ABSTRACT Prior studies have examined the impacts of sensemaking processes, such as forecasting, on ethical decision making but only a few have considered how aspects of the ethical issue itself, such as social consensus and magnitude of consequences, might interact with sensemaking processes to influence EDM. The present effort examines both forecasting and moral intensity, as well as their interactions, during the EDM process. Participants in this study were given an ethical scenario with either a high or low degree of (...) social consensus as well as a greater or smaller magnitude of consequences. They were then asked to forecast either many or few potential outcomes stemming from their actions before coming up with a final plan of action. Responses were rated for quality of forecasting, use of metacognitive reasoning strategies, perceived moral intensity, and ethicality. Results indicate that social consensus may not be beneficial for EDM if the magnitude of consequences is low or individuals are not engaged in extensive forecasting. Implications of these findings are discussed. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Research examining ethical decision-making has focused on how people engage in EDM, leading many researchers to focus on sensemaking models of EDM. Although the merits of a sensemaking approach with respect to EDM are evident in the literature, less is known about the specific cognitive processes by which sensemaking impacts EDM. This study examines the impact of three late-cycle cognitive processes – idea generation, evaluation, and revision – as well as the timing of these processes on EDM. Results indicate (...) that information gathering early on is critical to EDM; a finding which supports an active sensemaking model over an intuitive one. (shrink)

Everyone wants to be virtuous, but recent psychological investigations suggest that this may not be possible. Mark Alfano challenges this theory and asks, not whether character is empirically adequate, but what characters human beings could have and develop. Although psychology suggests that most people do not have robust character traits such as courage, honesty and open-mindedness, Alfano argues that we have reason to attribute these virtues to people because such attributions function as self-fulfilling prophecies - children become more studious (...) if they are told that they are hard-working and adults become more generous if they are told that they are generous. He argues that we should think of virtue and character as social constructs: there is no such thing as virtue without social reinforcement. His original and provocative book will interest a wide range of readers in contemporary ethics, epistemology, moral psychology and empirically informed philosophy. (shrink)

What is conscientious objection? -- Should conscientious objectors be accommodated? -- Assessing objectors' beliefs and reasons -- Accommodation and conscientious provision.

In a series of articles, Rieppel (2005, Biol. Philos. 20:465–487; 2006a, Cladistics 22:186–197; 2006b, Systematist 26:5–9), Keller et al. (2003, Bot. Rev. 69:93–110), and Nixon and Carpenter (2000, Cladistics 16:298–318) criticize the philosophical foundations of the PhyloCode. They argue that species and higher taxa are not individuals, and they reject the view that taxon names are rigid designators. Furthermore, they charge supporters of the individuality thesis and rigid designator theory with assuming essentialism, committing logical inconsistencies, and offering proposals that render (...) taxonomy untestable. These charges are unsound. Such charges turn on confusions over rigid designator theory and the distinction between kinds and individuals. In addition, Rieppel’s, Keller et al.’s, and Nixon and Carpenter’s proposed alternatives are no better and have their own problems. The individuality thesis and rigid designator theory should not be quickly abandoned. [Individuals; kinds; PhyloCode; rigid designators; species; taxa; taxon names.]. (shrink)

The coevolution of objectivity and subjectivity and the nature of both their division and connection are central to this paper. Section 2 addresses the nature of meaning from the subjective perspective. Initially, I examine the meaningful engagement that exists between the unicellular organism and its environment. In this respect, I focus on the ontological importance of the qualitative biochemical assimilation of the physical rather than on the evolution of form and function. In Section 3, I broaden the discussion to include (...) multicellular organisms and introduce the idea that meaning, at various levels, qualifies different objective and informational constructs of the world. These determine the character of interactive engagement and reveal much about the way in which an agent signifies the external. In Section 4, I review Darwinian evolution from the position of the existential self. I emphasize that meaning is that which qualifies the human concept of objectivity, rather than that objectivity is that which will help humankind qualify or understand meaning. Ultimately, this outlook challenges scientific disciplines that have tended to obscure the relevance of meaning and sought, instead, to explain it from an epistemological footing. In its overall scope, I try to establish the view that the subjective and objective domains are more nuanced, layered, and intertwined ontologically than the default stance that presents a binary juxtaposition between the two. (shrink)

This book outlines and evaluates the principal strands of critical legal studies, and achieves much more as well.

There has been a long history of discussion on the usefulness of formal methods in legal settings.1 Some of the recent debate has focussed on foundational issues in statistics, in particular, how the reference-class problem affects legal decisions based on certain types of statistical evidence.2 Here we examine aspects of this debate, stressing why the reference-class problem presents serious difficulties for the kinds of statistical inferences under consideration and the relevance of this for the use of statistics in the courtroom. (...) We also consider the relevance of foundational statistical issues in the broader context of.. (shrink)

Future population growth is uncertain and matters for climate policy: higher growth entails more emissions and means more people will be vulnerable to climate-related impacts. We show that how future population is valued importantly determines mitigation decisions. Using the Dynamic Integrated Climate-Economy model, we explore two approaches to valuing population: a discounted version of total utilitarianism (TU), which considers total wellbeing and is standard in social cost of carbon dioxide (SCC) models, and of average utilitarianism (AU), which ignores population size (...) and sums only each time period’s discounted average wellbeing. Under both approaches, as population increases the SCC increases, but optimal peak temperature decreases. The effect is larger under TU, because it responds to the fact that a larger population means climate change hurts more people: for example, in 2025, assuming the United Nations (UN)-high rather than UN-low population scenario entails an increase in the SCC of 85% under TU vs. 5% under AU. The difference in the SCC between the two population scenarios under TU is comparable to commonly debated decisions regarding time discounting. Additionally, we estimate the avoided mitigation costs implied by plausible reductions in population growth, finding that large near-term savings ($billions annually) occur under TU; savings under AU emerge in the more distant future. These savings are larger than spending shortfalls for human development policies that may lower fertility. Finally, we show that whether lowering population growth entails overall improvements in wellbeing—rather than merely cost savings—again depends on the ethical approach to valuing population. (shrink)

The question I investigate concerns the ethics of clinical ethics consultation. To begin, I reconstruct and critically assess a widespread understanding of clinical medical ethics, one most prominently advanced by Mark Siegler. That examination reveals an overtly political strategy designed to reinforce physician authority. Next, John La Puma's work is discussed. Arguably the most prominent of Siegler's students, and certainly the most prolific, La Puma appears attentive to the problems in Siegler's view regarding clinical judgment. I conclude, however, that (...) La Puma assumes a relatively flexible system of formal rules and more extensive informal codes which define the concepts and procedures of medical consultation and which he simply transcribes for ethics consultation. ;Albert Jonsen and Stephen Toulmin have apparently endorsed this medicalized strategy. They contend that the view of ethics advocated by these physicians represents a "new" casuistry consistent if not identical to their own theory. I show that the casuist method of clinical ethical decision making simply appropriates features of the diagnostic apparatus embedded in the political economy of the enterprise of medicine and makes the role of ethicist parasitic on that of the physician as expert. Their casuistry, I argue, merely serves as a means to reinforce the standardized apparatus of professional authority exercised in medical procedures and concepts. ;Finally, I sketch an alternative way to think about how experience with other persons informs ethical decision making. On the basis of an extensive and nuanced account of an ethics consultation, I argue that to consult as a clinical philosopher in any situation is, necessarily, to be focused on that individual situation for its own sake. Clinical philosophy, as a result, must be done by attending strictly to what appears as it appears: the issues, concerns, and questions expressed, in their own terms, by those individuals whose situation it is. (shrink)

Research Ethics Committees (RECs) play a critical gatekeeping role in clinical trials. This role is meant to ensure that only those trials that meet certain ethical thresholds proceed through their gate. Two of these thresholds are that the potential benefits of trials are reasonable in relation to risks and that trials are capable of producing a requisite amount of social value. While one ought not expect perfect execution by RECs of their gatekeeping role, one should expect routine success in it. (...) This article reviews a range of evidence showing that substantial numbers of ethically tainted trials are receiving REC approvals. Many of the trials are early phase trials that evidence shows have benefits that may not be reasonable compared with their risks and many others are later trials that evidence shows may lack sufficient social value. The evidence pertains to such matters as methodologically inadequate preclinical studies incapable of supporting the inferences that REC members must make about the prospects for potential benefit needed to offset the risks in early phase trials and sponsorship bias that can cause improperly designed, conducted, analysed and reported later phase trials. The analysis of the evidence makes clear that REC practices need to be strengthened if they are to adequately fulfil their gatekeeping role. The article also explores options that RECs could use in order to improve their gatekeeping function. (shrink)

This is one of those cases to which Dr. 8 oodhouse's remark applies with all its force, that a method which leads to true results must have its logic — H.S Smith (" On Some of the Methods at Present in Use in Pure Geometry," p. 6) A goodly amount of modern metaphysics has concerned itself, in one form or another, with the question: what attitude should we take in regard to a language whose semantic underpinnings seem less than certain? (...) Since much of standard English is surely of this type, many philosophers have felt driven to extreme and unpalatable resolutions — wholesale rejection of attractive logical rules, radical "antirealism", "minimalism" about truth, and so forth, Scientists, however, have long dealt with analogous foundational insecurities and, under the duress of practicality, have framed a set of shifting attitudes towards language and reasoning that seem far more commonsensical than the extreme positions to which pure philosophy has often been led. Following this lead, this essay will recommend a more nuanced approach to linguistic insecurity that is neither naively optimistic nor mired in the gloomy sloughs of antirealism. (shrink)

Socrates provides an argument at the end of the Apology that he believes gives hope that death is a blessing. This argument, grounded on the claim that death is one of two things, has been the subject of much derision and some recent defense. In this essay, I build on the work of other sympathetic commentators to show that Socrates' argument, when taken in context, not only makes good sense, but unifies Socrates' speech into a cohesive exhortation toward virtue.

The empirical turn, understood as a turn to the artifact in the work of Ihde, has been a fruitful one, which has rightly abandoned what Serres and Latour call “the empire of signs” of the postmoderns. However, this has unfortunately implied too little attention for language and its relation to technology. The same can be said about the social dimension of technology use, which is largely neglected in postphenomenology. This talk critically responds to Ihde and Stiegler, and sketches a Wittgensteinian (...) inroad to a more holistic and transcendental revision of postphenomenology which does not turn away from the artifact but places it in a wider social context and asks the question regarding the relation between language and technology. Finally, since the earth may be the ultimate condition of possibility, it is asked what this language-sensitive and transcendental approach may imply for rethinking our human position and agency in the Anthropocene. The paper ends with pointing to the role of language as transcendental condition that shapes the very project of thinking the “Anthropocene.”. (shrink)

Contemporary bioethicists and scholars of ancient philosophy explore the import of classical ethics on pressing bioethical concerns.

A collection of essays that deepens our understanding of Jacques Derrida, and removes the suspicion of mystification from his treatment of philosophic and literary issues. It focuses on displacement. It exemplifies the sophistication toward deconstruction in Britain and the United States.

This article questions whether past experience with nationalisms rooted in history, language, custom and religion will be much of a guide to pseudo-nationalisms that arise in a globalized age with increasingly ‘liquid’ societies.

In many countries throughout the world, regulators are struggling to determine whether and how to introduce competition into regulated industries. This essay exam- ines the complexities involved in the liberalization process. While stressing the impor- tance of case-specific analyses, this essay distinguishes liberalization policies that generally are procompetitive from corresponding anticompetitive liberalization policies.

Kant claims that autonomy is possible only if the law that determines the will disregards any incentive grounded in the natural world. Here I develop and defend an alternative notion of autonomy, drawn from the ancient eudaimonists, on which practical reason is grounded in our interest in living well. This allows eudaimonism a conception of the autonomy of the will in which (like Kant’s) the will is the source of its own laws, but in which (unlike Kant’s) it has an (...) object that is thoroughly situated in the empirical world. (shrink)

About the extent of moral agency in the animal kingdom, one view is that only humans are moral agents. Holding a different view, I argue that moral agency depends on the capacity for other-regard and the capacity to be attuned to significance—such that things matter to one. I derive a criterion where a creature is a moral agent if she performs an action that promotes others’ significant interests and brings great costs to herself where she is aware of these significant (...) interests and imposed costs. Failure to confirm that she has this awareness is a weakness of examples of moral agency in animals that writers provide, since she may be unaware of the significance of what she is doing. Since species of non-ape Primates and aquatic mammals satisfy the evidential criterion, moral agency is likely prevalent throughout much of Mammalia. I consider possible objections from Kant, Singer, and Korsgaard. (shrink)

Science presents us with a variety of accounts of the world. While some of these accounts posit deep theoretical structure and fundamental entities, others do not. But which of these approaches is the right one? How should science conceptualize the world? And what is the relation between the various accounts? Opinions on these issues diverge wildly in philosophy of science. At one extreme are reductionists who argue that higher-level theories should, in principle, be incorporated in, or eliminated by, the basic-level (...) theory. According to this view, higher-level theories do not ultimately exhibit conceptual integrity or provide genuine explanations. At the other extreme are pluralists who take higher levels of description and explanation seriously and argue for their independence and indispensability. It was the aim of the first Sydney–Tilburg conference on “Reduction and the Special Sciences”, which took place at the Tilburg Center for Logic and Philosophy of Science (TiLPS) in Tilburg, The Netherlands, over the 10–12th April 2008, to bring researchers working on these questions together and provide a platform to discuss them in a focused way. The papers in this special issue were presented at this conference. We would like to thank the Royal Netherlands Academy of Art and Sciences (KNAW), the Sydney Centre for the Foundations of Science at the University of Sydney and TiLPS for financial and institutional support. We also thank the authors and referees of the papers for their work, and Hans Rott for his support of this project. (shrink)

Philosophy of mind is one of the core disciplines in philosophy. The questions that it deals with are profound, vexed and intriguing. This volume of 15 new cutting-edge essays gives young researchers a chance to stir up new ideas. The essays cover a wide range of topics, including the nature of consciousness, cognition, and action. A common theme in the essays is that the future of philosophy of mind lies in judicious use of resources from related fields, including epistemology, metaphysics, (...) philosophy of language, philosophy of science, and cognitive neuroscience. Approaches that the researchers explore in this volume range from the use of armchair conceptual analysis to brain scanning techniques. (shrink)

Anderson beschrijft het kosmopolitisme als een omstreden kwestie in 'de culturele oorlogen van het hedendaagse Amerika' en gaat in op het 'niet-hegemonistische' begrip van het kosmopolitisme.

This paper extends the standard model of bundling to allow products to be substitutes and for products to be supplied by separate sellers. Whether integrated or separate, …rms have an incentive to introduce bundling discounts when demand for the bundle is elastic relative to demand for stand-alone products. Separate …rms often have a unilateral incentive to o¤er inter-…rm bundle discounts, although this depends on the detailed form of substitutability. Bundle discounts mitigate the innate substitutability of products, which can relax competition (...) between …rms and induce an integrated …rm to lower all of its prices when it follows a bundling strategy. (shrink)