The myelin basic proteins are a set of peripheral membrane polypeptides which play an essential role in myelination. Their most well‐documented property is the unique ability to ‘seal’ the cytoplasmic aspects of the myelin membrane, but this is probably not the only function for these highly charged molecules. Despite extensive homology, the individual myelin basic proteins (MBPs) exhibit different expression patterns and biochemical properties, and so it is now believed that the various isoforms are not functionally equivalent in myelinating cells. (...) We now think that while the major MBPs are intracellular adhesion molecules, some of the quantitatively less abundant isoforms that are expressed very early in development may have regulatory effects on the myelination program. (shrink)

It is well known that the medieval scholastics did not begin their philosophy systematically with an explicit theory of knowledge. Unfortunately many people have concluded from that fact that the very idea of an epistemology, and especially the idea of a critique of knowledge, was completely foreign to them. Within recent years authors such as Professor Van Steenberghen and Father Copleston have done a great deal to spread a correct understanding of St. Thomas’s views on this matter. Much evidence might (...) be adduced from the principal work of John Duns Scotus to show that he also took steps to justify man’s spontaneous conviction that some natural knowledge of truth with certainty can be attained. In this article we will consider some of these elements of Scotus’s philosophy as they are found in the volumes that have so far appeared in the critical edition of his works. (shrink)

The problem of values has given rise to a bewildering variety of theories. Louis Lavelle set himself the task of expounding and systematizing these diverse doctrines, of making “une sorte de tableau de toutes les directions dans lesquelles s’est engagée la reflection humaine au cours de son histoire, lorsqu’il s’est agi de definir pour elle la valeur absolue et les valeurs particulières”. He tried to bring order into the work of ages, situating it in a vaster order according to his (...) own views of man’s privileged place in the universe. Of course the study of values made by this great psychologist–metaphysician was far more than a lifeless gathering together of dry concepts: it involved a representation, from a new angle, of his entire philosophy of being. “Le problème essentiel de la métaphysique, le seul dont la solution puisse éclairer notre vie et guider notre conduite, c’est le problème du rapport entre l’être et la valeur”. M. Wesley Piersol now presents a fine compendium of Lavelle’s thought on value. He divides his study into four parts, aiming at thus keeping close to the line of development of the philosopher’s views. In the first part is found Lavelle’s analysis of the faculties of the moi, sentiment, will, preference, judgment of value. From this analysis is derived his understanding of the characters of value. Next comes a section on the incarnation of value by liberty in time: thus a psychology of value develops into a metaphysics of value. Finally, there is a section on the relation between axiology and ontology. The book is well planned and the matter clearly presented but, as anybody who is acquainted with Lavell’s writings must know, clarity and charm in presentation do not eliminate difficulty. (shrink)

In the introductory remarks to his inaugural lecture Professor Isaiah Berlin laments that so little attention is payed by professional philosophers to studies “about the ends of life”. Studies such as those to which the Chichele Chair of Social and Political Theory is dedicated “spring from and thrive on discord”. He observes.

Rational choice theory enjoys unprecedented popularity and influence in the behavioral and social sciences, but it generates intractable problems when applied to socially interactive decisions. In individual decisions, instrumental rationality is defined in terms of expected utility maximization. This becomes problematic in interactive decisions, when individuals have only partial control over the outcomes, because expected utility maximization is undefined in the absence of assumptions about how the other participants will behave. Game theory therefore incorporates not only rationality but also common (...) knowledge assumptions, enabling players to anticipate their co-players' strategies. Under these assumptions, disparate anomalies emerge. Instrumental rationality, conventionally interpreted, fails to explain intuitively obvious features of human interaction, yields predictions starkly at variance with experimental findings, and breaks down completely in certain cases. In particular, focal point selection in pure coordination games is inexplicable, though it is easily achieved in practice; the intuitively compelling payoff-dominance principle lacks rational justification; rationality in social dilemmas is self-defeating; a key solution concept for cooperative coalition games is frequently inapplicable; and rational choice in certain sequential games generates contradictions. In experiments, human players behave more cooperatively and receive higher payoffs than strict rationality would permit. Orthodox conceptions of rationality are evidently internally deficient and inadequate for explaining human interaction. Psychological game theory, based on nonstandard assumptions, is required to solve these problems, and some suggestions along these lines have already been put forward. Key Words: backward induction; Centipede game; common knowledge; cooperation; epistemic reasoning; game theory; payoff dominance; pure coordination game; rational choice theory; social dilemma. (shrink)

Payoff dominance, a criterion for choosing between equilibrium points in games, is intuitively compelling, especially in matching games and other games of common interests, but it has not been justified from standard game-theoretic rationality assumptions. A psychological explanation of it is offered in terms of a form of reasoning that we call the Stackelberg heuristic in which players assume that their strategic thinking will be anticipated by their co-player(s). Two-person games are called Stackelberg-soluble if the players' strategies that maximize against (...) their co-players' best replies intersect in a Nash equilibrium. Proofs are given that every game of common interests is Stackelberg-soluble, that a Stackelberg solution is always a payoff-dominant outcome, and that in every game with multiple Nash equilibria a Stackelberg solution is a payoff-dominant equilibrium point. It is argued that the Stackelberg heuristic may be justified by evidentialist reasoning. (shrink)

Standard game theory cannot explain the selection of payoff-dominant outcomes that are best for all players in common-interest games. Theories of team reasoning can explain why such mutualistic cooperation is rational. They propose that teams can be agents and that individuals in teams can adopt a distinctive mode of reasoning that enables them to do their part in achieving Pareto-dominant outcomes. We show that it can be rational to play payoff-dominant outcomes, given that an agent group identifies. We compare team (...) reasoning to other theories that have been proposed to explain how people can achieve payoff-dominant outcomes, especially with respect to rationality. Some authors have hoped that it would be possible to develop an argument that it is rational to group identify. We identify some large—probably insuperable—problems with this project and sketch some more promising approaches, whereby the normativity of group identification rests on morality. (shrink)

In a recent article in this journal, Duijf claims to have proved that team reasoning can be viewed as a payoff transformation. His formalization mimics team reasoning but ignores its essential agency switch. The possibility of such a payoff transformation was never in doubt, does not imply that team reasoning can be viewed as a payoff transformation, and makes no sense in a game in which payoffs represent players’ utilities. A theorem is proved here that a simpler and more intuitive (...) payoff transformation can mimic any theory that predicts what strategies players will choose in a well-defined game. (shrink)

Psychological game theory encompasses formal theories designed to remedy game-theoretic indeterminacy and to predict strategic interaction more accurately. Its theoretical plurality entails second-order indeterminacy, but this seems unavoidable. Orthodox game theory cannot solve payoff-dominance problems, and remedies based on interval-valued beliefs or payoff transformations are inadequate. Evolutionary game theory applies only to repeated interactions, and behavioral ecology is powerless to explain cooperation between genetically unrelated strangers in isolated interactions. Punishment of defectors elucidates cooperation in social dilemmas but leaves punishing behavior (...) unexplained. Team reasoning solves problems of coordination and cooperation, but aggregation of individual preferences is problematic. (shrink)

Psychology plays an increasingly important role in today's society. Its influence can be seen all around us - be it in the home, the workplace, the school or our private lives. A uniquely diverse discipline, it ranges from social psychology to biological aspects of behaviour, and from basic research to the applied professions. This _Companion Encyclopedia_ covers all these main branches of psychological research and professional practice. The thematic arrangement is the result of the Editor's extensive research into syllabi, from (...) which he distilled the 13 most frequently taught units. Students can consult and be referred to sections relating to their lecture programme, and can find lucid definitions of frequently used terms in the Glossary. Headings and sub-headings are clearly highlighted at the beginning of each chapter - ideal for quick reference. * Provides authoritative and in-depth reference material on all major branches of psychological research and professional practice * Contributors include many of the world's most eminent psychologists * Written in a lively style without assuming previous knowledge of the subject * Structured according to the core topics appearing most often as discrete modules in contemporary psychology courses * Detailed bibliographies, further reading sections, exhaustive index and glossary of technical terms * Containing 165 supporting illustrations. (shrink)

Even if game theory is broadened to encompass other-regarding preferences, it cannot adequately model all aspects of interactive decision making. Payoff dominance is an example of a phenomenon that can be adequately modeled only by departing radically from standard assumptions of decision theory and game theory – either the unit of agency or the nature of rationality. (Published Online April 27 2007).

A significant increase in the probability of an action resulting from observing that action performed by another agent cannot, on its own, provide persuasive evidence of imitation. Simple models of social influence based on two-person sequential games suggest that both imitation and pseudo-imitation can be explained by a process more fundamental than priming, namely, subjective utility maximization.

Mealey's interesting interpretation of sociopathy is based on an inappropriate two-person game model. A multiperson, compound game version of Chicken would be more suitable, because a population engaging in random pairwise interactions with that structure would evolve to an equilibrium in which a fixed proportion of strategic choices was exploitative, antisocial, and risky, as required by Mealey's interpretation.

This clear and lively introduction to psychology assumes no prior knowledge of the subject. Extensively revised and updated, this third edition describes psychology as it is taught at universitues. Examples are used throughout to illustrate fundamental ideas, with a self-assessment quiz focusing readers' minds on a number of intriguing psychological problems. The differences betwen psychology, psychiatry and psychoanalysis are explained, and the professions and careers associated with psychology are explored. Suggestions for further reading and useful internet sites are included.

Normative theories can be useful in developing descriptive theories, as when normative subjective expected utility theory is used to develop descriptive rational choice theory and behavioral game theory. “Ought” questions are also the essence of theories of moral reasoning, a domain of higher mental processing that could not survive without normative considerations.

Normative theories can be useful in developing descriptive theories, as when normative subjective expected utility theory is used to develop descriptive rational choice theory and behavioral game theory. questions are also the essence of theories of moral reasoning, a domain of higher mental processing that could not survive without normative considerations.

Only someone who has written or lectured, through the medium of Irish, on philosophy can fully appreciate the magnificent work done by Fr. Colmn Ó Huallachin in compiling this Philosopher’s Dictionary. Philosophy, like every specialised science, has its own vocabulary. Philosophers, physicists, biologists, economists must all use terms that are not found in everyday language. Before the publication of Foclir Fealsaimh, a philosopher who used Irish as a medium had to work under a serious handicap because he had no dictionary (...) to which he could refer to find the exact term he needed. Many of these terms were already in Irish but they were scattered through books and manuscripts written by Irish philosophers and theologians of the past and not readily available to-day. Other terms were new, terms that were not known when Irish was a normal medium of philosophical and theological thought, and these terms did not exist in Irish at all. As a result, the philosopher who lectured or wrote in Irish often had to spend much time looking for the exact term he needed or finding the best root on which to base a new Irish term. (shrink)

There is a long-standing debate in philosophy about whether it is morally permissible to harm one person in order to prevent a greater harm to others and, if not, what is the moral principle underlying the prohibition. Hypothetical moral dilemmas are used in order to probe moral intuitions. Philosophers use them to achieve a reflective equilibrium between intuitions and principles, psychologists to investigate moral decision-making processes. In the dilemmas, the harms that are traded off are almost always deaths. However, the (...) moral principles and psychological processes are supposed to be broader than this, encompassing harms other than death. Further, if the standard pattern of intuitions is preserved in the domain of economic harm, then that would open up the possibility of studying behavior in trolley problems using the tools of experimental economics. We report the results of two studies designed to test whether the standard patterns of intuitions are preserved when the domain and severity of harm are varied. Our findings show that the difference in moral intuitions between bystander and footbridge scenarios is replicated across different domains and levels of physical and non-physical harm, including economic harms. (shrink)

There is a long-standing debate in philosophy about whether it is morally permissible to harm one person in order to prevent a greater harm to others and, if not, what is the moral principle underlying the prohibition. Hypothetical moral dilemmas are used in order to probe moral intuitions. Philosophers use them to achieve a reflective equilibrium between intuitions and principles, psychologists to investigate moral decision-making processes. In the dilemmas, the harms that are traded off are almost always deaths. However, the (...) moral principles and psychological processes are supposed to be broader than this, encompassing harms other than death. Further, if the standard pattern of intuitions is preserved in the domain of economic harm, then that would open up the possibility of studying behaviour in trolley problems using the tools of experimental economics. We report the results of two studies designed to test whether the standard patterns of intuitions are preserved when the domain and severity of harm are varied. Our findings show that the difference in moral intuitions between bystander and footbridge scenarios is replicated across different domains and levels of physical and non-physical harm, including economic harms. (shrink)

Hypothetical trolley problems are widely used to elicit moral intuitions, which are employed in the development of moral theory and the psychological study of moral judgments. The scenarios used are outlandish, and some philosophers and psychologists have questioned whether the judgments made in such unrealistic and unfamiliar scenarios are a reliable basis for theory-building. We present two experiments that investigate whether differences in moral judgment due to the role of the agent, previously found in a standard trolley scenario, persist when (...) the structure of the problem is transplanted to a more familiar context. Our first experiment compares judgments in hypothetical scenarios; our second experiment operationalizes some of those scenarios in the laboratory, allowing us to observe judgments about decisions that are really being made. In the hypothetical experiment, we found that the role effect reversed in our more familiar context, both in judgments about what the actor ought to do and in judgments about the moral rightness of the action. However, in our laboratory experiment, the effects reversed back or disappeared. Among judgments of what the actor ought to do, we found the same role effect as in the standard hypothetical trolley scenario, but the effect of role on moral judgments disappeared. (shrink)

Animals and War: Confronting the Military-Animal Industrial Complex is the first book to examine how nonhuman animals are used in war and the military. Animals and War contributes significantly to the fields of social justice, animal rights, and anti-war/peace activist communities. This book also will be read by peace, conflict, social justice, and critical animal studies scholars, students, and practitioners.

Colman shows that normative theories of rational decision-making fail to produce rational decisions in simple interactive games. I suggest that well-formed theories are possible in local settings, keeping in mind that a good part of each game is the generation of a rational approach appropriate for that game. The key is rationality defined in terms of the game, not individual decisions.

Game theory poses problems for modeling rational belief, but it does not need a new theory of rationality. Experimental results that suggest otherwise often reveal difficulties in testing game theory, rather than mistakes or paradoxes. Even though the puzzles Colman discusses show no inadequacy in the standard theory of rationality, they show that improved models of belief are needed.

Quantum feminicity is a term that refers to the intersection of quantum theory, a technological branch of physics, with feminist theory, a social and political movement. Engaging the modal logics of this intersection, the article explores this intersection through one aspect of quantum literacy; that of the quantum splitting of the concept of the temporal narrative. The article examines what are the interdisciplinary convergences of feminist and physics’s respective philosophies. Focussing on the quantum modalities that are being practiced in relation (...) to the situated nature of technological platforms engaged, the article proposes that modelling a quantum feminicity can assist in disengaging modes of sexual difference that are used to gender all kinds of bodies through a countermanding the temporal. Experiences of bodies are considered as experimental modes that provide quantum vectors for feminist actions. (shrink)

The past fifty years have been a time of immense change in Ireland, as the country has moved from a traditional to a modern society. The introduction of electricity, the 'quiet revolution', was accompanied by changes in attitudes to Church, sex, relationships, property, emigration - to life in general. In that short time people have absorbed massive change, often enthusiastically, though perhaps with the occasional pang of regret for the 'old ways'. Here we see the faces, the landscapes and the (...) life of that recently disappeared Ireland - Jack Lynch, JFK, Grace Kelly, Dev, de Gaulle, the Troubles, folk traditions - alongside the new faces and the new styles of our modern society. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and (...) made generally available to the public. To ensure a quality reading experience, this work has been proofread and republished using a format that seamlessly blends the original graphical elements with text in an easy-to-read typeface. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

Although his subject matter is far from abstract and his arguments comparatively free from obscurity, Bernard Mandeville has generally been acknowledged a difficult philosopher. It is not hard to see why. First, Mandeville deliberately sets out to generate paradoxes. Secondly, he is not a systematic writer. His views are expounded and developed in a number of works of which The Fable of the Bees is only the best known. Thirdly, and most important, he is not solely a philosopher, but also (...) a satirist. His satire is intertwined with his purely philosophical theories and his style is often highly ironic. Any interpretation of Mandeville must consider his philosophical and his satirical intentions. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 10.1 (2003) 81-85 [Access article in PDF] "What's in the Box Then, Mum?"—Death, Disability, and Dogma Sheila Colman OVERHEARD IN AN EXCHANGE between a bereaved woman and her son outside the church just prior to a funeral service: "What's in the box, then?" "Daddy." The son is in his late 30s and has a learning disability. His mother had prepared him as well as (...) she could; his father had been ill for some time and was not expected to recover. Death, and the rituals surrounding it, had been explained and it was not the first family funeral he had attended.Trying to field such childlike questions is typical of living with a person with a learning disability; trying to find the right words is difficult enough without the added pressure of personal emotional distress.The generally accepted norm in life is that a child is parented within the home until adulthood and then independence is attained. Roles may well be reversed in later life in that the "child" may find responsibilities in caring for, and making decisions for, elderly parents. Few people can stop parenting when their offspring are fledged—even though it is at arms length and any advice may be ignored. Life with a child with a learning disability is unbalanced in this respect; as carers we do not lead lives considered to be normal because our children continue to be childlike for the rest of their, and our, lives. Some of us know that our sons and daughters do not have "apparently limitless potential... to develop skills and autonomy if only they are given the right help" (but try, as a parent or carer, saying that to a professional working in the field of learning disability!) and know that the best we can hope for is mature, rather than immature, dependence.No one tells parents of a learning disabled child—or any other, for that matter—what their responsibilities to that child are. Food, warmth, love, support, and so on are givens, but it takes a conscious effort to move a child toward adulthood when it involves changes in life, for example, moving away from the family home. The debate rages; is it letting go or getting rid of?We all delight in the pleasures our children experience in childhood; we know the magic has gone from the family Christmas once realisation dawns on the youngest child. If you consider that your son or daughter has been dealt a very poor hand in life, the temptation to prolong and promote that innocence is very tempting. It is much easier to prevaricate than to admit that life has its unpleasant sides; that failure and disappointment exist: my son was a great fan of Thomas the Tank engine videos until he was in his early teens, long after it was age appropriate. I passed them onto a younger child, having told him the videos were lost. The fall-out was spectacular [End Page 81] (but fortunately short lived!) and he eventually became very interested in Formula 1 motor racing. I had to push him to grow up.For all of us, the transition from childhood to adulthood is a process, not an event. Although I agree with the professionals that the child with a learning disability should be part of any discussions concerning his or her future, if that child does not have the intellectual capacity to make informed choices, someone else has to do it. That someone else is usually a parent, but is it a parent who is prepared to let go to help that person become an adult with his or her own life away from the family home, or is it a parent who has protected and coddled the child by promising they will never have to go?Lest you think I am a particularly hard, confrontational, and unfeeling mother, I would point out that I have almost 50 years of experience of living with learning disability in the immediate family; my son is 20 but my brother... (shrink)

Introduction : designing and turbulent Epicureans -- The proem to Book I : philosophy and the city -- The discovery of nature and the problem of the infinite and eternal -- Philosophic resignation : living beyond hope and fear -- O' mortal, o' fool, o' criminal, o' Memmius -- Gods of the philosophers and gods of the city -- Conclusion : the modern reversal.

The ability to convert human somatic cells into induced pluripotent stem cells (iPSCs) is allowing the production of custom‐tailored cells for drug discovery and for the study of disease phenotypes at the cellular and molecular level. IPSCs have been derived from patients suffering from a large variety of disorders with different severities. In many cases, disease related phenotypes have been observed in iPSCs or their lineage‐specific progeny. Several proof of concept studies have demonstrated that these phenotypes can be reversed in (...) vitro using approved drugs. However, several challenges must be overcome to take full advantage of this technology. Here, we highlight recent advances in the field and discuss the main challenges associated with this technology as it applies to disease modelling. (shrink)

Trolley problems have been used in the development of moral theory and the psychological study of moral judgments and behavior. Most of this research has focused on people from the West, with implicit assumptions that moral intuitions should generalize and that moral psychology is universal. However, cultural differences may be associated with differences in moral judgments and behavior. We operationalized a trolley problem in the laboratory, with economic incentives and real-life consequences, and compared British and Chinese samples on moral behavior (...) and judgment. We found that Chinese participants were less willing to sacrifice one person to save five others, and less likely to consider such an action to be right. In a second study using three scenarios, including the standard scenario where lives are threatened by an on-coming train, fewer Chinese than British participants were willing to take action and sacrifice one to save five, and this cultural difference was more pronounced when the consequences were less severe than death. (shrink)