The Anthropocene overthrows classical dichotomies like technology and nature and a new class of beings emerges: hybrids. The transitive status of hybrids - which establishes an extra, separate, 'third' ontological category, going beyond the dichotomy between nature and technology - constitutes a significant problem for environmental philosophy and philosophy of technology since they traditionally focus on either 'nature' (natural entities) or 'artefacts' (technological objects). In order to reflect on the ethical significance of hybrids, a classification of different types of hybrids (...) is required. Such a classification is provided by this article, based on insights from both environmental philosophy and philosophy of technology. After explaining why a new class of beings emerges in the Anthropocene, and reflecting on the one-sidedness of philosophy of technology and environmental philosophy in their focus on either technology or nature, we propose a new classification of hybrids in this article that provides a new starting point for reflections on the moral significance of hybrids in environmental philosophy and philosophy of technology. (shrink)

Grasping the identity of hybrids, that is beings which cross the binarism of nature and technology (e.g. genetically-modified organisms (GMOs), syn-bio inventions, biomimetic projects), is problematic since it is still guided by self-evident dualistic categories, either as artefacts or as natural entities. To move beyond the limitations of such a one-sided understanding of hybrids, we suggest turning towards the categories of affordances and the juxtaposition of needs and patterns of proper use, as inspired by the Heideggerian version of phenomenology. Drawing (...) upon selected concepts by Heidegger, we argue that hybrids can be conceptualised as a regenerative design and use to serve the planet. We argue that the ideal type of non-exploitative account of hybrids consists of the adaptive approach to the environment, which does not, however, exclude the possibility of designing and constructing new beings. We also point out that hybrids undermine the divide of being destructive/regenerative which marks the boundaries of nature and technology. (shrink)

Environmental philosophy always presents detailed distinctions concerning the kinds of natural beings that can be granted moral considerability, when discussing this issue. In contrast, artifacts, which are excluded from the scope of moral considerability, are treated as one homogenous category. This seems problematic. An attempt to introduce certain distinctions in this regard—by looking into dissimilarities between physical and digital artifacts—can change our thinking about artifacts in ethical terms, or more precisely, in environmentally ethical terms.

This paper enhances postnatural environmentalism (represented by Steven Vogel) by highlighting and incorporating selected concepts from Martin Heidegger's ontology. In particular, I examine Heidegger's detailed analysis of the affinity between phusis and techne, the critique of 'replaceability', the problem of 'proper use', and his earlier concept of a tool structure. This analysis is aimed at grounding the metaphysical and ethical significance of technical artefacts. It shows that Heidegger can support postnatural environmentalism's claim that artefacts should not be jettisoned by environmental (...) thinking because that leads to reckless treatment of them. Exploration of these issues also contributes to environmental interpretations of Heidegger's philosophical legacy, which were limited to natural beings. (shrink)

Is it possible that Heidegger was a reist? An attempt to reconstruct Heideggerian onticityThe paper aims to answer the following question: does Martin Heidegger’s ontology has its complement in some kind of onticity? In the attempt to reconstruct it, I show that Heidegger’s concept of being is combined with the reistic theory represented i.a. by Tadeusz Kotarbinski, according to which a being is always a thing. I argue that this is the result of the basic principles of Heideggerian being: that (...) being is unfolding of the particularity and peculiarity of each being and that being discloses itself through the structures of time-space, and hence it can occur only in the single, unique, and concrete beings such as things, and not in ideas or general and abstract beings. (shrink)

The paper revisits metaphysical and deontological stances on moral considerability and offers a new criterion for it – “affectability”, that is a capacity of an agent to affect a considered entity. Such an approach results in significant changes in the scope of moral considerability and is relevant for discussing the human position in the Anthropocene. This concept, given especially the assumption of the directness of moral considerability, is also substantial for the decision making process on the ethical, as well as (...) the political plane. (shrink)

Abstract:In this paper, Heidegger's lifelong interest in usable things is combined with his critique of aesthetics and environmental reading of his works to build the framework for reexamining his notion of authenticity (Eigentlichkeit) as the category which environmental aesthetics can employ to reconceptualize our aesthetic judgment of everyday artifacts and how, by doing so, that contributes to reducing the ecologically harmful effects of consumerism. To this end, I draw upon the ambiguous position of usable artifacts in Heidegger's philosophy. I shall (...) unpack this ambiguity by explaining that it mirrors tensions in Heidegger's idea of truth as inherently agonistic dis-closure. I argue that although everyday artifacts—as opposed to artworks—are situated closer to the pole of hiddenness, they can participate aesthetically in revealing being. Elucidating this requires re-appropriating Heidegger's concept of being 'authentic' as being 'one's own' (eigen). I show that applying the category of (Heideggerian) authenticity to everyday artifacts should consist in unfolding their ontological uniqueness, which is irrespective of their ontic replicability. Finally, I develop an understanding of authenticity by exploring environmental-aesthetical implications of some of Heidegger's remarks on things related to their susceptibility to changes. (shrink)