The potential for jointly using or integrating Western science and indigenous knowledge, especially in such fields as environmental management, is a hotly debated topic nowadays. However, the difficulties involved in such a task are not always fully understood and co-management experiences achieved only partially the expected outcomes. In this contribution, I show how a sound combination of the two bodies of knowledge would be possible only if there is a way to accommodate different interpretations of reality and knowledge criteria. The (...) issue should then be faced at the epistemological level too, discussing the possibility and implications of a genuine epistemic pluralism. With reference, among others, to Feyerabend’s later writings, here I illustrate some possible insights for addressing the matter that a Western perspectivist stance could provide. (shrink)

Most social scientists and philosophers claim that sociology and philosophy are disjoint fields of inquiry. Some have wondered how to trace the precise boundary between them. Mario Bunge argues that the two fields are so entangled with one another that no demarcation is possible or, indeed, desirable. In fact, sociological research has demonstrably philosophical pre-suppositions. In turn, some findings of sociology are bound to correct or enrich the philosophical theories that deal with the world, our knowledge of it, or (...) the ways of acting upon it. While Bunge's thesis would hardly have shocked Mill, Marx, Durkheim, or Weber, it is alien to the current sociological mainstream and dominant philosophical schools. Bunge demonstrates that philosophical problematics arise in social science research. A fertile philosophy of social science unearths critical presuppositions, analyzes key concepts, refines effective research strategies, crafts coherent and realistic syntheses, and identifies important new problems. Bunge examines Marx's and Durkheim's thesis that social facts are as objective as physical facts; the so-called Thomas theorem that refutes the behaviorist thesis that social agents react to social stimuli rather than to the way we perceive them; and Merton's thesis on the ethos of basic science which shows that science and morality are intertwined. He considers selected philosophical problems raised by contemporary social studies and argues forcefully against tolerance of shabby work in academic social science and philosophy alike. (shrink)

Should decision-making algorithms be held to higher standards of transparency than human beings? The way we answer this question directly impacts what we demand from explainable algorithms, how we govern them via regulatory proposals, and how explainable algorithms may help resolve the social problems associated with decision making supported by artificial intelligence. Some argue that algorithms and humans should be held to the same standards of transparency and that a double standard of transparency is hardly justified. We give two arguments (...) to the contrary and specify two kinds of situations for which higher standards of transparency are required from algorithmic decisions as compared to humans. Our arguments have direct implications on the demands from explainable algorithms in decision-making contexts such as automated transportation. (shrink)

The attempt to recuperate the efficacy of utopia from critics of its blueprint variants has seen the emergence of critical utopias.1 According to critics, the problem with "traditional" blueprint models lay in their production of "a closed, static, authoritarian society that negates temporality and does violence to plurality and individual singularity."2 Critical utopias sought to internalize such critiques in order to rescue utopia, resulting in a heightened attention to the problems of the dialectic of emancipation, plurality, and temporality. Consequently, critical (...) utopias contain a self-reflexive approach that aims to foreclose any authoritarian regression via an internalization of the preliminary and... (shrink)

Complex crises like the coronavirus pandemic are showing us that modern societies are becoming increasingly unable to live in equilibrium with nature. These crises are the result of multiple causes, which interact at different scales and across different domains. Therefore, investigating their proximate causes is not enough to fully understand them. It is also crucial to take into account the structural factors involved. As concerns the global pandemic, I suggest four levels of analysis: (i) the surface or “proximate” level of (...) the crisis; (ii) the human–environment–animal interface, as pointed out by the One Health approach; (iii) the broader socioeconomic context; and (iv) the deeper or worldview level. Furthermore, I argue that there is the need for a mindset shift if we want to properly trace causality. Much more attention must be given to the study of multilevel connecting patterns and nonlinear mechanisms as the producers of emergent global effects. (shrink)

During the COVID-19 pandemic, scientific experts advised governments for measures to be promptly taken; they also helped people to understand the situation. They carried out this role in the face of a worldwide emergency, when scientific understanding was still underway. Public scientific disputes also arose, creating confusion among people. This article highlights the importance of experts’ epistemic stance under these circumstances. It suggests they should embrace the intellectual virtue of epistemic humility, regulating their epistemic behavior and communication accordingly. In so (...) doing, they would also favour the functioning of the broad network of knowledge-based experts, which is required to properly address all the aspects of the global pandemic. (shrink)

This paper attempts to draw out the political import of Merleau-Ponty’s ontology of the flesh, by engaging the critique levelled against it by his student and literary executor Claude Lefort. In suggesting a tension in Merleau-Ponty’s work that obscures alterity, Lefort seems to miss the rich political import of Merleau-Ponty’s ontology of the flesh. Founded in his development of the concepts of écart and reversibility, Merleau-Ponty’s ontological position breaks with many of the standard tenets of political thinking, and offers a (...) multifaceted conception of alterity. I will suggest that Lefort’s own claim to alterity buckles under the immanent weight of his critique of Merleau-Ponty, offering at best a conception of otherness limited to a self-relational non-identity. This conception ultimately fails to adequately consider the relations existing between different beings-in-the-world. In thinking being as flesh, Merleau-Ponty offers us an ethico-political optic that attempts to think alterity and ontology in a manner that unhinges us from our closed and autonomous being, opening us to the world, others and to the non-identical becoming that characterizes being as such. (shrink)

It is generally argued that if the wave-function in the de Broglie–Bohm theory is a physical field, it must be a field in configuration space. Nevertheless, it is possible to interpret the wave-function as a multi-field in three-dimensional space. This approach hasn’t received the attention yet it really deserves. The aim of this paper is threefold: first, we show that the wave-function is naturally and straightforwardly construed as a multi-field; second, we show why this interpretation is superior to other interpretations (...) discussed in the literature; third, we clarify common misconceptions. (shrink)

Slightly revised version of the author's habilitation--Universitèat Gèottingen, 2014.

Descartes's distinction between res cogitans and res extensa is a paradigmatic concept on which Western thought has been grounded. The reductionist and objectivistic approach of modern science draws its fundamental premise from it. This dualism has also instigated a view of human as separate from nature. The complexity approach in its most radical form questions many of these assumptions, asserting that the subjective and objective dimensions are involved in a relation of mutual determination and dependence. This article argues that if (...) the dualistic metaphysics is replaced by a vision emphasizing this mutual dependence, a new way of interacting with nature may also be fostered. (shrink)

English summary: What is Religious Experience? For more than a hundred years the term "religious experience" has been part of the vocabulary of philosophy of religion. However, there is no common understanding of the meaning of religious experience. Mario Fischer analyzes Heidegger's early phenomenology of religious life and its background in contemporaneous theological and philosophical developments. The young Martin Heidegger developed his first autonomous phenomenological approaches by considering how the Christian experience of life is expressed in the letters of (...) the apostle Paul and in Augustine's onfessions These studies led to his later analysis of aseinin eing and Time In conclusion, Fischer examines the significance of Heidegger's understanding of religious experience for current discussions in the philosophy of religion. German description: Was ist religiose Erfahrung? Auch wenn seit etwas mehr als einem Jahrhundert der Begriff der religiosen Erfahrung aus der Religionsphilosophie nicht mehr wegzudenken ist, besteht kein einheitliches Verstandnis dessen, was unter religioser Erfahrung zu verstehen ist. Mario Fischer untersucht Heideggers fruhe Phanomenologie des religiosen Lebens vor dem Hintergrund der zeitgeschichtlichen theologischen und philosophischen Entwicklungen. Der junge Freiburger Privatdozent Martin Heidegger wollte nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg die Philosophie neu grundlegen und entwickelte seine ersten Ansatze einer eigenstandigen Phanomenologie. Dabei spielte die Auseinandersetzung mit Fragen nach der Bedeutung und Erfassung religioser Erfahrung eine wesentliche Rolle. Zunachst befasste sich Heidegger mit der Struktur religioser Erlebnisse, weitete seinen Blick dann aber auf die Struktur der Lebenserfahrung und ihre religiose Dimension. Dazu untersuchte er, wie sich diese konkret in den Briefen des Apostels Paulus und in den Confessiones Augustins ausdruckt. Spater fuhrten diese Studien zu seiner Daseinsanalyse in Sein und Zeit und stellten die Grundlage seines spateren Gesprachs mit Bultmann dar. Die Darstellung orientiert sich an Heideggers Biographie bis zu seinem Weggang aus Freiburg im Jahre 1923. Bewusst setzt sie nicht erst mit dem Beginn seiner philosophischen Lehrtatigkeit ein, sondern nimmt auch die Einflusse aus Heideggers Kindheit und Jugend sowie aus seiner Studentenzeit mit in den Blick. So entsteht ein vielgestaltiges und spannendes Bild der verschiedenen Geistesstromungen um den Ersten Weltkrieg. Abschliessend fragt Fischer nach der Bedeutung von Heideggers phanomenologischen Studien fur die gegenwartige religionsphilosophische Diskussion um religiose Erfahrung. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Milieu Philosophy or Physics? Apprenticeship Starting Research and Minerva From Physics to Philosophy Causality and Levels Teaching Acknowledgment Books by Mario Bunge.

This paper investigates the historical origin and ancestors of typicality, which is now a central concept in Boltzmannian Statistical Mechanics and Bohmian Mechanics. Although Ludwig Boltzmann did not use the word typicality, its main idea, namely, that something happens almost always or is valid for almost all cases, plays a crucial role for his explanation of how thermodynamic systems approach equilibrium. At the beginning of the 20th century, the focus on almost always or almost everywhere was fruitful for developing measure (...) theory and probability theory. It was apparently Hugh Everett III who first mentioned typicality in physics in 1957 while searching for a justification of the Born rule in his interpretation of quantum mechanics. The historically closest concept before these developments is moral certainty, which was invented by the medieval French theologian Jean Gerson, and it became a standard concept at least until the Age of Enlightenment, when Jakob Bernoulli proved the Law of Large numbers. (shrink)

While critical utopias sought to rescue the political import of utopia, recently scholars have questioned their overemphasis on literary forms and a disempowering pluralism. Challenging the applicability of these claims to one of the instigators of critical utopias, I provide a political reading of Miguel Abensour's understanding of utopia and connect this to councils as a concrete institutional infrastructure. This begins with a re-reading of his influential conception of the ‘education of desire’ in relation to the simulacrum as a utopian (...) ‘model’ that, in rejecting identity-thinking, refuses to reduce utopias to a blueprint. I then turn to conceptualising the utopia of councils through the simulacrum on two fronts: first, as a form subject to innovation in the context of the dialectic of emancipation; second, as a content that aims to both ‘democratise utopia’ by embracing plurality and ‘utopianize democracy’ by expanding the realm of democratic space. (shrink)

First, the article illustrates the concept of ‘cultural heritage’ as traditionally meant, namely relying on a historically consolidated narrative. Next, it undertakes a broader conceptual analysis and deals with three distinct issues: (i) the fact that the conceptualizations and uses of heritage largely depend on long lasting dichotomies (e.g., tangible/intangible, natural/cultural); (ii) the way in which cultural backgrounds shape the dynamics of valuing and approaching heritage; (iii) the temporal framing of heritage, which today, in the Anthropocene, also points towards how (...) to deal with a future of uncertainty. Lastly, it introduces the notion of epistemic heritage, (i.e., the existence of multiple cultural ways of knowing), investigating its implications for both how cultural heritage is conceived and the future approached. (shrink)

Il presente testo propone un attraversamento della metafisica di Whitehead, al fine di rintracciare i funzionamenti costituenti il carattere processuale di suddetta filosofia. Sono perciò problematizzati il concatenamento tra i differenti modelli di spazio genetico di concrescenza e coordinato di transizione, la dinamica complessa tra natura ed astrazione, il rapporto tra una formazione soggettiva ed affettiva e la neutra temporalità di blocchi di durata. L'intuizione alla base della riflessione proposta è che nei circuiti della cosmologia analizzata, che compongono il grande (...) tema whiteheadiano della Creatività, sia in primo luogo questione di quel concetto che tanto alle discipline scientifiche quanto alla tradizione metafisica non cessa di sfuggire: il Divenire. (shrink)

We put forth an account for when to believe causal and evidential conditionals. The basic idea is to embed a causal model in an agent’s belief state. For the evaluation of conditionals seems to be relative to beliefs about both particular facts and causal relations. Unlike other attempts using causal models, we show that ours can account rather well not only for various causal but also evidential conditionals.

We propose a method of learning indicative conditional information. An agent learns conditional information by Jeffrey imaging on the minimally informative proposition expressed by a Stalnaker conditional. We show that the predictions of the proposed method align with the intuitions in Douven, 239–263 2012)’s benchmark examples. Jeffrey imaging on Stalnaker conditionals can also capture the learning of uncertain conditional information, which we illustrate by generating predictions for the Judy Benjamin Problem.

I want to combine two hitherto largely independent research projects, scientific understanding and mechanistic explanations. Understanding is not only achieved by answering why-questions, that is, by providing scientific explanations, but also by answering what-questions, that is, by providing what I call scientific descriptions. Based on this distinction, I develop three forms of understanding: understanding-what, understanding-why, and understanding-how. I argue that understanding-how is a particularly deep form of understanding, because it is based on mechanistic explanations, which answer why something happens in (...) virtue of what it is made of. I apply the three forms of understanding to two case studies: first, to the historical development of thermodynamics and, second, to the differences between the Clausius and the Boltzmann entropy in explaining thermodynamic processes. (shrink)

The ontological models framework distinguishes ψ-ontic from ψ-epistemic wave- functions. It is, in general, quite straightforward to categorize the wave-function of a certain quantum theory. Nevertheless, there has been a debate about the ontological status of the wave-function in the statistical interpretation of quantum mechanics: is it ψ-epistemic and incomplete or ψ-ontic and complete? I will argue that the wave- function in this interpretation is best regarded as ψ-ontic and incomplete.

The following article proposes a change of perspective in the capital-theory debate of political economy. Instead of insisting upon the differences between a Marxian labour theory of value and a Ricardo-Sraffaian theory of prices of production (Marx versus Sraffa) the common basis of the two approaches is stressed. The common basis consists in the paradigm of duality between physical quantities and evaluation standards. The last part of the paper collects sceptical arguments concerning the question of whether the duality paradigm can (...) provide an adequate approach to an analysis of modern technical change. (shrink)

To go through the pages of the Autobiography of Mario Bunge is to accompany him through dozens of countries and examine the intellectual, political, philosophical and scientific spheres of the last hundred years. It is an experience that oscillates between two different worlds: the different and the similar, the professional and the personal. It is an established fact that one of his great loves was, and still is, science. He has always been dedicated to scientific work, teaching, research, and (...) training men and women in multiple disciplines. Life lessons fall like ripe fruit from this book, bringing us closer to a concept, a philosophical idea, a scientific digression, which had since been uncovered in numerous notes, articles or books. Bunge writes about the life experiences in this book with passion, naturalness and with a colloquial frankness, whether they be persecutions, banishment, imprisonment, successes, would-be losses, emotions, relationships, debates, impressions or opinions about people or things. In his pages we pass by the people with whom he shared a fruitful century of achievements and incredible depths of thought. Everything is remembered with sincerity and humor. This autobiography is, in truth, Bunge on Bunge, sharing everything that passes through the sieve of his memory, as he would say. Mario's many grandchildren are a testament to his proud standing as a family man, and at the age of 96 he gives us a book for everyone: for those who value the memories that hold the trauma of his life as well as for those who share his passion for science and culture. Also, perhaps, for some with whom he has had disagreements or controversy, for he still deserves recognition for being a staunch defender of his convictions. (shrink)

Questions of boosting human potential and biomedical techniques by modifying the normal way in which the human body works. This text first explains this phenomenon then reflects on it, drawing on philosophy, bioethics, law and technology.

What does it take to understand a phenomenon ideally, or to the highest conceivable extent? In this paper, we answer this question by arguing for five necessary conditions for ideal understanding: (i) representational accuracy, (ii) intelligibility, (iii) truth, (iv) reasonable endorsement, and (v) fitting. Even if one disagrees that there is some form of ideal understanding, these five conditions can be regarded as sufficient conditions for a particularly deep level of understanding. We then argue that grasping, novel predictions, and transparency (...) are not reasonable conditions for ideal understanding. (shrink)

Quanto spazio concedono alla libertà dell'interprete un testo sacro come una sonata di Beethoven o un articolo della Costituzione? Nella musica così come nel diritto, di fronte a una legge o a una suite di Bach, l'interprete si muove sempre in una delicata zona di confine che si situa tra l'eseguire e il creare. Dall'anelito alla perfezione alla deriva dei virtuosismi, dal gusto dell'improvvisazione alla necessità dell'innovazione, il compito più alto, e arduo, dell'interprete è quello di farsi tramite fra passato (...) e futuro. (shrink)