For democracies to thrive, citizens have to be taught to be democrats. How do people learn to be democrats in circumstances of diversity and plurality? We address this question via a discussion of three models of deliberative democracy: public reason (as exemplified by Rawls), discursive democracy (as exemplified by Benhabib) and communicative democracy (as exemplified by Young). Each of the three theorists contributes to an account of how to educate citizens by teaching talk. Against a commonly held assumption that the (...) protection of diversity in a pluralist democracy requires a thin conception of citizenship education, we defend a thick conception that simultaneously fosters autonomy and participation without sacrificing tolerance of diversity. (shrink)

For democracies to thrive, citizens have to be taught to be democrats. How do people learn to be democrats in circumstances of diversity and plurality? We address this question via a discussion of three models of deliberative democracy: public reason (as exemplified by Rawls), discursive democracy (as exemplified by Benhabib) and communicative democracy (as exemplified by Young). Each of the three theorists contributes to an account of how to educate citizens by teaching talk. Against a commonly held assumption that the (...) protection of diversity in a pluralist democracy requires a thin conception of citizenship education, we defend a thick conception that simultaneously fosters autonomy and participation without sacrificing tolerance of diversity. (shrink)

In recent years anti-universalism has become a sine qua non for respectability in philosophy of education, along with several other disciplines. The standard ph.

In recent years anti-universalism has become a sine qua non for respectability in philosophy of education, along with several other disciplines. The standard ph.

In recent years anti-universalism has become a sine qua non for respectability in philosophy of education, along with several other disciplines. The standard ph.

It is argued that Bachelard's work in the philosophy of science is not concerned only with many of the questions which characterize contemporary Anglo-American debates. Through a radical reappraisal of the functions of experimentation, it also proposes a convincing way of analyzing the relations between theories and objects, explanations and events, which avoids both relativism and a return to naive correspondence theories.

This chapter explores normative conceptions of citizenship and their implications for moral and civic education. Starting with an account of the historical emergence of Republican and Liberal conceptions of citizenship, it notes important conceptual links between notions of citizenship and agency, democracy, general will formation, political authority and legitimacy, rights and duties, and moral and political standing. Against this historical background, it then turns to a discussion of the cognitive and affective capacities that these notions of citizenship involve, and the (...) role of education in the development of citizens. Contemporary analyses and controversies, such as the role of national identity and the role of educational institutions as sites for developing civic knowledge and dispositions, are outlined. The chapter concludes by exploring the idea of global citizenship and its implications for citizenship education. (shrink)

Darrel Moellendorf argues that duties of justice have global scope. We share Moellendorf's rejection of statism and his emphasis on duties of justice arising out of association in Cosmopolitan Justice. Building on Moellendorf's view that there are cosmopolitan duties of justice, we argue that in education they are both negative and positive, requiring redistribution of educational resources and transnational educational intervention. We suggest what kinds of intervention are justifiable and required, the kinds of international structures that could regulate them, and (...) a conception of cosmopolitan citizenship to underpin education for global citizenship. (shrink)

Although measurement is widely misused in education, it is indispensable in addressing the problems of injustice in global educational opportunity. Considering how the case can be made for legitimate use of measurement in normative analysis and argument, we explore ways in which metrics have featured in the formulation of theories of justice, with particular attention to resourcist and capabilities approaches. We then consider three means of addressing global inequality and defend a reconstruction of the public sphere in which objective measures (...) of justice, deliberatively constructed, could supersede prevalent assumptions about measurement. (shrink)

Advocates of particularism in moral philosophy (e.g. Prichard, Dancy, McDowell) hold that moral theory contributes little if anything to moral deliberation, claiming that we do best in moral judgement by relying on our intuitive moral sensitivities to situations rather than on general principles. In this paper I argue that particularism lacks the resources to provide a preferable account of moral deliberation and justification.

Advocates of particularism in moral philosophy (e.g. Prichard, Dancy, McDowell) hold that moral theory contributes little if anything to moral deliberation, claiming that we do best in moral judgement by relying on our intuitive moral sensitivities to situations rather than on general principles. In this paper I argue that particularism lacks the resources to provide a preferable account of moral deliberation and justification.

The mere possibility of irrationality has been challenged by a long-standing tradition which strongly supports the normative primacy of ideals of rationality. In this paper, I consider the possibility that a coherent account of irrationality can nonetheless be provided and furthermore that some forms of irrationality may be seen as justifiable on the basis of their functional roles.

The view that some forms of irrationality may serve a useful purpose is being increasingly entertained despite the disquiet it elicits. The reason for the disquiet is not difficult to discern, for if the view were made good it might threaten the unqualified normative primacy that rationality enjoys in the evaluation of thoughts, beliefs, intentions, decisions, and actions. In terms of the predominant ‘rational explanation’ model, reasons both generate and justify actions, and carrying out the dictates of reason is held (...) up as an ideal. If it can be shown that under some circumstances or for certain types of actions irrational elements or procedures would produce ‘all things considered’ better results, this would put these deliberative ‘ideals’ in question. (shrink)

The guiding idea of Patricia Kitcher's Freud's Dream is that the use of interdisciplinary methodology accounts at the same time for the most central features of Freud's theory of the mind and for its most serious shortcomings. Kitcher proposes to provide an account of Freud's theory that illuminates its interdisciplinary underpinnings. While she indisputably succeeds in providing a subtle and rich reconstruction of Freud's work, her attempt to show up the limitations of interdisciplinary studies does not work. The value of (...) her account is attributable not to the idea that Freud's was a flawed interdisciplinary endeavour but to a contextually and historically sensitive approach that makes explicit and elucidates the norms of explanation at work in his method of theory construction and that takes into account the multifaceted nature of his scientific practice. (shrink)