberti. Daly, SJ.5 religion which, derived from Jesus Christ, and based on the Bible, is professed by Eastern, Roman Catholic, and Protestant bodies. Now, to help set the background for our discussion, I will try to list and briefly describe, relative to this theme, some of the major aspects or "moments" of Christianity (or Christian History), and do this in an approximately diachronic or chronological order. Much of this will be descriptive, but I will not go out of my way to dissociate the descriptions from the effects of all normative claims. I.Violence and Institution in the History of Christianity [1] The biblical foundation of Christianity in the Hebrew Scriptures. [2]The pervasiveness of violence in the Bible. [3]The Christian Scriptures present themselves as a gospel of peace. [4]Jesus and nonviolence. [5]Early Christians and nonviolence. [6]The early Christians and the military. [7]The "Constantinian turn." [8]Caesaro-papism. [9]The relegation ofChristian pacifism to religious and monastic life. [10]The just war theory. [11]The medieval Christian taken-for-grantedness of violence. [12]The Crusades. [13]Medieval Christian peace movements [14]Christians and heretics. The Inquisition. See [11] above. [1 5]Christianity and the witches. See [U] above. [16]The Reformation. [17]The Radical Reformation and the Peace Churches. [18]St. Bartholomew's Day Massacre (August 1572). [19]The religious wars. [20]Absolutism. [21]Modernity. [22]The Quakers—Religious Society of Friends. [23]The Enlightenment and Modernity. [24]Christianity and world mission; Christianity and colonialism. [25]Slavery. [26]Christianity and the "war" against native cultures. [27]Christianity and the First World War. [28]The Second World War. [29]The Holocaust. 6 Violence and Institution in Christianity [30]Christianity and the modern peace movement. [31]Christians and the "seamless ethic of life." [32]Christianity and International Communism. [33]Liberation theology. [34]The liberation of women. [35]Christianity and the resurgence of tribal and nationalist violence. [36]Christianity and human rights. [1] The biblical foundation of Christianity in the Hebrew Scriptures. Christians and Jews have the same family origins. Since believing Christians no less than believing Jews accept and revere the Hebrew Scriptures as the inspired word of God, Christians and Jews are indeed, to paraphrase Pope John XXIII, siblings. There is, beyond this, fromJudaism to Christianity, a significant parent-child relationship. In recent years (but not early enough to have prevented the Holocaust), the main line churches ofChristianity have rejected the supersessionism (the doctrine that the Old Testament has been abrogated by the New Testament) that used to characterize Christian attitudes towards the Jews and that... (shrink)

The day-to-day work of clinical ethics consultants and healthcare ethics committees can easily become overly routine. Too much routine, however, comes with a risk that morally important practices will be reduced to mere bureaucratic formalities, while practitioners become desensitized to ethically significant distinctions between cases. Clinical ethics consultation and organizational ethics must be set within the broader social and cultural context of the healthcare environment. This practice requires looking beyond mere legal compliance and the routinely false assumption that there are (...) unambiguous ethical norms that easily govern clinical ethics and hospital policy formation. Together the essays in this issue of HEC Forum challenge readers to rethink taken-for-granted assumptions regarding patient care, physician obligation, clinical ethics consultation, and organizational ethics. (shrink)

Mark J. Cherry; Searching for the Truly Human: Standing at the Precipice of a Post-Christian Age, Christian bioethics: Non-Ecumenical Studies in Medical Moralit.

Ferdinand Canning Scott Schiller was the foremost first generation British pragmatist; he is also the most overlooked pragmatist. F. C. S. Schiller and the Dawn of Pragmatism: The Rhetoric of a Philosophical Rebel, by Mark J. Porrovecchio, provides the first comprehensive examination of his philosophical career, examining the rhetorical practices that gave rise to his pragmatic humanism and the ways those strategies led to his erasure from the intellectual history of pragmatism.

Power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely. To be clear, I do not think that blood transfusions necessarily...

In studies of early Christian thought, 'philosophy' is often a synonym for 'Platonism', or at most for 'Platonism and Stoicism'. Nevertheless, it was Aristotle who, from the sixth century AD to the Italian Renaissance, was the dominant Greek voice in Christian, Muslim and Jewish philosophy. Aristotle and Early Christian Thoughtis the first book in English to give a synoptic account of the slow appropriation of Aristotelian thought in the Christian world from the second to the sixth century. Concentrating on the (...) great theological topics - creation, the soul, the Trinity, and Christology - it makes full use of modern scholarship on the Peripatetic tradition after Aristotle, explaining the significance of Neoplatonism as a mediator of Aristotelian logic. While stressing the fidelity of Christian thinkers to biblical presuppositions which were not shared by the Greek schools, it also describes their attempts to overcome the pagan objections to biblical teachings by a consistent use of Aristotelian principles, and it follows their application of these principles to matters which lay outside the purview of Aristotle himself. This volume offers a valuable study not only for students of Christian theology in its formative years, but also for anyone seeking an introduction to the thought of Aristotle and its developments in Late Antiquity. by a consistent use of Aristotelian principles, and it follows their application of these principles to matters which lay outside the purview of Aristotle himself. This volume offers a valuable study not only for students of Christian theology in its formative years, but also for anyone seeking an introduction to the thought of Aristotle and its developments in Late Antiquity. (shrink)

Since the start of the twenty-first century, the political mainstream has been shifting to the right. The liberal orthodoxy that took hold in the West as a reaction to the Second World War is breaking down. In Europe, populist political parties have pulled the mainstream in their direction; in America, a series of challenges to the Republican mainstream culminated in the 2016 election of Donald Trump. In Key Thinkers of the Radical Right, sixteen expert scholars explain sixteen thinkers, providing an (...) introduction to their life and work, a guide to their thought, and an explanation of their work's reception. The chapters focus on thinkers who are widely read across the political right in both Europe and America, such as Julius Evola, Alain de Benoist, and Richard B. Spencer. Featuring classic, modern, and emerging thinkers, this selection provides a good representation of the intellectual right and avoids making political or value judgments. In an increasingly polarized political environment, Key Thinkers of the Radical Right offers a comprehensive and unbiased introduction to the thinkers who form the foundation of the radical right. (shrink)

Dubourg and Baumard's paper takes a different, and fruitful, approach to the study of imaginary worlds than what is usually found in Media Studies, but omits certain circumstances and influences that shaped their history; this article argues that psychological or behavioral factors are not enough to explain the growth of imaginary worlds, even as they may be important influences.

Examines the political significance of ideas about happiness through the work of utilitarian philosophers William Thompson and Jeremy Bentham. Happiness is political. The way we think about happiness affects what we do, how we relate to other people and the world around us, our moral principles, and even our ideas about how society should be organized. Utilitarianism, a political theory based on hedonistic and individualistic ideas of happiness, has been dominated for more than two-hundred years by its founder, Jeremy Bentham. (...) In Happiness, Democracy, and the Cooperative Movement, Mark J. Kaswan examines the work of William Thompson, a friend of Bentham’s who nonetheless offers a very different utilitarian philosophy and political theory based on a different conception of happiness, but whose work has been largely overlooked. Kaswan reveals the importance of our ideas about happiness for our understanding of the basic principles and nature of democracy, its role in society and its character as a social institution. In what is the closest examination of Thompson’s political theory to date, Kaswan moves from philosophy to theory to practice, starting with conceptions of happiness before moving to theories of utility, then to democratic theory, and finally to practice in the first detailed account of how Thompson’s ideas laid the foundations for the cooperative movement, which is now the world’s largest democratic social movement. Mark J. Kaswan is Assistant Professor of Government at the University of Texas at Brownsville and J. Robert Beyster and Michael W. Huber Fellow, Rutgers University School of Management and Labor Relations. (shrink)

The Enarrationes in Psalmos are an important source for understanding the Augustinian theology of desire, linking it to his systematic theology and his pastoral practice. In this paper I illustrate by overviewing the expositions on Psalms 11 (12), 12 (13), 23 (24), and 26 (27). These Psalms teach us to love, trust, and seek God only, a failure to do which marks the Donatist schism. Augustine mingles ideas from pagan philosophy’s quest for eudaimonia or beata vita—the good, happy, and blessed (...) life—with biblical ideas. We want a stable happiness, and we must pursue wisdom; we can find stability in the rock that is Christ, to follow whom is to pursue wisdom rightly. Our desires must be converted to God, the only complete and perfect good and the source of eternal happiness, whom we must single-mindedly pursue with prayer and faith. While we must desire the eschaton and look to no earthly satisfaction, earthly goods may be received as gifts from God. One thing we can learn from studying the Enarrationes is how closely connected are the ideas of right love, the right church, and the right end; all three go together in Augustine’s theology. (shrink)

The treatment of persons who frequently present to the healthcare system following repetitive foreign body ingestion has been addressed in the psychiatric literature. However, there has been little exploration of the ethical considerations regarding the treatment of these patients. The complexity of their medical and psychiatric presentation raises fundamental ethical questions regarding the duty to treat, patient autonomy, justice, and futility. Careful ethical analysis is particularly important in this context, since the frustration that medical professionals may feel in response may (...) lead to false assumptions that can negatively impact patient care. A careful exploration of these questions can increase awareness and understanding, which in turn can lead to improved treatment of patients who repetitively ingest foreign bodies. Care for patients who inflict self-harm, particularly by repetitive foreign body ingestion, is not futile. The patients have a right to treatment and are entitled to resources. Efforts should be made to provide a more comprehensive treatment approach to these patients. (shrink)

On Monday, June 25, 2018, H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr., PhD, MD, co-founder of The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, was laid to rest in the beautiful Hill Country of Texas near Comal County. Professor Engelhardt co-founded The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy in 1976 with Dr. Edmund Pellegrino. Engelhardt first served as Associate Editor, and then Editor and Senior Editor from 1976 until 2018. The Journal thrived for more than four decades through his energy, vision, and dedication. One of the (...) intellectual founders of the fields that would become known as bioethics and the philosophy of medicine, Engelhardt’s seminal scholarship has framed the philosophical debates surrounding healthcare policy and medical practice throughout the world. The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy mourns his passing. (shrink)

Traditionalism is a shadowy philosophy that has influenced much of the twentieth century and beyond: from the far-right to the environmental movement, from Sufi shaykhs and their followers to Trump advisor and right-wing provocateur Steve Bannon. It is a worldview that rejects modernity and instead turns to mystical truth and tradition as its guide. Mark Sedgwick, one of the world's leading scholars of Traditionalism, presents a major new analysis, pulling back the curtain on the foundations of Traditionalist philosophy, its (...) major proponents-René Guénon, Julius Evola, and Frithjof Schuon-and their thought. One of Traditionalism's fundamental pillars is perennialism, the idea that beneath all the different forms of religion there lies one single timeless and esoteric tradition. A second is the view that everything is getting worse, rather than better, over time, leading to the Traditionalist critique of modernity. Sedgwick details Traditionalism's unique ideas about self-realization, religion, politics, and many other spheres. Traditionalism provides an expansive guide to this important school of thought-one that is little-known and even less understood-and shows how pervasive these ideas have become. (shrink)

Plantinga’s God and Other Minds, Reformed Epistemology articles, and Warrant Trilogy are all part of the same epistemological project. Although the project develops in phases focusing progressively on anti-theism, evidentialism, and internalism, the epistemology is consistently a Reidian particularism. It follows Roderick Chisholm’s famous particularist strategy for finding an epistemic criterion, uses principles of common sense from Thomas Reid as clear cases of beliefs satisfying that criterion, and applies that criterion to belief in God in order to show that this (...) belief is epistemically respectable. Understanding this will help to clarify Plantinga’s philosophical contributions to our understanding of religious belief. In my article I introduce Plantinga’s epistemological sources, explain the structure of his project, overview its development in these three phases, and correct some misunderstandings of Plantinga that arise from inattention to his Reidian particularism. I also show how Reidian particularism itself suggests an improvement to Plantinga’s epistemology which his critics often recommend: that we recognize that evidence for the existence of God, even if it is not necessary for theistic belief to be warranted, may yet be valuable. (shrink)

We all know faith and reason are not exactly the same thing. What exactly is the difference, and how are they related? A good orthodox Christian answer is that faith transcends reason, and for at least two reasons. First, the doctrines of orthodox Christian theology are beyond comprehension. Second, faith requires a total commitment when reason can provide only partial evidence. We cannot act meaningfully if we act only halfway. If evidence produces a 95-percent probability that a certain conclusion is (...) true, sometimes 100 percent is still the only way to act on it; commitment to Christ must lead all the way (perhaps unto death). -/- After a look at some definitions, some distinctions, and an illustration, I will consider what Immanuel Kant, Augustine of Hippo, William James, and Søren Kierkegaard have said about how faith goes beyond reason. Kant thinks faith goes beyond reason as a matter of necessity given the nature of morality and human knowledge. Augustine thinks faith goes beyond reason, but this is not a permanent thing; with sufficient mental training and contemplation, we may hope to achieve knowledge of God. James concurs, save that he looks to future experience rather than contemplation. Finally, Kierkegaard thinks Christian faith must always by nature go beyond reason; neither philosophical contemplation nor any experience in this life will change this; faith cannot be fully understood by reason and requires a commitment beyond what the evidence alone guarantees. (shrink)

This book represents a unique contribution to the field of clinical ethics consultation. What might seem at first glance to be an anthology, that is, a collection of independent essays, is actually more akin to a conversation, a shared engagement, a mutual undertaking. At the center of this conversation is a steadfastness, abiding and serious in its orientation – exemplified in these voices and contributions collected from colleagues – to explore, identify, and examine the actual conduct of individuals who engage (...) in ethics consultation practice. Although there is some helpful resemblance to an anthology, for example in the variety of ways these essays describe and depict a complex array of different standpoints regarding the practical and conceptual commitments in this growing field, more important to the Zadeh Project is the deliberate focus on explicating and probing the ways these commitments influence how a particular individual acting as an “ethics consultant” might understand and interpret the roles and prevalent expectations represented by those differing standpoints. In that light, and perhaps more urgently, this book is motivated by a mutual recognition that part and parcel with the responsibility of doing clinical ethics is an ongoing and clear need to describe and consider what clinical ethics consultants actually encounter when actively working with physicians, nurses, social workers, and other healthcare providers as well as with patients, families, and others who care about patients. As a contribution to that necessity of being accountable, this Project and the resulting book represent much more than merely collecting together the thoughts and perspectives of a group of colleagues from within a common field: this book is an attempt to display, to model through written text, a set of practices and what is at stake in these practices. (shrink)

We give necessary and sufficient conditions for a scoring rule to be proper for a quantile if utility is linear, and the distribution is unrestricted. We also give results when the set of distributions is limited, for example, to distributions that have first moments.

DSM-III and its revisions have provided little in the way of explicit historical or philosophical foundations. The logical empiricism embedded in its operational criteria and its external approach to validation are inadequate to account for the presumption of nosological regularities or the specific categories endorsed by the taxonomy. The nosologic operation that Jaspers referred to as the "synthesis of disease entities" is explored in connection with the central distinction in DSM-IV between mood disorders and schizophrenic disorders. This synthetic operation is (...) analyzed in terms of the paradigmatic shift from the mania-melancholia matrix of pre-modern psychiatry to the manic-depression/dementia praecox model defined by the work of Kraepelin. In the context of this analysis the self-evidence of these regularities is questioned. Keywords: DSM-III, DSM-IV, mood disorders, nosology, schizophrenic disorders CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

THIS IS A PRE-PUBLICATION VERSION OF THE PAPER. The New Testament speaks of our having faith rather than sight. This distinction is not made to distinguish faith from knowledge. Rather, it is to distinguish one kind of knowledge from another. We may know by trust in reliable authority; this knowledge is necessarily secondhand, but it is knowledge all the same. This, I argue, is the New Testament idea of faith. Another way of knowing is firsthand. Sight in the New Testament, (...) I argue, is a metonym for firsthand knowledge. In this article I consider the meaning of faith and sight in the relevant New Testament passages, with an extended exegesis of 2 Cor. 5:7 and Heb. 11:1. (shrink)

Regional Perspectives in Bioethics" illustrates the ways in which the national and international political landscape encompasses persons from diverse and often fragmented moral communities with widely varying moral intuitions, premises, evaluations and commitments.

In recent decades cognitive science has revolutionised our understanding of the workings of the human mind. Philosophy has made a major contribution to cognitive science and has itself been hugely influenced by its development. This dynamic book explores the philosophical significance of cognitive science and examines the central debates that have enlivened its history. In a wide-ranging and comprehensive account of the topic, philosopher M.J. Cain discusses the historical origins of cognitive science and its philosophical underpinnings; the nature and role (...) of representations in cognition; the architecture of the mind and the modularity thesis; the nature of concepts; knowledge of language and its acquisition; perception; and the relationship between the brain and cognition. Cain draws upon an extensive knowledge of empirical developments and their philosophical interpretation. He argues that although the field has generated some challenging new views in recent years, many of the core ideas that initiated its birth are still to be taken seriously. Clearly written and incisively argued, The Philosophy of Cognitive Science will appeal to any student or researcher interested in the workings of the mind. (shrink)

Aristotle sets the horizons of our inquiry: What is it when we say we know something? And is the object of knowledge a universal or particular [tode ti] object? Aristotle's critique of Plato's theory of form/Forms in light of his notion of actuality has generated a variety of topics that frame our inquiry: "Understanding Eidos as Form in the Works of Aristotle as Plato's Critical Student"; "Aristotle on Plato's Forms as Causes"; "Notes on the Relationship between Plato's Parmenides and Aristotle's (...) Metaphysics Alpha"; "'Separate' and 'Inactive'? Aristotle's Most Challenging Critique of Plato's 'Forms'"; "Too Much Unity in a City Is Destructive of the City: Aristotle against Plato's Unification Project of the Polis"; "Aristotle on the Soul as Actuality"; "Delphic Piety in the De Anima of Alexander of Aphrodisias"; "Aristotle and Plotinus: Act and Potency and the Two Acts"; and "Al-Fārābīon Habit and Imagination." Here, the Peripatetic readings of form and actuality are parsed from the precipice of historical, analytic, and continental approaches to the mind/language/object problem, with advocacy of the importance of Aristotle's contribution to this inquiry for the present age. (shrink)