The everyday concept of a social group is approached by examining the concept of going for a walk together, an example of doing something together, or "shared action". Two analyses requiring shared personal goals are rejected, since they fail to explain how people walking together have obligations and rights to appropriate behavior, and corresponding rights of rebuke. An alternative account is proposed: those who walk together must constitute the "plural subject" of a goal. The nature of plural subjecthood, the thesis (...) that social groups are plural subjects, and the relation of these ideas to Rousseau's and Hobbes 's, are briefly explored. (shrink)

A number of philosophers have argued that psychiatric delusions threaten Donald Davidson's rationalist account of intentional agency. I argue that a careful look at both Davidson's account and psychiatric delusions shows that, in fact, the two are perfectly compatible. Indeed, a Davidsonian perspective on psychiatric delusions proves remarkably illuminating.

Addressing central questions in the debate about Foucault's usefulness for politics, including his rejection of universal norms, his conception of power and power-knowledge, his seemingly contradictory position on subjectivity and his ...

Seneca stands apart from other philosophers of Greece and Rome not only for his interest in practical ethics, but also for the beauty and liveliness of his writing. These twelve in-depth essays take up a series of interrelated topics in his works, from his relation to Stoicism, Epicureanism, and other schools of thought; to the psychology of emotion and action and the management of anger and grief; to letter-writing, gift-giving, friendship, and kindness; to Seneca's innovative use of genre, style, and (...) humor. Recalling Socrates's critique of philosophical writing in Plato's Phaedrus, this volume gives particular attention to Seneca's ideas about the techniques of reading, writing, and study that make philosophy beneficial to the individual and to society. Clear explanations and careful translations make the volume accessible to a wide range of readers. (shrink)

This book describes how different nations have defined the core competencies and skills that young people will need in order to thrive in twenty-first-century jobs, and how those nations have fashioned educational policies and curricula meant to promote those skills. The book examines six countries--Chile, China, India, Mexico, Singapore, and the United States--exploring how each one defines, supports, and cultivates those competencies that students will need in order to succeed in the current century. Teaching and Learning for the Twenty-First Century (...) appears at a time of heightened attention to comparative studies of national education systems, and to international student assessments such as those that have come out of PISA (the Program for International Student Assessment), led by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. This book's crucial contribution to the burgeoning field of international education arises out of its special attention to first principles--and thus to first questions: As Reimers and Chung explain, "much can be gained by an explicit investigation of the intended purposes of education, in what they attempt to teach students, and in the related questions of why those purposes and how they are achieved." These questions are crucial to education practice and reform at a time when educators (and the students they serve) face unique, pressing challenges. The book's detailed attention to such questions signals its indispensable value for policy makers, scholars, and education leaders today. (shrink)

This book, the last volume in the Social Morphogenesis series, examines whether or not a Morphogenic society can foster new modes of human relations that could exercise a form of 'relational steering', protecting and promoting a nuanced version of the good life for all. It analyses the way in which the intensification of morphogenesis and the diminishing of morphostasis impact upon human flourishing. The book links intensified morphogenesis to promoting human flourishing based on the assumption that new opportunities open up (...) novel experiences, skills, and modes of communication that appeal to talents previously lacking any outlet or recognition. It proposes that equality of opportunity would increase as ascribed characteristics diminished in importance, and it could be maintained as the notion of achievement continued to diversify. Digitalization has opened the cultural 'archive' for more to explore and, as it expands exponentially, so do new complementary compatibilities whose development foster yet further opportunities. If more people can do more of what they do best, these represent stepping stones towards the 'good life' for more of them. (shrink)

This article explores how ethics and religion interface in everyday life by drawing on a study examining the negotiation of religious and spiritual plurality in health care. Employing methods of critical ethnography, namely, interviews and participant observation, data were collected from patients, health care providers, administrators and spiritual care providers. The findings revealed the degree to which `lived religion' was intertwined with `lived ethics' for many participants; particularly for people from the Sikh faith. For these participants, religion was woven into (...) everyday life, making distinctions between public and private, secular and sacred spaces improbable. Individual interactions, institutional resource allocation, and social discourses are all embedded in social relationships of power that prevent religion from being a solely personal or private matter. Strategies for the reintegration of religion into nursing ethics are: adjusting professional codes and theories of ethics to reflect the influence of religion; and the contribution of critical perspectives, such as postcolonial feminism, to the understanding of lived ethics. (shrink)

Patients with psychosis often have poor insight into their illness. Poor insight into illness is, at least among patients with psychosis, a good predictor of treatment non-adherence. This is no mystery, for as Xavier Amador asks, "Who would want to take medicine for an illness they did not believe they had?" What is curious is that some patients with psychosis do adhere to treatment despite a lack of insight. Why do these patients adhere to treatment, given that they do not (...) believe they are ill to begin with? In this paper, I attempt to answer this question. I do so by first considering cases of non-psychotic patients who adhere to treatment despite a lack of insight. I point out that these sorts of cases are commonplace, and attempt to explain why they arise. The explanation is given in terms of anticipated treatment benefits. However, these benefits are not conceptualized by the patient in terms of pathology. The patient does not, in other words, think of such benefits in terms of illness, symptoms, treatment, and so forth. I then argue that the proposed explanation can be extended to account for why psychotic patients without insight sometimes adhere to treatment. I conclude by drawing out some of the practical implications of the proposed view. I first argue, on practical as well as ethical grounds, that improving insight for purposes of treatment adherence is misguided. I then suggest that such adherence might be increased simply by explaining treatment benefits in language that does not presuppose that the patient is, in any sense, "ill," "diseased," "sick," "unwell," and so on. (shrink)

Presents a concise and comprehensive analysis of George Berkeley’s thought and the impact of his intellectual contributions to philosophy In this latest addition to the Blackwell Great Minds series, noted scholar of early modern philosophy Margaret Atherton examines Berkeley’s most influential work and demonstrates the significant conceptual impact of his ideas in metaphysics and the philosophy of religion. A concise and rigorous primer on Berkeley’s essential writings and contributions to modern philosophy Written by a leading scholar of early modern (...) philosophy Offers insight into the foundations of modern metaphysical and religious philosophy Equips readers to find firm footing in Berkeley’s wider body of published work in the canon of Western philosophy. (shrink)

Rebound effects on the consumer level occur when consumers’ realized greenhouse gas emission savings caused by behaviors that might be beneficial to the environment are lower than their potential greenhouse gas emission savings because the savings are offset by behavioral adjustments. While previous literature mainly studied the economic mechanisms of such rebound effects, research has largely neglected the moral-psychological mechanisms. A comprehensive conceptualization of rebound effects on the consumer level can help fill this void and stimulate more empirical research in (...) this relevant area. To this end, the paper introduces three focal dimensions of rebound effects on the consumer level: mechanism of rebound effects, product category, and consumption context. Based on this conceptualization, and integrating assumptions from the theory of moral licensing, the theory of categorization, and the construal level theory, this paper further refines the conceptualization of the moral component as an explanatory factor for rebound effects and highlights that the moral-psychological mechanisms of indirect rebound effects are more complex and diverse than the economic mechanisms. The paper outlines promising directions for future studies considering the different quantification and characteristics of economic and moral currencies that explain rebound effects on the consumer level and the strategic categorization of products and consumption contexts. (shrink)

Illuminating the complex relationships between tribal informants and twentieth-century anthropologists such as Boas, Parker, and Fenton, who came to their communities to collect stories and artifacts"--Provided by publisher.

In Talk About Beliefs, Mark Crimmins claims that de re belief reports are not nearly as common as they are generally thought to be. In the following paper, I take issue with this claim. I begin with a critique of Crimmins’arguments on behalf of the claim, and then follow with an argument on behalf of the opposing claim: that de re belief reports are indeed quite common. In defending this claim, I make some observations about the nature of tacit reference, (...) a phenomenon central to Crimmins’account of belief reports. (shrink)

We address the question whether there is an explanation for the fact that as Fodor put it the micro-level “converges on stable macro-level properties”, and whether there are lessons from this explanation for other issues in the vicinity. We argue that stability in large systems can be understood in terms of statistical limit theorems. In the thermodynamic limit of infinite system size N → ∞ systems will have strictly stable macroscopic properties in the sense that transitions between different macroscopic phases (...) of matter (if there are any) will not occur in finite time. Indeed stability in this sense is a consequence of the absence of fluctuations, as (large) fluctuations would be required to induce such macroscopic transformations. These properties can be understood in terms of coarse-grained descriptions, and the statistical limit theorems for independent or weakly dependent random variable describing the behaviour averages and the statistics of fluctuations in the large system limit. We argue that RNG analyses applied to off-critical systems can provide a rationalization for the applicability of these limit theorems. Furthermore we discuss some related issues as, for example, the role of the infinite-system idealization. (shrink)

Proceedings of SPIE present the original research papers presented at SPIE conferences and other high-quality conferences in the broad-ranging fields of optics and photonics. These books provide prompt access to the latest innovations in research and technology in their respective fields. Proceedings of SPIE are among the most cited references in patent literature.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reflections on InsightDilemmas, Paradoxes, and PuzzlesMarga Reimer (bio)Keywordsinsight, psychosis, treatment adherence, medical model, autonomy, open placebos, rationalityThe Practitioner's DilemmaThe psychiatrist aware of the potential intractability of what Jennifer Radden calls "insightlessness," faces a dilemma. Should she encourage her patient to embrace a medical model of his "troubles," a model whose adoption is likely to motivate treatment adherence? She might then be trying to do the impossible; she might (...) also alienate her patient in the process. Should she instead encourage her insightless patient to embrace his own non-medical model, according to which treatment adherence makes no medical sense whatsoever? She might then see herself as encouraging a kind of uninformed consent: Her insightless patient might be taking powerful, potentially harmful, medication for reasons (such as sound sleep and "peace of mind") that would never medically justify adherence.In my original paper, I suggested that the way out of this dilemma might be to embrace the latter option, while characterizing the very real (and medically based) benefits of treatment adherence in non-medical terms. I now realize that my proposed resolution reflects an oversimplified understanding of what might be called the "practitioner's dilemma." As Michaela Amering (2010) makes clear, the situation for those with mental illness is improving dramatically. With "recovery orientation" as the "guiding principle of mental health policy," the emphasis is on "health promotion, individual strengths, and resilience." The question becomes: Can the practitioner encourage her insightless patient to partake in this "recovery" movement if she does not simultaneously encourage him to embrace a medicalized understanding of his "troubles"?Not obviously. For although a "recovery" model might eschew notions like illness1 and disease, pathology and dysfunction, and even schizophrenia, it will inevitably involve some medical notions. The patient who partakes in the "recovery movement" described by Amering, would seem to have no choice but to accept a model that is essentially medical. Consider the language used by Amering in characterizing that movement. She talks of mental health problems, therapeutic relations, patient self-determination, diagnosis and, of course, recovery. The concepts underlying such language are intrinsic to the patient-oriented movement Amering describes. The question becomes:How can the insightless patient rationally partake in such a movement without embracing some version of the medical model of mental illness? [End Page 85]This question suggests the importance of promoting some kind of insight, even if not insight "into psychosis." At the close of these comments, I consider briefly what such "revisionary" insight might involve.Paradoxes of Conditional and Relinquished AutonomyAutonomy among patients with psychosis presupposes the sort of clear-headedness that arguably comes only with treatment adherence. This may provide some justification for the "coercive treatments" that Anthony (2006) finds so offensive. For patients with psychosis, genuine autonomy is conditional, requiring some degree of insight: Recognition that their "troubles" are at least amenable to medical treatment. Once the patient recognizes this, he can choose freely to decline such treatment (regardless of whether that choice is ultimately respected). Call this the "paradox of conditional autonomy." The conditional nature of autonomy is a familiar point in philosophical discussions regarding free will. There is no genuine freedom without the sort of knowledge required for informed choices. What distinguishes the patient with psychosis from persons more generally is that his autonomy is further conditioned: The knowledge required for autonomous decision making arguably requires some degree of treatment adherence.However, the mentally ill patient has the right, as do all patients, to relinquish autonomy. He may opt for deference to, and dependency on, the relevant experts: Mental health care professionals (Campbell 1994). We are led once again to paradox. To respect the patient's autonomy, the mental health care professional must respect his right to forego autonomy in favor of deference and dependency. This paradoxical situation, involving a kind of deferred autonomy, is not unique to psychiatry but applies to medicine across the board. Indeed, it applies to the human service industry more generally where, as McGorry (1992) suggests, there is an implicit assumption that the service user is to defer to the expertise of the service provider.This assumption is rightly challenged. Suppose Justin and... (shrink)

This book presents a critique of dominant governance theories grounded in an understanding of existence as a static, discrete, mechanistic process, while also identifying the failures of theories that assume dynamic alternatives of either a radically collectivist or individualist nature. Relationships between ontology and governance practices are established, drawing upon a wide range of social, political, and administrative theory. Employing the ideal-type method and dialectical analysis to establish meanings, the authors develop a typology of four dominant approaches to governance. The (...) authors then provide a systematic analysis of each governance approach, thoroughly unpacking and critiquing each one and exploring the relationships and movements among them that engender reform and revolution as well as retrenchment and obfuscation of power dynamics. After demonstrating that each governance approach has fatal flaws within a diverse global context, the authors propose an alternative they call Integrative Governance. As a synthesis of the ideal-types, Integrative Governance is neither individualist nor collectivist, while still maintaining the dynamic character required to accommodate responsiveness to cultural contexts. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy of Music Education Review 12.1 (2004) 4-16 [Access article in PDF] Once More With Feeling Reconciling Discrepant Accounts of Musical Affect Bennett Reimer Northwestern University When I was sixteen, a junior in high school in Brooklyn, I auditioned for the All-City High School Band of New York and was placed as first chair clarinet. At the first rehearsal, a piece we played (I don't remember what it (...) was except that it was new to me) had a long, melodic clarinet solo, with accompaniment. When I finished playing it the director stopped the band and said, "Very nice, first clarinet. Let's do it again, this time with more feeling." Then he said, "Letter C," and we started again.I could not have known, then, that I was to spend much of my life in pursuit of some sort of clarification of what transpired in that episode, as in this paper, where I deal once more with feeling. I had no idea that his apparently simple instruction to me raised issues so complex that many of humankind's most important thinkers had struggled with them in search of a resolution, as I, infinitely more modestly, was also to do. I was unaware that philosophical blood, sweat, and tears had been spilled through the centuries in various contentions as to the relation, if any, of musical feeling to feeling outside musical experience. I knew nothing of metaphor, [End Page 4] of effability and ineffability, of embodiment and designation, of issues of authenticity of feeling, and semantic density, significant form, semiotics, the relation of feeling to emotion, to gender, to meaning, and on and on with seemingly endless and intractable debates centered on how and why and when music is related to feeling.Being unencumbered with any of this (how one longs, sometimes, to return to one's philosophical Garden of Eden), and having to play that solo again immediately, I did what my novice performer's instincts told me to do-the only thing I knew how to do-I placed more emphasis on what the notes of that melody seemed to want to do, where they seemed to want to go and how they got there. Feeling their melodic tendencies more concentratedly and making them more apparent by the way I sounded them, I felt in myself a deeper sense of union-of the music as part of my undergoing-than I had the first time. When I finished the director stopped the band again, looked at me for several seconds, and said, "Lovely, first clarinet. Very musical. Let's go on."I would not have been able at the time that event occurred to describe, as I just did, what I did and how I felt. I did not have the conceptual apparatus to do so, although I did have, luckily for me, enough intuitive musicianship to have survived that test. My description, or perhaps interpretation, of how I reacted and how I experienced it can only reflect who I am now, with the cognitive structure allowing me to understand what happened as I reflect about it. Nevertheless I believe that several important matters relating to musical feeling can be clarified in relation to how I now interpret what I experienced as a youth in that band.I am aware now that I did what I did in ignorance of the fact that I was not the first to have played that solo. If I had known about and studied previous performances by a variety of clarinetists I would have, without doubt, been influenced by their solutions to the challenge of expressive interpretation it presented. Especially if I had been guided by a sensitive teacher, I would have reflected those influences in my own sounding. Perhaps I would have imitated what seemed to me the most musical rendition. If I had done so, I am now aware, that would have been regarded, in my culture at any rate, as a sign of my novice status, a more mature stage of musicianship requiring that I both reflect... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy in the School Music ProgramBennett ReimerWho is philosophy of music education for? Several groups of people immediately spring to mind. First, it is for those of us in music education who produce it and consume it as a major or important responsibility in our work—people like members of our Special Research Interest Group at MENC. Second, teachers of music education courses at the undergraduate and graduate levels who (...) deal with it either in a full course or series of courses or seminars devoted to philosophy, or as one part of courses devoted to other topics (as I believe is most often the case.) Third, school music teachers, many of whom have taken or are taking such courses (and many who have not) who are expected to have some level of acquaintance, however rudimentary, with philosophical issues so as to be able to cope with them, as when writing curriculum guides, or explaining to other teachers, administrators, school boards, and parents why music education is valuable and deserves support. If we stretch it, we might include among those who need to be involved with philosophy of music and music education all educational professionals, since all, in one way or another, exert some sort of influence on the fortunes of music education. But that begins to strain a bit at the edges.No doubt there are other constituencies that can be identified. But one that has not been conceived as requiring substantive encounters with philosophical issues of music is that of students in schools, K-12. We all assume that philosophy can and should play a major role in determining what is most valuable for students to learn in their study of music. But seldom has it been argued, to my [End Page 132] knowledge, that philosophical issues should be addressed in all programs of music education intended to produce people who are, in any convincing sense, musically educated.My premise is that philosophical reflection relating to music and to the teaching and learning of music should be foundational in school music programs. Further, philosophy needs to be present in our programs in three distinctive ways, reflecting common practices of education in America and all over the world. That is, as integral in the general music education of all students, as a component of all elective offerings, and as one particular, focused offering among the electives available to all students.My position is that what we call "general music" (which, as we know, goes by a variety of names around the world including just "music") is not complete; in fact is invalid, if it does not provide philosophical challenges of the same level of complexity, and the same degree of authenticity, as everything else we believe all students should know and be able to do in music. What we call the "music elective program," or the "music specialization program," is incomplete, in fact is invalid, if philosophical matters are not addressed as they relate to the particularities of each elective offered. And, in addition, philosophy needs to be a standard elective offering, taught with the same level of expertise by specialist teachers as we now routinely make available in performance and in the meager smattering of other electives we manage to offer.What? Philosophical thinking for all children, even in the primary grades, and as electives starting perhaps at the middle school or high school level? Electives taught by music educators whose specialization is the teaching of philosophy of music to youngsters? Am I serious? After all, even those of us who are devoted to it as a major aspect of our professionalism are constantly at the edges of our competence given the deep challenges philosophy presents to our intellect. And I expect children—all children—to be able to deal with it authentically?Well, we could ask precisely the same questions about, say, mathematics, and science, and history, and social studies, all the ways of thinking which constitute the basic learnings in all grades of our schools. As educators we know better than to conceive the nature of those subjects as only apparent at the level of professional work in them. We recognize the obvious: while at... (shrink)

Simone de Beauvoir’s early enthusiasm for the philosophy of Henri Bergson (1859-1941)—denied in her 1958 autobiography, Memoirs of a Dutiful Daughter—is a surprising discovery in her 1927 handwritten student diary, as I reported in 1999 and explored at more length in 2003 (Simons 1999; Simons 2003). Discovered by Sylvie Le Bon de Beauvoir after Beauvoir’s death in 1986 and now housed in the Bibliothèque nationale, Beauvoir’s student diary first appeared in print in the 2006 volume, Diary of a Philosophy Student: (...) 1926-27, followed in 2008 by the French publication, Cahiers de jeunesse: 1926-1930. Since my 1999 analysis of the 1927 diary, the publication of the 1926 diary and other posthumously discovered texts has deepened and complicated the evidence of Bergson’s influence.1 In this chapter, I propose to take up and expand upon my earlier analyses in the light of this new evidence, arguing that Beauvoir’s methodological turn to the description of immediate experience, especially her method of writing philosophy in literature and her lifelong interest in describing the subjective experience of time, drew upon Bergson’s philosophy before her first encounter with Husserl’s phenomenology which may have come as early as 1927; that her concept of bad faith and interest in exposing distortions in perception and thinking, as in the chapters in The Second Sex on myths about women, drew upon Bergson’s philosophy long before she had read Marx; and that her earliest formulation of the problem of the Other drew upon Bergson’s distinction between the “social self and the deep self,” two years before she met Jean-Paul Sartre and two decades before she first read Hegel’s Phenomenology. (shrink)

Learn how to think beyond the theoretical in any environment. "Ethics & Issues in Contemporary Nursing, 1st Edition" examines the latest trends, principles, theories, and models in patient care to help you learn how to make ethically sound decisions in complex and often controversial situations. Written from a global perspective, examples throughout the text reflect current national and international issues inviting you to explore cases considering socio-cultural influences, personal values, and professional ethics. Historical examples demonstrate how to think critically while (...) upholding moral and professional standards, as well as the law. Key topics throughout explore advocacy and rights, diversity, nurse burnout, mass casualty events, social media, violence in the workplace, medication error prevention, opioid and other substance use, HIPAA, and healthcare reform. In addition, this new title contains supplemental case studies and review questions to further challenge and prepare you to make morally sound decisions in any healthcare setting. -- From product description. (shrink)

This book re-imagines law as ecolaw. The key insight of ecological thinking, that everything is connected to everything else - at least on the earth, and possibly in the cosmos - has become a truism of contemporary theory. Taking this insight as a starting point for understanding law involves suspending theoretical certainties and boundaries. It involves suspending theory itself as a conceptual project and practicing it as an embodied and material project. Although an ecological imagining of law can be metaphorical, (...) and can be highly imaginative and suggestive, this book shows that it is also literal. Law is part of the material 'everything' that is connected to everything else. This means that once the previous certainties of legal thinking have been dismantled, it is after all possible to think of law as 'natural' - as embedded in and emergent from a normative biophysical nature. The book proposes that there exists a natural nomos: animals, plants, and Earth systems that produce their own values and norms from which human norms and laws emerge. This book, then, proposes a new way to understand law, and pursues specific arguments to demonstrate the feasibility of law as ecolaw. Drawing inspiration from current trends in the posthumanities, socio-ecological thought, and developments across the natural sciences in their specific intersections with humanities and social science disciplines, this book will appeal both to legal theorists and to others with interests in these areas. (shrink)

[1] Das Werten.--[2] Das Erkennen.--[3] Das Handeln.

In recent years, the free market position has been gaining strength. In this book, Radin provides a nuanced response to its sweeping generalization.

Economics was invented to deal with material scarcityScarcity, and is therefore biased towards increasing materially production. Many of the world’s current problems, however, are caused by excessive use of the resources of the natural world, often driven by an excessive desireDesire to accumulate the moneyMoney that stands proxy for them. In order to respond to these, then, we need to return the concept of ‘enoughEnough’ to the centre of moral and social, and therefore political and economic, thinking. ‘Enough’ for an (...) individual turns out to be concretely contextual and intrinsically relational. At the same time, it has objective boundaries, set not least by ecological limits combined with justice, both local and global. Therefore we need both good judgement and healthy societies to be truly satisfied, as individuals, with enoughEnough. One of the factors that exacerbates our weakness for excessExcess is the monetarisation of goodsGoods. Economists, I suggest, might need to be attentive to the importance, the specific complexities, and the risks of quantifying ‘enoughEnough’. (shrink)

That character virtue is produced, according to Aristotle, through a process of moral habituation is a familiar feature of his ethics. And yet our feeling of familiarity with the notions of habit and habituation can engender a like feeling of familiarity with the process Aristotle describes, and encourage us to conceive of this process in an overly narrow way. In this chapter, I examine Aristotle’s notion of ethos and ethismos (habit, habituation) in the Nicomachean Ethics to better understand what Aristotle (...) means to convey when he claims that character virtue ‘arises from habit’. I argue that to characterise habituation as ‘non-rational’ is misleading, particularly when this characterisation forecloses questions about what kinds of activity may be involved in the process of habituation, and what kind of states can be produced as a result. Habituation, I argue, is not characterised as a non-rational process, but a process that involves action and activity. This allows that the process of habituation may be understood in a relatively broad way and as potentially involving a range of activities which engage and develop a variety of psychological capacities. It also raises interesting questions about what a learner’s activity affords and how this contributes to her successful habituation. (shrink)

This book explains why universities, and academics within them, must engage with the diversity of knowledges and knowers that exist in the world. Through philosophical perspectives, theoretical frameworks and practical examples from around the world, the book searches for opportunities for renewal and inclusion in universities. It explains how higher education can better serve the purposes of social justice by re-evaluating the types of knowledge it promotes. Going beyond the identification and analysis of injustices in ways of knowing in academia, (...) the book offers insights and examples of practices in teaching, research and work with the community which aim to move towards justice on an epistemic level. It argues that inclusion in the domain of knowledge can lead to the generation of knowledges and understandings that are more robust and better equipped to address the pressing needs of the plural worlds outside the university. Contributions are included from authors working in varied disciplinary and cultural contexts in universities, who describe and explicate their work towards identifying epistemic injustice and finding spaces to advance knowledge justice in theory and in practice. The book will be beneficial to academics and those with an interest in the role of universities in serving the public good. (shrink)