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  1. Does Skepticism Lead to Tranquility? Exploring a Pyrrhonian Theme.Mario Attie-Picker - 2020 - Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy 3:97-125.
  2. On the Value of Sad Music.Mario Attie-Picker, Tara Venkatesan, George E. Newman & Joshua Knobe - manuscript
    Many people appear to attach great value to sad music. But why? One way to gain insight into this question is to turn away from music and look instead at why people value sad conversations. In the case of conversations, the answer seems to be that expressing sadness creates a sense of genuine connection. We propose that sad music can also have this type of value. Listening to a sad song can give one a sense of genuine connection. We then (...)
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    Obligations of feeling.Mario Attie-Picker - 2022 - European Journal of Philosophy 30 (4):1282-1297.
    Moral obligation, according to one influential conception, is distinct among other moral concepts in at least two respects. First, obligation is linked with demands. If I am obligated to you to do X, then you can demand that I do X. Second, obligation is linked with blame and the rest of our accountability practices. If I am obligated to you to do X, failure to do so is blameworthy and you may hold me accountable for it. The puzzle is the (...)
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    Is the folk concept of luck normative?Mario Attie-Picker - 2019 - Synthese (2):1-35.
    Contemporary accounts of luck, though differing in pretty much everything, all agree that the concept of luck is descriptive as opposed to normative. This widespread agreement forms part of the framework in which debates in ethics and epistemology, where the concept of luck plays a central role, are carried out. The hypothesis put forward in the present paper is that luck attributions are sensitive to normative considerations. I report five experiments suggesting that luck attributions are influenced by the normative features (...)
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