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Marc A. Moffett [11]Marc Anthony Moffett [1]
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Marc Moffett
University of Texas at El Paso
  1. Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action.John Bengson & Marc A. Moffett (eds.) - 2011 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press USA.
    Knowledge how to do things is a pervasive and central element of everyday life. Yet it raises many difficult questions that must be answered by philosophers and cognitive scientists aspiring to understand human cognition and agency. What is the connection between knowing how and knowing that? Is knowledge how simply a type of ability or disposition to act? Is there an irreducibly practical form of knowledge? What is the role of the intellect in intelligent action? This volume contains fifteen state (...)
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  2. Two Conceptions of Mind and Action: Knowledge How and the Philosophical Theory of Intelligence.John Bengson & Marc A. Moffett - 2011 - In John Bengson & Marc Moffett (eds.), Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action. Oxford University Press. pp. 3-55.
    Perhaps it is a pity that the Theory of Knowledge and the Theory of Conduct have fallen into separate compartments. (It certainly was not so in Socrates’ time, as his interest in the relation between eidos and technê bears witness.) If we studied them together, perhaps we might have a better understanding of both. H.H. Price, Thinking and Representation..
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  3. Nonpropositional Intellectualism.John Bengson & Marc A. Moffett - 2011 - In John Bengson & Marc A. Moffett (eds.), Knowing How. Oxford University Press. pp. 161-195.
  4. The folk on knowing how.John Bengson, Marc A. Moffett & Jennifer C. Wright - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 142 (3):387–401.
    It has been claimed that the attempt to analyze know-how in terms of propositional knowledge over-intellectualizes the mind. Exploiting the methods of so-called “experimental philosophy”, we show that the charge of over-intellectualization is baseless. Contra neo-Ryleans, who analyze know-how in terms of ability, the concrete-case judgments of ordinary folk are most consistent with the view that there exists a set of correct necessary and sufficient conditions for know-how that does not invoke ability, but rather a certain sort of propositional knowledge. (...)
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  5. References.John Bengson & Marc A. Moffett - 2011 - In Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 361-386.
    This compilation of references includes all references for the knowledge-how chapters included in Bengson & Moffett's edited volume. The volume and the compilation of references may serve as a good starting point for people who are unfamiliar with the philosophical literature on knowledge-how.
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  6.  22
    Constructing Attitudes.Marc A. Moffett - 2005 - ProtoSociology 21:105-128.
    The singular term theory maintains that that-clauses are complex singular terms which designate propositions. Though extremely well-supported, the theory is endangered by the existence of oblique that-clauses; that is, that-clauses occurring in what appear to be nonargument positions (e.g., ‘Lola was upset that Slick Willy had all the fun’). In this paper I argue that the best solution to the problem consistent with the singular term theory, invokes a construction-based grammatical theory. Such an approach challenges traditional views of semantic compositionality (...)
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  7. Intuitions as evidence : an introduction.Marc A. Moffett - 2019 - In Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & Clayton Littlejohn (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence. Routledge.
  8. Against A Posteriori Functionalism.Marc A. Moffett - 2010 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40 (1):83-106.
    There are two constraints on any functionalist solution to the Mind-Body Problem construed as an answer to the question, “What is the relationship between the mental properties and relations (hereafter, simply the mental properties) and physical properties and relations?” The first constraint is that it must actually address the Mind-Body Problem and not simply redefine the debate in terms of other, more tractable, properties (e.g., the species-specific property of having human-pain). Such moves can be seen to be spurious by the (...)
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  9.  12
    Language, Communication, and the Paradox of Analysis: Some Philosophical Remarks on Plato’s Cratylus.Marc A. Moffett - 2005 - History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 8 (1):57-68.
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  10.  18
    Review of Amie L. Thomasson, Norms and Necessity. [REVIEW]Marc A. Moffett - 2023 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
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  11.  76
    Introduction: Proceedings of the 36th annual meeting of the Society for Exact Philosophy: Syntax and the Void! [REVIEW]Marc A. Moffett - 2010 - Synthese 176 (2):151-152.