The relationship between politics and the digital has largely been characterized as one of epochal change. The respective theories understand the digital as external to politics and society, as an autonomous driver for global, unilateral transformation. Rather than supporting such singular accounts of the relationship between politics and the digital, this article argues for its specificity: the digital is best examined in terms of folds within existing socio-technical configurations, and as an artefact with a set of affordances that are shaped (...) and filled with meaning by social practice. In conceptualizing the digital as numeric, countable, computable, material, storable, searchable, transferable, networkable and traceable, fabricated and interpreted, it becomes clear that the digital cannot be divorced from the social. These affordances of the digital are discussed in relation to specific political, digital practices that are further developed in the different contributions in this special issue, such as predictive policing (Aradau and Blanke, this issue), data protection (Bellanova, this issue), extremist recruitment videos (Leander, this issue), political acclamation (Dean, this issue), and pandemic simulations (Opitz, this issue). (shrink)

A most sensible exposition of Nietzsche's philosophy.

This paper presents an axiomatic framework for the priority heuristic, a model of bounded rationality in Selten’s (in: Gigerenzer and Selten (eds.) Bounded rationality: the adaptive toolbox, 2001) spirit of using empirical evidence on heuristics. The priority heuristic predicts actual human choices between risky gambles well. It implies violations of expected utility theory such as common consequence effects, common ratio effects, the fourfold pattern of risk taking and the reflection effect. We present an axiomatization of a parameterized version of the (...) heuristic which generalizes the heuristic in order to account for individual differences and inconsistencies. The axiomatization uses semiorders (Luce, Econometrica 24:178–191, 1956), which have an intransitive indifference part and a transitive strict preference component. The axiomatization suggests new testable predictions of the priority heuristic and makes it easier for theorists to study the relation between heuristics and other axiomatic theories such as cumulative prospect theory. (shrink)

Taking Savage's subjective expected utility theory as a starting point, this thesis distinguishes three types of uncertainty which are incompatible with Savage's theory for small worlds: ambiguity, option uncertainty and state space uncertainty. Under ambiguity agents cannot form a unique and additive probability function over the state space. Option uncertainty exists when agents cannot assign unique consequences to every state. Finally, state space uncertainty arises when the state space the agent constructs is not exhaustive, such that unforeseen contingencies can occur. (...) Chapter 2 explains Savage's notions of small and large worlds, and shows that ambiguity, option and state space uncertainty are incompatible with the small world representation. The chapter examines whether it is possible to reduce these types of uncertainty to one another. Chapter 3 suggests a definition of objective ambiguity by extending Savage's framework to include an exogenous likelihood ranking over events. The definition allows for a precise distinction between ambiguity and ambiguity attitude. The chapter argues that under objective ambiguity, ambiguity aversion is normatively permissible. Chapter 4 gives a model of option uncertainty. Using the two weak assumptions that the status quo is not uncertain, and that agents are option uncertainty averse, we derive status quo bias, the empirical tendency for agents to choose the status quo over other available alternatives. The model can be seen as rationalising status quo bias. Chapter 5 gives an axiomatic characterisation and corresponding representation theorem for the priority heuristic, a heuristic which predicts binary decisions be- tween lotteries particularly well. The chapter analyses the normative implications of this descriptive model. Chapter 6 defends the pluralist view of decision theory this thesis assumes. The chapter discusses possible applications of the types of uncertainty defined in the thesis, and concludes. (shrink)

There is today broad agreement that knowledge of Hegels thought adds a critical dimension to our understanding of recent cultural and political history.This ...

We distinguish three qualitatively different types of uncertainty—ethical, option and state space uncertainty—that are distinct from state uncertainty, the empirical uncertainty that is typically measured by a probability function on states of the world. Ethical uncertainty arises if the agent cannot assign precise utilities to consequences. Option uncertainty arises when the agent does not know what precise consequence an act has at every state. Finally, state space uncertainty exists when the agent is unsure how to construct an exhaustive state space. (...) These types of uncertainty are characterised along three dimensions—nature, object and severity—and the relationship between them is examined. We conclude that these different forms of uncertainty cannot be reduced to empirical uncertainty about the state of the world without inducing an increase in its severity. (shrink)

We attribute three major insights to Hegel: first, an understanding of the real numbers as the paradigmatic kind of number ; second, a recognition that a quantitative relation has three elements, which is embedded in his conception of measure; and third, a recognition of the phenomenon of divergence of measures such as in second-order or continuous phase transitions in which correlation length diverges. For ease of exposition, we will refer to these three insights as the R First Theory, Tripartite Relations, (...) and Divergence of Measures. Given the constraints of space, we emphasize the first and the third in this paper. (shrink)

Un grand nombre de problèmes dont traite aujourd'hui la théorie de la décision reposent sur des problématiques qui appartiennent à des approches philosophiques, méthodologiques et théoriques fort différentes et dont l'auteur deChoix rationnel et vie publiquedéplore à juste titre l'absence d'unité intrinsèque. En effet, les racines de la théorie contemporaine du choix rationnel ont des ramifications dans trois traditions philosophiques qui ont été maintenues sans entretenir de contacts: théories philosophiques de l'action d'Aristote à Hume, à Kant et à la philosophie (...) analytique de l'action de Davidson; la théorie du conflit de Hobbes à David Gauthier; la théorie de la justice (d'inspiration utilitariste qui a profondément marqué la pensée économique du XXesiècle). Ces branches ont entretenu des interactions sporadiques, mais ces relations n'ont jamais été exploitées systématiquement. Le travail que présente l'auteur est une première tentative dans cette direction, du moins en langue française. (shrink)

We discuss the semantic significance of a puzzle concerning ‘ought’ and conditionals recently discussed by Kolodny and MacFarlane. We argue that the puzzle is problematic for the standard Kratzer-style analysis of modality. In Kratzer’s semantics, modals are evaluated relative to a pair of conversational backgrounds. We show that there is no sensible way of assigning values to these conversational backgrounds so as to derive all of the intuitions in Kolodny and MacFarlane’s case. We show that the appropriate verdicts can be (...) derived by extending Kratzer’s framework to feature a third conversational background and claiming that the relevant reading of ‘ought’ is sensitive to this parameter. (shrink)

I offer an argument for what mental action may be like in nonhuman animals. Action planning is a type of mental action that involves a type of intention. Some intentions are the causal mental antecedents of proximal mental actions, and some intentions are the causal mental antecedents of distal mental actions. The distinction between these two types of “plan-states” is often spelled out in terms of mental content. The prominent view is that while proximal mental actions are caused by mental (...) states with nonconceptual content, distal mental actions are caused by mental states with conceptual content. I argue that, when we are investigating animal cognition, we need a nonconceptual account for the content of intentions involved in mental actions such as action planning: non-immediate intentions. This in order to defend the claim that creatures that lack conceptual capacities are capable of entertaining plan-states, and thus of exercising mental agency in the form of action planning. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Ideas 62.3 (2001) 523-541 [Access article in PDF] Antiquarianism, the History of Objects, and the History of Art before Winckelmann Thomas DaCosta Kaufmann [Figures] To the Memory of Franklin LeVan Baumer. In light of postmodernist and poststructuralist trends in the humanities which have contested notions of originality and of authorship, it might seem surprising that one outstanding myth of the eighteenth century has (...) not yet been thoroughly challenged. This is the claim made by Johann Joachim Winckelmann in the foreword to the Geschichte der Kunst des Altertums, originally published in 1764, that he had created a new history of art which was distinct from a history of artists and also different from what had previously been written about antiquities (Altertümer): The history of the art of antiquity, which I have undertaken to write, is no mere account of the chronological order and change of art, but I take the word history in the wider sense, that it has in the Greek language, and my intention is to offer an attempt at a system.... But the essence of art is in every part the most eminent aim, in which the history of artists has little influence, and this [sort of history of artists], which has been compiled by others, is therefore not to be sought here... those who have treated antiquities, examine either only such where erudition was to be applied, or, if they speak of art, this happens in part with common eulogies, or their judgment is built on peculiar, false grounds. 1 [End Page 523]Wolf Lepenies once described this claim as one of the many foundational myths of the Enlightenment and presented instead some parallels between the writing of art history and natural history in the eighteenth century. 2 As interest in the historiography of art has revived, publications have continued to pour forth on Winckelmann. 3 Yet the critique suggested by Lepenies has largely not been followed. Winckelmann's claim to originality remains a starting or major turning point for most accounts of the history of the discipline of art history. 4 [End Page 524]It may be that Winckelmann's claim has remained largely unchallenged because his differentiation of his accomplishment from that of Gelehrsamkeit in particular coincides with and helps to support another distinction made at his time, that between "philosophy," or criticism, and erudition, the latter being at best necessary but inferior. 5 This distinction, which was fostered by the philosophes and their counterparts in other countries, has been frequently heard in scholarly debates, and it is echoed in current discussions where empirical scholarship is disparaged in favor of what is often now called Theory. 6 Thus while in the twentieth century the Enlightenment came in for heavy going starting with at least the critique of Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, 7 this is one Enlightenment opinion which, despite the rise of critical theory among other trends in recent scholarship, has gained in fashion, especially in the English-speaking world.But the contrast between philosophy, or critique, and erudition makes a distinction that is ultimately untenable, even if it is also one that has continued to dominate many views of the history of eighteenth-century scholarship. The case at hand suggests that supposed innovations of the eighteenth century in the historiography of art, as in many other fields of study, are much more bound up with late humanism and encyclopedism than their promulgators might have wished to admit. Scholars of a number of disciplines have begun to revise interpretations of the role of the so-called antiquarians of the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries--those who dealt with Altertümer. 8 Some recent studies of the historiography of art have pointed to some connections between the antiquarian tradition and that of the historiography of art. 9 These approaches, however, have primarily dealt with Italian and French writers and, moreover, have left Winckelmann's position largely untouched. 10 Winckelmann's situation in the [End Page 525] broader European historical and geographical context also remains... (shrink)

John Searle has recently developed a theory of reasons for acting that intends to rescue the freedom of the will, endangered by causal determinism, whether physical or psychological. To achieve this purpose, Searle postulates a series of “gaps” that are supposed toendowthe self with free will. Reviewing key steps in Searle's argument, this article shows that such an undertaking cannot be successfully completed because of its solipsist premises. The author argues that reasons for acting do not have a subjective, I-ontology (...) but a first-person plural, Weontology that better accounts for agency and responsibility. (shrink)

Während Heideggers Interpretationen zu Dichtern wie Hölderlin, George oder Rilke grosse forscherische Aufmerksamkeit erhalten haben, ist seine lebenslange Auseinandersetzung mit Goethe bisher weitgehend unbeachtet geblieben bzw. nur einseitig betrachtet worden. Auf der Grundlage der inzwischen auf 95 Bände angewachsenen Heidegger-Gesamtausgabe unternimmt die vorliegende Publikation erstmals eine differenzierte Rekonstruktion von Heideggers verschiedenartigen Bezugnahmen auf Goethes Werk und Wirkung von der frühen Schaffensphase um 1910 bis hin zu den letzten Texten des Philosophen aus den 1970er Jahren. Obwohl sich Heideggers Goethe-Bild als hochgradig (...) ambivalent erweist, hatte er einen gewissen Einfluss auf die deutschsprachige Goethe-Philologie der Nachkriegszeit, wie abschliessend gezeigt wird. Abgerundet wird die Studie von einer Stellenkonkordanz zu Goethe in der Heidegger-Gesamtausgabe. (shrink)