Developing a reading of some of Beauvoir and Sartre's most influential writings in philosophy, Max Deutscher explores contemporary philosophy in the light of the phenomenological tradition within which Being and Nothingness and The Second Sex occurred as striking events operating on the border of the modern and the 'post-modern'. Deutscher traces the shifts of genre that produce their gendered philosophies, and responds in terms of contemporary experience to the mood and the arguments of their works. Drawing upon the writings of (...) two contemporary critics in particular - Michele Le Dœuff and Luce Irigaray - Deutscher reworks this part of philosophy's history in order to advance thinking in contemporary philosophy, generate renewed philosophical reflection on consciousness, freedom and one's relation to others, and to return a look still cast in our direction from an earlier time. (shrink)

It is argued that 'p but I do not believe that p' seems close to a contradiction because if the speaker is correct in all that s/he says then what s/he says is false. Similarly,what is wrong with 'p, but I have no opinion whether p' is that, whether 'p' or 'not-p', if the speaker believes it, s/he cannot be completely correct. The argument assumes that 'I believe that' is not a mere parenthesis as in 'p, I believe', and that (...) to say 'I believe that p' is not only to claim a certain mentality, but to claim to be correct or mistaken depending upon whether 'p' is true or false. (shrink)

Spivak translates Derrida’s “il n’y a pas de hors-texte” as “there is nothing outside the text.” By considering how the aphorism works within his study of Rousseau on sexual and textual supplements, and by reviewing related expressions in French, a mistranslation is revealed. This is not a simple error, however. The distortion is generated by Derrida’s own broader context. We must not only distinguish signification from reference but also place the aphorism within Derrida’s allusion, in the first part of Of (...) Grammatology, to an all-embracing arche-writing. The paper ends in thus opening out the discussion of a textual “inside” or “outside.”. (shrink)

Arendt is a philosopher despite herself, and this paper uses the resources of her <<The Life of the Mind>> to develop her comparison of thinking as a 'departure' from the world with the fore-doomed attempt by Orpheus to bring from underground into the light of day. The paper investigates how thinking, though we 'lose' it in the speech and writing that makes it public, still can have the delicate power that Arendt attributes to it.

"hintikka's conception of epistemic logic" is a critical comment on hintikka's defence of his philosophical method ("epistemic logic and the methods of philosophical analysis", "a.J.P." no.1, 1968). There is a discussion of the symbolization and analysis of "a knows that p", "a knows that he knows that p", And the notions of virtual equivalence and virtual implication. The conclusion drawn is that whereas hintikka thought his critics misunderstood his method, In fact they were attacking his employment of it.

The article aims to show that there are everyday analogues to husserl's 'transcendental' subjectivity, And that this 'transcendence' can be understood as a limit of these varieties of detachment. Evidence is cited that his 'transcendental ego' is the body itself, In its capacity to transcend its conditions. Within this 'naturalized' interpretation of transcendental subjectivity we can see its practical and philosophical importance to our objectivity. His notion of a 'life-World' is a prophylactic against the monomaniac holding of physicalistic or other (...) theories, And his emphasis on and evocation of subjectivity is a reminder of the distinctness of other subjectivities. (shrink)

Achieving judgment -- In sensible judgment -- Sentencing -- Dissenting -- Making judgments -- Judging as right -- Living on the premises -- Inferring, judging, arguing -- Questioning critique -- Sting of reason -- Critique's mystique -- Enigma absolute -- Moving establishment -- Being nomadic -- Chasing after modernity -- When to forget.

The article focuses on the support to the position of Hannah Arendt that taste and feelings have roles in having sensible judgment. It mentions the pleasure that are derived from judgment such as aesthetic judgment and judging what is right. It states that Arendt argues that judgment should be used to defeat moral epithets.

Only in being pleased at what is done can I judge it as right. Kant is correct, nevertheless, then my motive is not the object of my judgment's concern. In working to make a good judgment, it is not pleasure but die right result that one seeks. In taking the jury's decision to be right, one is pleased at it—one takes pleasure in it. At the same time, it would shift attention from judgment's proper object to find the point of (...) die justice of the decision in one's having been pleased. (shrink)

Pt. I. Appearances of thought. 1. Appearances. 2. Thinking. 3. Recall -- Pt. II. Thinking with others. 4. By metaphor. 5. Conversing. 6. Absence -- Pt. III. Willing myths. 7. Being willing. 8. Resolving will. 9. Commandment -- Pt. IV. Judgment. 10. Process and judgment. 11. Working magic. 12. Willing thought.

Through a curated selection of essays written over four decades by one of Australia’s leading philosophers, this collection demonstrates the impact of Continental philosophy on philosophical thought in Australia.

Long after we have abandoned belief in a Cosmic Law Giver, still we cling to the word ‘law’ in science. It is in this same way that we cannot let go of the substantializing and pluralizing ‘universal’, even though its literal sense indicates a kind of turning, a ‘one-turning’, rather than a kind of thing . Yet ‘the problem of Universals’ is supposed to have become, again, a ‘compulsory examination question’ for philosophers. Let us reveal how this tradition begins for (...) us. (shrink)

The general context of this writing is that of finding exits both from dualism and from reductive physicalism. Dualism—the attitude of seeing and taking things according to a fixed absolute distinction, with mind as invisible, conscious ‘containing’ the thought, feeling and sensation ‘hidden’ by body. Reductive physicalism—the attempt to grasp and be satisfied with body as left over by dualism's rape of its mentality, dualism's refusal to recognize the distinctiveness of point of view, as requiring a bodily mentality. Physicalism finally (...) supplants an ‘inner life’ within the bodily vacancy after all, as in traditional dualist image, but now understands that ‘inner’, ‘conscious’ life in the terms pertaining to processes in the brain, rather than as deeds, passions, thoughts, reasoning as within the general ‘imaginary’ of our several minds. (shrink)

There is a tradition of philosophy—a conception we can easily under-stand as a limit of a tendency of our own thinking—that philosophy consists only of argument. The rest of the vast prepon-derance of words in philosophical texts is simply embroidery. ‘Naturally’, it will be conceded, actual philosophy books contain more or less of verbal pictures, words and phrases whose purpose is to evoke images, and many stories—examples, hard cases for definitions, and 4 anecdotes. These, it will be said, ‘are only (...) the embellishments, the relief from work, the appetizers or the post-prandial delicacies.’. (shrink)