This article opens a special section on the politics of opacity and openness. The rise of transparency as a political and cultural ideal has left secrecy to accumulate negative connotations. But the moral discourse that condemns secrecy and rewards transparency may cause us to misread the symbiotic relationship between these terms. After providing a historical account of transparency in public and political life, this article therefore makes the case for working with the tension between these terms rather than responding to (...) the dyad as a choice. We need to find different ways of staying with the aporia of transparency-as-secrecy and secrecy-as-transparency. Despite common demands to support either transparency or secrecy in political and moral terms, we live with the tension between these terms and its inherent contradictions daily. The theoretical questions posed by this material reality need to be asked and responded to. This article and the special section as a whole begin such an enterprise. (shrink)

Though far from new, the rhetoric of transparency is on the ascent in public and political life. It is cited as the answer to a vast array of social, political, financial and corporate problems. With the backing of a ‘movement’, transparency has assumed the position of an unassailable ‘good’. This article asks whether the value ascribed to transparency limits political thinking, particularly for the radical and socialist Left. What forms of politics, ethics, of being-in-common, might it be possible to think (...) if we pay attention to secrecy rather than transparency? (shrink)

Writing from a scientifically and philosophically informed perspective, the authors provide a critical overview of the conceptual difficulties encountered in many current neuroscientific and psychological theories.

This article attempts to question modes of sharing and watching to rethink political subjectivity beyond that which is enabled and enforced by the current data regime. It identifies and examines a ‘shareveillant’ subjectivity: a form configured by the sharing and watching that subjects have to withstand and enact in the contemporary data assemblage. Looking at government open and closed data as case studies, this article demonstrates how ‘shareveillance’ produces an anti-political role for the public. In describing shareveillance as, after Jacques (...) Rancière, a distribution of the sensible, this article posits a politico-ethical injunction to cut into the share and flow of data in order to arrange a more enabling assemblage of data and its affects. In order to interrupt shareveillance, this article borrows a concept from Édouard Glissant and his concern with raced otherness to imagine what a ‘right to opacity’ might mean in the digital context. To assert this right is not to endorse the individual subject in her sovereignty and solitude, but rather to imagine a collective political subjectivity and relationality according to the important question of what it means to ‘share well’ beyond the veillant expectations of the state. (shrink)

A long-standing theme in discussion of perception and thought has been that our primary cognitive contact with individual objects and events in the world derives from our perceptual contact with them. When I look at a duck in front of me, I am not merely presented with the fact that there is at least one duck in the area, rather I seem to be presented withthisthing (as one might put it from my perspective) in front of me, which looks to (...) me to be a duck. Furthermore, such a perception would seem to put me in a position not merely to make the existential judgment that there is some duck or other present, but rather to make a singular, demonstrative judgment, that that is a duck. My grounds for an existential judgment in this case derives from my apprehension of the demonstrative thought and not vice versa. (shrink)

This book defends antitheodicism, arguing that theodicies, seeking to excuse God for evil and suffering in the world, fail to ethically acknowledge the victims of suffering. The authors argue for this view using literary and philosophical resources, commencing with Immanuel Kant's 1791 "Theodicy Essay" and its reading of the Book of Job. Three important twentieth century antitheodicist positions are explored, including "Jewish" post-Holocaust ethical antitheodicism, Wittgensteinian antitheodicism exemplified by D.Z. Phillips and pragmatist antitheodicism defended by William James. The authors argue (...) that these approaches to evil and suffering are fundamentally Kantian. Literary works such as Franz Kafka'sThe Trial, Samuel Beckett's Waiting for Godot, and George Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-Four, are examined in order to crucially advance the philosophical case for antitheodicism. (shrink)

Para abordar a questão moral do aborto de fetos sem cérebro, inicialmente são apresentados e considerados insatisfatórios dois argumentos que defendem a punição para a gestante que aborta: a sacralidade da vida e a atribuição ao feto do caráter de “pessoa”. Em seguida, são apresentados e considerados satisfatórios quatro argumentos contra a punição da gestante: a morte certa do feto, o caráter terapêutico e não-eugênico do aborto, o sofrimento, sem fi nalidade evidente, dos envolvidos na situação e o direito da (...) mulher sobre seu corpo. Na terceira seção, discutem-se as exigências da compaixão. Chega-se à conclusão de que abortar ou não fetos anencefálicos deve ser uma decisão individual, não coletiva, que deveria ser tomada por cada mulher, e não pelo Estado democrático e então imposta às mulheres. A mulher tem o direito moral tanto de continuar quanto de interromper a gravidez de fetos anencefálicos. To approach the moral issue of the abortion of anencephalic fetuses, we fi rstly present and consider unsatisfactory two arguments for the punishment of the pregnant woman who makes an abortion: that of the sanctity of life and of the attribution of the status of a person to the fetus. After that, we present and consider satisfactory four arguments against the punishment of the pregnant woman: the certain death of the fetus, the therapeutic and non-eugenic character of the abortion, the inutility of the suffering brought by the situation to the woman and other people and the woman’s right over her body. On the third section, we discuss the demands for compassion. The conclusion is that the decision about the abortion of anencephalic fetuses should be an individual decision and not a collective one; it should be made by each woman, not by the democratic Estate and then imposed on women. The woman has the right of interrupting and of continuing the pregnancy of an anencephalic fetus. (shrink)

A seleção genética de embriões humanos algumas vezes é criticada porque se considera que de alguma maneira ela possa prejudicar os portadores de deficiências que já existem. O artigo defende que essa crítica é injustificada. A primeira seção apresenta as questões morais colocadas pelos portadores de deficiências. Em seguida, são apresentados os três argumentos contra a seleção de embriões baseados nos direitos dos portadores de deficiências – o Argumento do Apoio Social, o Argumento da Diversidade e o Argumento da Ofensa. (...) Dentre eles, o terceiro foi considerado o mais consiste e, por isso, a terceira seção é dedicada a sua análise, cuja conclusão é de que a seleção de embriões é consistente com o respeito aos direitos dos portadores de deficiências. (shrink)

A seleção genética de embriões humanos algumas vezes é criticada porque se considera que de alguma maneira ela possa prejudicar os portadores de deficiências que já existem. O artigo defende que essa crítica é injustificada. A primeira seção apresenta as questões morais colocadas pelos portadores de deficiências. Em seguida, são apresentados os três argumentos contra a seleção de embriões baseados nos direitos dos portadores de deficiências – o Argumento do Apoio Social, o Argumento da Diversidade e o Argumento da Ofensa. (...) Dentre eles, o terceiro foi considerado o mais consiste e, por isso, a terceira seção é dedicada a sua análise, cuja conclusão é de que a seleção de embriões é consistente com o respeito aos direitos dos portadores de deficiências. (shrink)

A seleção genética de embriões humanos algumas vezes é criticada porque se considera que de alguma maneira ela possa prejudicar os portadores de deficiências que já existem. O artigo defende que essa crítica é injustificada. A primeira seção apresenta as questões morais colocadas pelos portadores de deficiências. Em seguida, são apresentados os três argumentos contra a seleção de embriões baseados nos direitos dos portadores de deficiências – o Argumento do Apoio Social, o Argumento da Diversidade e o Argumento da Ofensa. (...) Dentre eles, o terceiro foi considerado o mais consiste e, por isso, a terceira seção é dedicada a sua análise, cuja conclusão é de que a seleção de embriões é consistente com o respeito aos direitos dos portadores de deficiências. (shrink)

O artigo analisa o caso em que os pais querem ter um filho com alguma deficiência em especial, a surdez. Em primeiro lugar, são apresentados os dois principais argumentos contra essa tentativa, as ideias de que isso prejudicaria o filho e de que os pais não estariam buscando o melhor para ele. Em seguida são apresentados três contra-argumentos a favor da escolha dos pais, que se baseiam nas considerações de que a surdez não é uma deficiência, de que essa escolha (...) aumentaria o vínculo entre pais e filhos e de que ela serviria como uma ação afirmativa a favor dos portadores de deficiências. A seção seguinte contém uma análise do que significa ter uma deficiência, a qual serve de base para o a discussão final que procura mostrar que a escolha dos pais é imoral, pois, limita propositalmente as oportunidades do filho. (shrink)

Krause & Merlussi criticized the book The Ethics of the Use and Selection of Human Embryos mainly for the low level of formalization of its arguments and for other logical features. This text answers these comments by accepting some of its terminological rectifications, but also pointing that some of those criticisms are considered unnecessary requirements by the practical ethics literature.

Temporal Logic: From Ancient Ideas to Artificial Intelligence deals with the history of temporal logic as well as the crucial systematic questions within the field. The book studies the rich contributions from ancient and medieval philosophy up to the downfall of temporal logic in the Renaissance. The modern rediscovery of the subject, which is especially due to the work of A. N. Prior, is described, leading into a thorough discussion of the use of temporal logic in computer science and the (...) understanding of natural language. Temporal Logic: From Ancient Ideas to Artificial Intelligence thus interweaves linguistic, philosophical and computational aspects into an informative and inspiring whole. (shrink)

In this article, we apply the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights to the private equity (PE) business model. PE firms often adopt a controversial, ‘value extractive’, business model based on high debt and extreme cost-cutting to generate investor returns. PE firms own large numbers of companies, including in many rights-related sectors. The model is linked to increased human rights risks to workers, housing tenants, and in privatized health and social care. We map these risks and analyse the (...) human rights responsibilities of PE firms. Our analysis has major implications for understandings of human rights responsibility. We argue that value extractive methods are the root cause of eventual harm to human rights, even though they may not harm rights directly. To respect human rights, PE firms must mitigate the risks of these value extractive methods. We define how human rights due diligence (HRDD) could achieve this and argue that given the extent of harm and the lack of a business case for adopting such a view of human rights responsibility, business strategy level HRDD should be a core component of forthcoming HRDD laws. (shrink)

Romain Ducoulombier, author ofCamarades!, a study of the origins of the French Communist Party, belongs to a different ideological context to earlier authors on the subject, such as Kriegel, Wohl or Robrieux. But though Ducoulombier claims originality for his work, there is little genuinely new here. He fails to grasp the impact of the Russian Revolution on the French working class and has little understanding of the dynamics of the Communist International. He stresses the ‘asceticism’ and ‘messianism’ of the early (...) Communist Party without giving a precise meaning to these terms. Worst of all, Ducoulombier concentrates on archival material while saying remarkably little about the French Communist Party’s actual activities, notably work in the trade unions, anti-militarism and anti-colonialism. (shrink)

Given that the Obama administration still relies on many strategies we would think of as sitting on the side of secrecy, it seems that the only lasting transparency legacy of the Obama administration will be data-driven or e-transparency as exemplified by the web interface ‘data.gov’. As the data-driven transparency model is exported and assumes an ascendant position around the globe, it is imperative that we ask what kind of publics, subjects, and indeed, politics it will produce. Open government data is (...) not just a matter concerning accountability but is seen as a necessary component of the new ‘data economy’. To participate and benefit from this info-capitalist-democracy, the data subject is called upon to be both auditor and entrepreneur. This article explores the implications of responsibilization, outsourcing, and commodification on the contract of representational democracy and asks if there are other forms of transparency that might better resist neoliberal formations and re-politicize the public sphere. (shrink)

The French journal Clarté had its origins in a movement launched just after the end of World War I by Henri Barbusse. It was soon taken over by a group of more radical intellectuals, who were close to the French Communist Party but not under its direct control. The journal combined politics and culture. It attempted to analyse the changing world-conjuncture, and in particular the significance of the defeated revolutions in Germany and China. But it also developed a theory of (...) culture under the influence of the Russian proletcult, Victor Serge, Georges Sorel and surrealism. In 1927, under the influence of Pierre Naville, Clarté broke with the Moscow-dominated Communist Party and became the organ of the French Left Opposition. Cuenot has given a well-researched and balanced account of its development. (shrink)

The paper is an attempt to make sense of Hegel's notion of aufheben. The double meaning of aufheben and its alleged ?rise above the mere ?either?or?; of understanding? have been taken, by some, to constitute a criticism of the logic of either?or. It is argued, on the contrary, that Hegel's notion of aufheben, explicated in its primary and philosophical context, turns out to be a substantiation of that logic. The intelligibility of the formula of either?or depends, for example, on the (...) categories of Being and Not?Being. But if these categories are regarded as particular finite determinations themselves subject to the formula of either?or, then the formula, far from being intelligible, ?falls apart?. Hegel is arguing, in other words, that if we are to substantiate the logic of either?or, we must, at the same time, ?rise above? that logic. The role of aufheben is then considered in the special sciences. Here it is argued that we must distinguish between empirical transitions, governed by the finite determinations of things, and logical or dialectical transitions, governed by considerations of the intelligibility of the notions involved. Applying the notion of aufheben to the former transitions suggests wrongly that empirical transitions have an objective or philosophic necessity. Finally, the place of ?immanent transformation? in the context of aufheben is examined. It is concluded that if there is to be a transformation, then a distinction must be drawn between thought and its content, but then the transformation cannot be regarded as immanent. (shrink)

Les sujets numérisés sont façonnés par ce qu’il faudrait appeler, à la suite de Rancière, le partage numérique du sensible – un arrangement qui détermine ce qui est visible, dicible et connaissable. Or cet arrangement implique des formes de surveillance distribuée, qu’on appellera « distriveillance », caractérisées par un transfert de la surveillance d’État vers les sujets eux-mêmes. Il est urgent d’interrompre ce partage de données automatisé pour ouvrir à nouveau à d’autres mises en commun.

It is often taken for granted that there is a crucial dichotomy between positive science, with its interest in what is the case, and morality, with its supposed interest in what ought to be the case. This assumption takes its departure from a belief in the notion of unconditional or categorical obligation or ?the moral? as ?that whose nature it is to be required or demanded?. The notion of unconditional or categorical obligation, together with the assumption that there is a (...) dichotomy between considerations of what is the case and what ought to be the case, however widespread and entrenched this notion and assumption might be, are logically confused. But to demonstrate this logical confusion is not the only task confronting ethical theory. Another, and often neglected task, is to draw attention to the ethical origins of this confusion in a particular way of life. Hegel's distinction between Moralität (Moral Life) and Sittlichkeit (Ethical Life) is of critical importance here. The obstacle to the development of ethical theory, then, is not some abstract ?logical confusion?, but is, rather, the way of life (Moral Life) of which this confusion is a natural expression. (shrink)

O homem contemporâneo vive um mundo de incertezas, onde muitos dos antigos paradigmas que o senso comum considerava como absolutos se desmoronam com incrível velocidade. Esta volatilidade de sentidos é observada com ampla nitidez na busca do sagrado: as religiões tradicionais são deixadas de lado ou misturadas a práticas esotéricas, místicas e ocultas, tentativa humana de explorar o mundo através de um enfoque holístico, que reimprima na vida a magia outrora perdida. Neste contexto de construção de uma nova realidade, a (...) percepção e manifestação do sagrado não desaparecem, mas, seguindo a mentalidade de seu tempo, transformam-se. A religiosidade assume um caráter individualista, imediatista e descompromissado, restaurando conceitos e práticas da antigüidade, em uma tentativa clara de reencantamento do mundo, agora sob a perspectiva da sociedade globalizada. Filosofias orientais invadem a dimensão religiosa do mundo ocidental, numa mistura explicitamente paradoxal. Deste epicentro nasce a cultura da Nova Era, movimento que busca restaurar a tradição sagrada do homem postulando um saber místico, pretendendo conectar o ser humano ao transcendente partindo não de instituições específicas, mas de conhecimentos e práticas do esoterismo, ocultismo e magia. Palavras-chave: Nova Era; Subjetivismo; Consumismo. ABSTRACT Contemporary man lives in a world of uncertainties, where many of the old paradigms that common sense used to consider absolute are falling apart with incredible speed. Such volatility of senses is clearly noticed in the search for the sacred: traditional religions are left behind or mingled with esoteric, mystical and occult practices, in a human attempt to explore the world from a holistic viewpoint capable of rescuing life’s lost magic. In that context of construction of a new reality, the perception and manifestation of the sacred do not disappear; they rather change, following the mentality of the times. Religion assumes an individualistic, immediate and uncommitted feature, restoring old concepts and practices, in an attempt to render the world enchanted once more, now in the perspective of globalized society. Oriental philosophies invade the religion scope of the Western world, in an explicitly paradoxical blend. From that epicenter is born the New Age culture, a movement that tries to restore human sacred tradition by postulating a mystical dimension and connecting man to the transcendent, not through specific institutions, but through the knowledge and practice of esoterism, occultism and magic. Key words: New age; Subjectivism; Consumerism. (shrink)

O presente artigo consiste em uma leitura do capítulo "Sobre versos de Virgílio". A primeira parte compara o amor com a amizade, questionando a tese de que a superioridade da última em relação ao primeiro é afirmada sem reservas por Montaigne. A segunda parte desenvolve uma interpretação do capítulo guiada pelas noções de "regra", "lei", "norma" e seus correlatos e identifica, a partir das diferentes perspectivas com que Montaigne aborda o assunto, três tipos de "regra": as regras dos homens, as (...) do amor e as do próprio autor dos Ensaios. Pretendemos mostrar que, embora fale muito das mulheres, o capítulo é, sobretudo, uma reflexão sobre a condição masculina. This paper presents a reading on the chapter "Upon some verses of Virgil". Its first part compares love and friendship and questions the thesis that for Montaigne the latter is superior to the former. The second part consists of an interpretation of the chapter guided by the notions of "rule", "law", "norm" and their correlates, and identifies, taking into account the different perspectives in which Montaigne develops the matter, three different kinds of rules - those of men, those of love and those of the Essays' author himself. It intends to show that, although "Upon some verses of Virgil" is a chapter that speaks much about women, it is mainly a reflexion about men and the masculine condition. (shrink)