Obóz Kultury 2.0 Mirosław Filiciak, Alek Tarkowski, Agata Jałosińska, Andrzej Klimczuk, Maciej Rynarzewski, Jacek Seweryn, Stunża M., D. Grzegorz, Marcin Wilkowski & Anna Orlik .

Editorial ROBIN LE POIDEVIN, Religious Studies , FirstView Article(s).

The introduction to this translation of excerpts of Dilthey’s writings offers a precise, yet comprehensive outline of the manifold theories of the German philosopher. The translation is to be justified and to be recommended by a report of the great influence that by the originality of his ideas and the width of his interests Dilthey exercises not only in contemporary, especially phenomenological and existentialistic philosophy, but also in the human studies of history, literature, psychology, and sociology.

The editors purport to provide the student with an overview of the recent work done on one particular dogma of empiricism. They have collected eight articles uniformly of high quality and added their own excellent elementary historical interpretative introduction. At the beginning of each selection, the editors have also appended a one or two page summary and interpretation which will be a great aid to the student. Although the book is supposedly designed to present the current state of discussion, only (...) one appeared as late as 1958. The others date from the early and mid-fifties. At least three of the selections have been anthologized so frequently that anyone considering the book for his own use will probably already have them in other volumes.--M. S. (shrink)

As the subtitle indicates, this book intends to discuss Descartes’ attempt of laying a new foundation of knowledge. In a lively and critical interpretation of Descartes’ writings, especially of his Discours de la Méthode and of his Meditationes, and a competent use of the corresponding philosophical literature the success of this attempt of enlightenment and its shortcomings, identified with the Cartesian re-introduction of the traditional metaphysics, are explained in order to allow the author in a concluding discussion to present his (...) ideas of the necessary revision of Descartes philosophy. Presenting the I as the subject not only for the first time but in an unique way, and concentrating upon the problem of the self-originating human knowledge in an exemplary manner, Descartes is found to have become the founder of subjective philosophy. As knowledge of knowledge, philosophy is not concerned primarily with objects, but with knowledge and has self-foundation as its main task. So it has to start with human knowledge and to place the self as the fountain from which all knowledge proceeds. The demands of subjective philosophy dictate its method described in the Discours. The foundation of knowledge, which as such can only be true and certain knowledge, leads to enlightenment, i.e., to the rebellion against and to the great confrontation with the culture of the time, that is, with the guiding principles of understanding and evaluating the world of his society, and to the introduction of self-experience as the primary source of knowledge. Appointing human reason as the only leader of his intellectual life, Descartes determines the program and future order of his thoughts; the method, in the form of the four rules, has "correctly to direct his reason and to seek the truth in the sciences." It brings Descartes over the methodical doubt to the unquestionable and unsurpassed foundation of human knowledge, the absolute certitude of the self in the Cogito. His analysis of the poor, unprotected I, related to itself knowingly, is unique and of priceless philosophical value. However, the further stations of the philosophical way of Descartes who, unable to stand the ontological loneliness of this philosophically determined self-awareness, sacrificed the idea of scientific progress to a rational theology, cannot be followed. The claim of the metaphysician to be able to discover or, at least, to test every humanly possible knowledge in terms of the absolute knowledge, disintegrates in view of the progress of the new sciences. Not eternal, necessary truth, but the finite human I is the origin of subjective philosophy. The stability of rational relations does not lie in these relations themselves as if they were existing for themselves, but in the strict consequence of logical reason. "'God’ is... the title for the transcendental-philosophical background of consciousness, for the conditions to which the I-think is always already subjected." All contents which allegedly are already given in the infinite knowledge and can always be deduced from it, have to be produced and developed out of the first human knowledge by way of scientific research. Science which received its new foundation in subjective philosophy and is sought in the efforts of communication of the scientists, is not characterized by truth, but by certitude. "'Truth’ is the concern of metaphysics or better of religion. It is of the essence of such truth, not to be capable of demonstration. The absolutely true has no need to prove itself; it is entitled to faith." Differences between metaphysics and religion, and the nature and possible justification of such metaphysical and religious faith are regrettably not discussed.—M. S. (shrink)

At issue in this study is a question as old as it is presently pertinent: Do individuals form the social or does the social form individuals? Like Socrates, Lévi-Strauss gives ontological priority to society. And his reasons, like those of Socrates, are weighted with ethical concern. But the concern of Levi-Strauss is not "Know thyself." For, by dissolving subjectivity into structures of the collective unconscious, he eliminates the self. Indeed, toward the end of this work, Shalvey likens the entire enterprise (...) of Levi-Strauss to that of Nietzsche. Not content, however, to announce the death of God, he proclaims the death of Man. (shrink)

A forceful study of Sophocles' great drama. With ingenious argument and scholarly documentation Mr. Knox argues that the tragedy of Œdipus is not a tragedy of fate, nor a tragedy of an Aristotelian hero with a "moral flaw," but rather the tragedy of a great man who tries to escape and deny the fact of divine omniscience. The author considers Œdipus as an individual hero, as a political animal who is a symbolic representation of Periclean Athens and as a paradigm (...) of all mankind. The book is written with great vitality and is worth while for "Greekless reader" and classical scholar alike.--M.S.S. (shrink)

This epistemological study is conceived as a positive answer to the decisive philosophical and existential question concerning the possibility of true and certain human knowledge. Its author refuses to accept "the chaotic conditions" of the philosophy of our age when, owing to the prevailing immanentism and relativism, truths actually "are illusions of which it was forgotten that they are such," as Nietzsche rightly diagnosed the situation. He is convinced that the capability of knowing existing reality represents a constitutive element of (...) the human person and that the actual defence of the knowledge of objective truth is an essential presupposition of every attempt of its theoretical denial. So he takes St. Augustine’s and Descartes’s confrontation of sceptical argumentations as a basis and uses insights and method of the early Husserl and of the thinkers of the Phenomenological School of Munich, systematically to lay the foundation of a realistic philosophy of transcendence and to secure an escape from the prison of the idealism and immanentism of transcendentalistic philosophies. (shrink)

This little volume is a critical introduction to the phenomenological scene through discussion of the ideas of some of its more prominent exponents and an extensive analysis of the thought of its founder. About two thirds of the book is devoted to Husserl. It traces the evolution of Husserl's philosophy from an early interest in the psychological presuppositions of number, to the phenomenological analysis of acts of meaning, and finally to his unsuccessful attempt to construct a comprehensive system embracing the (...) presuppositions of knowledge in general. Previous acquaintance with Husserl's work is not necessary as Pivcevic gives critical expositions of the main theses of Husserl's Philosophy of Arithmetic, Logical Investigations, Ideas for a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy, and The Crisis of European Sciences and Phenomenological Philosophy. He is careful to establish particular philosophic problems through reference to the views of other philosophers, and on different issues the position of Husserl is compared and contrasted to those of Frege, Brentano, Russell, Descartes, the positivists, the classical Empiricists and Kant. The presentation of Sartre's views includes brief discussions of European romanticism, Hegel, and Marx. Besides Sartre, Scheler and Heidegger are discussed to illustrate differing applications of the phenomenological method. The final chapter is a brief critique of the limitations of this method: the problem of "other egos," the marked tendency to anti-rationalism, and the failure to achieve its aim of a presupposition-less philosophy. Pivcevic is not totally sympathetic with the phenomenologists, which is perhaps what makes possible this critical exposition of their views. But at times one wishes his clear prose would follow a philosopher's thought further into its more obscure dimensions. His criticisms are often the standard, uninspired objections to what are generally accepted as unjustified excesses of existentialist thought. Nevertheless, this is an excellent introduction to phenomenology and especially valuable for its exposition of the thought of Edmund Husserl.--M. S. H. (shrink)

In this "contribution to philosophical anthropology" the author offers a competent examination of the body-soul relationship which represents primarily a phenomenological characterization of various psycho-somatic relations. The essential difference of the two substances of body and "personal spiritual soul" is to be established as "the indispensable presupposition" of "the wonderful and intimate unity" of man,, and this unique unity is systematically to be defended against all forms of exaggerated dualism and monism. In order to secure this fundamental philosophical truth about (...) the constitution of man against any sceptical questioning, the nature of philosophical knowledge is determined in a long introduction which summarizes an earlier epistemological publication of the author and utilizes its recognitions to manifest possibility and need of an independent philosophical discussion of psycho-somatic relations. Philosophical knowledge is described as a kind of cognition of its own, differing in method and contents from scientific efforts. While science studies contingent facts and conditions in empirical observation and by way of inductive reasoning, essential structures, necessary relations, and strictly deduced states of affairs constitute the object of philosophical knowledge. The latter uses the intuition of essences discovered in the Phenomenological School of Munich as the main method of its endeavors and as the foundation of demonstrative procedures. (shrink)

The prisoner presented as the object of the meditation of this book is Socrates. His behavior and its explanation on his last day in prison, as portrayed in Plato’s Phaedo, serve as the basis for the development of a modernized view of Socrates’ understanding of action and mind, that is to withstand attacks from present day versions of the rejected materialistic philosophy of man. The category of causality understood both as the "real cause" of human activity, which Socrates identifies with (...) his morally responsible intention and decision, and as the physical conditions of our behavior is to be replaced by, and interpreted in terms of, the more fundamental concept of originative action. (shrink)

A comprehensive study in the field of comparative religion with excellent historical analysis. The concluding sections of this volume contain interesting discussions of such topics as communism as a religion, Gandhi's religious philosophy and the relation of religion and psychotherapy. The sections dealing with Old Testament religion and Christianity are substantially the same as were found in Burtt's Types of Religious Philosophy. A fine bibliography is included.--M. S. S.

A detailed and scholarly study of an American city, with attention directed mainly to Catholic-Protestant relations within an urban community. The city is Holyoke, Massachusetts, chosen because of its interfaith problems, because of the occasion of the Sanger incident in 1940, and because Holyoke is a typical average-sized industrial community, well fitted to represent all such cities. Mr. Underwood, himself a Protestant, writes mainly as a sociologist of religion but also well understands that his personal commitment is a contributing factor (...) to his presentation. Extensive and impressive documentation can be found in the Notes and Appendix.--M. S. S. (shrink)

The author has convinced himself that philosophy is essentially mysterious. "Mystery," we are told, "is clearly [sic!] the outcome of indeterminateness, in knowledge and in being. But it is equally a function of determinateness, since complete indeterminateness is unintelligible, not mysterious at all". The definition is both internally contradictory and circular. Internally contradictory, because two incompatible predicates are being ascribed to one subject of predication. Circular, because the reason given for the presence of one of them in the definition is (...) that its absence would remove what is mysterious--which is just the adjectival form of the definiendum. (shrink)

Three themes dominate here: 1) traditional logical atomism implies a false theory of the distinction between particulars and universals; 2) the Bergmannian transformation of logical atomism cannot offer an adequate account of that distinction without covertly assuming a theory which it expressly repudiates; and 3) classical realism, the repudiated theory, can solve the problem which logical atomism unsuccessfully addresses by a doctrine of absolute natures.

This confrontation of analytical psychology with ethics is intended as a philosophical examination of the justification of Jung's and Erich Neumann's claim to have offered in their so-called individuation process the new ethics demanded by the discovery of the psychic reality of the collective unconscious. As a standard of evaluation the author first tries to establish the idea of self-realization as a moral imperative. Aware of the difficulty of finding agreement in matters of ethics, he turns to self-awareness as the (...) source of his ethical principle. Beginning with a discussion of Kant's understanding of moral life, the author recognizes the categorical imperative as an expression of an absolute and universal law of practical reason to be an unsatisfactory representation of subjective morality, and rediscovers in the awareness of the individual law of G. Simmel the evidence of the immediate givenness of our self as a strict moral obligation. The awareness of the self as a moral ideal pre supposes freedom, which, following Sartre's existentialistic [[sic]] understanding, is identified with human reality as such and is found not to allow any kind of determination of human existence; consciousness of impulses implies "original choice," and unconsciousness means abdicated freedom. Compared with the ideal reality of the self and with the conditions of its realization as experienced in immediate awareness, the psychic reality of the individuation process as described in complex psychology lacks every moral qualification. Jung's individuation process does not represent a realization or even a recognition of the self, as the second part of the book attempts to show. A natural process enforced by an archetype of the self, demanding as moral obligations only a conscious awareness of alleged unconscious contents of a collective and personal unconscious in a confrontation of archetypes of the process, and an integration or combination of opposing conscious and unconscious psychic elements, is essentially different from a free and responsible realization of one's individual law in active confrontation with one's own historical situation and reality, and with the moral demands of the physical and social world. Confusing subjective interpretations with objective psychic facts in its doctrine of the archetypes, and morality with mental health in its understanding of the individuation process, analytic psychology is rightly found to ignore decisive aspects of human existence and especially to disregard moral reality as an essential phenomenon of human life.--M. S. (shrink)

As indicated by its subtitle, this examination of the existentialist critique of psychoanalysis is not only understood as a study in philosophical psychology; it is primarily intended to be a report about a phase of the recent history of European thought. Both Freud’s metapsychology and the existentialist philosophical and psychiatric opposition to the psychoanalytic philosophy of man are to be presented as expressions of the crisis of Continental rationalism.

An enormous amount of material is brought together in order to call attention to the presence of naturalistic elements in ancient Indian thought. The core of naturalism treated here is the insistence upon ethical autonomy, maintained in opposition to revealed religion. The tradition that Riepe describes seems to be too varied and complex to yield easily to generalization.--M. S.

This admittedly sympathetic exposition of Maine de Biran's psychology represents a competent and comprehensive introduction into the main philosophical thought of the French thinker and into the conditions and value of his published and unpublished writings as well as of the literature dealing with his life and work. It is inspired by the conviction that there is a need for this new addition to the vast bibliography of the philosopher, not only because Biran is almost without readers in the English (...) philosophical tradition, but especially because his philosophizing centers around matters of current concern in English philosophy. The philosophical psychology which Biran considered, and hoped to develop, as the foundation not only of moral and religious philosophy, but also of empirical psychology, was above all a philosophical analysis of psychological concepts, as the author shows in his discussion of Biran's ideas about the method and the original concept of psychology in the two main parts of his text. In a critical account of Biran's argumentation, seen against the background of the philosophical problematics of today, his refutation of the mathematical analysis of traditional philosophy, of the inductive reasoning of the natural sciences, and of metaphysical or abstractive reasoning together with his defense of reflective consciousness as the appropriate method of psychological studies, are explained. The unique object of psychology, the private inner life, demands reflection as its corresponding method. An analysis of the data of consciousness is, then, to lead to the recognition of the true primitive fact of all inner experience which is to serve as the foundation of psychology. Biran finds it in the will, the awareness of our effort or willed action. The nature of this foundation of psychology and of the "twofold humanity" in man's being, i.e., of affective, passive life and of active, conscious life, indicates that Biran's philosophical psychology truly is a philosophy of mind, not a philosophy of man. The book ends with a classified select bibliography of 44 pages, various Appendixes and Indexes. It should be required reading for any student interested in Maine de Biran's philosophy.--M. S. (shrink)

This "philosophy of the passions" is intended as a radically new understanding of the nature of human emotions and as such as the only realistic philosophy of life. It is an attack on "the Myth of the Passions," the traditional Western view of emotional phenomena, according to which emotions are held to be beastly residues in our being and naturally opposed to the calm, divine objectivity of reason. This new "theory of the passions—with an almost exclusive emphasis on the emotions" (...) represents the defence of a "rational Romanticism," the thesis that the emotions are judgments constitutive of our world and of the meaning of life, not blind or irrational forces, and that it is reason, rather, which "requires the anchorage and earthy wisdom of the passions". (shrink)

This work is understood as an up-to-date philosophical and neurobiological answer to materialist positions concerning the nature of the human mind maintained in the English-speaking philosophy of today. Against physicalist and parallelist views of the body-mind relationship a "strong dualist-interactionist" theory of this relation is defended, in which the primacy is ascribed to the self using, modifying, and shaping its brain in deliberate autonomy. This theory is proposed and clarified in 3 sections. In the first part of the book, Popper (...) mainly examines materialist philosophies of the mind and gives "a history of the body-mind problem since Descartes and especially of the steps which led to parallelism". Physicalist theories of the self, like radical materialism and behaviorism, psycho-physical parallelism, epiphenomenalism, or identity theories are found to be incompatible with the irreducible reality and activity of 3 worlds : the universe of physical entities, the world of mental states, including states of consciousness, psychological dispositions, and unconscious states, and the world of the products of the human mind. Phenomena of consciousness seem "radically different" from what is found in the physical world; due to conscious and purposeful action dramatic changes have taken place in the physical environment of man. The idea of the closedness of W1 is "clearly refuted" by the existence of W3. Plato's and Descartes' conceptions of the body-mind relationship are basically correct--in spite of the fact that the Cartesian model of physical causation has broken down. The "brain is owned by the self, rather than the other way around". This philosophical view of the ultimate superiority of the self over the brain finds its scientific confirmation in Eccles's review of physiological findings concerning structure, function, and development of the nervous system offered in part II of the book. As especially Sperry's studies of brain-split patients have shown, the self stands in direct liaison with the body "only in relationship to activities in the dominant hemisphere" ; only specific neuronal structures, "the modules in the cerebral cortex," and these only in special conditions, are open to an interaction with the self. The evidence for the dependence of the mind upon determined brain centres in sensory, emotional and motoric behavior, in the acquisition and use of language and memory is presented. This dependence is found never to be automatic, instantaneous, or merely passive; nor does it offer an explanation of the experienced unity of the self or even of an image of perception. As a result of his survey of contemporary physiological knowledge, the author proposes "a radical new hypothesis" concerning the self-brain relations. The self-conscious mind "is an independent entity" actively engaged in reading out from the multitude of active centres in the modules of the brain's liaison areas, deliberately selecting from these centres in accord with its interests, integrating its selections into the unity of conscious experience, and acting back on the neuronal centres. The self-conscious mind developed in relationship to W3 influence on the self "exercises a superior interpretative and controlling role upon the neuronal events by way of a two-way interaction" between W1 and W2. (shrink)

This volume publishes the papers which were offered and discussed by a group of philosophers and psychologists during a conference "designed to explore the interrelations between philosophical analyses of the family of concepts relating to the self... and empirical studies in psychology of the development and manifestations of self-control, self-knowledge, and the like," held in Chicago in 1975. The late editor arranged the papers "in terms of four topics" indicating the major themes they address. After his introduction, "Conceptual Issues in (...) the Psychology of the Self", written after the conference and intended as an harmonization of opposing views expressed in the discussions, he presents three papers concerned with psychological and philosophical aspects of "Self-Control and the Concept of Agency." In "Self-Control and the Self," Walter and Harriet N. Mischel start with "an overview of some of the main types of self-control that psychologists have researched". Such psychological studies reveal the human being as "an active, self-aware problem-solver, capable of changing himself and achieving substantial self-control through the application of rational principles to a much greater degree than has usually been supposed in psychology". William P. Alston intends to determine in what ways the self has to be taken into account in the psychology of motivation in "Self-Intervention and the Structure of Motivation". That "there is an agent that does the integrating... and so on," is to be recognized as a fact. The understanding of this self-intervention, however, demands the admission of at least two motivational systems of higher-level-wants and of lower-level-wants, differing in structure and in the mode of acquisition. Charles Taylor explores "what is involved in the notion of self, of a responsible human agent" in his paper, "What is Human Agency". A person is found to be essentially characterized by the capacity for reflective self-evaluation. "Self-Knowledge" is discussed in the following two articles. Kenneth J. Gergen defends "The Social Construction of Self-Knowledge" in line with ideas of George Herbert Mead. Self-knowledge is "primarily a socially mediated and essentially arbitrary construction of experience". In its case "there is virtually nothing to know". This socio-cognitive conception of the self is emphatically rejected by David W. Hamlyn in his "Self-Knowledge". Knowledge about oneself as studied in psychology and sociology is essentially different from self-knowledge in the full sense, "connected with some kind of commitment to oneself". Different scientific views of certain aspects of human existence are presented in "Self-Development and Its Failures". Freud’s conception of the human person finds a realistic correction in the theoretical and practical work of contemporary psychoanalysts insisting upon the need of the concept of a "cohesive self," as described in Ernest S. Wolf’s "'Irrationality’ in a Psychoanalytic Psychology of the Self". This need is denied in behavioristic psychology, as Willard F. Day, Jr. shows in "On the Behavioral Analysis of Self-Deception and Self-Development". "To a behaviorist, there is no such thing" as the self. Consequently, there cannot be a genuine self-development as distinguished from a progress toward creating a desirable environment. Self-deception means fighting the environment. "A Critique of the Behavioral Paradigm and an Alternative Conceptualization" is offered by Paul F. Secord in an analysis of "Making Oneself Behave". Meaning and deficiencies of the understanding of the self in sociological social psychology are outlined by George J. McCall in "The Social Looking-Glass: A Sociological Perspective on Self-Development". The self is seen as essentially a social self or looking-glass self. Problems with regard to an explanation of the personal choice of behavior of a determined social role, however, seem to demand impulses as well as institutions as a locus of self-appraisal. "The Meaning of ’self’ and the Multiplicity of Selves" is the title of the last section of the book. Various uses of the term ’self’ are distinguished by Stephen E. Toulmin in "Self-Knowledge of the Self". The author is primarily concerned with establishing the relations of even the sophisticated psychological and psychiatric uses of the term to the everyday experience and language of reflective conduct. Rom Harré finally hopes to interpret "the syntax of much of the talk of ‘I’ and ‘me', ‘thou’ and ‘we'... as monodramatic performances" in "The Self in Monodrama". (shrink)

As a study of the scholastic sources of Malebranche's thought, this book contains a discovery of considerable importance. Connell has shown that the logical structure of Malebranche's initial demonstration of the theory of vision in God in La recherche de la vérité corresponds to the structure of discussions of angelic knowledge of matter in the Suarezian treatise De Angelis. This correspondence, together with a more general similarity of some philosophical themes, casts welcome light on Malebranche's argument. It also lends support (...) to Connell's further claim that Augustine was not a substantive influence upon the first formulation of the theory of vision in God. It seems to this reviewer that Connell is too direct in his assessment of the substantive influence of scholasticism upon Malebranche's meaning. He maintains that the first version of the theory depends upon a conception of ideas which renders them equivalent to the scholastic universal species, granting ambiguities attributable to Cartesianism. Texts cited in support of this thesis, however, do not contain a single unambiguous instance of the scholastic view as Connell presents it. At the same time, the book as a whole suffers from imbalance in exposition. The guiding principle of Connell's concern with Malebranche is stated only in the General Conclusion, following more than 350 pages of dense argumentation. Connell accuses Malebranche of a specifically modern heresy: ontologism. Consequently, if the pitfalls of his system can be shown to result from the subjection of scholastic insights to Cartesian philosophy, it follows that the philosophical thinking of Augustine is exonerated. It is not so much that Malebranche did not begin as an Augustinian as that Augustine is not responsible for the errors of Malebranche. But what is ontologism? Connell does not explain. He gives only the briefest of definitions in his conclusion. Also, from a few nominal references to it in the text of his exposition, one gathers that it has something to do with "idealism" and "pantheism." This hardly increases the reader's confidence in the general interpretation of the development of Malebranche's thought from the greater predominance of realistic tendencies to an almost unabashed idealism. In any case, it seems unfortunate that Connell's use of his discovery should have taken this rather special turn. Malebranche is not widely read outside the Continent, and yet deserves to be. There are few books about him in English, and this one is large and imposing.--M. S. (shrink)

An interpretive approach to the philosophy of Unamuno, presenting central themes from the entire range of his writing, conveys the philosopher's sense of the Spanish temperament beautifully, despite some awkward spots in the translation.--M. S.