The use of Big Data—however the term is defined—involves a wide array of issues and stakeholders, thereby increasing numbers of complex decisions around issues including data acquisition, use, and sharing. Big Data is becoming a significant component of practice in an ever-increasing range of disciplines; however, since it is not a coherent “discipline” itself, specific codes of conduct for Big Data users and researchers do not exist. While many institutions have created, or will create, training opportunities to prepare people to (...) work in and around Big Data, insufficient time, space, and thought have been dedicated to training these people to engage with the ethical, legal, and social issues in this new domain. Since Big Data practitioners come from, and work in, diverse contexts, neither a relevant professional code of conduct nor specific formal ethics training are likely to be readily available. This normative paper describes an approach to conceptualizing ethical reasoning and integrating it into training for Big Data use and research. Our approach is based on a published framework that emphasizes ethical reasoning rather than topical knowledge. We describe the formation of professional community norms from two key disciplines that contribute to the emergent field of Big Data: computer science and statistics. Historical analogies from these professions suggest strategies for introducing trainees and orienting practitioners both to ethical reasoning and to a code of professional conduct itself. We include two semester course syllabi to strengthen our thesis that codes of conduct can be harnessed to support the development of ethical reasoning in, and a sense of professional identity among, Big Data practitioners. (shrink)

Diese Studie weist nach, dass Nietzsche ein konsistentes und vollstäauml;ndiges Konzept der Ethik entwickelt hat. Es umfasst eine Handlungstheorie, die Bestimmung eines Begriffs des Guten und die Anwendung auf einzelne Verhaltensweisen im Sinne der Kontextgebundenheit praktischer Philosophie. Bei der Rekonstruktion des Verfassers stehen weniger die einzelnen Werke als ihr systematischer Zusammenhang im Zentrum. Füuuml;r Nietzsche bleibt Autonomie ohne den Bezug auf ein Handlungsziel im Sinn des Guten unbestimmt. Dass er auf diese Weise eine Position der antiken Ethik aufgreift, zeigt ein (...) Vergleich mit Platon. Gleichzeitig will Nietzsche sich nicht einfach von neuzeitlichen Moralkonzepten abgrenzen. Ihm geht es um eine hermeneutische Reflexion, welchen Sinn moralische Forderungen für das Selbst haben. Im Gegensatz zur aktuellen Debatte um Konzepte äauml;sthetischer Lebenskunst, die sich auf Nietzsche als ihr vermeintliches Vorbild beruft, zeigt die Studie: Nietzsche ist ein genuin ethischer Denker. (shrink)

The essay proposes to use alienation as a heuristic and conceptual tool for the analysis of the impact of digital information and communication technologies (ICTs) on users. It follows a historical materialist understanding, according to which data can be considered as things produced in an industrial fashion. A representational interpretation, according to which data would merely reflect a given reality, is untenable. It will be argued instead to understand data as an additional layer which has a transformative impact on reality (...) as a whole. The analysis follows the early Marx in thinking of alienation as a structural condition which holds even if it is not experienced psychologically by users. Alienation means that the desire to express oneself and achieve social recognition, self-realization, and participation through the use of ICTs is incongruent to the inherent purposes and functions of these technologies. Digital platforms create the ideological illusion that users contribute to the production of data solely for their own gratification. Users, in turn, react to structural alienation either by internalizing it, in which case they may become enthusiastic data producers, or by imposing alienating conditions on other users. Finally, it will be shown that a strong notion of privacy is less suited to articulate concerns about the impact of ICTs because it expresses a desire for privilege and individual control which has become unfulfillable in the environment of data industries. The essay closes by showing some of the changes in institutional structures and behavior that could follow from the focus on alienation. (shrink)

Was ein Gegenstand ist, in welcher Weise seine Gegenständlichkeit begegnet und worin deren Objektivität besteht, bleibt ein zentrales Thema zeitgenössischer Erkenntnistheorie. Deshalb erörtert der vorliegende Band den Begriff des Gegenständlichen im Hinblick auf die Themen Welt, Subjektivität, Personalität, Freiheit, Sprache, Interpretation und Wissenschaft, und dies geschieht im Spannungsfeld einer Neubewertung von Objektivität. Ausgangspunkt und Anlaß der Beiträge dieses Bandes ist ein neuerer Ansatz in der Hermeneutik, wie er von Günter Figal in seinem Werk 'Gegenständlichkeit' vorgelegt worden ist. Da die Reflexion (...) auf die Bedingungen, unter denen Gegenstände gegeben sind, nicht nur ein hermeneutisches Anliegen ist, sondern bereits im Deutschen Idealismus, im Neukantianismus und in der Phänomenologie (Husserl, Heidegger und Merleau-Ponty) ein zentrales Thema philosophischer Reflexion darstellt, ist der Band als sach- und richtungsübergreifender Dialog konzipiert. Mit Beiträgen von:Emil Angehrn, Damir Barbari¿c, Rudolf Bernet, David Espinet, Theodore D. George, Pavel Kouba, Birgit Recki, Friederike Rese, James Risser, John Sallis, Dennis Schmidt, Christian Sommer, Michael Steinmann, Tilo Wesche, Günter Zöller. (shrink)

In this work, Michael Steinmann provides a systematic reconstruction of Heidegger's thoughts on language, based on his early works on logic, on 'Being and Time' and 'On the Way to Language.

Nietzsche unternimmt im Begriff des "individuellen Gesetzes" den Versuch, Individualität and Allgemeinheit so zusammenzudenken, daß die Gesetzlichkeit an die Selbstdeutung des Individuums gebunden bleibt. Dieser Begriff trägt jedoch eine innere Spannung in sich, auf die in verschiedener Weise reagiert werden kann. Der Beitrag zeigt dies zunächst am Gegensatz von Herren- und Sklavenmoral und an der Gesetzgebung des Manu . Beide sind individuelle Gesetze, die jedoch keinen Bestand haben können, weil die von ihnen Beherrschten eine allgemeinere, gerechtere Gesetzgebung einklagen. Dagegen geht (...) es dem freien Geist um Freiheit gegenüber sich selbst, um die Aufgabe, Individualität nicht neuerlich als allgemeine Eigenschaft zu fixieren. Simmels Idee des individuellen Gestzes basiert auf der Möglichkeit einer Versöhnung zwischen den Polen; das Individuum ist in den sozialen Rollen, die es einnimmt, es selbst. Die Spannung, die für Nietzsche besteht, wird dadurch aufgehoben.With the notion of an "individual law", Nietzsche tries to combine individuality and universality in a way that allows to conceive lawfulness under the perspective of the individual, and not in opposition to it. However, the notion of an individual law is characterized by a certain tension, which has led to different reactions. The paper illustrates this tension in regard to master versus slave morality. and the law of Manu . Both are individual laws which have been overcome because the ruled began to claim a more general, a more equitable legislation. On the other side, the free spirit is concerned with freedom from itself, its challenge is to see individuality not as a new general quality. Simmel's notion of the individual law is based on the possibility of a reconciliation between the opposites; the individual remains individual even in its general social roles. This means, however, that the tension manifest in Nietzsche is given up. (shrink)

Philosophische Begriffe erlangen ihre Bedeutung intentional, als Abbreviaturen eines komplexeren Gedankengangs. Dies gilt auch für Martin Heidegger. Vom späten Denken her erscheint seine Begriffssprache in Sein und Zeit als metaphysisch. Kriterien hierfür sind die epistemische Bestimmbarkeit des Seins, seine apriorische Stellung und Absolutsetzung gegenüber dem Seienden sowie der Bezug auf Subjektivität. Dennoch ist es keineswegs notwendig, die Begriffe in genau diesem Sinn zu verstehen; vielmehr können sie zugleich als Hinweis auf ein anderes, nicht-metaphysisches Denken gelesen werden. Dies wirft die Frage (...) nach der Semantik philosophischer Begriffe auf. Das im Begriff Verstandene ist das Verstehen selbst, das in seinem Ursprung transparent gemacht werden soll. Die daraus resultierende Mehrdeutigkeit des Begriffs ist für Heidegger ein positives Phänomen, weil sie eine zunehmende Bedeutungsfüllung und damit die Annäherung an die Sachverhalte der Philosophie erlaubt. Was die Annäherung kriteriell leitet, ist die „Einfachheit“, d.h. Zusammengehörigkeit der schrittweise entfalteten Bedeutungsaspekte. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Martin Steinmann INTRINSIC MERIT AND MULTICULTURALISM O OME proponents of multiculturalism argue as follows: There is no such thing as intrinsic merit. Therefore, the hegemony ofwestern culture in America is not due to its intrinsic merit. Therefore, it is due only to the political and economic power of white Americans of European ancestry, especially males. Therefore, it might yield to a new order in which all cultures represented in (...) America, whatever dieir origin, have equal authority, influence, and status in schools, colleges, and universities, in theaters and concert halls, in museums and galleries, and in libraries. Is this a good argument for multiculturalism? I propose to examine not only its validitybutits assumptions and what impels diese multiculturalists to make it. Is there such a thing as intrinsic merit? A famous and influential argument that there is—W K. Wimsatt and Monroe C. Beardsley's "The Affective Fallacy" (1949)—argues that the merit (or lack of merit) of literature, and by extension the other arts, is intrinsic. Actually—what comes to much the same thing—this essay attacks die belief that merit is extrinsic, in particular that it inheres in effects upon readers. The Affective Fallacy, they claim, "is a confusion between the poem [where poem is synecdoche for work of literature] and its results (what it is and Philosophy and Literature, © 1994, 18: 253-264 254Philosophy and Literature what it does).... It begins by trying to derive die standards of criticism from the psychological effects of the poem and ends in impressionism and relativism." The standards ofcriticism ought to be derived, Wimsatt and Beardsley say, from "cognitive analysis ofparadox, ambiguity, irony, and symbol"—that is, intrinsic features of the poem itself. Are Wimsatt and Beardsley right? I think not. For one tiling, the weight of opinion, of both critics and writers, is against diem. For Aristode, the point of a tragedy was to arouse pity and fear in the audience. For Horace, die point of poetry was to please and instruct readers (dulce et utile). For Dickens, die point of his novels was to make readers laugh and cry. For Henry James, every choice he made as a novelist—of characters, incidents, setting, point ofview—he made widi effects upon readers in mind. Even for Romantic poets, diough die merit of a poem did not lie in its effects upon readers, it did not lie in its intrinsic features either, but in its effects upon the poet himself (for Wordswordi, occasioning "die spontaneous overflow of powerful feelings "). Indeed, not until the advent, in the late thirties, of the school of which Wimsatt and Beardsley were die chief theoreticians—die New Criticism—did critics locate merit in intrinsic features. Critics and writers, of course, often speak of intrinsic features but only, as James does, to relate them to somediing extrinsic. Aristode, for instance, says diat a tragedy can arouse pity and fear only if its hero is a person of middling virtue who undeservedly goes from good fortune to bad in die course of the play. Books of literature are created by humans for humans, and whatever merit (or lack of merit) they may have humans confer upon them. Far from being an intrinsic merit, paradox or ambiguity or irony or symbol or any intrinsic feature of a work is no merit at all unless readers count it as a merit; readers may disagree about whether it is a merit (the relativism thatWimsatt and Beardsley deplore) ; every standard to which diey may appeal to settle disputes is a standard created by humans; and they may have various reasons for counting it as a merit (or a defect). The most common reason, of course, commits the Affective Fallacy: the feature affects readers in a way they find desirable. (As I shall note later, in section III, diere can be other reasons less direcdy related to the effect of the work.) It is not easy for readers (or theorists of literary value) to sayjust what die effect is ofan intrinsic feature or why readers count this effect as desirable or even what feature of the work causes this effect. But, though Wimsatt and Beardsley, in arguing dieir case for the Affective Fallacy, make... (shrink)

In the Armenian tradition of Ailios Theon’s Progymnasmata two otherwise unknown historians occur. By examining the context of the passage and comparing it with authors like Philostephanos, it is made plausible that the ‘unknown’ historians are Phileas of Athens and Skymnos of Chios, whose names are misspelled in the Armenian text.

The paper discusses one of the later texts by Jacques Derrida. The text allows Derrida to be interpreted as a thinker of advanced modernity. Systematically it is possible to read modernity via the image of overcoming, which may be understood both in the sense of progress and restoration. The question Derrida asks is this: how can the potential of freedom to overcome be preserved without succumbing to teleology that informs it? The answer lies in the notion of future, which as (...) the simply uncontrollable cannot be situated in any history. However, Derrida‘s attempt to normatively fill the uncontrollable future by relying on Kant‘s practical philosophy and legitimise it as a form of the mind fails. The notion remains empty, as can be shown by setting the boundary against Nietzsche. Nietzsche‘s notion of Übermensch hints at modernity as a future that liberates it from the pressure of history. Nietzsche reflects the figure of overcoming without impoverishing it the way Derrida does.Der Beitrag diskutiert einen der späten Texte von Jacques Derrida. Der Text erlaubt es, Derrida als einen Denker der fortgeschrittenen Moderne zu interpretieren. Systematisch lässt sich die Moderne durch die Figur der Überwindung lesen, die sowohl im Sinne des Fortschritts als der Restauration verstanden werden kann. Derridas Frage lautet: Wie kann das Freiheitspotenzial der Überwindung beibehalten werden, ohne der in ihr liegenden Teleologie anheimzufallen? Eine Antwort ergibt sich durch den Begriff einer Zukunft, die als das schlechthin Unverfügbare in keiner Geschichte mehr situiert werden kann. Allerdings misslingt Derridas Versuch, diese unverfügbare Zukunft in Anlehnung an Kants praktische Philosophie normativ aufzuladen und als eine Form der Vernunft auszuweisen. Der Begriff bleibt leer, wie in Abgrenzung zu Nietzsche gezeigt werden kann. In Nietzsches Begriff des Übermenschen entwirft sich die Moderne auf eine Zukunft, die sie aus dem Zwang der Geschichte befreit. Nietzsche reflektiert die Figur der Überwindung, ohne sie, wie Derrida, zu entleeren.U prilogu se diskutira jedan od kasnijih tekstova Jacquesa Derride. Tekst dopušta interpretirati Derridu kao mislioca uznapredovale moderne. Sistematski je moguće modernu čitati kroz figuru prevladavanja, koja se može razumjeti u smislu napretka kao i restauracije. Derridino pitanje glasi: kako se može očuvati potencijal slobode prevladavanja, a da se ne podlegne teleologiji koja leži u njemu? Odgovor se nadaje u pojmu budućnosti, koja se kao ono jednostavno neovladljivo ne može više situirati ni u jednoj povijesti. No, propada Derridin pokušaj da tu neovladljivu budućnost normativno ispuni u osloncu na Kantovu praktičku filozofiju i legitimira je kao formu uma. Pojam ostaje prazan, kako se može pokazati u razgraničenju spram Nietzschea. U Nietzscheovu pojmu nadčovjeka nabacuje se moderna kao budućnost, koja je oslobađa prisile povijesti. Nietzsche reflektira figuru prevladavanja, a da je ne osiromašuje poput Derride. (shrink)

The paper concerns the uncertainty in current propositions for the regulation of tissue donation. It focuses mainly on two statements issued in Germany. The scope of the paper is to give a systematic approach to ethical problems coming up in this field. Both statements try to maintain the idea of positive autonomy in regard to tissue donation, but their attempt eventually is forced to fail. Different procedures are proposed that most often are not practicable (because a truly “informed” consent is (...) impossible, or because optional models tend to overwhelm donors). Blanket consent is also proposed, but this form of consent cannot be seen as an expression of self-determination. Under the pretence of autonomy, donors are left alone with the task to control scientific research and to have their personal and property rights respected. Following this rather weak position of autonomy, in one statement there is a clear tendency to place the intrinsic value of research over the autonomy of the donor. In order to avoid this conclusion, autonomy has to be more than individual decision making. It has to be embedded in social and institutional rules which support and protect individual choice. If the benefits of research are supposed to lead to a common good and to satisfy public interests, then research has to be controlled through public institutions. Autonomy does not exclude institutional support, as institutional support is the only way to take the autonomy of donors seriously. (shrink)