Marcus Verhaegh - Aesthetics and Cognition in Kant's Critical Philosophy - Journal of the History of Philosophy 45:2 Journal of the History of Philosophy 45.2 336-337 Muse Search Journals This Journal Contents Reviewed by Marcus Verhaegh Grand Valley State University Rebecca Kukla, editor. Aesthetics and Cognition in Kant's Critical Philosophy. Cambridge-New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006. Pp. xiii + 309. Cloth, $75.00. This collection of essays focuses on the Critique of Judgment, a work that offers material in aesthetics, but that (...) also has much to teach us concerning the nature of non-aesthetic judgment, concept formation, teleology, and the task of investigating both the natural and moral realms. The pieces in the collection reflect.. (shrink)

In this dissertation, I give a reading of Kant's Critique of Judgment. I focus on the cognitive value of judgments of beauty. I argue that judgments of beauty indirectly contribute to theoretical cognition. My particular focus is on such judgments' contributions to cognition of the 'rules of skill' that apply when one attempts to affect the behavior of other humans through language-use, and which also apply to formation of the subject's 'empirical character.' ;I base my reading on Rudolf Makkreel's work (...) on Kant. This work suggests that judgments of beauty have a role to play in the furthering the subject's global cognition. I examine Makkreel's reading in light of somewhat different accounts of the Critique of Judgment, such as are given by Paul Guyer and Henry Allison. I attempt to show where these scholars agree---and, where they disagree, I attempt to show how Makkreel's position is the correct reading. I focus on the central role of the 'principle of purposiveness' in Kant's account of judgments of beauty and their value, showing how Paul Guyer at times incorrectly downgrades this role. ;I next further elaborate my views on the centrality of this principle. I start with the basic point that the 'principle of purposiveness' is a principle that requires us to view nature as if it were ordered with the cognitive interests of humans in mind. I focus on Kant's claim that judgments of beauty give an aesthetic presentation of the order we take to find in nature, as we follow the principle of purposiveness. I then attempt to show that judgments of beauty point us toward useful ways of conceiving of this order in nature, and ultimately spur us on toward developing models of nature. However, I emphasize that the judgments of beauty themselves never reveal truth or knowledge concerning nature. I further emphasize that whatever accounts of nature we develop based upon these judgments' inspiration, we must check the accounts' validity independently of the status of any judgments of taste. (shrink)

Contemplation and politics in the life of the aristotelian philosopher.

I argue that Martha Nussbaum presents us with an invaluable stance toward nonmoral goods—especially those of fantasy—relative to 1) the anti-perfectionist view regarding moral goods taken in Susan Wolf's "Moral Saints" 2) theperfectionist stance taken by Iris Murdoch. I show how Nussbaum critiques Murdoch not by taking issue with her perfectionist agenda, but by suggesting an alternative to Murdoch's regret-less “coolness” in applying this agenda to the ubiquitously tragic situations that humans encounter.

I argue that Martha Nussbaum presents us with an invaluable stance toward nonmoral goods—especially those of fantasy—relative to 1) the anti-perfectionist view regarding moral goods taken in Susan Wolf's "Moral Saints" 2) the perfectionist stance taken by Iris Murdoch. I show how Nussbaum critiques Murdoch not by taking issue with her perfectionist agenda, but by suggesting an alternative to Murdoch's regret-less "coolness" in applying this agenda to the ubiquitously tragic situations that humans encounter.

I develop the concept of hypothetical interpretation to give an account of certain problematic interpretive practices within a broadly Gricean framework. These practices attempt to find neither speaker nor linguistic meaning but rather, seek to discover such things as the unconscious beliefs of a text’s producer. In developing the concept of hypothetical interpretation, I consider in particular the question of their plausibility. I show how the plausibility of a hypothetical interpretation can be taken as providing evidence about a speaker’s noncommunicative (...) mental state, and how psychoanalytic interpretive practices and similar “hermeneutics of suspicion” rely upon such evidence. (shrink)

I develop the concept of hypothetical interpretation to give an account of certain problematic interpretive practices within a broadly Gricean framework. These practices attempt to find neither speaker nor linguistic meaning but rather, seek to discover such things as the unconscious beliefs of a text’s producer. In developing the concept of hypothetical interpretation, I consider in particular the question of their plausibility. I show how the plausibility of a hypothetical interpretation can be taken as providing evidence about a speaker’s noncommunicative (...) mental state, and how psychoanalytic interpretive practices and similar “hermeneutics of suspicion” rely upon such evidence. (shrink)