Résumé Jacques Serrano conçoit un système d’échange économique structurellement de même nature que sa production artistique non-matérialisée, qui permet de repenser la fonction et le statut de collectionneur. Cette réflexion s’accompagne d’un exemple de mise en application. Marc Halévy éclaire les enjeux économiques de cette proposition, et Ghislain Mollet-Viéville en analyse l’originalité en termes de collection.

This collection of essays, offered in honor of the distinguished career of prominent political philosophy professor Clifford Orwin, brings together internationally renowned scholars to provide a wide context and discuss various aspects of the virtue of “humanity” through the history of political philosophy.

This collection of essays, offered in honor of the distinguished career of prominent political philosophy professor Clifford Orwin, brings together internationally renowned scholars to provide a wide context and discuss various aspects of the virtue of “humanity” through the history of political philosophy.

" L'homme a beau s'étendre autant qu'il peut par sa connaissance, a écrit Nietzsche ; il a beau s'apparaître aussi objectivement qu'il le veut ; il n'en retire cependant pour finir que sa propre biographie. " S'il appartient au biographe d'éclairer, voire d'" expliquer " l'œuvre par l'homme, peu d'écrivains ou de philosophes justifient autant que Nietzsche cette ambition et cette méthode. Car il en est peu, comme le montre Daniel Halévy, chez qui l'œuvre adhère aussi étroitement à la (...) biographie intérieure. A cet égard, l'ouvrage que Daniel Halévy consacra au philosophe du Gai Savoir, voici déjà un demi-siècle, reste un modèle du genre. Et, à l'heure où l'on célèbre le centenaire de la mort de Nietzsche, il s'ira pose comme un classique indispensable à la compréhension d'une œuvre trop souvent dénaturée par ses interprètes. (shrink)

This is a reproduction of a book published before 1923. This book may have occasional imperfections such as missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. that were either part of the original artifact, or were introduced by the scanning process. We believe this work is culturally important, and despite the imperfections, have elected to bring it back into print as part of our continuing commitment to the preservation of printed works worldwide. We appreciate your understanding of the imperfections (...) in the preservation process, and hope you enjoy this valuable book. (shrink)

It has often been argued that Humean accounts of natural law cannot account for the role played by laws in scientific explanations. Loewer (Philosophical Studies 2012) has offered a new reply to this argument on behalf of Humean accounts—a reply that distinguishes between grounding (which Loewer portrays as underwriting a kind of metaphysical explanation) and scientific explanation. I will argue that Loewer’s reply fails because it cannot accommodate the relation between metaphysical and scientific explanation. This relation also resolves a puzzle (...) about scientific explanation that Hempel and Oppenheim (Philosophy of Science 15:135–75, 1948) encountered. (shrink)

Why do forces compose according to the parallelogram of forces? This question has been controversial; it is one episode in a longstanding, fundamental dispute regarding which facts are not to be explained dynamically. If the parallelogram law is explained statically, then the laws of statics are separate from and “transcend” the laws of dynamics. Alternatively, if the parallelogram law is explained dynamically, then statical laws become mere corollaries to the dynamical laws. I shall attempt to trace the history of this (...) controversy in order to identify what it would be for one or the other of these rival views to be correct. I shall argue that various familiar accounts of natural law not only make it difficult to see what the point of this dispute could have been, but also improperly foreclose some serious scientific options. I will sketch an alternative account of laws that helps us to understand what this dispute was all about. (shrink)

Halevy (1872-1962) was a French historian who became a friend of Marcel Proust while studying at the Lycee Condorcet. This biography of the celebrated German philosopher, Nietzsche, was first published in the original French in 1909 and appeared in this English translation in 1911.

Le cycle antique.--Le cycle Moderne.--Leibniz et l'Europe.

Structural requirements of rationality prohibit various things, like having inconsistent combinations of attitudes, having means-end incoherent combinations of attitudes, and so on. But what is the distinctive feature of structural requirements of rationality? And do we fall under an obligation to be structurally rational? These issues have been at the heart of significant debates over the past fifteen years. Some philosophers have recently argued that we can unify the structural requirements of rationality by analyzing what is constitutive of our attitudes (...) (Lee, 2020; Worsnip, 2018a). It has also been suggested that, in the course of good first-personal deliberation, agents should treat structurally irrational combinations of attitudes as off-limits (Worsnip, 2021). In this paper, I raise a worry for these two theses concerning structural rationality. Roughly, I argue that some imperfect epistemic agents (like us) can be disposed to have structurally irrational combinations of attitudes. Also, when these imperfect agents deliberate, they should not treat structurally irrational combinations of attitudes as off-limits. Given our imperfections, being structurally irrational can very well be the best option we have. More generally, these observations reveal that structural rationality should not always be theorized independently from more “substantive” norms, like responsiveness to reasons or expected value optimization. (shrink)

Conflicts of interest are rampant in the American medical community. Today it is not uncommon for doctors to refer patients to clinics or labs in which they have a financial interest (40% of physicians in Florida invest in medical centers); for hospitals to offer incentives to physicians who refer patients (a practice that can lead to unnecessary hospitalization); or for drug companies to provide lucrative give-aways to entice doctors to use their "brand name" drugs (which are much more expensive than (...) generic drugs). In Medicine, Money and Morals, Marc A. Rodwin draws on his own experience as a health lawyer--and his research in health ethics, law, and policy--to reveal how financial conflicts of interest can and do negatively affect the quality of patient care. He shows that the problem has become worse over the last century and provides many actual examples of how doctors' decisions are influenced by financial considerations. We learn how two California physicians, for example, resumed referrals to Pasadena General Hospital only after the hospital started paying $70 per patient (their referrals grew from 14 in one month to 82 in the next). As Rodwin writes, incentives such as this can inhibit a doctor from taking action when a hospital fails to provide proper service, and may also lead to the unnecessary hospitalization of patients. We also learn of a Wyeth-Ayerst Labs promotion in which physicians who started patients on INDERAL (a drug for high blood pressure, angina, and migraines) received 1000 mileage points on American Airlines for each patient (studies show that promotions such as this have a direct effect on a doctor's choice of drug). Rodwin reveals why the medical community has failed to regulate conflicts of interest: peer review has little authority, state licensing boards are usually ignorant of abuses, and the AMA code of ethics has historically been recommended rather than required. He examines what can be learned from the way society has coped with the conflicts of interest of other professionals --lawyers, government officials, and businessmen--all of which are held to higher standards of accountability than doctors. And he recommends that efforts be made to prohibit and regulate certain kinds of activity (such as kickbacks and self-referrals), to monitor and regulate conduct, and to provide penalties for improper conduct. Our failure to face physicians' conflicts of interest has distorted the way medicine is practiced, compromised the loyalty of doctors to patients, and harmed society, the integrity of the medical profession, and patients. For those concerned with the quality of health care or medical ethics, Medicine, Money and Morals is a provocative look into the current health care crisis and a powerful prescription for change. (shrink)

The article « La Défenestration » by Belgian philosopher Marc Richir has been translated into Russian for the first time for this issue of the “Horizon. Studies in Phenomenology.” In his early work “The Defenestration” Richir raises the question of relation between the subject and conceivable world. Here, a philosopher is pictured contemplating the world through the window of his tower. In such detachment from the world the thinker finds himself according to all Modern philosophies of consciousness. Husserl’s phenomenology (...) inherits this detachment, since Husserl imposes the structure of transcendental ego as external to the world. Richir abolishes the concept of transcendental ego with the help of heideggerian Dasein, but analyzing Heidegger’s ontology he comes to the conclusion that the latter remains fixated on beings. Believing a person to live in the fundamental openness of Being, Heidegger places such a person in the secondary world of “truth.” In order to overcome the remains of traditional philosophy in Heidegger’s ontology Richir turns to Merleau-Ponty’ “cosmology of the visible.” The author takes the Merleau-Ponty’s thesis that everything visible has something fundamentally invisible in it. This allows him to discover the universe of “nothing”, which includes both the visible and what is “behind” it. As a result Richir overcomes the classical dualism of the sensual and the intelligible. The concept of defenestration places the subject and the world in the same universe. (shrink)

The Kuzari: In Defense of the Despised Faith is the first new translation into English of The Kuzari since 1905, annotated and explained based on the classic commentaries. Written by Rabbi Yehuda HaLevi of Spain over a period of twenty years and completed in 1140, The Kuzari has enthralled generations of Jews and non-Jews alike with its clear-cut presentation on Judaism, and its polemics against Greek philosophy, Christianity, Islam, and Karaism.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Theologian's Doubts:Natural Philosophy and the Skeptical Games of GhazālīLeor HaleviIn the history of skeptical thought, which normally leaps from the Pyrrhonists to the rediscovery of Sextus Empiricus in the sixteenth century, Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammad al-Ghazālī (1058-1111) figures as a medieval curiosity. Skeptical enough to merit passing acknowledgment, he has proven too baffling to be treated fully alongside pagan, atheist, or materialist philosophers. As a theologian defending certain Muslim (...) dogmas, Ghazālī has not met what historians consider the mark of the true skeptic, a mind doubting the possibility of all systems of knowledge. But what is fascinating about him is that he brought into practical operation the tools of what I call "functional skepticism."1He denied the claims to truth of Aristotelian physics—whose basis he showed to rest on groundless belief—then turned and argued for the possibility of the Resurrection tooth and nail. The scholarly debate on The Incoherence of the Philosophers (Tahāfut al-falāsifa) has concentrated on the extent to which Ghazālī qua Ashcarite theologian was seduced into Aristotelian philosophy despite himself.2 In my view this debate has been misguided in the attempt to distill the [End Page 19] essence of Ghazālī from the book's eclectic theology; I will argue for a different view of Ghazālī on the basis of a close reading of key passages. In the unusual sections where Ghazālī applies Aristotelian language to a world not following the ordinary laws of physics, some have found Ghazālī slipping, unconsciously perhaps, into an Aristotelian frame of mind. I will show that, as a skeptical theologian with a dialogic imagination, he was rather deconstructing Aristotelian discourse while playing a Wittgensteinian sort of language game.Natural Philosopher or Speculative Theologian?The disagreement about the extent to which philosophy infected Ghazālī is ancient. Ghazālī might have studied philosophy only in order to refute it. He himself defended his philosophizing with the claim that one cannot deconstruct a system of thought until one has understood it so deeply as to elaborate upon its fundamental principles.3 His Maqāṣid al-falāsifa was in fact received, especially in trans-Pyrenean Europe, as a philosopher's genuine summary of the object of philosophy.4 The book strikes me as suspiciously creative in its representation of philosophical discourse, but it appears in any case as an expert and surprisingly unbiased treatment.5 Arabic readers knew that Ghazālī had also written a polemical treatise against philosophy, Tahāfut al-falāsifa, but they still wondered about his engagement with the ideas he challenged. Abū Bakr Ibn al-cArabī, for example, commented that Ghazālī had been unable to extricate himself from philosophy.6 Other philosophers pondered whether or not he had been a closeted member of their charmed circle and sought in his writings traces of esoteric philosophy.7Averroës's own sober sense of distance between philosophy and theology was partially a reaction to what he perceived as Ghazālī's dangerous and carefree mixture of the two sciences.8 He attacked Ghazālī's book in The Incoherence [End Page 20] of the Incoherence to restore philosophy's sense of purity, an aim he sought to accomplish by separating religious concerns from the philosopher's field of inquiry.9 Ironically, such a separation is precisely what Ghazālī might have wished to provoke by crisscrossing and blurring the line between religion and philosophy.The modern debate on chapter 17 of Tahāfut al-falāsifa has concentrated on defining Ghazālī as either a natural philosopher or an occasionalist theologian. In his defense of the possibility of miracles Ghazālī presented two theories of causation, one denying the logical basis of Aristotelian notions of natural causality, and the other more or less adopting these notions. Jointly, the two theories have seemed incompatible, and for this reason scholars have attempted to sort Ghazālī out of the apparent confusion. In 1978 L. E. Goodman argued persuasively that Ghazālī exploited rather than denied the philosophers' ideas of causality. In two articles Michael Marmura challenged Goodman, contending... (shrink)

A number of authors argue that while species are evolutionary units, individuals and real entities, higher taxa are not. I argue that drawing the divide between species and higher taxa along such lines has not been successful. Common conceptions of evolutionary units either include or exclude both types of taxa. Most species, like all higher taxa, are not individuals, but historical entities. Furthermore, higher taxa are neither more nor less real than species. None of this implies that there is no (...) distinction between species and higher taxa; the point is that such a distinction is more subtle than many authors have claimed. (shrink)

Some mathematical proofs explain why the theorems they prove hold. This paper identifies several challenges for any counterfactual account of explanation in mathematics (that is, any account according to which an explanatory proof reveals how the explanandum would have been different, had facts in the explanans been different). The paper presumes that countermathematicals can be nontrivial. It argues that nevertheless, a counterfactual account portrays explanatory power as too easy to achieve, does not capture explanatory asymmetry, and fails to specify why (...) certain proofs are explanatory and others are not. Greater informativeness about counterfactual dependence can even yield less explanatory power. (shrink)

Norms have been widely enacted in human and agent societies to regulate individuals’ actions. However, although legislators may have ethics in mind when establishing norms, moral values are only sometimes explicitly considered. This paper advances the state of the art by providing a method for selecting the norms to enact within a society that best aligns with the moral values of such a society. Our approach to aligning norms and values is grounded in the ethics literature. Specifically, from the literature’s (...) study of the relations between norms, actions, and values, we formally define how actions and values relate through the so-called value judgment function and how norms and values relate through the so-called norm promotion function. We show that both functions provide the means to compute value alignment for a set of norms. Moreover, we detail how to cast our decision-making problem as an optimisation problem: finding the norms that maximise value alignment. We also show how to solve our problem using off-the-shelf optimisation tools. Finally, we illustrate our approach with a specific case study on the European Value Study. (shrink)

The expression “République des lettress” is still used today. It appears in most recent dictionaries of the French language, and it even occasionally occurs in ordinary conversation or in the press, a pompous and ironic circumlocution to designate the Parisian literary “milieu.” This archaistic and pejorative survival masks (somewhat similarly to the word “rhetoric”) the attention that researchers are now according to the older meaning of this surviving expression, and to the concept of an international exchange of ideas that it (...) represented for scholars of the Ancien Régime. As proof that this scientific interest is recent, Paul Hazard, in the famous Crise de la conscience européenne (1936), devotes not a single line to the “Republic of Letters,” while in the chapter dealing with Pierre Bayle he cites the “Nouvelles de la République des Lettres” (1684), the learned periodical published in Amsterdam by this erudite Calvinist, apparently without feeling a need to explain a title that seemed self-evident. For the history of ideas, this notion was not a subject for history. It resided outside the field of perception of a discipline that was completely devoted to a sort of chemistry of pure ideas, removed from the literary form that carried them, and a fortiori from institutional circuits, and forms of sociability and dialogue that “invent” and spread them, and even more so from the awareness that “scholars” might have had of the solidarity that united them and of the meaning they might be able to attribute to it. (shrink)

Author Marc James Léger responds to Elias Khoury’s review of his book _Bernie Bros Gone Woke: Class, Identity, Neoliberalism_, which was published in volume 17 of the _International Journal of __Žižek Studies_. While Léger accepts the one mistake in the book that Khoury correctly identifies, he takes issue with nearly everything else in Khoury’s review, which involves fallacies, misquotations, reductive arguments, misdirection and failure to mention anything that would contradict Khoury’s generally false claims. Léger describes the possibility of academic (...) foul play in the context of a public secret directed against him and that he has been struggling against since the late 1990s. (shrink)

“Je doute qu'il y ait un dialogue de la chenille et du papillon”A. MatrauxThe most ordinary events astonish only those who think about them. What can be more natural than two people talking? They are from the same country, they speak the same language, they understand one another. They have things to say to each other and they say them. Anyone who would try to question such evident truisms would be seen as attempting to be a spinner of paradoxes. And (...) yet…First of all is it as natural as it appears that two people should stop and speak? To an impartial observer of the behavior of one's peers this would not seem to be the case. Most of the people we rub elbows with daily—in the street, in the subway, on a beach, in a hotel or even in the apartment building where we have lived for ten years—are people whom we do not accost and to whom we never speak. In order for people to speak to one another, certain circumstances must exist; there must be a ritual of introduction and a mutual consent that often occurs only after a certain resistance has been overcome. There are important differences to be observed in this respect among different peoples and, within the same nation, among people of different classes. But in every case dialogue is preceded by a preparatory phase of prudent observation, reserve and mistrust during which the partners size one another up and seek to situate themselves in relation to each other. (shrink)

Talk at the Philosophy [in:of:for:and] Digital Knowledge Infrastructures online workshop 2023 (28/09/2023).

Obituaries represent a prominent way of expressing the human universal of grief. According to philosophers, obituaries are a ritualized way of evaluating both individuals who have passed away and the communities that helped to shape them. The basic idea is that you can tell what it takes to count as a good person of a particular type in a particular community by seeing how persons of that type are described and celebrated in their obituaries. Obituaries of those killed in conflict, (...) in particular, are rich repositories of communal values, as they reflect the values and virtues that are admired and respected in individuals who are considered to be heroes in their communities. In this paper, we use natural language processing techniques to map the patterns of values and virtues attributed to Australian military personnel who were killed in action during World War I and World War II. Doing so reveals several clusters of values and virtues that tend to be attributed together. In addition, we use named entity recognition and geotagging the track the movements of these soldiers to various theatres of the wars, including North Africa, Europe, and the Pacific. (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: Introduction The Ontological Nature of Species Taxonomic Pluralism Two Major Schools of Biological Taxonomy The Linnaean Hierarchy References Further Reading.

This chapter contains section titled: Is Biology Like Physics? Laws of Nature: The Standard Picture Why Not Laws of Biology? The Problem of Exceptions Why Not Laws of Biology? The Problem of Accidentalness A Worked Example: The “Area Law” Evolutionary Accidents as Laws of Functional Biology References Further Reading.

En posant la question du sublime et du soi, Marc Richir retrouve certaines questions fondamentales de Hegel, de Schelling et de Fichte, qui le poussent vers ce qui lui paraît comme l'ultime, au-delà duquel il est impossible d'aller sans dogmatisme : l'écart différentiel et la vibration instantanée. Expressions hautement paradoxales, qui amènent à une réévaluation de la phénoménologie husserlienne jusqu'à une relecture nouvelle de la philosophie classique, en passant par une épochè hyperbolique de la pensée heideggerienne - la mise (...) hors circuit de toute " légende " ontologique ou " méta-ontologique ". Tout cela, qui ne pouvait faire l'objet d'un ouvrage systématique, ne pouvait s'énoncer, à ses risques et périls, que sous la forme de " propositions " de dimension variable, vagabondant dans une problématique passablement complexe, au fil de son inspiration, allant pour ainsi dire de buisson en buisson. (shrink)

Our model integrates the nativist assumption of prespecified neural structures underpinning basic emotions with the constructionist view that emotions are assembled from psychological constituents. From a dynamic systems perspective, the nervous system self-organizes in different ways at different time scales, in relation to functions served by emotions. At the evolutionary scale, brain parts and their connections are specified by selective pressures. At the scale of development, connectivity is revised through synaptic shaping. At the scale of real time, temporary networks of (...) synchronized activity mediate responses to situations. To the degree that humans share common emotional functions, neural structuration is similar across scales, giving rise to “basic” emotions. However, unique developmental and situational factors select for neural configurations mediating emotional variants. (shrink)

Marc Richir est l'un des phénoménologues les plus importants de sa génération. Ces conversations avec Sacha Carlson sont d'abord l'occasion de revenir sur son itinéraire philosophique et intellectuel. Il s'y explique pour la première fois sur sa formation et sur les sources initiales de sa pensée, de celles qui ont éveillé son mouvement. Au fil de la discussion, il reprend en outre les thèmes principaux de son oeuvre, à savoir le phénomène comme rien que phénomène, le simulacre, l'épochè phénoménologique (...) hyperbolique, le sublime, l'affectivité, l'architectonique, l'institution symbolique, etc. Sans sacrifier à la vulgarisation, mais en restant fidèle à l'exigence du dialogue philosophique qui invite à étayer le propos sur des exemples concrets, ces conversations ouvrent non seulement sur une retraversée de l'oeuvre et de ses moments fondamentaux, mais aussi sur une méditation, dans le présent de la parole échangée, où le phénoménologue s'explique sur son rapport avec d'autres champs de recherche, comme l'anthropologie, la psychanalyse, les mathématiques, la physique, l'art, le politique et l'histoire. (shrink)

Marc Hauser puts forth the theory that humans have evolved a universal moral instinct, unconsciously propelling us to deliver judgments of right and wrong independent of gender, education, and religion. Combining his cutting-edge research with the latest findings in cognitive psychology, linguistics, neuroscience, evolutionary biology, economics, and anthropology, Hauser explores the startling implications of his provocative theory vis-à-vis contemporary bioethics, religion, the law, and our everyday lives.

Le présent livre part d'une idée polémique et critique : la philosophie est encore aujourd'hui dominée et commandée par la théologie et la religion. Cette domination prend la vie pour sujet et la mort comme alliée et s'appuie sur une transcendance, une instance qui vient à la verticale de la vie. Cette domination structure la philosophie politique et donne forme à l'idéologie des Partis et des États qui mettent la vie et la mort en jeu et qui subordonnent la vie (...) démocratique à une politique religieuse ou à une religion politique. Il faut alors relire les philosophes de la modernité, ceux qui s'inscrivent dans l'horizon de la fin de la religion et cherchent à interrompre l'absolu théologique - Nietzsche, Benjamin, Freud, Heidegger, et au-delà de la modernité Derrida et Ameisen - pour analyser comment ceux-ci résistent au pouvoir théologique et religieux à travers leur écriture : s'inspirer de leur résistance d'écriture pour inventer une tout autre pensée de la vie. La tâche qui se dessine ici est la suivante : revenir aux philosophes et aux penseurs qui se sont exposés de manière critique à la limite de la théologie et de la religion, dénouer le lien du théologique et du politique sans faire de la politique la religion du présent, autrement dit libérer la pensée et la possibilité d'une vie démocratique à venir, chercher dans les textes de la modernité et dans certaines strates imaginaires de la Bible la possibilité d'une vie sans appui : sans fondement théologico-religieux, suspendue à elle-même comme à sa propre liberté"--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

Nobody's Law shows how people - who are disappointed, disenchanted, and outraged about the justice system - gradually move away from law. Using detailed case studies and combining different theoretical perspectives, this book explores the legal consciousness of ordinary people, businessmen, and street-level bureaucrats in the Netherlands. The empirical research in this study tells an original and alternative narrative about the role of law in everyday life. While previous studies emphasize the law's hegemony and argue that it's 'all over', Hertogh (...) shows that legal proliferation makes it harder for people to know, and subsequently identify with, the law. As a result, official law has become increasingly remote and irrelevant to many people. The central finding presented in this highly topical text is that these developments signal a process of 'legal alienation'- a gradual and mundane process with potentially serious consequences for the legitimacy of law. A timely and original study, this book will be of particular interest to scholars in the fields of law and society, socio-legal studies and legal theory. (shrink)

S'appuyant sur l'étude des spécificités du monde numérique et des mécanismes cognitifs, l'auteur propose une méthode originale de formation à l'esprit critique, basée sur la métacognition. Il présente des exemples concrets de pédagogie directement applicables en milieu scolaire.