Celem tego tekstu jest po pierwsze zastanowienie się nad możliwymi przyczynami obojętnościmoralnej; po drugie rozróżnienie jej dwóch rodzajów: obojętności biernej i obojętnościsprawczej, będącej warunkiem niezbędnym okrucieństwa. Ten pierwszy rodzaj, bardziejpospolity, to brak reakcji na zło, krzywdę i cierpienie innego człowieka, ten drugi, to obojętnośćoparta na przekonaniu, że cierpiący i krzywdzony w ogóle nie jest człowiekiem; jestpoza sferą podmiotowości, odpowiedzialności, wrażliwości i winy.

The article is based on the assertion that conflict constitutes an important element of social reality both in its moral and political aspect. The conflicts of: Antigone and Creon, Socrates and Athens, Christ and the Pharisees, Gandhi and the British, M.L. King and the racists, have clearly contributed to moral development. Conflicts arise from the human need of using one’s freedom in questioning the existing order, in distrusting every truth. It is not the fact of the existence of conflicts that (...) is bad for a civil society, but the lack of skills to solve them. Hence the importance of the need for a dialogue in civil society. The author presents various kinds of dialogue and supports rationality as a moral stand. (shrink)

The article attempts to present and pass comment on a number of themes found in the last book by Henri Bergson, Les deux sources de la morale et de la religion. The author has selected ethical themes only, but presents them in the general context of Bergson’s philosophy. In her interpretation Bergson places morality in two irreducible moral worlds, one founded on the concept of moral duty, which creates static morality incorporated in social life, and another, founded on the concept (...) of moral challenge or inspiration which adds a dynamic dimension to moral reactions wherever they are motivated by an elemental, creative, supra-rational feeling known to exceptional individuals only. (shrink)