The use of artefacts by human agents is subject to human standards or norms of conduct. Many of those norms are provided by the social context in which artefacts are used. Others are provided by the proper functions of the artefacts. This article argues for a general framework in which norms that are provided by proper functions are related to norms provided by the (more general) social context of use. Departing from the concept, developed by Joseph Raz, of “exclusionary reasons” (...) it is argued that proper functions provide “institutional reasons” for use. Proper use of artefacts (use according to the proper function) is embedded in the normative structures of social institutions. These social normative structures are complementary to traditional norms of practical rationalityand are a kind of second-order reasons: exclusionary reasons. It is argued that proper functions of artefacts provide institutional reasons, which are up to a certain extent similar to exclusionary reasons. The most notable difference concerns the fact that proper functions not so much exclude other types of use, but rather place that use (and the user) in particular social structures with particular rights and obligations. An institutional reason not only gives a reason for action, it also provides reasons for evaluating actions according to such reasons positively (and other negatively). The upshot of the analysis is that it provides an additionaltool for understanding and evaluating the use of artefacts. (shrink)

Modern methods of information storage up completely new possibilities for the systematics of biology, understood in the widest sense. The construction of identification codes for use with punchcards must be considered against the wider background of these new possibilities. A critical pre-condition for the use of these modern methods is that questions of terminology and classification should be fundamentally restudied. The book for flowering plants “Flora von Deutschland” has been used as a basis for developing several punch-card codes. These codes (...) have made it possible to establish sets of IBM punchcards, totalling about 3000 in all, for German flowering plants. Современные методы хранения информации раскрывают для биологической систематики совершенно новые возможности. Составление ключов определения использующих пуншкарты следует рассматривать в связи с этими новыми возможностями. Для применения новых способов бесусловно требуется основное изучение вопросов терминологии и классификации. Посредством определителя цветных растений „Flora von Deutschland” .составились разные ключи определения для пуншкарт. С помощью этих ключов изготовились системы ИБМ пуншкарт для цветных растений Германии. Die modernen Methoden der Wissensspeicherung erschließen für die gesamte biologische Systematik völlig neue Möglichkeiten. Der Aufbau von Bestimmungsschlüsseln für Lochkarten muß in dem durch diese neuen Möglichkeiten gegebenen größeren Zusammenhang gesehen werden. Eine entscheidende Voraussetzung für die Anwendung der modernen Verfahren ist die erneute und gründliche Beschäftigung mit den Fragen der Terminologie und der Ordnungslehre. Ausgehend von dem Bestimmungsbuch für Blütenpflanzen „Flora von Deutschland“ wurden verschiedene Lochkartenschlüssel entwickelt. Mit Hilfe der Schlüssel konntenIBM-Karteien von insgesamt rund 3.000 Lochkarten über deutsche Blütenpflanzen aufgestellt werden. (shrink)

It is argued that the explanatory gap argument, according to which it is fundamentally impossible to explain qualitative mental states in a physicalist theory of mind, is unsound. The main argument in favour of the explanatory gap is presented, which argues that an identity statement of mind and brain has no explanatory force, in contrast to "normal" scientific identity statements. Then it is shown that "normal" scientific identity statements also do not conform to the demands set by the proponent of (...) the explanatory gap. Rather than accept all such gaps, it is argued that we should deny the explanatory gap in a physicalist theory of mind. (shrink)

The use of artefacts by human agents is subject to human standards or norms of conduct. Many of those norms are provided by the social context in which artefacts are used. Others are provided by the proper functions of the artefacts. This article argues for a general framework in which norms that are provided by proper functions are related to norms provided by the (more general) social context of use. Departing from the concept, developed by Joseph Raz, of “exclusionary reasons” (...) it is argued that proper functions provide “institutional reasons” for use. Proper use of artefacts (use according to the proper function) is embedded in the normative structures of social institutions. These social normative structures are complementary to traditional norms of practical rationalityand are a kind of second-order reasons: exclusionary reasons. It is argued that proper functions of artefacts provide institutional reasons, which are up to a certain extent similar to exclusionary reasons. The most notable difference concerns the fact that proper functions not so much exclude other types of use, but rather place that use (and the user) in particular social structures with particular rights and obligations. An institutional reason not only gives a reason for action, it also provides reasons for evaluating actions according to such reasons positively (and other negatively). The upshot of the analysis is that it provides an additionaltool for understanding and evaluating the use of artefacts. (shrink)