Psychosis is associated with distorted perceptions and deficient bottom-up learning such as classical fear conditioning. This has been interpreted as reflecting imprecise priors in low-level predictive coding systems. Paradoxically, overly strong beliefs, such as overvalued beliefs and delusions, are also present in psychosis-associated states. In line with this, research has suggested that patients with psychosis and associated phenotypes rely more on high-order priors to interpret perceptual input. In this behavioural and fMRI study we studied two types of fear learning, i.e., (...) instructed fear learning mediated by verbal suggestions about fear contingencies and classical fear conditioning mediated by low level associative learning, in delusion proneness—a trait in healthy individuals linked to psychotic disorders. Subjects were shown four faces out of which two were coupled with an aversive stimulation while two were not in a fear conditioning procedure. Before the conditioning, subjects were informed about the contingencies for two of the faces of each type, while no information was given for the two other faces. We could thereby study the effect of both classical fear conditioning and instructed fear learning. Our main outcome variable was evaluative rating of the faces. Simultaneously, fMRI-measurements were performed to study underlying mechanisms. We postulated that instructed fear learning, measured with evaluative ratings, is stronger in psychosis-related phenotypes, in contrast to classical fear conditioning that has repeatedly been shown to be weaker in these groups. In line with our hypothesis, we observed significantly larger instructed fear learning on a behavioural level in delusion-prone individuals compared to non-delusion-prone subjects. Instructed fear learning was associated with a bilateral activation of lateral orbitofrontal cortex that did not differ significantly between groups. However, delusion-prone subjects showed a stronger functional connectivity between right lateral orbitofrontal cortex and regions processing fear and pain. Our results suggest that psychosis-related states are associated with a strong instructed fear learning in addition to previously reported weak classical fear conditioning. Given the similarity between nocebo paradigms and instructed fear learning, our results also have an impact on understanding why nocebo effects differ between individuals. (shrink)

Why do forces compose according to the parallelogram of forces? This question has been controversial; it is one episode in a longstanding, fundamental dispute regarding which facts are not to be explained dynamically. If the parallelogram law is explained statically, then the laws of statics are separate from and “transcend” the laws of dynamics. Alternatively, if the parallelogram law is explained dynamically, then statical laws become mere corollaries to the dynamical laws. I shall attempt to trace the history of this (...) controversy in order to identify what it would be for one or the other of these rival views to be correct. I shall argue that various familiar accounts of natural law not only make it difficult to see what the point of this dispute could have been, but also improperly foreclose some serious scientific options. I will sketch an alternative account of laws that helps us to understand what this dispute was all about. (shrink)

It has often been argued that Humean accounts of natural law cannot account for the role played by laws in scientific explanations. Loewer (Philosophical Studies 2012) has offered a new reply to this argument on behalf of Humean accounts—a reply that distinguishes between grounding (which Loewer portrays as underwriting a kind of metaphysical explanation) and scientific explanation. I will argue that Loewer’s reply fails because it cannot accommodate the relation between metaphysical and scientific explanation. This relation also resolves a puzzle (...) about scientific explanation that Hempel and Oppenheim (Philosophy of Science 15:135–75, 1948) encountered. (shrink)

Structural requirements of rationality prohibit various things, like having inconsistent combinations of attitudes, having means-end incoherent combinations of attitudes, and so on. But what is the distinctive feature of structural requirements of rationality? And do we fall under an obligation to be structurally rational? These issues have been at the heart of significant debates over the past fifteen years. Some philosophers have recently argued that we can unify the structural requirements of rationality by analyzing what is constitutive of our attitudes (...) (Lee, 2020; Worsnip, 2018a). It has also been suggested that, in the course of good first-personal deliberation, agents should treat structurally irrational combinations of attitudes as off-limits (Worsnip, 2021). In this paper, I raise a worry for these two theses concerning structural rationality. Roughly, I argue that some imperfect epistemic agents (like us) can be disposed to have structurally irrational combinations of attitudes. Also, when these imperfect agents deliberate, they should not treat structurally irrational combinations of attitudes as off-limits. Given our imperfections, being structurally irrational can very well be the best option we have. More generally, these observations reveal that structural rationality should not always be theorized independently from more “substantive” norms, like responsiveness to reasons or expected value optimization. (shrink)

Conflicts of interest are rampant in the American medical community. Today it is not uncommon for doctors to refer patients to clinics or labs in which they have a financial interest (40% of physicians in Florida invest in medical centers); for hospitals to offer incentives to physicians who refer patients (a practice that can lead to unnecessary hospitalization); or for drug companies to provide lucrative give-aways to entice doctors to use their "brand name" drugs (which are much more expensive than (...) generic drugs). In Medicine, Money and Morals, Marc A. Rodwin draws on his own experience as a health lawyer--and his research in health ethics, law, and policy--to reveal how financial conflicts of interest can and do negatively affect the quality of patient care. He shows that the problem has become worse over the last century and provides many actual examples of how doctors' decisions are influenced by financial considerations. We learn how two California physicians, for example, resumed referrals to Pasadena General Hospital only after the hospital started paying $70 per patient (their referrals grew from 14 in one month to 82 in the next). As Rodwin writes, incentives such as this can inhibit a doctor from taking action when a hospital fails to provide proper service, and may also lead to the unnecessary hospitalization of patients. We also learn of a Wyeth-Ayerst Labs promotion in which physicians who started patients on INDERAL (a drug for high blood pressure, angina, and migraines) received 1000 mileage points on American Airlines for each patient (studies show that promotions such as this have a direct effect on a doctor's choice of drug). Rodwin reveals why the medical community has failed to regulate conflicts of interest: peer review has little authority, state licensing boards are usually ignorant of abuses, and the AMA code of ethics has historically been recommended rather than required. He examines what can be learned from the way society has coped with the conflicts of interest of other professionals --lawyers, government officials, and businessmen--all of which are held to higher standards of accountability than doctors. And he recommends that efforts be made to prohibit and regulate certain kinds of activity (such as kickbacks and self-referrals), to monitor and regulate conduct, and to provide penalties for improper conduct. Our failure to face physicians' conflicts of interest has distorted the way medicine is practiced, compromised the loyalty of doctors to patients, and harmed society, the integrity of the medical profession, and patients. For those concerned with the quality of health care or medical ethics, Medicine, Money and Morals is a provocative look into the current health care crisis and a powerful prescription for change. (shrink)

Le mathématicien au travail sait faire un geste que l'on appelle la« pulsation mathématique», qui s'exprime en tennes de bougé créatif nécessaire dans les diagrammes de pensée et d'interprétation des écrits mathématiques. Dans cette perspective Je statut d'objet est définitivement en révision, sous condition du jeu des relations. Le but ici est de construire aujourd'hui cette pulsation à partir de ce que Bachelard proposait hier comme épistémologie, aussi bien de la mathématique que de la science dite physique mathématique. Les liens (...) entre la pensée bachelardienne et les propositions plus récentes de Gilles Châtelet, Charles Alunni, ou René Guitart, sont mis en relief ainsi que ceux d'autres auteurs comme Jacques Lacan, Arthur Koestler, Alfred N. Whitehead, Charles S. Peirce. Nous proposons que le travail mathématique soit pensable comme du mouvement dans l'espace des diagrammes, du bougé pulsatif en icelui, et que cette manière de voir soit éminemment compatible avec la vue bacheJardienne suivant laquelle la forme intellectuelle précède l'objet empirique, lequel provient in fine, comme d'une concrétion de la pulsation de la pensée. Nous terminons donc sur un schème catégoricien de la pulsation. (shrink)

The article « La Défenestration » by Belgian philosopher Marc Richir has been translated into Russian for the first time for this issue of the “Horizon. Studies in Phenomenology.” In his early work “The Defenestration” Richir raises the question of relation between the subject and conceivable world. Here, a philosopher is pictured contemplating the world through the window of his tower. In such detachment from the world the thinker finds himself according to all Modern philosophies of consciousness. Husserl’s phenomenology (...) inherits this detachment, since Husserl imposes the structure of transcendental ego as external to the world. Richir abolishes the concept of transcendental ego with the help of heideggerian Dasein, but analyzing Heidegger’s ontology he comes to the conclusion that the latter remains fixated on beings. Believing a person to live in the fundamental openness of Being, Heidegger places such a person in the secondary world of “truth.” In order to overcome the remains of traditional philosophy in Heidegger’s ontology Richir turns to Merleau-Ponty’ “cosmology of the visible.” The author takes the Merleau-Ponty’s thesis that everything visible has something fundamentally invisible in it. This allows him to discover the universe of “nothing”, which includes both the visible and what is “behind” it. As a result Richir overcomes the classical dualism of the sensual and the intelligible. The concept of defenestration places the subject and the world in the same universe. (shrink)

This paper argues that there is a conflict between two theses held by John McDowell, namely i) the claim that we are under a standing obligation to revise our beliefs if reflection demands it; and ii) the view that veridical experience is a mode of direct access to the world. Since puts no bounds on what would constitute reasonable doubt, it invites skeptical concerns which overthrow. Conversely, since says that there are some experiences which we are entitled to trust, it (...) undermines the prescriptive scope of. Drawing on C. S. Peirce's distinction between genuine and contrived doubt, I maintain that critical revisions of beliefs should be triggered only by unwanted disruptions of habits, thereby restoring unity between McDowell's two theses. (shrink)

Deception scholars have argued that increasing the liar’s cognitive system artificially can produce deception cues. However, if too much load is imposed the truth tellers’ performance can also be impaired. To address this issue, we designed a veracity task that incorporated a secondary task to increase cognitive load gradually. Also, because deception has been associated with activity in the inferior frontal cortex (IFC), we examined the influence of transcranial direct current stimulation of the IFC on performance. During stimulation, participants truthfully (...) or deceptively indicated whether each of a number of statements shown on screen was true or not. Higher load decreased recall but not general compliance or response times (RTs). Truthful trials yielded higher compliance rates and faster RTs than deceptive trials except for the highest load level. Anodal right stimulation decreased compliance in truthful trials when participants were not overloaded. Truth telling was more vulnerable to cognitive load and tDCS than lying. (shrink)

Some mathematical proofs explain why the theorems they prove hold. This paper identifies several challenges for any counterfactual account of explanation in mathematics (that is, any account according to which an explanatory proof reveals how the explanandum would have been different, had facts in the explanans been different). The paper presumes that countermathematicals can be nontrivial. It argues that nevertheless, a counterfactual account portrays explanatory power as too easy to achieve, does not capture explanatory asymmetry, and fails to specify why (...) certain proofs are explanatory and others are not. Greater informativeness about counterfactual dependence can even yield less explanatory power. (shrink)

The hexagonal structure for ‘the geometry of logical opposition’, as coming from Aristoteles–Apuleius square and Sesmat–Blanché hexagon, is presented here in connection with, on the one hand, geometrical ideas on duality on triangles (construction of ‘companion’), and on the other hand, constructions of tripartitions, emphasizing that these are exactly cases of borromean objects. Then a new case of a logical interest introduced here is the double magic tripartition determining the semi-ring ${\mathcal{B}_3}$ and this is a borromean object again, in the (...) heart of the semi-ring ${{\rm Mat}_{3}(\mathbb{B}_{\rm Alg})}$ . With this example we understand better in which sense the borromean object is a deepening of the hexagon, in a logical vein. Then, and this is our main objective here, the Post-Mal’cev full iterative algebra ${\mathbb{P}_4 = \mathbb{P}(\mathbb{F}_4)}$ of functions of all arities on ${\mathbb{F}_4}$ , is proved to be a borromean object, generated by three copies of ${\mathbb{P}_2}$ in it. This fact is induced by a hexagonal structure of the field ${\mathbb{F}_4}$ . This hexagonal structure is seen as precisely a geometrical addition to standard boolean logic, exhibiting ${\mathbb{F}_4}$ as a ‘boolean manifold’. This structure allows to analyze also ${\mathbb{P}_4}$ as generated by adding to a boolean set of logical functions a very special modality, namely the Frobenius squaring map in ${\mathbb{F}_4}$ . It is related to the splitting of paradoxes, to modified logic, to specular logic. It is a setting for a theory of paradoxical sentences, seen as computations of movements on the bi-hexagonal link among the 12 classical logics on a set of 4 values. (shrink)

A number of authors argue that while species are evolutionary units, individuals and real entities, higher taxa are not. I argue that drawing the divide between species and higher taxa along such lines has not been successful. Common conceptions of evolutionary units either include or exclude both types of taxa. Most species, like all higher taxa, are not individuals, but historical entities. Furthermore, higher taxa are neither more nor less real than species. None of this implies that there is no (...) distinction between species and higher taxa; the point is that such a distinction is more subtle than many authors have claimed. (shrink)

Norms have been widely enacted in human and agent societies to regulate individuals’ actions. However, although legislators may have ethics in mind when establishing norms, moral values are only sometimes explicitly considered. This paper advances the state of the art by providing a method for selecting the norms to enact within a society that best aligns with the moral values of such a society. Our approach to aligning norms and values is grounded in the ethics literature. Specifically, from the literature’s (...) study of the relations between norms, actions, and values, we formally define how actions and values relate through the so-called value judgment function and how norms and values relate through the so-called norm promotion function. We show that both functions provide the means to compute value alignment for a set of norms. Moreover, we detail how to cast our decision-making problem as an optimisation problem: finding the norms that maximise value alignment. We also show how to solve our problem using off-the-shelf optimisation tools. Finally, we illustrate our approach with a specific case study on the European Value Study. (shrink)

Freedom and compassion in the anthropocene -- Can science save animals? -- Who we eat -- Fat rats and lab cats -- Charismatic, caged, and occasionally crazy: zooed animals -- Captive and companion -- Born to be wild? -- Coexistence in the anthropocene and beyond: compassion and justice for all.

This chapter contains section titled: Introduction The Ontological Nature of Species Taxonomic Pluralism Two Major Schools of Biological Taxonomy The Linnaean Hierarchy References Further Reading.

This chapter contains section titled: Is Biology Like Physics? Laws of Nature: The Standard Picture Why Not Laws of Biology? The Problem of Exceptions Why Not Laws of Biology? The Problem of Accidentalness A Worked Example: The “Area Law” Evolutionary Accidents as Laws of Functional Biology References Further Reading.

Marc Hauser puts forth the theory that humans have evolved a universal moral instinct, unconsciously propelling us to deliver judgments of right and wrong independent of gender, education, and religion. Combining his cutting-edge research with the latest findings in cognitive psychology, linguistics, neuroscience, evolutionary biology, economics, and anthropology, Hauser explores the startling implications of his provocative theory vis-à-vis contemporary bioethics, religion, the law, and our everyday lives.

The expression “République des lettress” is still used today. It appears in most recent dictionaries of the French language, and it even occasionally occurs in ordinary conversation or in the press, a pompous and ironic circumlocution to designate the Parisian literary “milieu.” This archaistic and pejorative survival masks (somewhat similarly to the word “rhetoric”) the attention that researchers are now according to the older meaning of this surviving expression, and to the concept of an international exchange of ideas that it (...) represented for scholars of the Ancien Régime. As proof that this scientific interest is recent, Paul Hazard, in the famous Crise de la conscience européenne (1936), devotes not a single line to the “Republic of Letters,” while in the chapter dealing with Pierre Bayle he cites the “Nouvelles de la République des Lettres” (1684), the learned periodical published in Amsterdam by this erudite Calvinist, apparently without feeling a need to explain a title that seemed self-evident. For the history of ideas, this notion was not a subject for history. It resided outside the field of perception of a discipline that was completely devoted to a sort of chemistry of pure ideas, removed from the literary form that carried them, and a fortiori from institutional circuits, and forms of sociability and dialogue that “invent” and spread them, and even more so from the awareness that “scholars” might have had of the solidarity that united them and of the meaning they might be able to attribute to it. (shrink)

As a significant extension of our previous calculus of logical differentials and moving logic, we propose here a mathematical diagram for specifying the emergence of novelty, through the construction of some “differentials” related to cohomological computations. Later we intend to examine how to use these “differentials” in the analysis of anticipation or evolution schemes. This proposal is given as a consequence of our comments on the Ehresmann–Vanbremeersch’s work on memory evolutive systems, from the two points of view which are characterization (...) of life and use of categorical modeling. It would not be possible to conceive of the “differentials” outside the frame of a MES. Furthermore, we hope that this diagram will be useful to exhibit the “emergence of sense” in discourses, and this idea is supported here by a brief examination of how a discourse could be seen as a living system. (shrink)

La tesis o hipótesis que se sostiene en el artículo es que la puesta en relación de formas explícitas e implícitas de vida compartida en las sociedades contemporáneas conlleva el auge de identidades híbridas, múltiples o complejas. Entendiendo por identidades híbridas la confluencia de múltiples identificaciones en la biografía personal. Siendo la globalización y la pluralización cultural las formas fundamentales de la sociedad contemporánea, la movilidad se convierte en su principal ingrediente. Se describe la presencia de distintos elementos culturales conformadores (...) de identidad en Chiapas. Internet, la emigración a Estados Unidos o el Tratado de Libre Comercio entre México, Estados Unidos y Canadá se hibrida con la heterogeneidad identitaria (religiosa, étnica, lingüística) existente en el territorio. Se discute el carácter híbrido de las sociedades contemporáneas y las consecuencias sociales y políticas que conlleva. (shrink)

Descartes et Freud ont pour véritables soucis fonciers, l'un l'évidence, et l'autre l'étrangeté. Il est remarquable qu'ils ne déterminent ces notions qu'implicitement, de façons réellement paradoxales. Cela peut surprendre, surtout si l'on ajoute que leurs façons sont identiques. A partir de la décision cartésienne d'identifier le vrai à l'évident se trouve fondée la science ; et l'identification freudienne du vrai à l'étrange fonde la psychanalyse. La question de la relation entre science et psychanalyse porte donc, ici, sur le réel du (...) nouage paradoxal entre les deux déterminations du vrai pointées par Descartes et Freud, sur leur différence et leur inséparabilité. Plus spécifiquement, c'est d'abord du point de vue du rapport entre mathématique et psychanalyse que la question est approfondie. La visée du livre est de construire le principe de ce nouage, de ce nœud hétérogène. La ressource centrale est de considérer comme vitale, tant au jeu de l'évidence qu'à celui de l'étrangeté, la question de la lettre. (shrink)

The article affixes a resolutely structuralist view to Alain Badiou’s proposals on the infinite, around the theory of sets. Structuralism is not what is often criticized, to administer mathematical theories, imitating rather more or less philosophical problems. It is rather an attitude in mathematical thinking proper, consisting in solving mathematical problems by structuring data, despite the questions as to foundation. It is the mathematical theory of categories that supports this attitude, thus focusing on the functioning of mathematical work. From this (...) perspective, the thought of infinity will be grasped as that of mathematical work itself, which consists in the deployment of dualities, where it begins the question of the discrete and the continuous, Zeno’s paradoxes. It is, in our opinion, in the interval of each duality ― “between two ends”, as our title states ― that infinity is at work. This is confronted with the idea that mathematics produces theories of infinity, infinitesimal calculus or set theory, which is also true. But these theories only give us a grasp of the question of infinity if we put ourselves into them, if we practice them; then it is indeed mathematical activity itself that represents infinity, which presents it to thought. We show that tools such as algebraic universes, sketches, and diagrams, allow, on the one hand, to dispense with the “calculations” together with cardinals and ordinals, and on the other hand, to describe at leisure the structures and their manipulations thereof, the indefinite work of pasting or glueing data, work that constitutes an object the actual infinity of which the theory of structures is a calculation. Through these technical details it is therefore proposed that Badiou envisages ontology by returning to the phenomenology of his “logic of worlds”, by shifting the question of Being towards the worlds where truths are produced, and hence where the subsequent question of infinity arises. (shrink)

The identity is an arduous and complex topic that includes practically all the aspects of the life of a human being. The identity, mediated narrative, plays a role aimed at the personal direction of ours lives and sociocultural function linked to the quest for recognition of the rights of social groups to which one feels attached . Between economic globalization and pluralization of the life forms, identity is the result of a double disorientation. At the individual level, the insecurity work, (...) the flexibility of human relations, the rise in divorces or international migrations require rethinking, constantly, the circumstances on which our lives are developed. At the collective level, the new transnational agents like ONU or OTAN and local agents like nationalism, ethnic or immigrant groups forced to rethink the space of groups, collectives and communities between the global homogenization and local heterogeneity. (shrink)

Over the past decades, the psychological science has accumulated a large corpus of empirical knowledge about police interviews, deception detection, and suspects’ confessions. However, it is unclear whether European police forces’ practices and beliefs are consistent with recommendations derived from this empirical literature. The study described in this report is part of a larger research project examining European police investigators’ practices and beliefs. An online survey was administered to Guardia Civil (n = 89) and Policía Nacional investigators (n = 126). (...) The survey inquired about the length, frequency and electronic recording of interviews, the suspects’ use of their right to remain silent, investigators’ self-reported skills in distinguishing between truthful and deceptive statements, their estimates of the frequency of (false) confessions, and their use of specific interview tactics. The outcomes provide insights into investigators’ knowledge and practices, highlight specific needs, and allow for a comparison between European and North American police forces. (shrink)

Jordan Peterson gave a series of lectures on the Psychological Significance of the Biblical Stories. His first lecture lasted two hours. In that time, Peterson managed to cover only a single line from the Bible. This lopsided gloss-to-text ratio, I argue, entails that the rational explanations actually do all the work while the Bible is dispensable.