“No lo hicieron extraterrestres; fueron personas como nosotros[1]” comentaban en el programa especial del InfoK[2] sobre el Holocausto. Kitson, Steward y Husbands lo justifican: una de las mayores dificultades del alumnado que aprende contenidos históricos es entender por qué las personas de un contexto hicieron lo que hicieron. Desde la enseñanza de la historia se ha reflexionado ampliamente sobre las causalidades relacionadas con ciertos hechos históricos, pero se ha dado menos peso a analizar las interpretaciones sobre la agencia histórica. En (...) este artículo nos proponemos repasar y concretar la conceptualización que desde la didáctica de las ciencias sociales se ha dado a la agencia histórica en la comprensión de las causalidades para entender las decisiones y las responsabilidades de las personas en contextos como el del Holocausto para entender que todas las personas somos agentes sociales, de cambio y continuidad y, por tanto, agentes históricas. (shrink)

Una educación democrática, inclusiva y atenta a la diversidad tiene que serlo en todos sus ámbitos, también en el de los contenidos. Cuando cuestionamos los contenidos de las ciencias sociales escolares y las personas que los protagonizan con perspectiva de género llama la atención, en primer lugar, la ausencia de la mujer como sujeto histórico y social. Preguntarnos por el eje identitario del género nos permite cuestionar todas las identidades invisibilizadas en la construcción heteropatriarcal del currículum. En este artículo planteamos (...) la importancia del concepto de la interseccionalidad para repensar los contenidos curriculares y sus protagonistas afrontando las identidades desde el reconocimiento de la diversidad y entendiéndola dentro de las relaciones de poder y discriminación, algo fundamental si aspiramos a una educación que no sea reproductora de desigualdades sino crítica, comprometida y transformadora. (shrink)

Over recent years, the eSport phenomenon has grown in players and audience. The broadcast of certain eSport events have become worldwide mass events. Conceiving eSport gaming as an actual sports practice is not yet common, but it is current issue that deserves careful attention. This article stands on the idea that eSport gaming could be considered a sport and it examines some reasons on that regard. First of all, the piece will elucidate what the practice of gaming involves and if (...) there are reasons to consider the claim that it can be an actual sports practice. Secondly, it will address the distinctive features that eSport gaming as a sport may have. Thirdly, it wants to explore and explain an example of an eSport worldwide success which is the case of League of Legends. And finally, it will introduce and briefly discuss some sports issues this new sports practice would encounter in the near future and which might derive into policy matters. (shrink)

This article presents a critique of an article previously featured in Nursing Philosophy (10: 26–33) by Ursula Naue and Thilo Kroll, who suggested that people living with dementia are assigned a negative status upon receipt of a diagnosis, holding the identity of the ‘demented other’. Specifically, in this critique, we suggest that unwitting use of the adjective ‘demented’ to define a person living with the condition is ill-informed and runs a risk of defining people through negative (self-)attributes, which has a (...) deleterious impact upon that person's social and relational personae. Moreover, use of the locution ‘demented’ reinforces a divide between the ‘demented’ (them) and the ‘healthy others’ (us). Social constructionist theory, malignant positioning and viewing people with dementia as semiotic subjects are the philosophical pillars through which we construct the main arguments of the critique. The article concludes with the voice of one of the authors, a younger person with dementia, asking for language in dementia care to be carefully reconsidered and reframed and for the recognition of the diagnosed person's agency in the conduct of their day-to-day lives. (shrink)

Human social interaction is varied, complex and always changing. How we perceive each other and ourselves, how individuals interact within groups, and how groups are structured--all these are the domain of social psychology. Many have doubted, however, that a full-fledged social psychology textbook can successfully be written from a Christian perspective. Inevitably, some say, when attempting to integrate theology and social psychology, one discipline must suffer at the expense of the other. Angela Sabates counters that thinking by demonstrating how these (...) two disciplines can indeed be brought together in a fruitful way. She crisply covers key topics in social psychology, utilizing research that is well grounded in the empirical and theoretical literature, while demonstrating how a distinctively Christian approach can offer fresh ideas and understandings. Why doesn t our behavior always match what we say we believe? How and when are we most likely to be persuaded? What is the social psychology of violence? How reliable are eyewitness testimonies? Are racism and prejudice on the decline or are we just better at hiding them? Sabates draws out the implications of a Christian view of human persons on these and other central subjects within the well-established framework of social psychological study. This volume is for those looking for a core text that makes use of a Christian theological perspective to explore what the science of psychology suggests to us about the nature of human social interaction. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Husserlian Phenomenology and the Treatment of DepressionCommentary and CritiqueMarilyn Nissim-Sabat (bio)KeywordsHusserl, phenomenology, psychotherapy, drug therapyProfessor Hadreas begins his interesting and challenging essay by saying that, "This paper is concerned with a model of self-awareness which fits the testimony of subjects' reactions to selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs), of which fluoxetine (Prozac, Lilly, Indianapolis, IN) is probably the best known" (2010, 43). Several important features of Dr. Hadreas' approach can (...) be inferred from this statement. Most important, the verbatim testimony of subjects regarding their states of self-awareness is analyzed and interpreted for its compatibility with three philosophical models of self-awareness: Empiricism, rationalism, and Husserlian phenomenology. This is the methodology through which the author aims to show that one of the three models is more adequate than the others as a model of the self-awareness of the subjects, and that model is that of Husserlian phenomenology (hereinafter, phenomenology, with the understanding that only phenomenology according to Husserl is intended by both Dr. Hadreas and myself). In formulating this as the aim of his paper and his research, Dr. Hadreas has taken on an extremely difficult task.In general, attempts to show that any philosophical stance bears directly and immediately on the understanding of patients' symptoms, as well as on both theoretical and therapeutic work with people with mental disorders, is, owing to the ostensible gap in levels of conceptualization and systematicity, that is, the theory/praxis divide ostensibly separating the two realms, extraordinarily difficult. The task is rendered even more difficult in work like that of Prof. Hadreas,' in which, I believe, the researcher does not want to "apply" philosophy parasitically, as if research into psychiatric phenomena in relation to philosophy is just a matter of cannibalizing philosophy for self-justification, or vice versa; rather, Hadreas wants to preserve the integrity of both research into the phenomenology of psychiatric disorders and of [End Page 53] the philosophical perspective that may improve understanding of those disorders. In undertaking an effort along these lines, Hadreas breaks new ground.In particular, for this commentator, bringing Husserlian phenomenology to bear on these issues is particularly gratifying. Moreover, and most important, Hadreas bases his critique of classical empiricist and rationalist models of self-awareness on bringing to the fore Husserl's views on pre-reflective consciousness. This is extremely important for, as Dan Zahavi, noted Husserlian phenomenologist and philosopher of the phenomenology–psychiatry interface, points out, not only in the book cited by Hadreas but in a more recent article (Zahavi 2003), Husserl's notion of self-awareness has been critiqued by many who claim that he lacked a notion of pre-reflective consciousness. Indeed, Zahavi's (2003) work in this area quite effectively refutes these claims, and he does so by drawing on a large body of evidence from Husserl's posthumous writings. Thus, Hadreas is to be congratulated for using Husserl's long-neglected notion of pre-reflective consciousness as a means of approaching phenomenologically the testimony of patients who discussed changes in their self-awareness owing to their experiences with SSRI medications, chiefly fluoxetine. However, it is just because I share with Hadreas the conviction that Husserlian phenomenology is the best philosophical approach to understanding, and indeed, possibly improving the treatment of mental disorders, that I think it is vital to raise some questions regarding Hadreas' approach.My first critical comment is this: Hadreas' aim in writing his paper is unclear in a way that calls his project into question. In the conclusion of his paper, he indicates that his findings can enable psychiatrists to determine which patients are more likely to experience "SSRI cures." Given this, it would seem that his purpose in introducing Husserlian phenomenology is to facilitate this goal. Those subjects, he finds (based on his phenomenological analysis of the subjects' own testimony), who "have lived enough of life to have formed, for better or worse, an abiding empirical ego" are more likely to be "good responders" to SSRIs. It would seem, then, that this finding would aid psychiatrists in evaluating patients who have been treated, or who might be treated, with SSRIs. This, then, if correct, would be a considerable... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Mild Cognitive Impairment:What's in a Name?Steven R. Sabat (bio)Keywordslabeling, mild cognitive impairment, recall memory, selfhood, stereotype threatCorner and Bond (2006) raise a number of important conceptual issues related to the problems involved in defining mild cognitive impairment (MCI), differentiating it from normal aging, the definition of normal aging itself, and ethical issues surrounding the possible adverse effects of a diagnosis of MCI on the individuals thus described. It would (...) seem that portentous ramifications are involved and that clarifying the conceptual issues would be of great value, not only to researchers but also to the ever-growing population of elderly people. In what follows, I address some of these issues further.Problems of Definition and MeasurementOne of the problems that the authors discuss at the outset of their article concerns what methods are appropriate for detecting those with MCI: "Neuropsychological tests alone do not discriminate between normal aged-related memory loss and MCI or dementia and clinical judgment remains central to diagnosis" (Corner and Bond 2006, 5). Of course, to be able to discriminate between normal aged-related memory problems and MCI, we must first be able to define the former. What exactly is normal? As the authors correctly point out, the term has different meanings, one being normative (usual), another being nonpathologic. Is it normal (usual) for some sort of breakdown to occur in brain systems as a function of increased age? If so, is there a threshold age below which the very same physiologic breakdown is unusual? Would such a threshold age, if one existed, be the same for everyone, regardless of genotype and the cumulative interactive effects of nutrition, health, and stress-related factors over a period of decades? In effect, is some sort of memory impairment part of the natural (usual) process of aging for some people at particular ages rather than for others? And exactly what does it mean to be mildly impaired in the cognitive domain?Hogan and McKeith (2001) presented a working group's definition characterizing MCI such that people who complain about memory problems and who also provide objective evidence of such problems, yet who simultaneously display "normal general cognitive function and intact activities of daily living" (Hogan and McKeith 2001, 1131), should be identified and followed. Here again, however, we confront the problem of defining "normal general cognitive function" as well as "normal activities of daily living." Can one have normal general cognitive function without normal memory function? If so, what exactly constitutes [End Page 13] general cognitive function and on what conceptual or theoretical basis is such a definition valid? Furthermore, what sort of memory function are we talking about? Memory can be said to involve a number of stages: encoding, storage, and retrieval. Retrieval can be of the explicit type (conscious recall or recognition of specific information) with which people with Alzheimer's disease (AD) often reveal deficits or of the implicit type (a change in behavior as a result of previous experience of which the person may have no conscious recollection) as demonstrated in people with AD (Knopman and Nissen 1987). That is, people with AD can display deficits in explicit memory functions without similar deficits simultaneously in implicit memory functions.A partial answer to the question about memory loss in MCI may be found in the use of the Mini-Mental State Examination (MMSE; Folstein, Folstein, and McHugh 1975), originally intended to be used as a screening device, but employed more and more frequently as an outcome measure to assess cognitive decline as well as the efficacy of drug treatments. Although the examination purports to test orientation, registration, attention, calculation, recall, language (naming, repeating, reading, writing, three-stage command), and construction, a task analysis reveals that the test is not quite as "global" in the cognitive domain as it is purported to be. For example, ten of the maximum thirty points on the examination are earned for "orientation" in time and place. Yet, all of the questions in this section of the test require intact recall of the relevant information. For example, if a person is asked, "What day of the week is this?" and replies "I don't know," the... (shrink)

In Neither Victim nor Survivor: Thinking toward a New Humanity, Marilyn Nissim-Sabat offers a comprehensive critique of the interrelated concepts of "victim" and "survivor" as they have been ideologically distorted in Western thought. Nissim-Sabat proposes that a phenomenological attitude empowers us to overcome the anti-human consequences of both victimization of individuals and peoples and the ideological distortions of concepts that help to perpetuate that victimization.

In this article, I explore how methods of investigation can allow us either to appreciate the intact cognitive and social abilities of people with Alzheimer’s disease or unwittingly obscure those same abilities. Specifically, I shall assert that (1) the biomedical- quantitative approach, while being generally appropriate for drug efficacy studies, does not allow us to appreciate the many significant strengths possessed by people diagnosed with dementia, (2) qualitative/narrative approaches do so admirably, and (3) understanding the cognitive and social strengths of (...) people diagnosed is of paramount importance for developing optimal care giving approaches and reveals strikingly the shared humanity of those diagnosed with dementia and those deemed healthy. (shrink)

El presente trabajo se propone abordar la recepción de la filosofía moderna europea que se desplegó en el siglo XVIII en dos instituciones fundamentales del territorio del Río de la Plata: la Universidad de Córdoba y el Colegio de San Carlos de Buenos Aires. Nuestro objetivo es analizar dicha recepción a pensando su vínculo con una manera específica de practicar la enseñanza de la filosofía en estas instituciones, entendiéndola como parte esencial del quehacer filosófico, como una búsqueda genuina de conocimiento. (...) Nos concentraremos en el caso de Baruch Spinoza —pensador perseguido y condenado a la censura— para ilustrar las diversas formas en las que nuevos autores modernos eran incorporados paulatinamente a la enseñanza de la filosofía en las aulas rioplatenses. (shrink)

1. Filosofía del ser.--2. Filosofía del pensar.

1. Desde los sumerios hasta Roma.--2. Desde el sacro imperio hasta Savigny.

El objetivo del presente trabajo es rastrear cuál es el semblante que el padre benedictino Benito Feijoo construye de la figura de Baruch Spinoza en su Teatro Crítico Universal. Creemos que es fundamental estudiar las referencias al nombre del filósofo holandés presentes en la obra feijoniana en tanto permiten delimitar un comienzo en la recepción del spinozismo en la primera ilustración española. La hipótesis que defenderemos es que Spinoza es un interlocutor constante de Feijoo, que reviste importancia, que es convocado (...) al diálogo filosófico pero, al mismo tiempo, es presentado estratégicamente de manera solapada, disimulada, distante. (shrink)

In Neither Victim nor Survivor: Thinking toward a New Humanity, Marilyn Nissim-Sabat offers a comprehensive critique of the interrelated concepts of "victim" and "survivor" as they have been ideologically distorted in Western thought. Nissim-Sabat proposes that a phenomenological attitude empowers us to overcome the anti-human consequences of both victimization of individuals and peoples and the ideological distortions of concepts that help to perpetuate that victimization.

Grant Gillett's (2009) welcome and extremely thought-provoking target article addresses many complex issues of such far-ranging consequence that it seems impossible to provide a commentary worthy o...

The problem of exclusion threatens non-reductive physicalist theories of the mind by implying that they cannot account for mental causation. This paper attempts to clarify what exactly the exclusion problem is, and, given the problem, to survey the theoretical options open. First I reconstruct the problem from its most influential sources (Malcolm and Kim), showing that it should be understood as an ontological rather than an explanatory problem. I then distinguish the problem from some consequences that seem to follow from (...) it. Finally I sketch a map of possible answers to exclusion. (shrink)

How does mind fit into nature? Philosophy has long been concerned with this question. No contemporary philosopher has done more to clarify it than Jaegwon Kim, a distinguished analytic philosopher specializing in metaphysics and philosophy of mind. With new contributions from an outstanding line-up of eminent scholars, this volume focuses on issues raised in Kim's work. The chapters cluster around two themes: first, exclusion, supervenience, and reduction, with attention to the causal exclusion argument for which Kim is widely celebrated; and (...) second, phenomenal consciousness and qualia, with attention to the prospects for a functionalist account of the mental. This volume is sure to become a major focus of attention and research in the disciplines of metaphysics and philosophy of mind. (shrink)