Human beings are essentially vulnerable in the view that their existence qua humans is not given but construed. This vulnerability receives basic protection from the State, expressed in the form of the universal rights all citizens are meant to enjoy. In addition, many individuals fall prey to destitution and deprivation, requiring social action aimed at recognising the specific harms they suffer and providing remedial assistance to palliate or remove their plights.Citizens receive protection against their biologic vulnerability by means of an (...) in rem right to health [care], which is more an attitude of protection than a specific programme. When individuals become susceptible, that is, biologically weak or diseased, they also increase their predisposition to additional harm, and require social actions to treat their demeaned condition. Such assistance takes the form of positive healthcare rights.Research on human beings has been slow to observe that the subjects recruited are susceptible, especially so if research is done in less developed countries. By mislabelling them as vulnerable – a characteristic they share with all humans – sponsors avoid registering the deprivation these people suffer, and the ethical obligation to offer them remedial help.The distinction between vulnerability and susceptibility also marks the difference between being intact but fragile – vulnerable – and being injured and predisposed to compound additional harm – susceptible. Awareness of this difference should give additional force to the rejection of double standards in research ethics. (shrink)

The so-called European principles of bioethicsare a welcome enrichment of principlistbioethics. Nevertheless, vulnerability, dignityand integrity can perhaps be moreaccurately understood as anthropologicaldescriptions of the human condition. Theymay inspire a normative language, but they donot contain it primarily lest a naturalisticfallacy be committed. These anthropologicalfeatures strongly suggest the need todevelop deontic arguments in support of theprotection such essential attributes ofhumanity require. Protection is to beuniversalized, since all human beings sharevulnerability, integrity and dignity, thusfundamenting a mandate requiring justice andrespect for fundamental human (...) rights.Being a feature of all humanity, vulnerabilityis improperly extended to designatedestitute individuals and populations. Rather,they are in a state of fallen vulnerability,for they already are harmed in some way, andhave become deprived of their range ofcapabilities. These individuals are destituteand are no longer in command of theirfundamental human rights. They have lost thestatus of unharmed vulnerability;identifying them as susceptible – vulnerated andno longer only vulnerable – stresses thepoint that bioethics demands specific socialaction to palliate or remove their distress.When harm does occur – in the form of disease,for example –, individuals are no longervulnerable – for they have ceased to be intact–, they become susceptible to additionaldeprivations and sickness; integrity isdemeaned and dignity is offended, leading tostates of dysfunction that require specificremedial social practices, aimed at treatingand removing injuries.The main point this paper addresses is thatvulnerability – as well as dignity and integrity – are descriptive characteristics ofhuman beings qua humans, which are not normative in themselves, but fundamental enoughto inspire bioethical requirements of protection and respect for human rights in thewake of social justice. A clear distinction must be made in regard to human beings who areinjured by poverty, sickness, discriminating deprivations or suffer otherdestitutions, having ceased to be only vulnerable for they are no longer intact. Theseindividuals and populations require more than protection, their needs must be met byspecific care and remedial measures to be identified and instigated by bioethics quaapplied ethics. (shrink)

Clinicians' work depends on sincere and complete disclosures from their patients; they honour this candidness by confidentially safeguarding the information received. Breaching confidentiality causes harms that are not commensurable with the possible benefits gained. Limitations or exceptions put on confidentiality would destroy it, for the confider would become suspicious and un-co-operative, the confidant would become untrustworthy and the whole climate of the clinical encounter would suffer irreversible erosion. Excusing breaches of confidence on grounds of superior moral values introduces arbitrariness and (...) ethical unreliability into the medical context. Physicians who breach the agreement of confidentiality are being unfair, thus opening the way for, and becoming vulnerable to, the morally obtuse conduct of others. Confidentiality should not be seen as the cosy but dispensable atmosphere of clinical settings; rather, it constitutes a guarantee of fairness in medical actions. Possible perils that might accrue to society are no greater than those accepted when granting inviolable custody of information to priests, lawyers and bankers. To jeopardize the integrity of confidential medical relationships is too high a price to pay for the hypothetical benefits this might bring to the prevailing social order. (shrink)

Autonomy has been hailed as the foremost principle of bioethics, and yet patients’ decisions and research subjects’ voluntary participation are being subjected to frequent restrictions. It has been argued that patient care is best served by a limited form of paternalism because the doctor is better qualified to take critical decisions than the patient, who is distracted by illness. The revival of paternalism is unwarranted on two grounds: firstly, because prejudging that the sick are not fully autonomous is a biased (...) and unsubstantial view; secondly, because the technical knowledge of healthcare professionals does not include the ethical qualifications and prerogative to decide for others.Clinical research settings are even more prone to erode subjects’ autonomy than clinical settings because of the tendency and temptation to resort to such practices as shading the truth when consent to participation is sought, or waiving consent altogether when research is done in emergency settings.Instead of supporting such dubious practices with unconvincing arguments, it would seem to be the task of bioethics to insist on reinforcing autonomy. (shrink)

Clinical and research practices designed by developed countries are often implemented in host nations of the Third World. In recent years, a number of papers have presented a diversity of arguments to justify these practices which include the defence of research with placebos even though best proven treatments exist; the distribution of drugs unapproved in their country of origin; withholding of existing therapy in order to observe the natural course of infection and disease; redefinition of equipoise to a more bland (...) version, and denial of post-trial benefits to research subjects. These practices have all been prohibited in developed, sponsoring countries, even though they invariably have pockets of poverty where conditions comparable to the Third World prevail. Furthermore, the latest update of the Declaration of Helsinki clearly decries double ethical standards in research protocols. Under these circumstances, it does not seem appropriate that First World scholars should propose and defend research and clinical practices with less stringent ethical standards than those mandatory in their own countries. Recent years have witnessed frequent reports of less stringent ethical standards being applied to both clinical and research medical practices, for the most part in the field of drug trials and drug marketing, initiated by developed countries in poorer nations. Still more unsettling, a number of articles have endorsed the policy of employing ethical norms in these host countries, which would be unacceptable to both the legislations and the moral standards of the sponsor nations. Also, these reformulations often contravene the Declaration of Helsinki or one of its updates. This paper is not so much concerned with the actual practices, which have been subjected to frequent scrutiny and publicly decried when gross misconduct occurred. Rather, my concern relates to the approval and support such practices have found in the literature on bioethics from authors who might be expected to use their energy and scholarship to explore and endorse the universalisability of ethics rather than to develop ad hoc arguments that would allow exceptions and variations from accepted moral standards. To this purpose, issue will be taken with arguments in three fields: medical and pharmaceutical practices, research strategies, and local application of research results. (shrink)

Phenomenology in medicine’s main contribution is to present a first-person narrative of illness, in an effort to aid medicine in reaching an accurate disease diagnosis and establishing a personal relationship with patients whose lived experience changes dramatically when severe disease and disabling condition is confirmed. Once disease is diagnosed, the lived experience of illness is reconstructed into a living-with-disease narrative that medicine’s biological approach has widely neglected. Key concepts like health, sickness, illness, disease and the clinical encounter are being diversely (...) and ambiguously used, leading to distortions in socio-medical practices such as medicalization, pharmaceuticalization, emphasis on surveillance medicine. Current definitions of these concepts as employed in phenomenology of medicine are revised, concluding that more stringent semantics ought to reinforce an empirical phenomenological or postphenomenological approach. (shrink)

A number of recent publications by the philosopher David Seedhouse are discussed. Although medicine is an eminently ethical enterprise, the technical and ethical aspects of health care practices can be distinguished, therefore justifying the existence of medical ethics and its teaching as a specific part of every medical curriculum. The goal of teaching medical ethics is to make health care practitioners aware of the essential ethical aspects of their work. Furthermore, the contention that rational bioethics is a fruitless enterprise because (...) it analyses non-rational social events seems neither theoretically tenable nor to be borne out by actual practice. Medical ethics in particular and bioethics in general, constitute a field of expertise that must make itself understandable and convincing to relevant audiences in health care. (shrink)

This brief reply gives a few references and clarifies some points in order to emphasize that a number of Professor Seedhouse's assertions are debatable and that his criticism of slovenly scholarship and his unbridled ad hominem argumentation are out of place and easily refuted.

Based on the distinction between living body and lived body, we describe the disease-subject as representing the impact of disease on the existential life-project of the subject. Traditionally, an individual's subjectivity experiences disorders of the body and describes ensuing pain, discomfort and unpleasantness. The idea of a disease-subject goes further, representing the lived body suffering existential disruption and the possible limitations that disease most probably will impose. In this limit situation, the disease-subject will have to elaborate a new life-story, a (...) new character or way-of-being-in-the-world, it will become a different subject. (shrink)

Medical ethics needs to be on its guard against those in military or political power who would seek to subvert its most basic tenets in order to serve their own endsEmergencies and warlike situations often force medical personnel to follow orders and perform actions or duties pertaining to their field of expertise in flagrant violation of their professional code of ethics. Opposing such orders may be contextually impossible, or elicit unduly high personal costs. Medical ethics, while lamenting these impositions, is (...) often reduced to passive and silent disagreement. In recent years, however, biomedical ethics has become active in accepting and supporting these estrangements from accepted standards and values of the healthcare professions, coming up with justifications of torture; suggesting non-treatment of the wounded, depending on their combatant status; prompting collaboration in the development of biological weapons, and disregarding informed consent.Physicians’ participation in torture has been unanimously condemned and, although acknowledging that such conduct “is the result of the displacement of their medical vocation by the doctrine of ‘national security’”, such an “ideological substrate” has nevertheless been deemed untenable.1 Perpetrators were found to have committed their deeds in an ethical void2; this was recognised, but in no way did it serve to excuse physicians from the duty of opposing induced suffering and assuaging its effects to the best of their abilities.Torture in its “humane” form has been defended on utilitarian grounds,3 using weak arguments that are unable to justify physicians’ active participation in torture. For the most part, professional ethics has remained adamant in its undaunted disapproval of medical non-therapeutic involvement in violent scenarios such as war, terrorism, and even torture. Nobody would have thought, in earlier times, that medical ethics could take any other position than to unrelentingly reject physicians’ participation in torture, …. (shrink)

Summary Care and cure have been described as different kinds of ethical approaches to clinical situations. Female concerns in nursing care have been contrasted with masculine, cure orientated physician's attitudes. Ethics in such different voices may have sociologic determinants, but they do not represent intrinsic distinctions. Medicine has shown a divergent development, on the one hand stressing cure in a deterministic and instrumental way, on the other hand being aware that disease is as much a pathographic as a biographic, care‐requiring (...) existential situation. Disease is a breakdown of the living organism, to be cured by therapeutic efforts, but it is also the distressing failure of the lived body, requiring concern and care. Based on Lévinas’ ethics of encounter, it is suggested that any interpersonal relatedness is based on concern for the other, being grounded on an essentially ethical interaction. The clinical encounter is a paradigm of such ethics‐based relationships, which necessarily builds on awareness of the other qua other, and is concerned with fulfilling the therapeutic mandate. Caring for the other means doing one's best to help her/him, so that care and cure are inextricably interwoven, although care is the more fundamental form of human relatedness. Thus, neither gender nor professional tasks can allow for a caring attitude to develop without curing concerns, just as trying to cure without caring is unthinkable. (shrink)

Informed consent has become one of the central problems in medical ehtics. At first sight, it would seem that no argument can be made against a person's right to be fully aware of the extent, course, and implications of his medical condition. It seems equally obvious that it is the patient's right to participate in, influence, or fully and solely assume the decisions of medical actions that should be undertaken or withheld with regard to his disease. Nevertheless, there are circumstances (...) in which these commonly held assumptions about a patient's rights may not apply. It is the purpose of this report to describe a case where informed consent was deliverately not sought, and to discuss the ethical issues involved. (shrink)

Conflicts of interest are receiving increased attention in medical research, clinical practice and education. Criticism of, and penalties for, conflicts of interest have been insufficiently discussed and have been applied without adequate conceptual backing. Genuine conflicts of interest are situations in which alternative courses of action are ethically equivalent, decision-making being less a matter of moral deliberation than of personal weighing of interest. In contrast, situations usually thought of as conflicts of interest are mostly temptations to follow an attractive but (...) undue option that causes harm by failing to uphold well-entrenched ethical standards. Examples of moral quandaries that pose as ethically neutral conflicts of interest are healthcare providers enticed to favour certain products; patients being referred to non-therapeutic trials entailing risks and non-optimal healthcare; industry-supported scientists failing to deliver unbiased research results and reports or participating in ghost-writing; and sponsored educators who praise their supporters beyond objective evidence. All these are moral blemishes, where integrity gives way to material incentives at the cost of provoking risky and harm-producing situations, thus constituting false conflicts of interest when they are in fact ethical misdemeanours. Disclosure has been the most widely recommended response to avoid the concealment of conflicting and ethically suspect interests. Regulations regarding disclosure reveal a utilitarian stance that shows more concern for the magnitude of support or sponsorship than for the underlying ethical transgression. Education and oversight should directly address and help correct the moral attitude towards undue influence of inducements and marketing strategies falsely posing as conflicts of interest. (shrink)

Classical medicine operates in a climate of rational discourse, scientific knowledge accretion and the acceptance of ethical standards that regulate its activities. Criticism has centred on the excessive technological emphasis of modern medicine and on its social strategy aimed at defending exclusiveness and the privileges of professional status. Alternative therapeutic approaches have taken advantage of the eroded public image of medicine, offering treatments based on holistic philosophies that stress the non-rational, non-technical and non-scientific approach to the unwell, disregarding traditional diagnostic (...) categories and concentrating on enhancing subjective comfort and well-being, but remaining oblivious to the organic substrate of disease. This leads to questionable ethics in terms of false hopes and lost opportunities for effective therapy. (shrink)

Medical ethics could be better understood if some basic theoretical aspects of practices in health care are analysed. By discussing the underlying ethical principles that govern medical practice, the student should also become familiar with the notion that medical ethics is much more than the external application of socially accepted moral standards. Professions in general and medicine in particular have internal values that command their moral virtuosity at the same time as their technical excellence. Three examples where clinical practice can (...) be clearly shown to require an ethical analysis are given: medical praxiology illustrates the motives, means and aims of physicians and patients; clinical decision-making as a practical syllogism that reaches prescriptive conclusions based on medical knowledge and the patient's wishes/intentions. Finally, diagnostics as an ethical bayesian approach is discussed, where the patient informedly decides the benefits and risks of further testing. (shrink)

Supererogatory acts are considered by some to be part of medicine, whereas others accept supererogation to be a gratuitous virtue, to be extolled when present, but not to be demanded. The present paper sides with those contending that medicine is duty-bound to benefit patients and that supererogation/altruism must per definition remain outside and beyond any role-description of the profession. Medical ethics should be bound by rational ethics and steer away from separatist views which grant exclusive privileges but also create excessive (...) demands, way beyond what physicians perform or are willing and able to offer. (shrink)

Neglected diseases are severe conditions that mainly affect the world's poorest people. Those suffering from neglected diseases are mostly suffering from tropical infections that have failed to receive priority in pharmaceutical research and development programs, as well as in public health policies aimed at improving availability and access to preventive, diagnostic and curative medicine. The World Health Organization has issued a number of documents directing attention to the plight affecting one third of the world's population, assisted by active support from (...) private organizations, notably the Bill and Melissa Gates Foundation, but the overall situation remains dismal. In the wake of major socioeconomic processes including globalization, steadily growing economic disparity, healthcare inequality, the instability created by rogue states and terrorism, as well as massive migration, and epidemic outbreaks, the features of neglected diseases have been changing. Neglected populations affected by tropical diseases are suffering increasingly from non-infectious degenerative conditions and disabilities due to untreated chronic maladies. Pockets of poverty and neglect can also be detected in high-income countries, contributing to the emergence of new diseases and the reemergence of infections believed to be disappearing such as tuberculosis and the measles. Included in the issues of neglect are rare diseases, mostly of genetic origin, affecting a small number of patients that suffer from multiple life-shortening functional impairment and organ defects. Effective medicines are extremely expensive, allegedly because research and development of appropriate drugs is resources and time consuming, requiring exorbitant prices to recoup investment from a small number of consumers. Bioethics has been tardy in addressing the suffering and destitution of neglected and rare diseases. Convinced that permanently repeated denunciations blunt the sensitivity towards suffering, whereas statistics are bloodless and unable to elicit commitment, this book attempts to explore a different strategy. In an upstream approach, bioethics needs to engage in ethnographic fieldwork that confronts and shares the context in which people suffer, vividly presenting what epidemiological research has blunted into statistical data. Additionally, a downstream approach is suggested, requiring bioethics to vigorously and openly denounce unethical biomedical and pharmaceutical research, misdeeds in registration and marketing of drugs, and misalignment of policies with the unmet healthcare needs of the destitute. More than being critical observers, bioethicists ought to shed lurking conflicts of interests and seek active participation in planning research and public healthcare practices aimed at improving the lives of medically neglected populations. (shrink)

Latin American countries have slowly enacted laws decriminalizing abortion in three circumstances: Life‐threatening risk for the pregnant woman, extra‐uterine non‐viability of malformed foetus, and pregnancy due to rape or incest. Chile is one of the last countries to adopt such a law, formulated in an increasingly restrictive format. Conservative politicians and Church‐related healthcare institutions promptly announced individual and institutional conscientious objection based on the right of private facilities to obey their ideology and personal moral integrity. Juridical consultations and Constitutional Court (...) rulings allowed private hospitals to uphold their objection even if contracted to provide some public health services. Under these conditions, only a few hundred women requested and obtained a legal abortion, while an estimated 100,000 continued to depend on unsafe procedures. Bioethical debate was silenced by the unfettered drive for conscientious objection that continues to limit women’s autonomy, and fails to ease the public health scourge of massive unsafe clandestine abortions. (shrink)

Concern about the rapid ageing of all societies reaches alarming proportions as healthcare inequities are steeply rising, prompting the elderly to live longer but subject to insufficient social protection and healthcare in the wake of dwindling public resources. The aged population of developing nations are facing additional hardships due to the growing gap between needs and the financial reductions of public institutions, retirement funds, and the trend towards privatization of essential services turned into commodities. Current approaches to allocation of insufficient (...) resources without ageist discrimination are briefly discussed: individual self‐care aimed at successful, active and healthy ageing based on resourcefulness of the privileged elderly; utilitarian approaches founded on QALY and fair innings, and human rights focused on the plights of the elderly. These approaches cannot apply to resources poor nations, who need to engage in context‐bound bioethics dealing with the realities of their exposed ageing population. A developing world bioethics is needed to face the plights of the elderly in countries with low and middle‐income and insufficient social capital. Suggested are: 1) a phenomenological approach based on the interaction of bioethics and ethnology, furthering grass‐roots input from the elderly; 2) Create small communities –campus‐like boroughs– to simplify accessibility to social services and healthcare facilities, as an alternative to the high‐cost WHO proposal of age‐friendly large cities. (shrink)

The FME symposium on teaching medical ethics takes up the issue of competence and responsibility in matters concerning bioethics (1). Foreseeably, the medical participants argue that physicians are prepared, or can be easily prepared, to handle all relevant aspects of medical ethics. The contrary position is sustained by the philosophically trained participants, who believe that physicians do not, in fact cannot, sufficiently manage medico-ethical problems. This paper sees a role for both parties. Medical ethicists should properly be involved in medical (...) education and in analytical and systematic study of medical ethics. They should not generally be involved in clinical medico-moral decision-making, which is properly the realm of patient and (ethically competent) doctor. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Warming Up Seeking Early Solace Experience and Thought So Be It Against Lukewarmness Pragmatic Use of Belief.

The development of the philosophy of medicine in the Federal Republic of Germany since 1945 is presented in a thematic form. The first two decades were characterized by the evolution of an anthropological school of thought that aimed at relating physician and patient in a more personal and existential form than had hitherto been the case. In the last years, this tendency to demand deeper psychic and broader social involvement with medical problems had increased. Somatic disorders were considered to be (...) fundamentally caused by socially induced mental stress. After a brief period during which the theme of organisms in general and phenomenologically grasped living-body of human beings in particular were discussed, there followed since the mid-seventies an essential preoccupation with the methodology and epistemology of medicine. According to this trend, medicine is to be analyzed in terms of the theory of action, with its conceptual and strategic orientation towards practice and not, as generally believed, towards the standards of scientific truth. The concepts of disease, diagnosis and therapy are therefore relative and their validity is dependent on time, persons and circumstances involved. Thus, the highest criteria of utility for medical actions cannot but be the affected patient and society. (shrink)

The multidisciplinary provenance of bioethics leads to a variety of discursive styles and ways of reasoning, making the discipline vulnerable to criticism and unwieldy to the setting of solid theoretical foundations. Applied ethics belongs to a group of disciplines that resort to deliberation rather than formal argumentation, therefore employing both factual and value propositions, as well as emotions, intuitions and other non logical elements. Deliberation is thus enriched to the point where ethical discourse becomes substantial rather than purely analytical. Caution (...) must be exercised to avoid this formal permissiveness from accepting empty and incorrigible statements that are but flatus voci since they can neither be supported nor falsified. It is therefore suggested that deliberation in bioethics should comply with three sets of conditions: (1) Be understandable, truthful, honest and pertinent, as suggested by communicative ethics; (2) Allow for second order, thick judgements as suggested by pragmatism; (3) Abide by additional criteria as here proposed: Doxastic propositions should be bolstered by a cognitive element; statements should be specific and proportional to the issue at hand, and they should be arguable and coherent. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction Medical Migration and Moral Responsibility Lending Money to Developing Countries Culture and Religion Health Research and Resources Conclusions References.