Is Gilles Deleuze’s concept of virtuality sufficiently close to the concept of virtuality used in informatics and the philosophy of information for computer-created objects and virtual reality to justify the latter’s explanation by means of the former? This question is the main objective of the present paper. We aim to show that, contrary to its most widespread interpretations, the Deleuzian conception of virtuality is epistemological and not ontological, and that this invalidates the belief that Deleuze’s virtuality and that of computer (...) science are sufficiently close to justify the transposition of one to the other. (shrink)

This book deals with correspondence truth. It critically analyses selected known correspondence truth theories and proposes - as an alternative - the symbolic truth conception in which correspondence is a symbolisation and not copying.

It is shown that the program of naturalizing of epistemology, that is, the program of the whole substitution of epistemology for sciences or for the humanities is not realizable. Naturalized epistemology includes metaphysical (in Kant’s sense: synthetic, speculative, a priori) claims which save its partly autonomous philosophical status. The result presented in the paper does not exclude the naturalizing program. It leads, instead, to a modified, attenuated version of it—such one which permits to open epistemology by transferring it in multi-facet (...) vivid philosophical investigations juxtaposed with science and the humanities. The postulated attenuated version of naturalizing does not result in destroying epistemology as a special philosophical domain of investigations, not substitutable for sciences. (shrink)

It is shown that the program of naturalizing of epistemology, that is, the program of the whole substitution of epistemology for sciences or for the humanities is not realizable. Naturalized epistemology includes metaphysical (in Kant’s sense: synthetic, speculative, a priori) claims which save its partly autonomous philosophical status. The result presented in the paper does not exclude the naturalizing program. It leads, instead, to a modified, attenuated version of it—such one which permits to open epistemology by transferring it in multi-facet (...) vivid philosophical investigations juxtaposed with science and the humanities. The postulated attenuated version of naturalizing does not result in destroying epistemology as a special philosophical domain of investigations, not substitutable for sciences. (shrink)

It is shown that the program of naturalizing of epistemology, that is, the program of the whole substitution of epistemology for sciences or for the humanities is not realizable. Naturalized epistemology includes metaphysical (in Kant’s sense: synthetic, speculative, a priori) claims which save its partly autonomous philosophical status. The result presented in the paper does not exclude the naturalizing program. It leads, instead, to a modified, attenuated version of it—such one which permits to open epistemology by transferring it in multi-facet (...) vivid philosophical investigations juxtaposed with science and the humanities. The postulated attenuated version of naturalizing does not result in destroying epistemology as a special philosophical domain of investigations, not substitutable for sciences. (shrink)

In this essay I wish to add my voice to Michael H. Mitias’s polemic with Robert E. Allinson’s view that an Enlightenment-driven reform of the human world is desirable, and even necessary. Allinson calls the outcome of such a reform the “New Enlightenment.” I also consider the few main threads of Mitias’s alternative proposal for repairing the human world, which involves the reinterpretation of the Enlightenment ideology, and I strive to show that, contrary to Mitias’s belief, both his and Allinson’s (...) positions have important common points. Moreover, I also take a closer look at Mitias’s project, especially his postulate to begin funding the reforming of the human world in human nature. (shrink)

I investigate the universality of science as perceived in epistemological conceptions and in sociology of science, as well as claims about the anti-universal character of science. In this, I distinguish two kinds of universality of science: epistemic and global cultural/social, and in the latter also the global universality of the basic level of science. I attempt to show that epistemology views science as universal in its basic aspects relating to knowledge, its object, subject and cognitive values as well as methods, (...) which, according to the epistemological meta-theses, are necessary for scientific validity and autonomy. I also draw attention to the fact that sociologised, multiculturally-oriented approaches to science are wrong to hold it for irrevocably anti-universal and exclusively a part of Western culture. I suggest instead the perspective of basic-level global universalism, where science is seen to grow out of a cultural base common to all cultures, which provides the criteria for weak rationality, weak empiricism and methodology and determines the nomological character of cognition. Finally, I trace the evolution of universality from a property of science to a value, and ask about the meaning of this property-cum-value for the human world. (shrink)

The paper analyses today partly forgotten Max Horkheimer’s conception of instrumental reason which presents this reason differently from the definition widespread today (claiming that it consists in adopting suitable means to set ends). Horkheimer relates instrumental reason to subjective one, seeing the former as a degenerate form of the latter. His theory is far more philosophical than the dominating today conceptions which do not consider the problem of instrumental reason philosophical any longer and instead move it step by step to (...) the domain of a nonphilosophical decision theory. The paper analyses in particular Horkheimer’s beliefs claiming that 1) it is science which founds instrumental reason, and therefore 2) it is science which is the main source of oppressiveness and degradation of the contemporary civilization. It is shown among other things that Horkheimer misunderstands some properties of science and its operations and this leads to his incorrect presentation of the role of instrumental reason. (shrink)

The present essay outlines the metaphilosophical foundations necessary for an analysis of science’s dependence on culture. It shows that the matter cannot be approached on a purely objective level as all studies and conclusions are perforce relativized by adopted cultural and scientific norms. The multifariousness of science and culture—which lies at the root of the whole problem—results in a broad network of relations between the two.The enclosed studies on the loading of science by culture lead to rather integristic conclusions as (...) to the essence of culture. This integristic position is in a sense a “third road” halfway between the two known radical approaches—one proclaiming that culture is totally diversified, the other that it is one. The “third path” underscores the universal fundament of culture in all its varieties and views science as universal despite its cultural load and the diversity of existing cultures—precisely because of its rooting in this fundament. (shrink)

In the article different modification of classical concept of truth are considered. The author claims that analyses of cognitive processes and ways of acquiring knowledge should be taken into account in such modification.

W artykule analizowane są z filozoficznej perspektywy niezdaniowe semantyczne koncepcje nauk empirycznych, głównie ich najnowsza, to jest strukturalistyczna wersja. Dowodzi się, że strukturaliści wielorako interpretują swe fundamentalne kategorie: modelu, teorii empirycznej oraz relacji spełniania, przy czym niektóre interpretacje są niespójne ze swą wyjściową bazą, to jest logiczną teorią modeli. Konstruując koncepcję teorii empirycznej, strukturaliści dokonują szczególnie rozumianej transgresji logicznej teorii modeli.

Rozważane są dwie kwestie podstawowe dla oceny strukturalistycznej koncepcji nauk empirycznych: 1) czy możliwa jest i realizowalna logicyzacja filozofii nauki, w szczególności, czy możliwa jest redukcja strukturalistycznej koncepcji teorii empirycznej do logiki, oraz 2) jaki aktualny charakter i perspektywy ma strukturalistyczna niezdaniowa koncepcja wiedzy? Rozważania oparte są na wynikach pracy: Modele semantyczne w filozofii nauk empirycznych po pół wieku. Część I. Filozoficzne wątpliwości.