4 found
Order:
  1.  9
    Language-at all times: Action and interaction as contexts for enriching representations.Iris Nomikou, Malte Schilling, Vivien Heller & Katharina J. Rohlfing - 2016 - Interaction Studies 17 (1):128-153.
  2.  5
    Language-at all times.Iris Nomikou, Malte Schilling, Vivien Heller & Katharina J. Rohlfing - 2016 - Interaction Studies. Social Behaviour and Communication in Biological and Artificial Systemsinteraction Studies / Social Behaviour and Communication in Biological and Artificial Systemsinteraction Studies 17 (1):128-153.
    This article discusses the importance of social interaction for the development of the representations for symbolic communication. We suggest that there is no need to distinguish between different representational systems emerging at different stages of development. Instead, we propose that representations are rich right from the beginning of a child’s life, and that they are driven mainly by acting and interacting in the physical and social world. The more variety in a child’s interactional experience, the more enriched and abstracted the (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  3. How and to What End May Consciousness Contribute to Action? Attributing Properties of Consciousness to an Embodied, Minimally Cognitive Artificial Neural Network.Holk Cruse & Malte Schilling - 2014 - In Ezequiel Morsella & T. Andrew Poehlman (eds.), Consciousness and action control. Lausanne, Switzerland: Frontiers Media SA.
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4.  10
    Simulation across representation: The interplay of schemas and simulation-based inference on different levels of abstraction.Malte Schilling, Nancy Chang, Katharina J. Rohlfing & Michael Spranger - 2020 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 43.
    Language comprehension of action verbs recruits embodied representations in the brain that are assumed to invoke a mental simulation. This extends to abstract concepts, as well. We, therefore, argue that mental simulation works across levels of abstractness and involves higher-level schematic structures that subsume a generic structure of actions and events.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark