In a recent article Merritt has claimed that current observational data provide “severe tests” falsifying the standard cosmological model. Based on Popper’s idea of conventionalism, he concludes that the introduction of some essential components of the standard cosmological model—including dark matter and dark energy—are a consequence of conventionalist stratagems. In this article, I provide more recent discoveries and discussions showing that the standard cosmological model is not built on any conventionalist stratagem.

Recently, Philip Goff has argued that the idea of agentive cosmopsychism is the best explanation of cosmic fine-tuning. This idea suggests that our universe is a conscious subject which has capacity to recognize and respond to reasons or facts about value. In this article, by carefully examining the involved premises in Goff’s argument, we show that two important premises are dubious and not rationally acceptable. Therefore, we conclude that Goff’s argument for agentive cosmopsychism fails.

Some scientists or philosophers argue that multiverse theories are unfalsifiable and thus not scientific. However, some advocates of multiverse theories have recently argued that although the multiverse is not observable, multiverse theories are indeed falsifiable in principle. Therefore, they share similar features with a conventional scientific theory. On the other hand, the proposals of an epistemic shift and nonempirical theory assessment have possibly revived the discussions of the scientific nature of multiverse theories. In this article, I revisit the falsifiable arguments (...) made by the advocates of multiverse theories and show that these arguments do not justify arguing the scientific nature of such theories. Moreover, even if we accept the proposals of the epistemic shift and the nonempirical theory assessment, I argue that multiverse theories still cannot pass or satisfy the required assessments based on the new theoretical virtues and the nonempirical arguments. (shrink)