Na een ongeluk met hersenletsel wist hij precies hoe de mens zich, eenmaal van God los, zou moeten bevrijden van allerlei mythen en angsten om eindelijk een onafhankelijk individu te worden. Maar de gedachten van deze eigenzinnige Napolitaanse filosoof druisten lijnrecht in tegen de gevestigde orde en stuitten op onbegrip en hoongelach. Want Vico vertrouwde eerder op poëzie, leugens en verbeelding dan op het 'meten is weten' van Descartes.0En niemand kon vermoeden dat juist hij veel later de inspiratie zou worden (...) van denkers als Nietzsche, Hegel, Marx, Berlin, Said, Eco en Sloterdijk. Zijn adagium 'Ik fabuleer, dus ik ben' zou bovendien naadloos in onze tijd hebben gepast.0Mark Blaisse schreef een uiterst onderhoudend, geromantiseerd portret van deze briljante anarchist, een pechvogel op vrijwel elk gebied. In 'Het orakel van Napels' gidst de eigenzinnige Vico de lezer door barok Napels, langs schilderijen, theaters, castraten, vioolbouwers, verboden boekenkasten, bordelen en literaire salons. Een wereld vol populisme, corruptie en alternatieve feiten: Vico's leven en ideeën blijken verbazingwekkend actueel. (shrink)

In the twenty-four years since the dismantling of the Berlin Wall, a body of high-quality scholarship on socialism has slowly accumulated. Here I discuss two superb additions to this incipient post–Cold War canon, Mark Bevir’s The Making of British Socialism and Jonathan Sperber’s Karl Marx: A Nineteenth Century Life. Both authors take it as axiomatic that the socialist utopia, with its quasi-eschatological promise of complete human emancipation, is an idea whose time has passed. But Bevir and, to a (...) lesser degree, Sperber discern a utopian afterglow that warrants our interest—and is still quite capable of providing inspiration. “This book has been a long time in the making,” Mark Bevir admits in the .. (shrink)

In this outstanding collection of essays, Isaiah Berlin, one of the great thinkers of the twentieth century, discusses the importance of dissenters in the history of ideas--among them Machiavelli, Vico, Montesquieu, Herzen, and Sorel. With his unusual powers of imaginative re-creation, Berlin brings to life original minds that swam against the current of their times--and still challenge conventional wisdom. In a new foreword to this corrected edition, which also includes a new appendix of letters in which Berlin (...) discusses and further illuminates some of its topics, noted essayist Mark Lilla argues that Berlin's decision to give up a philosophy fellowship and become a historian of ideas represented not an abandonment of philosophy but a decision to do philosophy by other, perhaps better, means. "His instinct told him," Lilla writes, "that you learn more about an idea as an idea when you know something about its genesis and understand why certain people found it compelling and were spurred to action by it." This collection of fascinating intellectual portraits is a rich demonstration of that belief. (shrink)

"The fox knows many things, but the hedgehog knows one big thing." This ancient Greek aphorism, preserved in a fragment from the poet Archilochus, describes the central thesis of Isaiah Berlin's masterly essay on Leo Tolstoy and the philosophy of history, the subject of the epilogue to War and Peace. Although there have been many interpretations of the adage, Berlin uses it to mark a fundamental distinction between human beings who are fascinated by the infinite variety of (...) things and those who relate everything to a central, all-embracing system. Applied to Tolstoy, the saying illuminates a paradox that helps explain his philosophy of history: Tolstoy was a fox, but believed in being a hedgehog. One of Berlin's most celebrated works, this extraordinary essay offers profound insights about Tolstoy, historical understanding, and human psychology. This new edition features a revised text that supplants all previous versions, English translations of the many passages in foreign languages, a new foreword in which Berlin biographer Michael Ignatieff explains the enduring appeal of Berlin's essay, and a new appendix that provides rich context, including excerpts from reviews and Berlin's letters, as well as a startling new interpretation of Archilochus's epigram. (shrink)

Although Isaiah Berlin's critique of positive liberty has achieved canonical status, its place within his wider political philosophy remains obscure. However, the re-publication of one of his most important philosophical essays, From Hope and Fear Set Free, as part of a new edition of Four Essays on Liberty, simply entitled Liberty, has opened the door to a re-evaluation of Berlin's political project. At the heart of Berlin's argument, which gains its fullest expression in From Hope and Fear (...) Set Free, stands his contention that positive liberty, in its incarnation as self-realisation, conflates liberty with knowledge, which leads to the distortion of our phenomenologically inescapable structure of experience. This transgression against the conceptual framework in terms of which we think, Berlin argues, played its desolate part in linking the ?totalitarian temptation? latent in liberty as self-realisation with the totalitarian politics of the mid-twentieth century. (shrink)

Introduction: Beyond neoliberalism -- Friedrich A. Hayek : markets, planning, and the rule of law -- The politics of utopia and the liberal theory of totalitarianism : Karl Popper and Michael Foucault -- Pluralism and positive freedom : toward a critique of Isaiah Berlin -- From the Crick report to the Parekh report : multiculturalism, cultural difference and democracy -- Foucault, liberal education and the issue of autonomy -- Saving Martha Nussbaum from herself : help from friends she didn't (...) know she had -- Social democracy in the 21st century : Hobson, Keynes and complexity. (shrink)

With Fermat’s Last Theorem finally disposed of by Andrew Wiles in 1994, it’s only natural that popular attention should turn to arguably the most outstanding unsolved problem in mathematics: the Riemann Hypothesis. Unlike Fermat’s Last Theorem, however, the Riemann Hypothesis requires quite a bit of mathematical background to even understand what it says. And of course both require a great deal of background in order to understand their significance. The Riemann Hypothesis was first articulated by Bernhard Riemann in an address (...) to the Berlin Academy in 1859. The address was called “On the Number of Prime Numbers Less Than a Given Quantity” and among the many interesting results and methods contained in that paper was Riemann’s famous hypothesis: all non-trivial zeros of the zeta function, ζ(s) = ∞ n=1 n−s, have real part 1/2. Although the zeta function as stated and considered as a real-valued function is defined only for s > 1, it can be suitably extended. It can, as a matter of fact, be extended to have as its domain all the complex numbers (numbers of the form x + yi, where x and y √ −1) with the exception of 1 + 0i (at which point are real numbers and i =. (shrink)

The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, founded July 1, 1978, at Clare Hall, Cambridge University, was established by the American scholar, industrialist, and philanthropist Obert Clark Tanner. Lectureships are awarded to outstanding scholars or leaders in broadly defined fields of human values and transcend ethnic, national, religious, or ideological distinctions. Volume 31 features lectures given during the academic year 2010–2011 at Yale University, The University of Utah, The University of Michigan, Stanford University, Princeton University, and Harvard University. _Contributors: __Rebecca Goldstein, (...) “The Ancient Quarrel: Philosophy and Literature” _ Rebecca Goldstein is a research associate in the Department of Psychology, Harvard University, and an award-winning novelist. _Spike Lee, “America Through My Lens: The Evolving Nature of Race and Class in the Films of Spike Lee” _ Spike Lee, a writer-director, actor, producer, author, and educator who has revolutionized the role of black talent in cinema, is widely regarded as today’s premiere African-American filmmaker. _Susan Neiman, “Victims and Heroes”_ Susan Neiman is the director of the Einstein Forum, an international interdisciplinary think tank in Berlin, and is the author of three books. _Elinor Ostrom, “Frameworks” and “Analyzing 100-Year-Old Irrigation Puzzles”_ Elinor Ostrom is Distinguished Professor, Arthur F. Bentley Professor of Political Science, and senior research director of the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington. _Robert Putnam, “American Grace: Religious Americans Are Nicer and Happier. Why?”_ and “American Grace: Americans Are Religiously Devout and Religiously Divided, yet Religiously Tolerant. Why?” Robert Putnam is Malkin Professor of Public Policy at Harvard University and has written more than a dozen books. _James Scott, “The Late Neolithic Multispecies Resettlement Camp” and “The Long Golden Age of Barbarians, a.k.a. Non-State Peoples”_ James Scott is the Sterling professor of Political Science and professor of Anthropology and director of the Agrarian Studies Program at Yale University. _Martin Seligman, “Flourish: Positive Psychology and Positive Interventions”_ Martin Seligman is Zellerbach Family Professor of Psychology at the University of Pennsylvania and director of the Positive Psychology Center. He is the author of twenty-one books and more than 250 articles. _Susan Smith, “Moral Maze: Dealings in Debt” and “Ethical Investment?: Attending to Assets”_ Susan Smith, Mistress of Girton College, Cambridge, researches the interdisciplinary world of housing studies. She has published more than 100 scholarly articles. (shrink)

© 2015, Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg.Genetic studies have identified single nucleotide polymorphisms associated with the risk of prostate cancer. It remains unclear whether such genetic variants are associated with disease aggressiveness. The NCI-SPORE Genetics Working Group retrospectively collected clinicopathologic information and genotype data for 36 SNPs which at the time had been validated to be associated with PC risk from 25,674 cases with PC. Cases were grouped according to race, Gleason score and aggressiveness. Statistical analyses were used to compare the (...) frequency of the SNPs between different disease cohorts. After adjusting for multiple testing, only PC-risk SNP rs2735839 was significantly and inversely associated with aggressive and high-grade disease in European men. Similar associations with aggressive and high-grade disease were documented in African-American subjects. The G allele of rs2735839 was associated with disease aggressiveness even at low PSA levels in both European and African-American men. Our results provide further support that a PC-risk SNP rs2735839 near the KLK3 gene on chromosome 19q13 may be associated with aggressive and high-grade PC. Future prospectively designed, case-case GWAS are needed to identify additional SNPs associated with PC aggressiveness. (shrink)

7 What Ss Counter- Enlightenment? Mark Cilia i. The critique of the modern age is as old as the age itself. Ever since men began seeking distinction by ...

For Hegel’s German-Jewish disciples, the French Revolution marked the starting point of a history of freedom, which was to include legal and political emancipation. In many cases, however, the experiences of German-Jewish migrants in Paris were disappointing. The philosophical idea of “France” was not to be confused with its political reality. Nevertheless, the image of France served as a critical antithesis to the political situation in Germany throughout the 1820 and 1830s. The article discusses the impact of France on the (...) political concepts of Jewish Hegelians with a focus on the jurist and political philosopher Eduard Gans. (shrink)

This paper takes a close look at Berlin’s claim that the emergence of Counter-Enlightenment pluralism marks a momentous historical watershed. It concludes that Berlin is right to draw our attention to the importance of this event, but that he seriously misinterprets its significance. He has good reason, in particular, to treat Herder as ‘the most formidable adversary of the French philosophes and their German disciples’, but not because Herder put a stop to the ancient creed of monism on (...) which they relied. For Berlin’s monistic interpretation of the French Enlightenment, I shall show, badly misrepresents that intellectual movement and its impact on the world. The great significance of Herder’s pluralist critique of the Enlightenment lies, instead, in the way in which it rehabilitates prejudice as a source of human virtue and creativity, a critique that directly attacks the core mission of the philosophes: to remove the obstacles to the gathering, preservation and dissemination of useful knowledge. (shrink)

¿The fox knows many things, but the hedgehog knows one big thing.¿ This fragment of Archilochus, which gives this book its title, describes the central thesis of Isaiah Berlin¿s masterly essay on Tolstoy. There have been various interpretations of Archilochus¿ fragment; Isaiah Berlin has simply used it, without implying anything about the true meaning of the words, to outline a fundamental distinction that exists in mankind, between those who are fascinated by the infinite variety of things (foxes) and (...) those who relate everything to a central all-embracing system (hedgehogs). When applied to Tolstoy, the image illuminates a paradox of his philosophy of history, and shows why he was frequently misunderstood by his contemporaries and critics. Tolstoy was by nature a fox, but he believed in being a hedgehog. (shrink)

Isaiah Berlin, English Liberalism and a Third Concept of Liberty. Isaiah Berlin is celebrated for having defended the claim that there are two distinct concepts of liberty. According to the more familiar view, liberty is a « negative » concept. The presence of liberty is said to be marked, that is, by the absence of something, and specifically by the absence of inteference with an agent’s capacity to pursue some chosen end. According to Berlin, however, this concept (...) stands in contrast with a « positive » view, according to which liberty is the name of that state in which we shall have realised ourselves most completely. Liberty on this account is the name not of an opportunity but of a moral achievement. Berlin considered the second view dangerously confused, but one aim of the present essay is to defend its coherence. Its principal aim, however, is to show that Berlin’s understanding of negative liberty is a misleadingly narrow one. As is evident from classical and early-modern debates, we have in fact inherited two rival conceptions of negative liberty. One of these focuses, as Berlin rightly observed, on the idea of absence of interference. But the other, which he overlooked, sees lack of liberty as arising from relations of domination and dependence. The principal aim of the present essay is to distinguish these two traditions and to give new prominence to the idea of negative liberty as absence not of interference but of dependence. (shrink)

Mark Jago presents an original philosophical account of meaningful thought: in particular, how it is meaningful to think about things that are impossible. We think about impossible things all the time. We can think about alchemists trying to turn base metal to gold, and about unfortunate mathematicians trying to square the circle. We may ponder whether God exists; and philosophers frequently debate whether properties, numbers, sets, moral and aesthetic qualities, and qualia exist. In many philosophical or mathematical debates, when (...) one side of the argument gets things wrong, it necessarily gets them wrong. As we consider both sides of one of these philosophical arguments, we will at some point think about something that’s impossible. Yet most philosophical accounts of meaning and content hold that we can’t meaningfully think or reason about the impossible. -/- In The Impossible, Jago argues that we often gain new information, new beliefs, and, sometimes, fresh knowledge through logic, mathematics, and philosophy. That is why logic, mathematics, and philosophy are useful. We therefore require accounts of knowledge and belief, of information and content, and of meaning which allow space for the impossible. Jago’s aim in this book is to provide such accounts. He gives a detailed analysis of the concept of hyperintensionality, whereby logically equivalent contents may be distinct, and develops a theory in terms of possible and impossible worlds. Along the way, he provides a theory of what those worlds are and how they feature in our analysis of normative epistemic concepts: knowledge, belief, information, and content. (shrink)

Isaiah Berlin's (1909-97) standing in twentieth-century intellectual history rests primarily upon his post-Second World War writings in political theory and the history of ideas. Berlin's investigations into the antagonistic traditions of Enlightenment and Counter-Enlightenment thought, and his advocacy of liberal responses to the conflicts between values, which, he believed, were an unavoidable feature of the human condition, have been the subject of extensive discussion. Less has been written, however, about Berlin's formative experiences of analytic philosophy during the (...) 1930s and late 1940s. It is often assumed that Berlin 'abandoned' philosophy after the war in favour of the history of ideas. As such, there is a tendency in much of the existing literature to underestimate the influence of Berlin's early analytical work on his later historical and political writings. Indeed, Berlin's work is regularly thought to be marked by a fracture at which point the study of philosophy is relinquished for that of history and political theory. The present article will aim to challenge this reading of Berlin's work. The article will advance two main claims. Firstly, it will be argued that not only is Berlin's early work in analytic philosophy of interest to those concerned with the development of his thought as a whole but also that it is highly edifying for any understanding of the nature of the outlook contained in his later writings. Secondly, the article will maintain that there exists a degree of continuity in Berlin's thought that connects his earlier and later work in a manner reflecting a greater level of coherence than is generally assumed. The main theme of continuity emphasized in the article is represented by Berlin's critique of what he terms the 'fallacy of reduction'. (shrink)

‘IB was one of the great affirmers of our time.’ John Banville, New York Review of Books The title of this final volume of Isaiah Berlin’s letters is echoed by John Banville’s verdict in his review of its predecessor, Building: Letters 1960–75, which saw Berlin publish some of his most important work, and create, in Oxford’s Wolfson College, an institutional and architectural legacy. In the period covered by this new volume (1975–97) he consolidates his intellectual legacy with a (...) series of essay collections. These generate many requests for clarification from his readers, and stimulate him to reaffirm and sometimes refine his ideas, throwing substantive new light on his thought as he grapples with human issues of enduring importance. Berlin’s comments on world affairs, especially the continuing conflict between Israel and the Palestinians, and the collapse of Communism, are characteristically acute. This is also the era of the Northern Ireland Troubles, the Iranian revolution, the rise of Solidarity in Poland, the Chernobyl nuclear disaster, the fall of the Berlin Wall, Ayatollah Khomeini’s fatwa against Salman Rushdie, the spread of Islamic fundamentalism, and wars in the Falkland Islands, the Persian Gulf and the Balkans. Berlin scrutinises the leading politicians of the day, including Reagan, Thatcher and Gorbachev, and draws illuminating sketches of public figures, notably contrasting the personas of Alexander Solzhenitsyn and Andrey Sakharov. He declines a peerage, is awarded the Agnelli Prize for ethics, campaigns against philistine architecture in London and Jerusalem, helps run the National Gallery and Covent Garden, and talks at length to his biographer. He reflects on the ideas for which he is famous – especially liberty and pluralism – and there is a generous leavening of the conversational brilliance for which he is also renowned, as he corresponds with friends about politics, the academic world, music and musicians, art and artists, and writers and their work, always displaying a Shakespearean fascination with the variety of humankind. Affirming is the crowning achievement both of Berlin’s epistolary life and of the widely acclaimed edition of his letters whose first volume appeared in 2004. (shrink)

Nondescriptivist views in many areas of philosophy have long been associated with the commitment that in contrast to other domains of discourse, there are no propositions in their particular domain. For example, the ‘no truth conditions’ theory of conditionals1 is understood as the view that conditionals don’t express propositions, noncognitivist expressivism in metaethics is understood as advocating the view that there are not really moral propositions,2 and expressivism about epistemic modals is thought of as the view that there is no (...) such thing as the proposition that Jack might be at home, over and above the proposition that Jack is at home.3 Of course, it is nearly always acknowledged that advocates of a nondescriptivist theory need not deny that there are conditional, moral, or modal propositions ‘at the end of the day’ – for if they also endorse a deflationary reading of talk about propositions, as famously advocated by Simon Blackburn, then they can employ such deflationary talk just as much as the rest of us. They just don’t appeal to propositions to do any of the work in their theories. Rather, they ‘earn the right’ to talk about propositions.4 It is the aim of this paper to upset this way of thinking about the proper attitude of nondescriptivists toward propositions, and to advocate a more constructive and in some ways more radical alternative on behalf of the nondescriptivist. I will begin by introducing and developing a set of problems that are faced by any nondescriptivist theory which tries to do without propositions. All of these problems are easily solved by any view which postulates propositions across the board, but none of them are solved by merely deflationary talk about propositions – their most promising solutions require propositions to do real theoretical work, and therefore the problems themselves remind us of and illustrate some of the important reasons why it is worth positing propositions in the first place.. (shrink)