Botswana’s history is one of an unwavering exercise of self-determination and quest for self-rule. Post-independence, self-government prioritized an overarching philosophy of Kagisano or social harmony within which the aims of education were framed, in conjunction with a political commitment to Botho through democracy. For economic and social reasons the current educational policy of Botswana is based on outcomes based education (OBE), with its metrics of quantifiable outcomes. The article argues that Olúfemi Táíwò’s analysis of decolonization provides a philosophical lens (...) through which to interpret Botswana’s current educational pathway within the prevailing decolonization discourse. OBE clearly exhibits features of neo-colonialism, as it pertains to the national value principles. We draw on Ndlovu-Gatsheni decolonial epistemic perspective to frame the discussion that were possible to integrate OBE with Botswana’s ethnically inclusive, community-based view of democracy and associated virtues, this would be a worthwhile goal for education and could lead to a particular form of indigenised democracy. Substantive distinctions among the concepts of decolonization, neo-colonialism, and decoloniality, underwrite this thesis. We see the project of envisaging a future of education in Botswana as having to do with disentangling colonialist-imperialist cultural reproduction from indigenous aspirations. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Before Confucius: Studies in the Creation of the Chinese ClassicsJohn S. MajorBefore Confucius: Studies in the Creation of the Chinese Classics. By Edward L.Shaughnessy. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997. Pp. ix + 262. $19.95.The eight essays in this collection (six of them previously published) show the combination of boldness and erudition that is characteristic of all of Edward Shaughnes-sy's work. The results of his investigations (...) are always interesting and felicitously expressed, and if one sometimes resists following the author quite so far down the evidentiary and interpretive road as he himself is willing to go, the intellectual journey is always a rewarding one.The common thread in these essays is Shaughnessy's belief that the Chinese classics, although admittedly written in their final form at a time well after the era [End Page 314] to which they refer-that is, during the Warring States Period or even the Han—preserve much material that authentically refers to, and was originally written more-or-less contemporaneously with, events of the Western Zhou era. He adduces evidence from bronze inscriptions, archaeologically recovered texts, positional and calendrical astronomy, and other securely datable sources to argue for the authenticity of portions of the classics, notably the Book of Documents, the Book of Poetry, and the Book of Changes.Publication of these essays comes just when the antiquity of the classics is being challenged more vigorously than at any time since the "doubting antiquity" movement of the 1920s. In particular, the evidence presented by Bruce and Taeko Brooks and their associates in meetings of the Amherst-based Warring States Working Group tends to support a view not only that the classics were written down much later than the events they purport to describe (almost everyone agrees about that) but that much of the "historical" material in the classics is closer to legend than to fact, and may well represent later confabulation for purposes of political or philosophical advantage. Shaughnessy's Before Confucius and the Brookses' The Original Analects (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998) strikingly represent two poles of the contemporary disagreement about the nature and authenticity of the Chinese classics.As a charter member of the Warring States Working Group who has consistently dissented from its more radical antiquity-doubting positions, I am perhaps unusually well placed to comment on the questions of dating raised by Shaughnessy's work. It seems to me that the key to the synthesis that I suspect will form over the next decade or so is the nature of the archaeologically recovered texts of the Warring States Period that have emerged from the ground in such profusion in recent decades, and continue to do so. These attest to several unexpected things, including the extent to which texts were possessed, copied, and circulated at the time; the implied high level of literacy among the contemporary ruling class; the degree to which assemblages of texts from individual tombs seem not to represent schools, master-disciple lineages, or clear doctrinal or ideological groupings, but rather to testify to a strong eclectic tendency among the contemporary literate elite; and the degree to which recovered texts anticipate later received texts, but in variant and/or partial form (for example, the Guodian Laozi text, recognizably Laozi but a far cry from the complete, received Daodejing).In view of all this, it seems to me reasonable to say that on the one hand a fair amount of material may well have come down to later ages from the Western Zhou and Spring and Autumn periods (through many vicissitudes of copying, recitation, variation, repairs to broken and misarranged bundles of slips, and so on), to enter wide circulation as texts in the Warring States Period. On the other hand, the late Warring States and Han editors of the textual tradition that had come down to them collated, amalgamated, sorted, augmented, and otherwise shaped the texts to a somewhat larger degree than has sometimes been supposed, and it is extremely unlikely that any of the Chinese classics were in circulation in anything like their received form at the end of the Spring and Autumn periods. Thus, while I... (shrink)

My dissertation focuses on problems that arise when a group makes decisions that are in reasonable ways connected to the beliefs and values of the group members. These situations are represented by models of decision-theoretic aggregation: Suppose a model of individual rationality in decision-making applies to each of a group of agents. Suppose this model also applies to the group as a whole, and that this group model is aggregated from the individual models. Two questions arise. First, what sets of (...) reasonable conditions can we consistently impose on the aggregation? Second, what can we learn from insights gained in such models, in particular for ethics and political philosophy? The dissertation has three parts, each using a different model of individual rationality. Each part contains essays addressing questions of either the first or the second kind with regard to its underlying model. Part I uses a social-choice-theoretic model, in which agents are only assumed to rank alternatives. Arrow's "Impossibility Theorem" shows that certain conditions that it would be natural to impose on all aggregation cannot be so imposed, on pain of contradiction. I discuss the impact of this result on the evaluation of majority rule and on democratic theory. I also discuss Sen's "Liberal Paradox", which addresses the possibility of incorporating rights into a social-choice theoretic model. Part II uses the von Neumann/Morgenstern theory of expected utility. A result under this model has been regarded as providing an argument for utilitarianism. I locate a place within utilitarianism where the theorem can do some work. To prepare the ground, I interpret the von Neumann/Morgenstern theory as part of a theory of deliberation. Thereby, this version of expected utility theory can be embedded into the philosophy of practical reasoning. The underlying model in Part III is Bayesian decision theory. Whereas the other two inquiries focus on the philosophical assessment of formal results, the third makes a formal contribution. One essay surveys the area, and a second explores a curious phenomenon that occurs in determining outcomes under one type of Bayesian aggregation. (shrink)

This article provides a survey of existing studies of majority rule, outlines misconceptions of majority rule, and highlights underexplored fields of research. It argues that the reasons why the minority complies with majority decisions have been underexplored.

In his book, The Logic of Democracy, T.L. Thor son has published a chapter entitled "Majority Rule and Minority Rights". In this paper he has pointed out a controversy which has arisen between "natural rights democrats" and "majority rule democrats." In this paper I argue that elected representatives represent the majority and their rule can be called the rule of the majority so long they can protect the rights of individuals. This is (...) why the natural rights of man are more fundamental and essential than majority rule. In conclusion, I insist that neither "natural rights" nor "majority rule" can be called the elements of democracy. If the former and the latter could have been understood as the end of democracy and the means to achieve the end, respectively, then the controversy would not have arisen. (shrink)

In his book, The Logic of Democracy, T.L. Thor son has published a chapter entitled "Majority Rule and Minority Rights". In this paper he has pointed out a controversy which has arisen between "natural rights democrats" and "majority rule democrats." In this paper I argue that elected representatives represent the majority and their rule can be called the rule of the majority so long they can protect the rights of individuals. This is (...) why the natural rights of man are more fundamental and essential than majority rule. In conclusion, I insist that neither "natural rights" nor "majority rule" can be called the elements of democracy. If the former and the latter could have been understood as the end of democracy and the means to achieve the end, respectively, then the controversy would not have arisen. (shrink)

ALTHOUGH majority rule finds ready acceptance whenever groups make decisions, there are surprisingly few philosophically interesting arguments in support of it.1 Jeremy Waldron’s The Dignity of Legislation contains the most interesting recent defense of majority rule. Waldron combines his own argument from respect with May’s influential characterization of majority rule, tying both to a reinterpretation of a well-known passage from Locke’s Second Treatise (“the body moves into the direction determined by the majority of (...) forces”). Despite its impressive resourcefulness, Waldron’s defense is deficient, and one goal of this essay is to show how. Yet our main concern is not to criticize Waldron, but to demonstrate general deficiencies of arguments for majority rule and to suggest a strategy for a more adequate and more complete defense. Such arguments tend to have one of two weaknesses: Either they assume that collective decisionmaking is done in terms of ranking options and thus neglect both aggregation methods using more information than the relative standing of options in rankings (such as so-called positional methods) and rules that are not aggregation methods at all (such as fair-division procedures); or they also constitute arguments for other decision rules. In the first case, the argument is too narrow, in the second it is too broad. The narrowness problem is bigger than stated so far because arguments for majority rule tend to assume not only that decisions are made by ranking options, but also that only two options are to be ranked. Both problems arise for Waldron’s defense and leave it incomplete. Yet such incompleteness also characterizes the state of the art in arguing for majority rule. So in addition to.. (shrink)

A number of arguments against relativism are based on the concept of majority rule. Since, the arguments allege, on relativism moral truth is founded on majority opinion, relativism entails that (a) moral progress and reform are impossible, (b) propaganda, advertising, brainwashing, and high birth rates turn mistaken moral judgments into correct ones, (c) moral horrors, if enough people believe them acceptable, are not moral horrors at all, (d) finding out what’s right and what’s wrong is extremely easy, (...) (e) moral reasoning is very different from what we normally take it to be, and (f) internal criticism of a moral code is impossible. These arguments get their due in this article, which first defines and explicates relativism and then exposes, explains, and criticizes the arguments. Especially important to understand about the relation between relativism and majority opinion is the notion of a convention. Accordingly, it is discussed at some length. (shrink)

Democracy is commonly associated with political equality and/or majority rule. This essay shows that these three ideas are conceptually separate, so the transition from any one to another stands in need of further substantive argument, which is not always adequately given. It does this by offering an alternative decision-making mechanism, called lottery voting, in which all individuals cast votes for their preferred options but, instead of these being counted, one is randomly selected and that vote determines the outcome. (...) This procedure is democratic and egalitarian, since all have an equal chance to influence outcomes, but obviously not majoritarian. (shrink)

The majority rule has caught much attention in recent debate about the aggregation of judgments. But its role in finding the truth is limited. A majority of expert judgments is not necessarily authoritative, even if all experts are equally competent, if they make their judgments independently of each other, and if all the judgments are based on the same source of (good) evidence. In this paper I demonstrate this limitation by presenting a simple counterexample and a related (...) general result. I pave the way for this argument by introducing a Bayesian model of evidence and expert judgment in order to give a precise account of the basic problem. (shrink)

The principle of majority rule is a concept that is often employed both in normative democratic theory and in practical politics. But not only that there are relatively few academic studies focusing exclusively on this concept, it is also possible to claim that the existing discussions usually overlook different dimensions of majority rule. This article aims to outline some suggestions for what these dimensions might be, such as: the nature of the participants, the subject matter of (...) the decision and the context in which the decision is made. One underlying assumption in this study is that the normative prospects of the majority rule principle depend on the evaluation of these different dimensions. (shrink)

This paper claims that the intuitive and widespread legitimating power of majority rule (MR) arises from the link between majority rule and the principle of equality of political opportunity. The egalitarian character of MR is established by exploring “puzzles” in democratic theory, such as the insensitivity of democratic voting procedures to unequal intensity of citizens' preferences, and the relationship between the principle of unanimity (sometimes thought better to respect citizens' equality) and MR. Special attention is directed (...) to the relationship between political equality and equality in the outcomes of political decisions: The claim is made that the language of equal political opportunity captures well the idea of equal political influence, in the circumstance of disagreement about what is required to achieve equal treatment through the outcomes of political decisions. (shrink)

Minority governments in parliamentary democracies are conventionally considered to be unstable and ineffective aberrations from the principle of majority rule. Through analysis of over 350 postwar governments, the author shows that minority governments are neither exceptional nor unstable but in fact a common feature of parliamentary democracies and frequently perform as well as, or better than, majority coalitions. Using the Italian and Norwegian governments as case studies, he suggests that minority governments are particularly likely to form when (...) parties anticipate competitive elections and when opposition parties are able to influence legislative decisions. As an attempt to document and explain a very common form of government in parliamentary democracies, this book will contribute significantly to the understanding of the importance of electoral competition in democratic politics. (shrink)

I provide a novel argument in favour of majority rule. In particular, I consider the distribution of voter satisfaction in response to the outcome of a vote and prove that under certain conditions majority rule minimizes the level of inequality present in the distribution of voter satisfaction. This finding is reinforced by a computer simulation as well as an analysis of over four decades of polling data. Results complement existing procedural justifications of majority rule, (...) demonstrating that majority rule ensures equality at the level of both procedure and outcome. (shrink)

In the basic model of Condorcet’s jury theorem and in the literature that follows, an odd-numbered group of voters is assumed so that the simple majority rule can be used. We show that this assumption is not necessary either in Condorcet’s basic model or in the general framework of dichotomous choice. We first apply simple majority rule to an even-numbered homogeneous fixed-size committee. We then provide a justification for using simple majority rule for an (...) even-numbered heterogeneous fixed-size committee when the competence structure of the committee members is not common knowledge. (shrink)

Majority rule is often regarded as an important democratic principle. But modern democracies divide voters into districts. So if the majority should rule, which majority should rule? Should it be the popular majority, or an electoral majority (i.e., either the majority of voters in the majority of districts, or the majority of voters in districts that contain the majority of the population)? I argue that majority rule (...) requires rule by the popular majority. This view is not novel and may seem obvious. But it is rarely defended, and often rejected. I defend it by arguing that this view about which majority should rule is best supported by the arguments for why the majority should rule, and best avoids the arbitrary and perverse verdicts of rule by electoral majorities. I close by considering the significant practical implications of the view. The Electoral College is often criticized on the basis that the winner of the popular vote doesn’t always win the election. But all district-based democracies have this feature, so all district-based democracies must be reformed if they are to satisfy the principle of majority rule. (shrink)

In this study I analyse the performance of a democratic decision-making rule: the weighted majority rule. It assigns to each voter a number of votes that is proportional to her stakes in the decision. It has been shown that, for collective decisions with two options, the weighted majority rule in combination with self-interested voters maximises the common good when the latter is understood in terms of either the sum-total or prioritarian sum of the voters’ well-being. (...) The main result of my study is that this argument for the weighted majority rule — that it maximises the common good — can be improved along the following three main lines. (1) The argument can be adapted to other criteria of the common good, such as sufficientarian, maximin, leximin or non-welfarist criteria. I propose a generic argument for the collective optimality of the weighted majority rule that works for all of these criteria. (2) The assumption of self-interested voters can be relaxed. First, common-interest voters can be accommodated. Second, even if voters are less than fully competent in judging their self-interest or the common interest, the weighted majority rule is weakly collectively optimal, that is, it almost certainly maximises the common good given large numbers of voters. Third, even for smaller groups of voters, the weighted majority rule still has some attractive features. (3) The scope of the argument can be extended to decisions with more than two options. I state the conditions under which the weighted majority rule maximises the common good even in multi-option contexts. I also analyse the possibility and the detrimental effects of strategic voting. Furthermore, I argue that self-interested voters have reason to accept the weighted majority rule. (shrink)

We study the uncertain dichotomous choice model. In this model a set of decision makers is required to select one of two alternatives, say ‘support’ or ‘reject’ a certain proposal. Applications of this model are relevant to many areas, such as political science, economics, business and management. The purpose of this paper is to estimate and compare the probabilities that different decision rules may be optimal. We consider the expert rule, the majority rule and a few in-between (...) rules. The information on the decisional skills is incomplete, and these skills arise from an exponential distribution. It turns out that the probability that the expert rule is optimal far exceeds the probability that the majority rule is optimal, especially as the number of the decision makers becomes large. (shrink)

Majority rule is often adopted almost by default as a group decision rule. One might think, therefore, that the conditions under which it applies, and the argument on its behalf, are well understood. However, the standard arguments in support of majority rule display systematic deficiencies. This article explores these weaknesses, and assesses what can be said on behalf of majority rule.

While epistemic democrats have claimed that majority rule recruits the wisdom of the crowd to identify correct answers to political problems, the conjecture remains abstract. This article illustrates how majority rule leverages the epistemic capacity of the electorate to practically enhance the instrumental value of elections. To do so, we identify a set of sufficient conditions that effect such a majority rule mechanism, even when the decision in question is multidimensional. We then look to (...) the case of sociotropic economic voting in US presidential elections to provide empirical tractability for these conditions. We find that absent such an epistemic capacity a number of presidential elections might well have been decided differently. By generating clear conditions for the plausibility of claims made by epistemic democrats, and demonstrating their correspondence to empirical data, this article strengthens the broader instrumental grounds recommending democracy. (shrink)

Multiple-vote majority rule is a procedure for making group decisions in which individuals weight their votes on issues in accordance with how competent they are on them. When individuals are motivated by the truth and know their relative competence on different issues, multiple-vote majority rule performs nearly as well, epistemically speaking, as rule by an expert oligarchy, but is still acceptable from the point of view of equal participation in the political process.Send article to KindleTo (...) send this article to your Kindle, first ensure [email protected] is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Note you can select to send to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be sent to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply. Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.A CASE FOR MULTIPLE-VOTE MAJORITY RULEVolume 9, Issue 1Richard Bradley and Christopher ThompsonDOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2011.5Your Kindle email address Please provide your Kindle [email protected]@kindle.com Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Send article to Dropbox To send this article to your Dropbox account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to Dropbox. A CASE FOR MULTIPLE-VOTE MAJORITY RULEVolume 9, Issue 1Richard Bradley and Christopher ThompsonDOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2011.5Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Send article to Google Drive To send this article to your Google Drive account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to Google Drive. A CASE FOR MULTIPLE-VOTE MAJORITY RULEVolume 9, Issue 1Richard Bradley and Christopher ThompsonDOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2011.5Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Export citation Request permission. (shrink)

The Condorcet efficiency of a social choice procedure is usually defined as the probability that this procedure coincides with the majority winner (or majority ordering) in random samples, given a majority winner exists (or given the majority ordering is transitive). Consequently, it is in effect a conditional probability that two sample statistics coincide, given certain side conditions. We raise a different issue of Condorcet efficiencies: What is the probability that a social choice procedure applied to a (...) sample matches with the majority preferences of the population from which the sample was drawn? We investigate the canonical case where the sample statistic is itself also majority rule and the samples are drawn from real world distributions gathered from national election surveys in Germany, France, and the United States. We relate the results to the existing literature on majority cycles and social homogeneity. We find that these samples rarely display majority cycles, whereas the probability that a sample misrepresents the majority preferences of the underlying population varies dramatically and always exceeds the probability that the sample displays cyclic majority preferences. Social homogeneity plays a fundamental role in the type of Condorcet efficiency investigated here. (shrink)

In this companion piece to 'On the Philosophy of Group Decision Methods I: The Non-Obviousness of Majority Rule', we take a closer look at some competitors of majority rule. This exploration supplements the conclusions of the other piece, as well as offers a further-reaching introduction to some of the challenges that this field currently poses to philosophers.

Florida International University, USA edwardj{at}fiu.edu ' + u + '@ ' + d + ' '/ /- -> Several authors have analyzed the optimal k -majority rule based on a variety of criteria. Buchanan and Tullock argued that, in constitutional settings, the criterion should be that all changes meet the Pareto criterion; otherwise the status quo should be preferred. They then asserted that unanimity rule would be the preferred voting rule in this setting. In parliamentary settings, (...) they claimed that a near majority rule would be preferred because it minimizes the sum of decision costs and external costs. This article investigates both claims in an N -voter, two-alternative setting. We show the conditions under which unanimity rule is less likely to select BT preferred alternatives than other k -majority rules and prove that the difference in performance can be negligible when N is large and certain weak conditions are met. Furthermore, if we define external costs as the expected number of losers from a BT-inferior vote, then external costs become negligible for a range of supermajority rules. This implies that unanimity rule and a range of supermajority rules should be equally preferred when decision costs are added. Finally, we show that the external cost function can actually increase for certain populations. Many of the broader conclusions should also hold for multiple alternatives. Key Words: constitutional design • Pareto criterion • external costs • social contract. (shrink)